S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. v. Narayana Reddy and Others
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals are directed against a common judgment
and order dated 29th April, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, all owing the
review petitions filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein (IA No.2 of
2014 in Revision CRPMP No. 6377 of 2014 moved in and Civil Revision
Petition No.2786 of 2013 and IA No.1 of 2014 in Revision CRMP No.4997
/2014 moved in and Civil Revision Petition No.2787 /2013). As a result
of allowing the review petitions, the common judgment and order dated
09th July, 2013 passed by the predecessor Bench upholding the common
order dated 23 rd March, 2013 in Cases No. F1/3/2005 and F1/4/2005
passed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, has been set aside and as
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS
a sequel thereto, the orders dated 31st March, 1967 passe d by the
Tahsildar, Shadnagar, accepting the surrender of protected tenancy rights
by the ancestors of the appellant have been confirmed.
3. The appeals have a chequered history that dates back t o the
year 1967. The facts relevant for deciding the present ap peals are as
follows:-
3.1 Late Shri Chandra Reddy and late Shri Chenna Reddy, both
sons of Buchi Reddy, were protected tenants in respect of separate
parcels of land situated in different survey numbers of Kamm adanam
Village, Shadnagar Mandal, Mahabubnagar District 1. The recorded
landlord of the protected tenants was late Venkat Anantha Reddy, who
was the Karta of a joint family comprising of himself and his brother,
late Laxma Reddy. On the basis of an oral partition of the land that took
place between the two brothers, the subject land fell to the share of late
L. Harshavardhan Reddy (respondent No.6), son of late Laxma Reddy.
Pertinently, L. Harshavardhan Reddy expired during the pendency of
the review petitions and L. Sameera Reddy was brought on re cord as
his legal heir. As per the respondents, late Shri Chandr a Reddy, who
was a protected tenant in respect of the subject land measuring 57 acres
and 16 guntas, had surrendered his protected tenancy rights on submitting
a written application dated 6th August, 1966 to the Tehsildar. A similar
application was submitted by the three legal heirs of Late Chenna Reddy
(Ram Reddy, Chandra Reddy and Laxma Reddy) in respect of land
measuring 98 acres 18 guntas. The respondents claim that on receiving
the said applications, the Tehsildar, Shadnagar, recorded the statements
of the applicants and after confirming the identity of the parties, issued a
public notice and thereafter, accepted the surrender on sati sfying the
requirements prescribed in the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 19502. After accepting the surrender applications,
the names of the protected tenants were struck off from the final records
of tenancy, vide order dated 31 st March, 1967.
3.2 It is also the version of the respondents that the prot ected
tenants had surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of lat e Venkat
Anantha Reddy pursuant to an understanding that the latter would n ot
oppose the 38-B Certificate issued by the Tenancy Tribunal in favour of
Chandra Reddy and the sons of late Chenna Reddy in respect of the
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘subject land’
2 For short ‘Act’
49
parcel of land measuring 85 acres 23 guntas situated in Kammadanam
Village. In other words, there was a reciprocity between t he protected
tenants and the landlord based on which, the landlord relinquished his
rights in respect of land measuring 85 acrs 23 guntas in exchange of the
surrender of the subject land by Chandra Reddy and the l egal heirs of
late Chenna Reddy.
3.3 On the other hand, the appellant, who is the legal heir of the
original tenants, claims that his ancestors were dispos sessed from the
subject land in the year 1975 when they were trying to obtain 38-E
Certificate from the authorities. Only in the year 2001 when the legal
heirs of the protected tenants had applied for the final record of tenancy,
did they discover that the names of the protected tenants had been struck
off on the basis of the purported surrender proceedings conducted by
the Tehsildar in the year 1967. Challenging the said surrender proceedings,
the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant being the protected tenants,
preferred appeals before the Joint Collector in February, 2002 along
with an application seeking condonation of delay. The said appeals were
allowed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, being the Ap pellate
Authority, vide order dated 2nd April, 2005. Aggrieved by the said order,
the respondents approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh3 raising
a plea that it was an ex-parte order and filed two Civil Revision Petitions
(CRP No. 4620/2005 and CRP No. 4988/2005), which were allowed,
vide order dated 19th September, 2006 and the matters were remanded
back for fresh disposal. On a re-hearing, the Appellate Authority passed
an order on 23rd March, 2013 whereby, the order dated 31st March, 1967
passed by the Tehsildar, Shadnagar accepting the surr ender of the
protected tenancy rights by the ancestors of the appellant, was set aside
and the original entries in respect of the land in the final record of tenancy
as existing prior to 1967, were restored.
