Rameshwar and Ors v. State of Haryana & Ors.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. INDEX Background…………………………………………… ....para(s) 1-6 I. Applications filed by: (a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd………………… para(s) 7-10 (b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd……………… ..para(s) 11-18 (c) Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd………..... para(s) 19-27 (d) Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c)… para(s) 28-45 II. Applications filed by: (a) M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Subros Ltd…………………… ...........................................para(s) 46-50 III. Applications filed by: (a) Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd… para(s) 51-64 IV. Applications filed by: RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. (a) M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd………………... para(s) 65-75 V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd…………………………. para(s) 76-88 VI. Applications filed by: (a) Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd……………… para(s) 89-101 VII. Applications pertaining to Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd.: (a) Legend Height Owners Welfare Association..... para(s) 102- 104 (b) Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd …………...para(s) 105-106 (c) Analysis of VII (a) and (b)…………………… para(s) 107-113 VIII. Applications filed by: (a) Dharamvir & Ors… …………………………… para(s) 114-118 IX. Other issues ……………………………………..para(s) 119-120 Conclusion……………………………………….para(s) 121(a)-(p) Background 1. The present judgment will dispose of various applications filed by the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation (hereinafter, “HSIIDC”) and others, by way of clarifications sought on the judgment delivered by this Court in Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1(hereinafter, “main judgment”) . 2. The main judgment of this Court had, after duly considering the sequence of facts and developments which occurred after publ ication of the notification under Section 4 of the (now repealed) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, “Acquisition Act”) on 27.08.2004, read with the final decision of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “State”) dated 29.01.2010 to not proceed with the said acquisition, declared as mala fide and inoperative the decision dated 29.01.2010. The Court’s reasoning was that the State, in principle, had decided to with draw from the acquisition afterthe notification under Section 4, which was followed by the declaration under Section 6 and the receipt of objections from the concerned lands owners etc., even when the matter was po sted for publication of the award on 26.08.2007. In the interim period, land owners, 1 Rameshwar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. , (2018) 6 SCC 215. 719 alarmed by the prospect of losing their holdings, were induced to sell or otherwise transfer their lands to colonizers / developers at significantly lower rates of compensation. Most of such colonizers / developers had entered into collaboration agreements after the notification under Section 4, sought (and were granted) licenses by the Department o f Town and Country Planning of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “DTCP”). This Court found that upon an overall consideration of the materials (which included relevant official notings in government files, ministerial decisions and notifications), the state machinery was used to further private ends. The Court held that such a decision to withdraw from acquisition was a fraud on power under the Acquisition Act. Therefore, the judgme nt invalidated all transfers effected from the date of pub lication of the notification under Section 4, to the date of publication of the S tate’s decision to revoke the acquisition i.e., from 27.08.2004 to 29.01.2010 (hereinafter, “suspect period”). 3. Apart from invalidating the State’s final decision, the judgment also contained consequential directions on various aspects. Before moving further, it would be useful to extract these directions: “42 . Having bestowed our attention to various competing elements and issues we deem it appropriate to direct: 42.1. The decisions dated 24-8-2007 and 29-1-2010 ref erred to hereinabove are set aside as being brought about by mala fide exercise of power. In our considered view, those dec isions were clear case of fraud on power and as such are annulled. 42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when t he matters were already posted for pronouncement of the award on 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps prior thereto were properly and validly undertaken, and sin ce the decision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exercise of fraud on power, it is directed that an award is de emed to have been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands: (i) which were covered by declaration under Section 6 in the present case, and (ii) which were transferred by the landholders duri ng the period 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010. The lands which were not transferred by the landhol ders during the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are not governed by these directions. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 42.3. Subject to the directions issued hereafter, t he lands covered under aforementioned Direction 42.2 shall v est in HUDA/H SIIDC , as may be directed by the State of Haryana, free from all encumbrances. HUDA/H SIIDC may forthwith take possession thereof. Consequently, all licences gran ted in respect of lands covered by the deemed award dated 26-8- 2007 will stand transferred to HUDA/HSIIDC. 42.4. Since the dropping of acquisition on 24-8-200 7 and subsequent decision dated 29-1-2010 have been set a side, the period between 24-8-2007 and up to the date of this judgment shall not be counted for the purposes of S ection 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transpa rency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlemen t Act, 2013. 42.5. All transactions entered into during the period from 24- 8-2007 till 29-1-2010, pursuant to which the origin al landholders transferred their holdings in favour of bui lders/ private entities or third parties shall be subject to and the interest of the respective parties shall be governe d by the directions issued hereafter. 42.6. Consistent with the directions issued in para 33 of Uddar Gagan [Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378: (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198], the builders/private entities will not be entitled to recover the consideration paid by t hem to the landholders. The sale consideration paid by the builders/private entities to the landholders shall be treated towards compensation under the award and the landho lders will not be required to refund any amount to such bui lders/ private entities. The landholders will be at liberty t o prefer Reference under Section 18 of the Act within a period of three months from today. For the purposes of maintaining such reference the reasoning that weighed while passing a wards dated 9-3-2006 and 24-2-2007 shall be the basis. If the Reference Court were to enhance the compensation, t he amounts received by the landholders by way of consideration from the builders/private entities shall be appropriated towards such sum awarded by the Reference Court. If the landholders are still entitled to something more than what they had received 721 from the builders/private entities, the differentia l sum shall be made over to them by the State of Haryana toward s acquisition of their interest in the lands in quest ion. If, however, what the landholders had received towards consideration from the builders/private entities is found to be in excess of what is awarded by the Reference Court , the remainder shall not be recovered from them. 42.7. Consistent with the directions issued by this Court in paras 33.6 and 33.7 in Uddar Gagan [Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198] , the builders/private entities will be entitled to refund/ reimbursement of any payment made to the landholder s or the amounts that had been spent on development of the land, such payments shall be made by HUDA or H SIIDC on being satisfied about the extent of actual expenditure not exceedin g HUDA or H SIIDC norms on the subject, as the case may be. Refund will however be in respect of amount at whic h the landholders sold the land and not of subsequent sal es. As regards subsequent transactions, the subsequent pur chasers will have remedies against their respective vendors. Claims of builders/private entities entitled to refund will be taken up after settling claims of third parties from whom the bui lders/ private entities had collected monies. No interest will be payable on such amounts. 