Neelima Srivastava v. the State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
KRISHNA MURARI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated
07.05.2018 passed by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’) allowing the Special Appeal
filed by the State-Respondent and setting aside the judgment and order
dated 15.05.2014 passed in Writ Petition filed by the appellant herein.
3. The appellant is a Post Graduate from Kanpur University and
also holds the certificate of Sangit Prabhakar and Senior Diploma from
the Prayag Sangit Samiti, Allahabad. On 23.07.1984, she was appointed
as Assistant Music Teacher in Government Inter College, Mahmoodabad,
District Sitapur on a leave vacancy as the regular incum bent went on
leave without pay. The terms of the appointment order specified that the
appointment was temporary and meant to last till the permanent incumbent
173
rejoined the service. The educational qualifications of the appel lant
satisfied the requirements prescribed under the relevant se rvice rules.
Vide letter dated 16.05.1986, the terms of the appointment order dated
23.07.1984 was modified by providing that the appointment was to last
till the regular incumbent joined back or 20.05.1986, whichever was earlier.
4. Aggrieved by the said modification in the terms of appointment,
the appellant filed a Writ Petition No. 3316 (SS) of 1986 before the High
Court challenging the modified terms of the appointment. On 19.05.1986,
the management of the College issued another order dispensing with the
services of the appellant w.e.f. 20.05.1986.
5. A learned Single Judge vide order dated 20.05.1986 while issuing
notice to the respondents stayed the operation of t he order dated
16.05.1986 modifying the terms of the appointment order. It was further
provided that the interim order shall automatically lapse on return of the
permanent incumbent Smt. Safia Khatoon.
6. It so happened that Smt. Safia Khatoon did not rejoin the service,
as a result her services were terminated vide order dated 16.01.1988. It
is undisputed fact that the respondents never undertook any ste ps for
filling up the post and the appellant was continued on the said post without
any interruption till 2020.
7. On 17.08.2001, the State of Uttar Pradesh Promulgated the
UP Secondary Education Department Regularization of Ad hoc
appointments on the Post of Trained Graduate Teachers Rules, 2001
(for short known as ‘Regularization Rules, 2001). On 02.11.2001, the
appellant made a representation to the authorities seeking regularization
in accordance with the said Rules. When no action was taken on a
representation for a substantial period of time, she approached the High
Court again by filing Writ Petition No. 7890 (SS) of 2003. This Writ
Petition came to be clubbed with the earlier Writ Petition No. 3316 (SS)
of 1986 filed by the appellant and were heard together and disposed of
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by making followin g
observations :-
“After hearing learned counsel for the parties and p erusing
the record, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner has mor e
than 21 years experience working as Assistant Teacher Music ,
LT Grade in the Government Inter Collge, Mahmoodaba d,
Sitapur. As per documents placed on record, she is having all
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
requisite educational qualification as required in the
Intermediate Education Act. She might have been appoint ed
in a leave arrangement but by virtue of his (sic her) continuous
satisfactory services, she has now acquired a right to hold
the post and continue in the institution, and at this s tage, it
would not be appropriate to treat her as an appointee in stop-
gap arrangement.”
8. The operative portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-
“In view of above, the Writ Petitions are allowed. The
consequences shall follow. The petitioner shall be allowed to
continue on the post, held by her. Her case shall be consi dered
for regularization under the relevant regularization Rules and
appropriate orders shall be passed within three months f rom
the date of presentation of a certified copy of the judgment
and order.”
9. It is pertinent to point out at this stage that the aforesaid common
judgment rendered in the two Writ Petitions filed by the appellant attained
finality as it was not put to challenge before any higher forum.
10. Vide order dated 29.01.2007, the Joint Director of Education
considered the case of the petitioner (appellant herein) a nd despite
observations contained in the judgment of the learned Single Judge
rejected her claim for regularization. Her claim for regul arization was
mainly rejected on the ground that since her initial appointment was on
leave vacancy for which there was no provision under the 2001 Rules,
as such she cannot be held to be entitled to the benefit confer red by
Regularization Rules, 2001.
11. This order was again put to challenge by the appellant by filing
yet another Writ Petition No. 8597 of 2010. After hearing learned counsel
for the parties, learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated
15.05.2014 allowed the same on the following reasonings :-
i. Petitioner has been working since 23.07.1984 and in the earlier
round of litigation, the High Court had held her entitled to
hold the post. The judgment dated 23.01.2006 had become
final and was unchallenged.
ii. Regularization Rules, 2001 were applicable to the petitio ner.