3.4 Dissatisfied by the order dated 23 rd March, 2013, the
respondents once again approached the High Court by filing two Civil
Revision Petitions (CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP No.2787/2013), which
came to be dismissed by a common judgment and order dated 09th July,
2013. The review petitions subsequently filed by the responde nts for
seeking review of the aforesaid judgment (Rev. CRMP No.5443/2013
in Civil Revision Petition No. 2786/2013 and Rev. CRMP No. 5432/
2013 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2787/2013) were also dismissed, vide
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
3 For short ‘High Court’
order dated 20th February, 2014. The common judgment and order dated
9th July, 2013 and the order dated 20th February, 2014 were assailed by
the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Special Leave Petitions (C) CC No.
8209- 8210/ 2014 that were disposed of with the following order passed
on 4th July, 2014:
“Delay condoned.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he would be
in a position to file genuine documents to show that there w as
surrender of tenancy. If he will be able to obtain such documents,
it is open to him to file a review before the High Court. The special
leave petitions are disposed of accordingly.”
3.5 Armed with the above order, the respondents No. 1 to 6 again
approached the High Court and filed a second round of review applications
seeking review of the common order and judgment dated 9th July, 2013
which have been allowed by the impugned order. The learned Sin gle
Judge has upheld the surrender order dated 31st March, 1967 passed by
the Tehsildar, Shadnagar whereby the names of the protected te nants
(predecessors-in-interest of the appellants) were deleted from the final
records of tenancy.
4. Arguing for the appellant, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned
Senior Advocate has contended that the review petitions filed by the
respondents No. 1 to 6 are not maintainable as they do not satisfy any of
the conditions for review provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 19084. He submitted that the grounds taken in the second
set of review petitions were akin to those taken in the first set of review
petitions and once the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the
High Court, vide order dated 20th February, 2014 and no new grounds
were taken by the respondents No.1 to 6 subsequently, there wa s no
occasion to allow the second set of review petitions; that the respondents
No. 1 to 6 did not take a plea that the documents subsequently filed by
them, were not in their knowledge when they had filed the civil revision
petitions and the first set of review petitions before the High Court for
attracting the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Stating that the
scope of review is very limited and a review applicati on can only be
entertained if there is any error apparent on the face of the record,
which the respondents No. 1 to 6 have failed to point out in the instant
4 For short ‘CPC’
51
case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court ought to
have dismissed the same outright. It was argued that by virtue of the
impugned order, the High Court has virtually treated the review petitions
filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6 as independent appeals, which i s
impermissible. To buttress the aforesaid submissions made on the limited
ambit and scope of a review petition and the bar on filing successive
review petitions, the decisions of this Court in Babboo Alias Kalyandas
and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 and Lilly Thomas and Others
v. Union of India and Others 6 have been cited.
5. Another plea sought to be taken on behalf of the appellant is
that the name of the father of the protected tenants, Chandra Reddy and
Chenna Reddy has been stated to be Papi Reddy in the surrender
proceedings whereas, his correct name is Buchi Reddy which goes to
show that the surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar were
fabricated and the fact of the matter is that neither the appellant, nor his
ancestors had ever surrendered the tenancy rights in favo ur of the
respondents/their ancestors/ predecessors- in-interest. It was contended
that this fact is borne out from the declaration made by the landlord in
the ceiling proceedings where he had admitted that 38-E Certi ficate
was granted in respect of the subject land and the tena nts were in
possession thereof. It was canvassed that the High Court has failed to
appreciate that had surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour
of the landlord actually taken place in the year 1967, as allege d, there
was no occasion for the landlord to have later on claimed exemption of
these lands for being computed as part of his holdings under the Andhra
Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 19737.