42.8. The third parties from whom money had been collected by the builder/private entities will either be entitle d to refund of the amount from and out of and to the extent of the amount payable to the builder/private entities in terms of above direction, available with the State, on their claims being verified or will be allotted the plots or apartments at the agreed price or prevalent price, whichever is higher. Every such claim shall be verified by HUDA or H SIIDC . In cases where constructions have been erected and the entire proj ect is complete or is nearing completion, upon acceptance of the claim, the plots or apartments shall be made over t o the respective claimants on the same terms and conditions. Except for such verified and accepted claims, the remaining area or apartments will be completely at the disposal of HU DA RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] or H SIIDC , as the case may be, which shall be free and competent to dispose of the same in accordance with the prevalent policy and procedure. In order to facilitate such exercise all third parties who had purchased or had been allotted the plots or apartments shall prefer claims within one month from to day, which claim shall be verified within two months from today. 42.9. As found by us in the preceding paragraphs, substantial sums were made over to “middlemen”. In the pending investigation, CBI may do well to unravel the truth. In any case, such hefty sums which were made over to “middlemen” cannot be said to be rightfully earned by and belongi ng to them. In fact, this actually represents the return for be ing able to garner the lands in question and getting requisite licence s under the provisions of the Haryana Act and a benefit deri ved out of fraud on power. In our view, this money righ tfully belongs to the State and none other. We direct the authoritie s of the State as well as the Central Government to reac h the depths of such transactions and recover every single pie and make it over to the State Government. A complete investig ation in the transactions including unearthing unnatural gains received by “middlemen” shall be undertaken by CBI.” 4. The present applications have been preferred by HSIIDC and several colonizers / developers, transferees, license holder s as well as associations of allottees of flats or commercial plots, cons umers, etc. The primary question which this Court has been called upon to answer is as to the nature of the term ‘transfer’, adverted to in p ara 42 of the main judgment. 5. The colonizers / developers and license holders on the one hand submitted that so long as the lands were not ‘transferred’ by their owners (who continued to hold title), mere grant of developmental rights or other associated rights by instruments such as builder development agreements, collaboration agreements, and other contracts would n ot amount to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of the main judgment. The stand of HSIIDC and the State (based upon the opinion of the learned Advocate General of Haryana) on the other hand was that entering i nto such development agreements or contracts was in fact a ‘tran sfer’ as it impeded the enjoyment of title by the owners. It was further submitted that such agreements led to issuance of licenses, which were the basis for ultimately deciding not to acquire such lands. 723 6. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary to set out the facts in regard to the relevant transactions. I. Applications filed by (a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd.; (b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and (c) Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd. a. M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd. and Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd. 7. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paradise”) purchased 2.681 acres of land in village Lakhnaula on 06 - 07.04.2004, by registered sale deeds. 2 On 09.09.2007, Paradise entered into a collaboration agreement with M/s. Sunshine Telecom Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Sunshine”). The consideration for that agreement was ` 75 lakhs - received by Paradise. In addition, Paradise was entitled to 35% share in the built-up commercial office space with proportionate land rights and common area rights of the developed property. Paradise granted the ‘absolute developmental right’ of land for construction of commercial office space. The agreement also recorded that the period for completion of the project was to be sixty months. 8. Based on this collaboration agreement, an application was made for grant of license to the DTCP, and License No. 59 of 2 009 was granted on 26.10.2009. Paradise alleged that Sunshine did not adhere to the terms of the collaboration agreement. Paradise c laims to have refunded all amounts received by it and annulled that transacti on by deed dated 30.03.2013. Paradise thereafter entered into another collaboration agreement with M/s. Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Green Heights”) for development of the sam e lands on 30.03.2013. This collaboration agreement referred to License No. 59 of 2009, which was valid up to 25.10.2013. Paradise parted with all rights of development to Green Heights. 3 In terms of this collaboration agreement, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores as consideration. The collaboration agreement also recorded the liability of Par adise to the tune of ` 4.25 crores to the DTCP. 2 Referred to in the collaboration agreement between Paradise and Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd. dated 30.03.2013. The collaboration agree ment was executed on behalf of Paradise by its then director, Mr. Lalit Modi and o n behalf of Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd. by its director, Mr. Virendra Kumar Bhati a. 3 Detailed facts, with documents are set out in I.A. 112515/2020 in M.A. 2150 of 2020. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 9. Both Paradise and Green Heights contend that no ‘transfer’ took place in the suspect period. It was argued on their behalf by learned Senior Advocates Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Ms. Kiran Suri that pa rties were (and continued to be) the owners of the lands in question, which were purchased prior to the notification under Section 4 dated 27.08.2004. In these circumstances, Paradise was legitimately entitled to enter into collaboration agreements, first with Sunshine Telecom, and la ter with Green Heights. Paradise received valuable consideration in its agreement with Green Heights. It was argued that Green Heights had invested ` 144.91 crores in the project and constructed a total of 371 units. Counsels further submitted that a sum of ` 139.78 crores had been received from allottees who booked the properties. The amounts received and the particulars of the allottees who had paid for respective allotted units have been revealed to the Court by Green Heights 4. It was therefore urged that firstly, the transaction which Paradise ente red into initially with Sunshine and subsequently with Green Heights, did not fall within the mischief of the proscribed transactions that were covere d by the main judgment. Secondly, the project was completed and the all ottees had paid almost the entire consideration which was util ized in the construction of the building. The counsels submitted that the Court should clarify that there was no ‘transfer’ in respect of the land covered by License No. 59 of 2009. 