The earlier judgment had found petitioner to be entitled to
175
hold the post. Respondents’ refusal to apply the Regularization
Rules, 2001 was accordingly unlawful.
iii. A quietus needs to be given to long drawn litigation and the
petitioner is entitled for regularization.
12. The learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the Constitution
Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Rudra Kumar Sain and
Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. 1 and in particular the following
observations made in paragraph 20 of the said Constitutio n Bench
Judgment :-
“In the service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite
qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is
appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate
authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then
such an appointment cannot be held to be ‘stopgap or fortuitous
or purely ad hoc’.”
13. The learned Single Judge found that the appellant has been
teaching since 23.07.1984 and in an earlier judgment, the High Court
has already held her appointment not being a stopgap arrangement and
further she has a right to the post which has attained finality having not
been challenged the Regularization Rules, 2001 are applicable to such
cases and refusal to give benefit of the said Rules is not lawful exercise
of the power by Joint Director and since no regular appointment has
been made, she is fully eligible and qualified to be appointed as such.
14. Vide order dated 31.10.2015, in terms of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 15.05.2014, the respondent regularized the
services of the appellant and simultaneously also filed a Special Appeal
before a Division Bench.
15. Vide order dated 07.05.2018, impugned in this appeal the
Division Bench allowed the Special Appeal preferred by the respondents
herein and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Division
Bench was of the view that since the appellant herein was appointed in
leave vacancy on 23.07.1984 and her services came to an end on
20.05.1986 and she continued on the post on the basis of the interim
order passed by the High Court in earlier round of litigat ion and her
appointment is litigious appointment and thus she has no enforceab le
right to hold this post legally in her favour.
1 (2000) 8 SCC 25
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
16. Heard Shri Nikhil Goel, learned counsel for the appellant and
Shri Harish Pandey, learned counsel for the State-Respondent. We have
also gone through the impugned judgment as also the record of the case
with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties.
17. The Special Appeal filed by the State was allowe d by the
Division Bench of the High Court mainly on the reasoning that the
petitioner (appellant herein) was employed on a temporary basis against
the leave vacancy and since the Service Rules, 1983 did not permit any
appointment on leave vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner (appellant
herein) was illegal appointment of ‘stop-gap nature’. Ana lyzing the
Regularization Rules, 2001 the Division Bench found that there was no
provision for regularization of an appointment made against the leave
vacancy.
18. Relying upon the observations made by this Court in the case
of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi & Ors.2 wherein
it was held that since the initial appointment of the petitioner (appellant
herein) was dehors the Rules and thus was illegal and her appointment
was litigious appointment and she continued on the strength of an interim
order passed by the High Court on 20.05.1986, she was not entitled for
regularization.
19. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Umadevi
(3) has held that a temporary, contractual, casual or a daily-wage
employee does not have a legal right to be made permanent unless the
appointment has been made in accordance with the terms of the relevant
service rules governing the said appointment and in adherence of Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court however made one exception
to the above by observing in paragraph 53 of the reports as under :-
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where
irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in
S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071], R.N.
Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N.
Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3
SCR 937] and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified
persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made
and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more
but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunal s.
2 (2006) 4 SCC 1
177
The question of regularization of the services of such employees
may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles
settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light
of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the Stat e
Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to
regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly
appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly
sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of
tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are
undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be
filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers
are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within
six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if
any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based
on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the
constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent,
those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”
20. The above quoted paragraph 53 from the pronouncement in
the case of Umadevi(3) has carved out an exception to the general
principles against ‘regularization’ in case, the following conditions are
fulfilled :
i. The incumbent should have worked for 10 years or more on a
duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the
interim order of any Court or Tribunal.
ii. The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even
if irregular.
21. Applying the above tests laid down in the judgment of Umadevi
(3), carving an exception to the general principles against ‘regularization’,
the Division Bench of the High Court has held that since the appointment
of the appellant was dehors the rules and without undergoing the process
of open competitive selection, as such the same is illegal and since she
continued in service under the cover of the order passed by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, her appointment is litigious and thus is
not covered by exception carved out in the case of Umadevi(3).
22. Referring to the observations made in the case of Umadevi
(3) paragraph 53 quoted herein above, this Court in the case of State of
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
Karnataka & Ors. vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors.3 has laid down the conditions
to test when the appointment will be considered illegal and when it shall
be considered to be irregular. It may be relevant to extract paragraph 7
from the said report, which reads as under:-
“It is evident from the above that there is an exception to t he
general principles against `regularization’ enunciated in Umadevi,
if the following conditions are fulfilled :
(i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or
more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of
the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, t he
State Government or its instrumentality should have employed
the employee and continued him in service voluntaril y and
continuously for more than ten years.
(ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even
if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continue d
against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not
possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments
will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed
possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against
sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the
process of open competitive selection, such appointments are
considered to be irregular.”
23. In the case of the appellant, it is undisputed that she was
appointed by the Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, who is the
prescribed appointing authority under the Uttar Pradesh Subordina te
Educational (Trained Graduates Grade) Service Rules, 1983. Equal ly
undisputed is the fact that she was appointed on a sanctioned post and
possessed all the necessary prescribed qualifications under 1983, Rules.
24. Applying the tests laid down in State of Karnataka & Ors.
Vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors. (Supra) the appointment of the appellant can
only be construed as irregular and not illegal. The finding recorded by
the Division Bench of the High Court in respect of n ature of the
appointment of the appellant being illegal is thus not liable to be sustained.
Her rejection of the claim for regularization on the ground of her
appointment being illegal by the impugned order is patently erroneous.
The other condition of having worked for 10 years or more also stands
3 (2010) 9 SCC 247
179
fully satisfied as the appellant at the time of consid eration of her
regularization had completed almost 23 years of service.
25. The only question which now requires consideration is whether
her continuation on the post on the strength of the interim order passed
by the High Court would dis-entitle her from regularization in view of
the dictum in the case of Umadevi(3).
26. Writ Petition No. 3316 (SS) of 1986 filed by the appella nt
before the High Court challenging the modification in the terms of her
appointment was stayed vide order dated 20.05.1986 during the pendency
of this Writ Petition before the High Court. She again appro ached the
High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 7890 of 2003 challenging the order
passed by the Joint Director of Education rejecting her claim of
regularization. The two pending Writ Petitions were clubbed by the High
Court and disposed of vide common judgment and order dated 23.01.2006
with the finding that the appellant is having all the requisite qualification
and has worked for 21 years and she might have been appointed in a
leave arrangement but by virtue of her satisfactory servi ces, she has
now acquired a Right to hold the post and continued in the institution and
at this stage, it would not be appropriate to treat her as an appointee in a
stop-gap arrangement and accordingly directed the State-respondent to
consider for regularization under the relevant Regularization Rules.
27. This Judgment attained finality inter-se between the parties
as admittedly the State-respondent did not put the same to c hallenge
before any higher forum. The aforesaid judgment which attained finality
crystallized the right of the appellant for regularization. When the same
was refused by the Joint Director of Education, it was again challenged
by filing Writ Petition No. 8597 of 2010. A learned Single Judge vide
order dated 15.05.2014 allowed the Writ Petition with the finding that in
the earlier round of litigation, the High Court had held that she was
entitled to hold the post and since the said judgment become final and
unchallenged, the Regularization Rules, 2001 were applicable and refusal
to apply the said Rules was unlawful.
28. Admittedly, when the judgment dated 23.01.2006 was passed
by the High Court in the earlier two Writ Petitions filed by the appellant,
the dictum of Umadevi (3) was not even in existence as the said judgment
was rendered subsequently on 10.04.2006.
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
29. The Division Bench of the High Court has errone ously
understood the dictum of this Court in Umadevi (3). The Constitution
Bench has nowhere directed that service matters that stand c oncluded
inter partes, ought to be re-opened. On the contrary, in paragraph 54
of the said decision, the Constitution Bench clarified as under:-
“It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the
principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running
counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their
status as precedents.”
30. It becomes absolutely clear from the above clarification that
earlier decisions running counter to the principles settled in the decision
of Umadevi (3) will not be treated as precedents. It cannot mean that
the judgment of a competent Court delivered prior to the decisi on in
Umadevi (3) and which has attained finality and is binding inter se
between the parties need not be implemented. Mere over-ruling of the
principles, on which the earlier judgment was passed, by a subsequent
judgment of higher forum will not have the effect of uprooting the final
adjudication between the parties and set it at naught. There is a distinction
between over-ruling a principle and reversal of the j udgment. The
judgment in question itself has to be assailed and got rid of in a manner
known to or recognized by law. Mere over-ruling of the principles by a
subsequent judgment will not dilute the binding effect of the decision on
inter-parties.