6. The aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant
have been vehemently contested by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the respondents. It was submitt ed that the
surrender proceedings had attained finality in the year 1967 a nd after
maintaining silence for almost 35 years, the legal heirs of the protected
tenants, had filed a misconceived appeal under Section 90(1) of the Land
Ceiling Act. Pertinently, the respondents being the purchasers of the
subject land, were not made parties in the said proceedings and the
Appellate Authority had proceeded to pass an order dated 2nd A pril,
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
5 (1979) 4 SCC 74
6 (2000) 6 SCC 224
7 For short ‘the Land Ceiling Act’
2005 allowing the said appeals behind their back. Aggrieved by the said
ex parte order, when the respondents approached the High Court, the
matters were remanded back to the Appellate Authori ty for fresh
adjudication. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals, once again
compelling the respondents to approach the High Court by filing fresh
appeals which were knocked off vide order dated 09 th July, 2013 and
their review petitions were also dismissed on 20th February, 2014. Against
the said dismissal orders, the respondents had to approach thi s Court.
The petitions for special leave to appeal preferred by them were disposed
of vide order dated 4th July, 2014 that has been extracted in para 5
hereinabove.
7. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in the light of t he
permission granted by this Court, the respondents had filed review petitions
in the Civil Revision Petitions before the High Court after obtaining
certified copies of the relevant documents forming a part of the revenue
records. Only after considering the said documents did the learned Single
Judge allow the review petitions for cogent and valid reasons that do not
deserve any interference. It has been canvassed on behalf of the
respondents that the legal heirs of the protected tenant had knowledg e
about the surrender of the subject land right from the year 1967 to 2001
and they were also aware of the fact that the names of t heir ancestors
were not reflected in the protected tenants register. The real position is
that the ancestors of the appellant were never in possession of the subject
land after 1967. Despite that, they had approached the Appellate Authority
challenging the surrender proceedings after a passage of 35 years.
Contending that said appeals were highly belated and deserved t o be
thrown out on the ground of limitation alone without going into the merits,
the decisions in Sakuru v. Tanaji8 and Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop.
Milk Products Societies Union Limited 9 have been cited. It has been
urged that the appeals preferred by the ancestors of the appellant were
not maintainable, being patently barred by limitation which aspect has
been gone into by the High Court while passing the impugned judgment
allowing the review petitions filed by the respondents.
8. As for the mis-description of the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellant, it was submitted that Buchi Reddy was also known Papi Reddy
in the village which fact is reflected from the revenue records, namely,
8 (1985) 3 SCC 590
9 (2007) 9 SCC 109
53
Faisal Patti record of the village, as recorded by the Patwari. Counsel
for the respondents also sought to negate the ground taken by the other
side with reference to the landlord claiming exemption under t he land
ceiling proceedings on the ground that Land Reforms Tribunal did not
accept such a plea of exemption. It was thus submitted that surrender of
the tenancy rights had attained finality in the year 1967 its elf and the
appellant and his ancestors have reopened settled issues af ter passage
of 35 years reckoned from the date of surrender only for the reason that
the price of the subject land, which is situated close to the International
Airport at Shamshabad, have escalated and he wants to encash the
same.
9. This Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment and
the orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the records
and given its thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for consideration
in these appeals is whether the respondents/review petitioners had made
out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated 23rd March, 2013
by satisfying the criteria for entertaining a second set of review petitions,
having failed to succeed in the first set of review petitions.