10. HSIIDC and the State urged that though there was no ‘transfer’ or conveyance of the title in the strict sense, what was appar ent was that in terms of the collaboration agreements, thou gh the original landowner held nominal title, effective control of the lands was parted to the colonizer / developer. In the case of Sunshine, the consideration was ` 75 lakhs, which was in excess by more than twice the value of compensation offered under the Acquisition Act in adjacent lands. In the case of Green Heights, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores. It was submitted that under the collaboration agreement, the colonizer / developer was entitled to develop the lands, build upon it, and allot the residential or commercial unit, as the case was, to those who entered into agreements and paid valuable monies. Crucial rights such as possession, the right to construct as per one’s choice, and the right to sell, all devolved on the colonizer / developer, who would be entitled to a share of the proceeds. Therefore, it was urged that the real purpose behind the tr ansactions 4 I.A. No. 118401 of 2020 in M.A. No. 2150 of 2020. 725 ought to be viewed holistically, and not only one facet of it, i.e., retention of the title by the landowners. HSIIDC and the State therefore, contended that these lands clearly fell within the description of ‘transfers’ and should be included in the award deemed to have been passed on 26.08.2007 by the main judgment (hereinafter, “deemed award”). b. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and Unitech Ltd. 11. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Karma” ) had purchased lands in villages Manesar, Naurangpur and Lakhnaula, between 1996 and 2004. In respect of the total 207.11 acres it had acquired, Karma was granted a conversion of land use (hereinaf ter, “CLU”) certificate by the State on 13.03.1996. 12. The notification issued under Section 4 had included these 207.11 acres, as well as another lot of 25.95 acres in villages Naurangpur and Lakhnaula, owned by companies whose dominant shareholder (to the extent of 90%) was also the majority shareholder in Karma. When the declaration under Section 6 was published on 25.08.2005, Karma’s lands, which were the subject of the CLU (207.11 acres), were dropped from acquisition. This was apparently in tune with the existing policy of not acquiring lands whose use had been converted. There is no controversy about those lands at present. 13. In these proceedings, it is the smaller parcel of 25.95 acres of land, which is the subject matter of consideration. Unlike the lands for which CLU had been obtained, these 25.95 acres were included in the acquisition proceedings, in the declaration under Section 6. In respect of these lands, Karma had entered into a collaboration agr eement on 16.02.2004, and a supplementary agreement on 24.12.2006, after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 i.e., after 25.08.2005. The collaboration agreement envisaged development of these lands by M/s Unitech Ltd. (hereinafter, “Unitech”). According to the arrangement, a large number of golf villas were to be built and given out on long-lease basis. During the proceedings before this Court, Unitech state d that it had paid ` 15 crores to Karma as consideration for the same. 14. By the time the supplementary agreement was executed on 24.12.2006, the Delhi High Court approved a scheme of amalgamation of the land-owing companies, merging them with Karma. Karma t hen applied to the DTCP for a license to develop a group housing colony on 15.01.2007. Consequently, License No. 206 of 2008 was issued on RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 16.12.2008. Thereafter, when the award scheduled for 26.08.2007 was not pronounced, and the decision of the State to not acquire lands was taken on 29.01.2010, these 25.95 acres belonging to Ka rma were excluded from acquisition. 15. Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Senior Advocate for Karma, argued that the State’s attempt to include Karma’s land in the deemed award was untenable. He also urged that the landowning companies which eventually merged with Karma had as a matter of fact purchased these lands as early as the mid-1990s. Karma’s bona fides was evident from the fact that the largest portion of its acquired la nd, i.e., 207.11 acres, was left out of the acquisition on a proper application of the existing policy, which the State consciously followed. By this policy, lands which had CLU certificates were excluded. Therefore, the 207.11 acres earmarked for the development of the golf course which was a subject matter of the CLU obtained in 1996 was excluded; consequently, it did not find place in the declaration under Section 6. It was submitted that even though the non-CLU lands, i.e., 25.95 acres, did not fulfill the terms of the policy, nevertheless, the justification for not letting the State proceed with their acquisition was that neither Karma nor its predecessors had attempted to influence the acquisition. Karma submitted that while these lands were included in the notification under Section 6, they stood on the same footing as the lands owned by other bona fide land owners, because they were not the subject matter of any speculation. The lands had been purchased at least ten years or so prior to the notification is sued under Section 4. In the circumstances, Karma was justified in seeking a license after waiting for a reasonable period of time, even within the suspect period. Mr. Chahar also pointed out that no malice or ulteri or motive could be attributed to Karma because its collaboration with Unitech was entered into on 16.02.2004, which was prior to the notification unde r Section 4. 16. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that Ka rma’s applications, i.e., M.A. No. 1046/2019, and connected applications, were for directions for release of a total area of 9.7 acres. It was submitted that these were seven distinct units of land which Karma was forced to purchase because they fall in pockets within the larger a rea of 207.11 acres, left out of the acquisition when the declaration under Section 6 was issued. It was submitted that being a contiguous land, it interfered with the integrity of the golf course. Their inclusion in acquisition would 727 ultimately disturb the peaceful enjoyment of land, which Kar ma was legitimately entitled to. He also relied upon a policy of the Sta te dated 14.06.2012 (issued under a letter 5) which contained a comprehensive policy in respect of leftover pockets of land. It was submitted t hat this Court should grant liberty to the State to release the lands whic h were the matter of acquisition in view of this policy. However, at the end of the hearings, Mr. Chahar sought and was granted liberty to wi thdraw the application (M.A. No. 1046 of 2019). The application was therefore dismissed as withdrawn on 19.04.2022. 