31. In an identical situation, this Court in Civil Appeal No. 4443 of
2021 with Civil Appeal Nos. 4444 & 4445 of 2021 decided on 26.07.2021
(Vice Chancellor Anand Agriculture University vs. Ka nubhai
Nanubhai Vaghela and Anr.) has rejected the argument advanced by
the appellant in the said case that the judgment of this Court dated
18.01.2001 in Gujarat Agricultural University vs. Rathod Labhu
Bechar & Ors. 4does not survive after the judgment of this Court in
Umadevi(3). It was held in paragraph 11 as under:-
“11. We have heard Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for
the university and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for t he
respondents. The main contention of the university is that after
the judgment of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and
Ors. vs. Umadevi and Ors. 2, the respondents are not entitled for
4 (2001) 3 SCC 574
181
regularization as there are no sanctioned posts available. Another
submission made on behalf of the appellant is that the judgment of
this Court dated 18.01.2001 in Gujarat Agricultural University
(supra) does not survive after the judgment of this Court in
Umadevi. It is no doubt true that in Umadevi’s case, it has been
held that regularization as a one-time measure can only be in
respect of those who were irregularly appointed and have worked
for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned posts. However, in the
instant case the respondents are covered by the judgment of this
Court in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra). This Court
approved the proposed scheme of the State of Gujarat and directed
regularization of all those daily wagers who were eligible in
accordance with the scheme phase-wise. The right to be
regularized in accordance with the scheme continues till all the
eligible daily-wagers are absorbed. Creation of additional posts
for absorption was staggered by this Court permitting the appellant
and the State of Gujarat to implement the scheme phase -wise.
We are not impressed with the submissions made on behalf of the
university that the judgment of this Court in Umadevi’s c ase
overruled the judgment in Gujarat Agricultural University (supra).
The judgment of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural Universit y
(supra) inter partes has become final and is binding on the
university. Even according to Para 54 of Umadevi’s case, any
judgment which is contrary to the principles settled in Umadevi
shall be denuded of status as precedent. This observation at Para
54 in Uma Devi’s case does not absolve the university of its duty
to comply with the directions of this Court in Gujarat Agricultural
University (Supra).”
32. The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded as if it was
hearing an appeal against the judgment dated 23.01.2006 of the learned
Single Judge which had already attained finality. Appeal filed under the
Rules of the Court was filed against the judgment dated 15.05.2014
rendered in Writ Petition No. 8597 of 2010. It is a well settled principle
of law that a Letters Patent Appeal which is in continuation of a Writ
Petition cannot be filed collaterally to set aside the judgment of the same
High Court rendered in an earlier round of litigation ignoring the principles
of res-judicata and doctrine of finality.
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]
33.By a majority decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors.
vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.5has laid down the law in this regard
as under:-
“When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for hi s
adjudication, he first decides questions, of fact on which the parties
are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the s aid facts.
Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are rig ht or
wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers
from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party
aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before
the appellate Court.”
34. In Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra & Anr. 6, while
dealing with an identical issue this Court held that reconsideration of the
judgment of this Court which has attained finality is no t normally
permissible. The decision upon a question of law rendered by this Court
was conclusive and would bind the Court in subsequent cases. The Court
cannot sit in appeal against its own judgment.
35. In Union of India & Ors. vs. Major S.P. Sharma & Ors. 7,
a three-judge bench of this Court has held as under:-
“A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be challenged
in collateral proceedings for the reason that if it is permitted to do
so there would be “confusion and chaos and the fina lity of
proceedings would cease to have any meaning.”
36. Thus, it is very well settled that it is not permissi ble for the
parties to re-open the concluded judgments of the Court as the same
may not only tantamount to an abuse of the process of the Cour t but
would have far reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice.
37. It is undisputed that in compliance of the judgment of the
learned Single Judge dated 15.05.2014 vide order dated 31.10.2015
respondents regularized the services of appellant subject to the outcome
of the proceedings in the LPA and the appellant now stand superannuated
having attained the age of superannuation after about 33 years of
continuous service.
5 1967 AIR SC 1
6 (1999) 2 SCC 103
7 (2014) 6 SCC 351
183
38. In the end, a feeble attempt was made by the learned counsel
for the State-respondent to persuade us not to interfere in the matter on
the ground that the services of the appellant were terminated vide letter
dated 19.05.1986 which was never challenged as such her services stood
terminated. We are not ready to accept the proposition ca nvased by
learned counsel for the respondent at this stage for the simpl e reason
that it was open for the State to have advanced this conte ntion before
the learned Single Judge in the two Writ Petitions decided vide judgment
and order dated 23.01.2006. Once this argument was never made
before the learned Single Judge in the proceedings which has attained
finality, the respondent cannot be permitted to raise this argument in this
appeal.
39. Analyzing the entire facts of the case and upon consideration
of the matter and settled legal position, we are of the considered view
that the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of High Court
is not liable to be sustained and is hereby set aside. The appeal, accordingly,
stands allowed. The appellant is held entitled to be regularized with all
consequential benefits which may be extended to her within a period of
three months from today.
40. In the facts and circumstances, we, however, do not make
any order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
NEELIMA SRIVASTAVA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]