10. The core argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that
the High Court ought not to have entertained successive review petitions
filed by the respondents when they could not demonstrate emergence of
any new facts or point out any error apparent on the face of the record,
for allowing the review applications, must be put to test by examining
the relevant provisions of law that governs review jurisdiction.
11. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision,
deals with the scope of review and states as follows:
“Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself
aggrieved:-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this
Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this
Code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes ,
may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the
decree or made the order, and the court may make such order
thereon as it thinks fit.”
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
12. The grounds available for filing a review application against a
judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following
words:
“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decre e or
order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a
reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient
reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order
made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order ma y
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of
an appeal by some other party except where the ground of suc h
appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,
being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case
on which he applies for the review.
1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on a question of law on
which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]’’
13. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear tha t a
review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and
important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due di ligence,
were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced
by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for
any other sufficient reason.
14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others10,
this Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done
10 1980 Supp SCC 562
55
unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on
the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine
its soundness. The observations made are as under:
“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved t o
hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has
been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier
order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of
the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib 11
this Court observed :
‘A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission o r
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlie r
by judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not a virg in
ground but review of an earlier order which has the
normal feature of finality.’ ’’
(emphasis added)
15. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others 12,
stating that an error that is not self- evident and the one thathas to be
detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error
apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers
of review, this Court held as under:
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to b e strictly
confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. 13 this Court
opined:
‘11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether
the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error
apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the
earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts
that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be
conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
11 (1975) 1 SCC 674
12 (1997) 8 SCC 715
13 1964 SCR (5) 174
follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the
record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it
might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is
by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but li es
only for patent error.’
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury 14
while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma 15 this Court once again held
that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to
be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error appare nt
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-e vident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the face of the recor d
justifying the court to exercise its power of review unde r
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction und er
Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an errone ous
decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petit ion,
it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’”.
[emphasis added ]
16. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the
face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. W hile
discussing the scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers theSupreme
Court to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours
of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in Lily
Thomas (supra), this Court held as under :
“54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments
subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any
rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Suprem e
14 (1995) 1 SCC 170
15 (1979) 4 SCC 389
57
Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of
the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of
the grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides:
“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the recor d,
or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of
the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or
made the order.’
Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review
lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the
record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court
Rules provides that after an application for review has been
disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same
matter.
XXX XXX XXX
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be
exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substit ute
a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of
the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review
cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The m ere
possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for
review. Once a review petition is dismissed no furt her
petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of
following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches
and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinate d
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.
However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that
the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental
rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can
take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.
XXX XXX XXX
58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of
the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvas sed
before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal case 16. It is not the case of the
petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter
which after the exercise of due diligence was not within thei r
knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at
the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised bef ore us
were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before
the Bench which, after considering those pleas, pas sed the
judgment in Sarla Mudgal16 case. We have also not found any
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a
review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such
which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error
which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error
of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the
judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment
interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the
fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for
reviewing the judgment. The words “any-other sufficient
reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC” must mean “a
reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram v. Neki
Ram17 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius 18. Error
apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is
16 (1995) 3 SCC 635, Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India and
Others
17 AIR 1922 PC 112
18 1955 SCR 520
59
based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of
law. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa 19 this Court held that
such error is an error which is a patent error and n ot a
mere wrong decision . In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad 20, it
was held:
“It is essential that it should be something more than a
mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on
the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to
this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the
principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case.
When does an error, cease to be mere error and become an
error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on
either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which
the boundary between the two classes of errors could be
demarcated.
Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the
strength of certain observations of Chagla, CJ in – ‘Batuk K
Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality ’21, that no error could
be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was n ot
self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to
establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision
in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in whi ch
even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also
differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as
self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact
is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record
cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being
an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nat ure,
and it must be left to be determined judicially on the
facts of each case.
Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have n ot
made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with
Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1
CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case 16.
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
19 1955 SCR 250
20 AIR 1955 SC 233
21 ILR 1953 Bom 191
The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.”