17. Learned counsel for HSIIDC Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen argued that even though Karma or its affiliates had purchased the lands earlier, only 207.11 acres was covered by a previously issued CLU. Its exclusion from acquisition was justifiable due to extant policy. However, with respect to 25.95 acres, it was included in the declaration under Section 6, and there was no justification for its non-inclusion in the deemed award. It was urged that Karma’s intensions were clear because eve n after the declaration under Section 6 was issued, and much before the scheduled date for the award, on an assumption that it still owned the la nd and could develop it, an application was made on 15.01.2007 for license. It was also submitted that Karma’s submissions that the colla boration agreement with Unitech was arrived at earlier, were of no a vail given that the supplementary agreement was also executed by the parties after the declaration under Section 6. Clearly, these events wer e meant to create an impediment in the acquisition and ultimately led to the decision by which the proposed award was never announced in respect of these lands and finally, the State decided to drop the acquisition in respect of 25.95 acres on 29.01.2010. 18. It was also urged by the State and HSIIDC that unlike i n other cases, there had been no development on the land. Further, interests like those of third party allottees was not involved. In these circumstances, the lands which were deliberately excluded from acquisition, after they formed part of the final declaration, by non-publication of the award, clearly fell within the mischief of what could be termed as ‘transfer’ in the main judgment. c. Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd., Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari, M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd., and Godrej Properties Ltd. 5 No.PF-31/7/10/2012-2 TCP dated 14.06.2012. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 19. Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Frontier”) had originally purchased 8.568 acres of land at village Naurangpur on 16.08.2004 under its erstwhile name Conway Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Lot 1”). The consideration paid was 5.62 crores. Another parcel, i.e., 5.175 acres of land was jointly owned by one Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari (hereinafter, “Lot 2”). Both lots were included i n the notification under Section 4, as well as the declaration under Section 6. During this period, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari entered into a collaboration agreement with M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “E arl”) on 24.08.2006 for its development. Soon thereafter, Earl entered int o a development collaboration agreement with Frontier in respect of Lot 2 on 11.12.2006. Frontier agreed to jointly develop both lots. This agreement was followed up with a supplementary agreement between Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari, and Earl under which further amounts were given to th e owners as consideration. 20. On 11.12.2006, Frontier applied to the DTCP for a license enclosing the collaboration agreement and related documents. Along with this, a sum of 1.17 crores was also paid for the license. On 07.05.2008, License No. 88 of 2008 was issued in the name of Frontier, Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari and Earl in respect of the entire composite area of 13.743 acres (Lot 1 + Lot 2). After the final decision of the S tate to drop the acquisition on 29.01.2010, on 24.06.2010, the four licensees transferred their rights to develop all 13.743 acres to Godrej P roperties Ltd. (hereinafter, “Godrej”). 21. In this agreement, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari were to receive 55,328.60 sq. ft. of built-up area. The agreement (by clause 2.11) showed exact areas - including built up areas - which were to com e up; what was allocable for amenities, common facilities, etc. The consider ation was that Frontier was to have a 30% right in the gross share of revenue, and Godrej the remaining 70%. Godrej paid Frontier an interest- free deposit equal to 16 crores of which 5.5 crores was non-refundable; in addition, Frontier’s expenses till then were reimbursed. The prior commitments of Frontier, including allotment of land to owners (55,328.60 sq. ft.) and additional 1,00,000 sq. ft. for 50 residential flats in favor of the Jammu & Kashmir All India Service Officers Society was also agreed to. 22. The materials on record show that a group housing colony styled as “Godrej Frontier” was developed. The occupation certificate 729 was granted by the DTCP on 16.10.2014 for residential, EWS and commercial units, and on 19.06.2017 for community building. The group housing colony comprised of 567 units in total – 475 residential, 84 EWS and 8 commercial. Godrej disclosed in its affidavit that i t sold 357 residential units, 8 commercial shops and 83 EWS units from its share and a negligible number of units remained unsold, i.e., 4 residential units; 1 EWS unit and a nursery school. Of the group housing units developed by Godrej Frontier, 199 units were registered in favour of third- party buyers. 23. It was argued, on behalf of Godrej, by learned Senior Advocates Mr. Pinaki Misra and Mr. Randeep Singh Rai that the original landowners in question were not aggrieved. They were neither parties be fore any forum, nor did they allege any fraud, influence nor were theydistressed. Landowners in the present case transacted voluntarily with the colonizers / developers. There was no allegation offraud or illegality against Godrej. It wasemphasized that the original landowners retained their respective titles in the project land. It was urged that this Court’s m ain judgment onlyapplied to cases involving forceful and fraudulent saleof l ands at throwaway prices after the issuance of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6. The basis of the main judgment was against the illegal monetary gains by thebuilders on purchasing land at throwaway prices fromfarmers by threatening them with effects of the acquisition.In the present case, theownership of the land was intact and no illegal monetary gain was made. Moreover,no middle men were invo lved. Therefore, thepresent land was not covered by the p urview of directionsgiven in the main judgment. 24. Counsels highlighted the following portions of the m ain judgment: “42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when the matters were already posted for pronouncement of the award on 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps prior thereto were properly and validly undertaken, and sin ce the decision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exercise of fraud on power, it is directed that an award is de emed to have been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands: (i) which were covered by declaration under Section 6 in the present case, and RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] (ii) which were transferred by the landholders duri ng the period 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010. The lands which were not transferred by the landhol ders during the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are not governed by these directions”. 25. In the present case, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari owned Lot 2 much before the notification under Section 4,and these landowne rs continued to hold title of the land as on the date of filing their affidavits before this Court. The only difference was that the flats devel oped on the land had been sold to bona fide consumers and conveyance deeds had been executed in their favour by the landowners and the colonizers / developers. Out of the entire flats developed on the sai d land, some had been allocated to respective stakeholders including the landowners. The original landowner in the case of Lot 1 was always Frontier, which had also purchased the lands before the notification under Section 4. In these circumstances, the project should not be covered by the deemed award as stipulated in the main judgment. 26. It was urged that entering into collaboration agreeme nts, applying for licenses and issuing licenses could not be co nstrued as ‘transfers’, or a burden on the title. It was submitted that these were legitimate activities that landowners with valid title could perform. It was also urged that Godrej in fact took over development five months after the lands were released from the cloud of acq uisition (the collaboration agreement was dated 24.06.2010, whereas the decision of the State to drop the acquisition proceedings was taken on 29.01.2010). Godrej therefore could not be accused of any wrongdoing, because it entered into agreement with bona fide land owners after any kind of impediment on collaboration had ceased. Furthermore, it developed the property by beginning construction only in 2011, after obtaining all permissions. 27. It was lastly urged that in case the interpretation of the main judgment were so as to include the present lands within the ambit of the deemed award, then the purpose of carving out an exception in para 42.2 would be defeated. Moreover, the main judgment was meant to protect the interests of farmers, and in this case, any alternate interpretation would end up harming their interests. Likewise, the genuine interests of bona fide third-party consumers would be jeopardized. 731 d. Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c) : 28. To discern the content and nature of the transactions whereby landowners conferred rights upon colonizers / developers, it would be necessary to notice some relevant conditions in the c ollaboration agreements placed on record by the parties: Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh and Earl Infotech (dated 24.08.2006) “7. That the Owners shall execute General Power of Attorney (GPA) and Special Power of Attorney and/or any othe r document or papers in favour of the Developer or it’s nom inee to enable the Developer to apply for all regulatory app rovals, licenses, sanctions and no objections for development of the said land and to raise constructions thereon as agreed hereto. However, in the event, any other/further document in respec t of said land the Owners have to sign the same to enable to Developer to obtain the necessary license/permissio n and complete the development of the colony on the said. Land. The Owners shall sign the same without raising any objection in any manner whatsoever and withinthe stipulated perio d . **** 9. That the Owners further undertakes that he/she/they shall not deal with the said land in any manner whatsoeve r and shall henceforth keep thesaid land free from any change, lien, litigation, claim etc. And shall notcreate any obstru ction or impediment in the development of the said landof the ‘Development’. **** 12. That Owners will hand over the actual physical possession of the said land to the developer for purpose of dev eloping for the purpose of the residential/commercial Group Housi ng/ industrial/Special Economic Zone complex agreed to be developed at the time of signing of this agreement and to enable the developer to discharge its part of obligations. **** 18. That the developer shall commence and complete the development of the said residential/Commercial/Grou p RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] Housing/Industrial Complex byproviding the entire fi nance, equipment, inputs material infrastructureand expert ise necessary to develop the Special Economic Zone/resid ential/ Commercial/ Industrial Complex in accordance with thesanctioned plans and any modifications thereof a s may becomenecessary or agreed to during the progress of the work. That theDeveloper is fully empowered and entitled to a ssign this agreement infavour of any Third Party at its a bsolute discretion without any recourseto the Owners and the Owners shall have no objection for suchassignment. xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx 21. The Owners shall not interfere with or obstruct in any manner with the execution and completion of the work of development the said residential/ commercial/Group Housing /Ind ustrial complex and/or booking and sale of developer’s shar e of development, built or unbuilt areas of the project . However, if any defect is pointed out in the development while the work is in the progress by the Owners, the same will be removed and rectified by the developer. 22. It is agreed between the parties that the possession of the said land once delivered/handed over to the develop er for the purpose of the aforementioned project shall not be disturbed nor a ny interference caused by the Owners till the project is comp lete . 1t is clarified that the ownership in the said land shall continue to vest exclusively in the Owners and developer s hall not be entitled to claim any right, title or interest in t he said portion of the said land or any part thereof before successful completion of the project complex as provided herei n after which the Ownership in the property shall be of bot h the parties as per their respective shares. **** 24 . That the Qwners shall be entitled to retain or let out or sell the areatheir respective share to any party either i n whole or in parts, but subjectto Para No. 16 hereinabove. If in case 733 the Owners are desirous of sale oftheir residential plots areas forming part of their allocation, they shall firstoffer the same for purchase to the Developer . It is however, madeclear that the Developer shall be afforded a period of two weeks from thedate of receipt of written intimation from the owners al ong with offer in writing, to communicate its decision per taining to purchase of the allocation of the owner, in case Devel opers is in a position to match the highest offer available wi th the Owners for sale of their property referred to above, i t shall be entitled to pay the sale consideration amount wi thin a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of intimation from the owners and to purchase the property being alienate d by the Owners. In case Developers fails to respond wit hin the period of two weeks referred to above calculated fr om the date of receipt of written intimation by the Develop ers from the Owners, the Owners shall be at liberty to sell their a rea to third party. The developer shall be entitled to enter in to any agreement to sell/lease/rent or to dispose of its sh are in any manner to receive the payments and to execute the necessary documents in favor of such purchaser. The Owners shall also join hands in executing the documents in favour of such purchaser and shall also do all other acts, deeds and thin gs which may be required to be done in order to confer legal and perfect title in favour of such purchaser and all r eceipt shall be issued for an on behalf of the owners and developer conclusively thereby binding both the parties for t he transaction. ” (emphasis supplied) Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari, Earl and Godrej (dated 24.06.2010) “2.9 The Power of Attorney shall be irrevocable (ex cept inaccordance with the terms of this agreement) and the Developer shall be entitled to appoint one or more substitutesunder the said Power of Attorney for the exercise of any or all of the powers and authorities thereun der in favour of its Affiliates.” **** RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 4.2 Marketing It is agreed between the parties hereto that the De veloper shallhave the exclusive marketing rights of the Project. It shall alsobe the obligation of the Developer to sell and market t he areareserved for Frontier commitments. **** 6.7 Developer shall have exclusive possession of th e said property and shall allow reasonable access to Front ier as may be required . Developer also agrees to provide for inspection of all Project related information on a q uarterly basis to Frontier. **** 6.8 The original title documents pertaining to Lan d B are inthe possession of Land B Owners. Earl and Frontie r shallprocure from Land B Owners to deposit the same withthe Developer prior to the formation of a society of prospective purchaser of flats in the Project, in conformity wi th the Applicable law.” (emphasis supplied) In light of the above extracts of the documents, it would now be necessary to examine the true nature of the collaboration ag reements whereby the owner (title holder) parted with possession to the colonizer / developer for payment of valuable consideration and alloca tion of a certain number of constructed units or percentage of built-up area. 29. The common refrain of the colonizers / developers was t hat while the collaboration agreements were entered into during the suspect period, the title to the lands had never passed onto them. F urther, (in some cases) licenses were obtained only after the time for announcing the award had expired. 