(emphasis added)
17. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the
Court cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion
even if two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity
Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others22,
this Court observed as follows:
“10. ....In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusi on,
even if that is possible . Learned counsel for the Board at best
sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between
the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court.
We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be
advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence
on record is fully within the domain of the appellate cour t.
If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the co urt
records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that
conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it
is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the
record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been
contended before us that there is any error apparent on the f ace
of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a
question of appreciation of evidence would amount t o
converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.”
(emphasis added)
18. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot b e
permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for r eopening the
conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be
confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to
correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This p oint has been
elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.23where
it was held thus:
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned,
the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting th at
22 (2005) 6 SCC 651
23 (2006) 5 SCC 501
61
virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought
at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negat ived.
Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition wou ld
lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter . It is
settled law that the power of review cannot be confu sed
with appellate power which enables a superior court to
correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is
not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and
overruled argument is not enough to reopen conclude d
adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with
extreme care, caution and circumspection and only i n
exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein
had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard
and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect
method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion,
is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermiss ible
and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”
(emphasis added)
19. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others 24, this Court observed that
review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit
of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in
the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties
are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only becaus e an
alternative view is possible. The principles for exe rcising review
jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review
are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of
the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
24 (2013) 8 SCC 320
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in
Chajju Ram vs. Neki 17, and approved by this Court in Moran
Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius & Ors.18 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles
have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese
& Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors .25,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to
reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original
hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest
on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent
error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a
ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the
record should not be an error which has to be fished out and
searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced
in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at
the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
20. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma15,
this Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissioner
who was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of the
appellant, while deciding a review application filed by the respondents
25 (2013) 8 SCC 337
63
therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court had overl ooked
two important documents that showed that the respondents wer e in
possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought
easementary rights to access his home-stead. The said appeal was allowed
by this Court with the following observations:
“3 …It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and
Others v. State of Punjab26 there is nothing in Article 226 of the
Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power
of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to
prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulp able
errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise
of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised
on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not with in
the knowledge of the person seeking the review or co uld
not be produced by him at the time when the order w as
made; it may be exercised where some mistake or err or
apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not b e
exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneou s
on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal .
A power of review is not to be confused with appell ate
power which may enable an appellate court to correct all
manner of errors committed by the subordinate court .”
(emphasis added)
21. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta
and Another 27, this Court emphasized the requirement of the review
petitioner who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new
matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not wi thin his
knowledge and held thus:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is
sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence,
such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of s uch a
character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered
the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
26 (1979) 4 SCC 389
27 (2008) 8 SCC 612
important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for
review ex debito justitiae . Not only this, the party seeking
review has also to show that such additional matter or
evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the
exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced
before the court earlier.”
(emphasis added)
22. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’
has been discussed in the following words:
“22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se f rom
the record of the case and does not require detaile d
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection
thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cann ot
be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record f or the
purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act.
To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot
be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law o r on
the ground that a different view could have been taken by
the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while
exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned
cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision ”.
(emphasis added)
23. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka and
Another28, this Court explained as to when a review jurisdiction could
be treated as statutory or inherent and held thus :
“18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the
rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.
The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of
stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in
Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before
justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the
higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court
finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would
28 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595
65
not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erro neous
assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpet ration
shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any
principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mist ake
is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Differe nce
lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectific ation,
depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which
the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either
statutory or inherent. The latter is available wher e the
mistake is of the Court” .
(emphasis added)
24. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri Pradyuman
Singhji Arjunsinghji29, this Court held as follows:
“4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not an
inherent power. It must be conferred by law either
specifically or by necessary implication . No provision in the
Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that
the Government had power to review its own order. I f the
Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious
that its delegate could not have reviewed its order.……”
(emphasis added)
25. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. Vinod
Kumar Rawat and Others30, citing previous decisions and expounding
on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1,
this Court has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions
precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section
prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision.
However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds
prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be
exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised
in the guise of exercising the power of review.
26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been
consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that
the Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A
judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
29 (1971) 3 SCC 844
30 (2020) SCC Online SC 896
on the face of the record, but an error that has to be de tected by a
process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error appare nt on the
face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review und er
Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review,
the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier
merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A
judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter
of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subje ct to the
condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party
seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made
despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There i s a clear
distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent
on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be correct ed by
the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record
can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Ye t another
circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment
has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase
has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least
analogous to those specified in the rule ” (Refer: Chajju Ram v.
Neki Ram17 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most
Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others 18).
27. In the light of the legal position crystalized above, let us now
examine the grievance raised by the appellant. The learned Single Judge
of the High Court has taken great pains to discuss the three circumstances
available under Order XLVII CPC for maintaining a review application
and observed that in the instant case, the respondents had stated before
this Court that they had in their possession, genuine documents relating
to surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subject
land and in view of the said submission, the petitions for Special Leave
to Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if the respondents
were able to obtain such documents, it would be open to them to file a
review petition before the High Court. What is relevant is that this Court
had even then declined to interfere with the findings on merits returned
by the High Court vide Judgment dated 09 th July, 2013; nor was the
review order dated 20th February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb
of the liberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all that
the respondents have done is to obtain certified copies o f the revenue
records in respect of the subject land and enclosed them with the second
67
set of review petitions. This is so when photocopies of the said documents
had been filed by them earlier.
28. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the cer tified
copies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file only
photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings along with the revision
petitions that were ultimately dismissed by the High Court vide common
judgment dated 9 th July, 2013. The High Court refused to accept the
version of the respondents that the protected tenants had su rrendered
the subject lands in favour of the landlord. The discussion in the judgment
regarding the purported surrender proceedings of protected ri ghts by
the tenants before the Tehsildar in the year 1967 is revealing and extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference :-
“2. …………The legal representatives of the protected tenants
were not parties to the alleged surrender proceedings before the
then Tahsildar in the year 1967. There is nothing on record to
show that they were ever dispossessed from the lands, so that
they can take necessary steps under relevant provisions of the
Act before the authorities concerned. After coming to know about
earlier proceedings which are stated to be in the year 1967, they
rushed to the Joint Collector with the present appeals. The re is
nothing on record to impute knowledge of the proceedings of the
year 1967 to them at any time prior to filing of the appeals before
the Joint Collector.
3. Though the alleged surrender of protected tenancy rights b y
one protected tenant and three legal representatives of the other
protected tenant was stated to be in the year 1967, it is p ointed
out by the Joint Collector in the impugned order that the original
land holder/landlord sought for exemption from computing these
lands in his holding under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms
(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. If really the alleged
surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour of the landlord
was in the year 1967, the landlord would not have cla imed
exemption for these lands from being computed in his holding under
the Ceiling Act. No doubt, the Land Reforms Tribunal reje cted
the plea of exemption put forward by the landlord on the ground
that he did not produce proper evidence of granting certi ficates
under Section 38-E of the Act in favour of the protected tenants
for these lands. Therefore, these lands were computed in the
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
holding of the landlord not on the ground of the protected tenants
surrendering their protected tenancy rights, but on the ground that
the landholder could not produce relevant documents for exemption.
Therefore, the Joint Collector rightly came to the conclusion that
file relating to surrender of lands by the protected tenants in the
year 1967 was manipulated by ante dating the same after the land
ceiling case was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal.
4. Further, the Joint Collector rightly disbelieved th e alleged
surrender of protected tenancy rights in the year 1967 on the ground
that if the surrender in the year 1967 was correct, the question of
again terminating protected tenancy rights for Ac.36.34 gunt as
by order dated 16.06.2008 does not arise.