30. The question then revolves around the true nature of these development rights, and whether the directions issued in the main judgment were applicable to their ‘transfer’. In these cases, undoubtedly transfer of such rights was done after the lands were notified under Section 4 (except in the case of Karma where apart from the original development 735 agreement dated 16.02.2004, a supplementary agreement was enter ed later into on 24.12.2006). Additionally, soon after the collabora tion agreements were executed, licenses were applied for and issued (License Nos. 88 of 2008, 59 of 2009 and 206 of 2008) after the declaration under Section 6 but before the State’s final decision to not acquire the lands on 29.01.2010. 31. The following are the features common to all the collaboration agreements: i. Possession was handed over to the colonizer / developer; ii. Full rights of development – the nature, the kind of colony or group housing units to be constructed as well as their numbers were at the absolute discretion of the colonizer / developer; iii. Substantial amounts were paid to the land owner (and in the case of Frontier, in addition to the original landowners, the intervening developer as well, such as Earl); iv. Wherever intervening rights existed (such as tho se of Frontier which had already committed to allot a certain number of developed or constructed units to third parties) the ultimate developer (such as Godrej) took over such liability; v. The landowners, and wherever applicable, the intervening developer, were in addition, entitled to a share in the proceeds and to a certain number of units of constructed or developed lands defined specifically in the agreement; vi. Power of attorney documents were executed in favour of the colonizer / developer, to facilitate the latter’s intent to develop the lands; vii. The consideration paid to landowners in all these case s far exceeded the market value of the lands, prevailing at the time of the notification under Section 4; viii. The landowner – and wherever applicable, the intervening colonizer / developer – executed registered power of attorneys to the final developer, and in all cases agreed to execute registered sale deeds to the allottees of the colonizer / developer as and when called upon to do so; and RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] ix. In some cases, on the strength of these collabor ation agreements, licenses were applied for by the landowner or by the intervening developer. 32. The nature of collaboration agreements has been discusse d by this Court in Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr .6 In this case, the parties had entered into a collaboration agreement for the construction of a residential building. The usual conditions, such as handing over possession, non-interference in the project, handing over title documents to enable sale of constructed units to third parties, et c. were agreed to. Holding that the Consumer Protection Act, 19 86 was applicable to the collaboration agreement, and that the parties could not be viewed as constituting a ‘joint venture’ given the power i nequality between them, this Court held as follows: “27. What then is the nature of the agreement betwe en the appellant and the first respondent? The appellant is the ow ner of the land. He wants a new house, but is not able to construct a new house for himself either on account of paucity of funds or lack of expertise or resources. He, therefore, e nters into an agreement with the builder. He asks the builder to construct a house and give it to him. He says that as he does not have the money to pay for the construction and will, the refore, permit the builder to construct and own additional floor(s) as consideration. He also agrees to transfer an und ivided share in the land corresponding to the additional f loor(s) which falls to the share of the builder. As a result, instead of being the full owner of the land with an old buildi ng, he becomes a co-owner of the land with a one-third share in the land and absolute owner of the ground floor of the newly constructed building and agrees that the builder will bec ome the owner of the upper floors with corresponding two -third share in the land. As the cost of the undivided two-third share in the land which the landowner agrees to transfer to the builder, is more than the cost of construction of the ground floor by the builder for the landowner, it is also mutually agreed that the builder will pay the landowner an additional cash consideration of Rs 8 lakhs. 28. The basic underlying purpose of the agreement i s the construction of a house or an a partment (ground floor) in 6 Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr ., (2008) 10 SCC 345. 737 accordance with the specifications, by the builder for the owner, the consideration for such construction bein g the transfer of undivided share in land to the builder and grant of permission to the builder to construct two floor s . Such agreement whether called as a “collaboration agreement” or a “joint venture agreement”, is not, however, a “joint venture”. There is a contract for construction of an apartment or house for the appellant, in accordance with the specificati ons and in terms of the contract. There is a consideration for such construction, flowing from the landowner to the builde r (in the form of sale of an undivided share in the land and permission to construct and own the upper floors). To adjust the value of the extent of land to be transferred, there is also payment of cash consideration by the builder. But t he important aspect is the availment of services of the builder by the landowner for a house construction (construction o f the owner’s share of the building) for a consideration. To that extent, the landowner is a consumer, the builder is a ser vice provider and if there is deficiency in service in r egard to construction, the dispute raised by the landowner wil l be a consumer dispute. We may mention that it makes no differ ence for this purpose whether the collaboration agreemen t is for construction and delivery of one apartment or one f loor to the owner or whether it is for construction and deli very of multiple apartments or more than one floor to the owner. The principle would be the same and the contract will b e considered as one for house construction for considera tion. The deciding factor is not the number of apartments deliverable to the landowner, but whether the agreement is in the nature of a joint venture or whether the agreem ent is basically for construction of certain area for the landowner.” (emphasis supplied) 33. The above judgment, while clarifying the purpos e of collaboration agreements, falls short of delving into the legal effects of the transfer of such development rights. Parting with rights which are fundamental to ownership, for valuable consideration (in cash or by handing over constructed units), leaving only the nominal ‘title’ with the landowner, is a common feature of such collaboration agreements. Given RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] the evolution in complexity of real