5. Record of the then Tahsildar in the year 1967 discloses t hat
one protected tenant and legal heirs of other protected t enant
intended to surrender protected tenancy rights in favour of t he
landlord as the landlord intended to cultivate these lands personally.
Further, the Joint Collector came to the conclusion that the alleged
surrender in the year 1967 was without knowledge of the protected
tenant and legal heirs of another protested tenant inasmuch as the
landholder pleaded before the Land Ceilings Tribunal in his land
celling declaration that these lands are in possession of the
protected tenants. From the above circumstances, it can be safely
concluded that record of the then Tahsildar, Shamshadnagar by
way of surrender of protected tenancy rights under Section 19 of
the Act was not only ante dated but also cooked up. Hence, find
no reason to come to a different conclusion from that of the Joint
Collector in this revision petition. The common order passed by
the Joint Collector is proper, legal and regular.”
29. In the first round of the review proceedings filed by the
respondents for seeking review of the order and judgment dated 9th July,
2013, they had sought to raise, amongst others, the plea of limitation, the
purported error on the part of the Appellate Authority in calling for the
records from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer for deciding
the case and the alleged misconstruction of the ceilin g proceedings
conducted by the Land Reforms Tribunal, all of which were earlier argued
and did not find favour with the High Court. But, at no stage was a plea
taken by the respondents with regard to the discovery of new documents
which could not have been produced by them after undertaking due
69
diligence before the order dated 9th July, 2013 came to be passed. When
the first set of review petitions were dismissed by the l earned Single
Judge by a detailed order dated 20th February, 2014, it was specifically
observed in para 2 that the respondents did not plead that any new facts
had come to light for the consideration of the Court. In fact, a perusal of
the said order shows that the respondents only sought to reargue the
points that had already been taken by them and were rejected outrightly,
vide judgment dated 9th July, 2013.
30. The sequence of events narrated in the order da ted
20th February, 2014, passed by the High Court while dismissing the first
set of review applications brings to the fore the fact that the respondents
had approached the High Court twice by filing Civil Revision Petitions.
In the first round, two Revision Petitions [CRPs No. 4620 and 4988 of
2005] filed by the respondents against the order dated 2 nd April, 2005,
passed by the Appellate Authority, were allowed by the High Court vide
order dated 19 th September, 2006 on the ground that the proceedings
initiated by the legal heirs of the protected tenants we nt uncontested
before the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the appeals were remitted
back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. On remand, the
said appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Authority on merits vide
order dated 23rd March, 2013. The second set of Revision Petitions filed
by the respondents questioning the said decision, were turned down on
merits by the common order dated 9 th July, 2013, review whereof was
also dismissed vide order dated 20th February, 2014.
31. The above chronology of events gains significance as it goes
to amply demonstrate that several opportunities were av ailable to the
respondents if they really wished to file authenticated copi es of the
revenue records relating to the purported surrender proceedings before
the Tehsildar which they did not avail of, for reasons best kno wn to
them. The first opportunity arose when the respondents challenged the
ex parte order dated 2nd April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authority
when they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowed and the
matter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh
consideration; the second opportunity arose when the Appellate Authority
re-considered the appeals remitted by the High Court and pa ssed an
order dated 23rd March, 2013, in favour of the predecessors-in-interest
of the appellant; the third opportunity arose when the respondents
preferred a second set of Civil Revision Petitions assaili ng the order
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
dated 23rd March, 2013 that culminated in the common judgment and
order dated 9th July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunity
arose when the respondents filed two review applications f or seeking
review of the common judgment and order dated 9 th July, 2013, that
came to be dismissed vide order dated 20th February, 2014; and the fifth
opportunity arose when the respondents preferred petitions for special
leave to appeal before this Court being aggrieved by th e common
judgment and orders dated 9th July, 2013 and the review order dated 20th
February, 2014 passed by the High Court.