estate contracts, and the absence of the definition of collaboration agreements in legislation, their interpretation by various High Courts assumes significance. In a question pertaining to the applicability of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to such contracts, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar 7while addressing the nature of development agreements, also answered the question in affirmative: “45. This leads to the unavoidable discussion as to what may be regarded as a Development Agreement as referred to in the questions framed for the reference and the Judgment s of this Court cited by the parties. Without intending the discussion to be an exhaustive treatise on Development Agreement s of all hues, it may be recognized there can be several Agreements, which can be loosely described as Development Agreem ents in the sense that such expression has been used in the judgments cited in course of the present proceedings. An owner without any funds or the independent resources to const ruct a new building on such owner’s land may engage anot her for such purpose with the consideration for the constr uction being paid by allocation of a part of the construct ed area. There could be several variants of the same basic st ructure of a Development Agreement with the Agreement eithe r providing for the owner being entitled to a sum of money in addition to a specified share in the constructed area o r with a Developer being required to rid the land of its encumbrances, whether monetary or otherwise, prior to the construction being taken up. There may be other sim ilar Agreements under which the Developer is required to temporarily relocate an existing tenant or occupant and ultimately provide the tenant or occupant a part of the constructed area. In the context in which certain Agreemen ts pertaining to the construction of new buildings conte mplate the construction to be undertaken or orchestrated by a person other than the owner of the land, whether upon the demolition of the existing structure or otherwise, with such person other than the owner having a share in the constructed area, such Agreements have now come to be regarded as Developm ent Agreements. Whether or not such Agreements are in the nature 7 Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar , AIR 2014 Cal 92. 739 of collaboration or joint venture, they are loosely referre d to as Development Agreements in several Judgments. Suc h Agreements are not merely for the construction of any buildi ng or for the mere execution of any other work on the land. The Developer is not merely a Contractor engaged to under take the construction; the Developer is, under the Agreemen t with the owner, promised a part of the constructed premi ses as owner thereof together with the proportionate area of the la nd. In the context in which certain Agreements are referred to as Development Agreements and the non-owner party to s uch an Agreement is regarded as the Developer qua the nature of the work envisaged under the Agreement, the Developer always has a share in the building or the area proposed to be constructed – which implies a proportionate share of the piece of earth – and such Agreement envisages the Develop er to have a share of, and interest in, the final product which is the outcome of the Agreement . 46. In such sense, a Development Agreement which envisage s the party thereto other than the owner being responsib le for ensuring the construction of a building on the subj ect land and having a share therein, there is an inescapable contr act to transfer immovable property . In form, a Development Agreement which envisages the Developer to have a share in the building proposed to be constructed in terms of the Agreement, the Agreement may appear to be somewhat not resembling an Agreement for transfer of an immovabl e property; and, indeed, it is not an Agreement simpli citer for sale of an immovable property. In law, however, a Development Agreement of the kind described herein entails the t ransfer of immovable property in the sense that the Developer or an assignee of the Developer, at the instance of the D eveloper, would be entitled not only to a part of the constru cted area but the proportionate share of the land on which th e construction is made.” (emphasis supplied) 34. Thus, collaboration agreements which enable the colonizer / developer to retain a significant portion of the const ructed area as consideration, are not in the nature of pure construction contr acts. An RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] analysis of these agreements depicts the transfer of cr ucial rights and interests in the property, which otherwise are enjoyed only by the landowner, falling short only in respect of the ‘title’. 35. In Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors., 8this Court stressed on the necessity to analyze the terms of the collaboration agreement in order to determine if any ‘charge’ or ‘interest’ had been created in the land. If so, such agreements could attract the application of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: “17. The expression “development agreement” has not bee n defined statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclature which is used to be describe a wide range of agreements w hich an owner of a property may enter into for developme nt of immovable property. As real estate transactions hav e grown in complexity, the nature of these agreements has b ecome increasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without i ntending to be exhaustive), development agreements may be of var ious kinds: 17.1. An agreement may envisage that the owner of t he immovable property engages someone to carry out the w ork of construction on the property for monetary conside ration. This is a pure construction contract; 17.2. An agreement by which the owner or a person holdin g other rights in an immovable property grants rights to a th ird party to carry on development for a monetary considerat ion payable by the developer to the other. In such a situation, t he owner or right holder may in effect create an interest in the property in favour of the developer for a monetary consideration; 17.3. An agreement where the owner or a person holding any other rights in an immovable property grants rights to another person to carry out development. In consideration, the developer has to hand over a part of the constructed area to the owner. The developer is entitled to deal with the balanc e of the constructed area. In some situations, a society or simi lar other association is formed and the land is conveyed or lease d to the society or association ; 8 Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors ., (2019) 2 SCC 241. 741 17.4. A development agreement may be entered into i n a situation where the immovable property is occupied by tenants or other right holders. In some cases, the property may be encroached upon. The developer may take on the enti re responsibility to settle with the occupants and to t hereafter carry out construction; and 17.5. An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop a plot of land which is occupied by slum dwellers and which has been declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be old and dilapidated buildings which are occupied by a n umber of occupants or tenants. The developer may undertak e to rehabilitate the occupants or, as the case may be, the slum dwellers and thereafter share the saleable construct ed area with the owner. 18. When a pure construction contract is entered in to, the contractor has no interest in either the land or the construction which is carried out. But in various other categori es of development agreements, the developer may have acquired a valuable right either in the property or in the con structed area. The terms of the agreement are crucial in determ ining whether any interest has been created in the land or in respec t of rights in the land in favour of the developer and if so, t he nature and extent of the rights . 