32. Pertinently, this Court had declined to entertain the said petitions
preferred by the respondents but having regard to the submission made
on their behalf that they would be in a position to file documents to show
that there was surrender of tenancy on the part of the protected tenants
and their legal heirs, it was left open to the respondents to file a review
petition before the High Court. It was only thereafter that the respondents
woke up to filing certified copies of those documents, xerox co pies
whereof had already been filed by them in the second round of revision
petitions preferred before the High Court. That being the posi tion, the
respondents cannot be heard to state that the documents in question
were not to their knowledge or that the certified copies of the revenue
record could not be produced by them before the High Court passed the
common judgment and order dated 09th July, 2013. At the time of filing
the second set of review petitions, the respondents raised a plea that the
learned Single Judge did not consider the relevant record produced by
them regarding the surrender proceedings and had erroneously returned
a finding that the file relating to surrender of the land by the protected
tenants in the year 1967, was manipulated by ante-dating the same after
the land ceiling was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal. However,
apart from the bald averment by the respondents that the docume nts
were not considered, which averment has been replicated in the impugned
order, a perusal of the earlier judgment of the High Court does not suggest
any such non-consideration. Rather, it appears that th e High Court
considered the records available before it, which included the copies of
the revenue records as admitted by the parties and pa ssed certain
observations.”
33. A perusal of the averments made in the second set of review
petitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discovery
of new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. When it
71
is the case of the respondents themselves that the releva nt documents
were all along available in the revenue records and they had already
filed xerox copies thereof during the second revision proceedings, they
can hardly be heard to state that the said documents were unk nown to
them and were unavailable for being produced before the learned Single
Judge prior to passing of the common judgment and order dated 9th July,
2013. It is evident from the above that the respondents had not discovered
any new material for them to have moved a second set of review petitions.
In order to satisfy the requirements prescribed in Order X LVII Rule 1
CPC, it is imperative for a party to establish that discovery of the new
material or evidence was neither within its knowledge when the decree
was passed, nor could the party have laid its hands on such documents/
evidence after having exercised due diligence, prior to pa ssing of the
order. What to speak of conclusive proof of having undertaken an exercise
of due diligence for accessing the relevant documents, there is not an
averment made by the respondents in the second set of review petitions
to the effect that they could not trace the documents in question earlier
or that they had made sincere efforts to obtain certified copie s thereof
before the common order dated 9th July, 2013 was passed, but could not
do so for some cogent and valid reasons.
34. In other words, nothing has been stated on affid avit to
substantiate the plea taken by the respondents at such a be lated stage
that the documents sought to be filed by them with the second set of
review petitions had come to light after passing of the judg ment and
order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them,
the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring loopholes and introduce
evidence in the review proceedings that was all along in their power and
possession and ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. In
fact, it appears that the Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued to
the hilt on several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,
which were all considered and turned down as meritless. Therefore, we
have no hesitation in holding that non-production of the relevant
documents on the part of the respondents at the appropriate stage cannot
be a ground for seeking review of the judgment and order dated 9th July,
2013 particularly, when five opportunities enumerated in para 31 above,
were available to them for production of the said documents , which
were all frittered away, one by one.
35. In our opinion, even otherwise, recourse to successive review
petitions against the same order is impermissible more s o, when the
S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY AND
OTHERS [HIMA KOHLI, J.]
respondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this Court to
any circumstances that would entitle them to invoke review jurisdiction
within the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules, the respondents were not
required to produce “genuine” documents but new documents/evidence
that was not within their knowledge and could not have been so even
after exercise of due diligence, which could have turned the tables in
their favour. Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record been
brought out by them.
36. Given the above facts and circumstances, we are of the firm
view that the second set of review petitions were nothing short of an
abuse of the process of the court and ought to have been rejected by the
High Court as not maintainable, without having gone into the merits of
the matter. In the result, the present appeals are allowed. The impugned
judgment dated 29th April, 2022, is set aside and the common judgment
and order dated 9 th July, 2013 passed in CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP
No. 2787 of 2013, is restored.
37. Parties are left to bear their own expenses.
Ankit Gyan Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)