19. In a construction contract, the contractor has no interes t in either the land or the construction carried out on the land. But, in other species of development agreements, the devel oper may have acquired a valuable right either in the property or the constructed area. There are various incidents of owner ship in respect of an immovable property. Primarily, own ership imports the right of exclusive possession and the e njoyment of the thing owned. The owner in possession of the thing has the right to exclude all others from its possession and enjoyment. The right to ownership of a property carrie s with it the right to its enjoyment, right to its access and to other beneficial enjoyments incidental to it. (B. Gangadhar v. B.G. Rajalingam [B. Gangadhar v. B.G. Rajalingam, (1995) 5 SCC 238, para 6] .) Ownership denotes the relationship be tween a person and an object forming the subject-matter o f the RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] ownership. It consists of a complex of rights, all of whic h are rights in rem, being good against the world and not merely against specific persons. There are various rights or inc idents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use a nd enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee [Swad esh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee, (1991) 4 SCC 572] .) An essential incident of ownership of land is the r ight to exploit the development, potential to construct and to deal with the constructed area. In some situations, unde r a development agreement, an owner may part with such rig hts to a developer. This in essence is a parting of som e of the incidents of ownership of the immovable property. There could be situations where pursuant to the grant of such rights, the developer has incurred a substantial investment, altere d the state of the property and even created third-party r ights in the property or the construction to be carried out. There coul d be situations where it is the developer who by his efforts has rendered a property developable by taking steps in law. In development agreements of this nature, where an inte rest is created in the land or in the development in favour of the developer, it may be difficult to hold that the agreement i s not capable of being specifically performed. For exampl e, the developer may have evicted or settled with occupant s, got land which was agricultural converted into non-agric ultural use, carried out a partial development of the prope rty and pursuant to the rights conferred under the agreement, create d third-party rights in favour of flat purchasers in the proposed building. In such a situation, if for no fault of the develo per, the owner seeks to resile from the agreement and terminat es the development agreement, it may be difficult to h old that the developer is not entitled to enforce his rights . This of course is dependent on the terms of the agreement in each case. There cannot be a uniform formula for determi ning whether an agreement granting development rights ca n be specifically enforced and it would depend on the na ture of the agreement in each case and the rights created under it.” (emphasis supplied) 743 36. The recognition of transfer of valuable rights by collaboration agreements was also commented upon in Unitech Ltd. v. Union of India,9 whereinthis Court was concerned with whether a collaborat ion agreement constituted ‘transfer’ of property under Chapter X X-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Vidarbha Engineering Industries entered into a collaboration agreement with Unitech on 17.03.1994 for development and construction of a commercial project at Dahipura and Untkhana in Nagpur. Unitech was to retain 78% of the total cons tructed area, transferring the rest 22% to Vidarbha. It is imperative to note that Vidarbha itself had leased said land from Nagpur Improvement Trust for a period of thirty years, and could not transfer title to any third pa rty such as Unitech. The Court interpreted Section 269-UA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which included transfer of any ‘right’ or enabling enjoyment of immovable property, as follows: “6. It is clear from the agreement that the transfer of ri ghts of Vidarbha Engineering in its land does not amount to any sale, exchange or lease of such land, since, only possessory righ ts have been granted to Unitech to construct the build ing on the land. Nor is there any clause in the agreement expre ssly transferring 22% of the building to Vidarbha after it is constructed by Unitech. Clause 4.6 only mentions that as a consideration for Unitech agreeing to develop the prop erty it shall retain 78% and the share of Vidarbha Engineering will be 22%. In fact Parliament has defined “transfer”, deliberately wide enough to include within its scop e such agreements or arrangements which have the effect of transferring all the important rights in land for f uture considerations such as part acquisition of shares in building s to be constructed, vide sub-clause (ii) of clause ( f) of sub- section (2) of Section 269-UA. There is no doubt th at the collaboration agreement can be construed as an agreeme nt and in any case an arrangement which has the effect of transferring and in any case enabling the enjoyment, of su ch property. Undoubtedly, the collaboration agreement en ables Unitech to enjoy the property of Vidarbha Engineeri ng for the purpose of construction.There is also no doubt that an agreement is an arrangement. It must, therefore, be held that 9 Unitech Ltd. v. Union of India , (2016) 2 SCC 569. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] the collaboration agreement effectuates a transfer of the subject land from Vidarbha Engineering to Unitech w ithin the meaning of the term in Section 269-UA of the Act. It appears to be the intention of parliament to cover all such transac tions by which valuable rights in property are in fact tra nsferred by one party to another for consideration, under th e word “transfer”, for fulfilling the purpose of pre-emptive purchase i.e. prevention of tax evasion. A judgment of the Patna High Court in Ashis Mukerji v. Union of India [Ashis Mukerji v. Union of India, (1996) 222 ITR 168 (Pat) ] cited before us takes the view that a development agreeme nt is covered by the definition of “transfer” in Section 269-UA. We note the same with approval.” (emphasis supplied) Thus, for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, the collaboration agreement was considered as a ‘transfer’, even though no tit le vested with Vidarbha in order to pass the same to Unitech. 37. The features set out earlier in this judgment demonstrate that the landowner in all the cases were aware that the notif ication was issued under Section 4 on 27.08.2004. No doubt, such landowners did not acquire the land after such notification. Howev er, during the subsistence of the notification, which constituted the manifest intention of the State to acquire the lands, the third parties’ rights were consciously created for substantial consideration. In the case of Paradise, the initial sum paid was 75 lakhs, and in the subsequent agreement with Green Heights, the sum paid was 28 crores for parting with development rights relating to 2.681 acres. Similarly, in the case of Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari, the initial agreement with Frontier entitled the landowners to 1000 sq. yds out of each developed acre plus 52 lakhs, and in the subsequent agreement with Godrej, the landowners were en titled to 55,328.60 sq. ft. of built up units, and Frontier was entitled to 30% share of the receipts in the project. In the case of Karma, the developer Unitech paid 15 crores and was entitled to a share of receipts of deve loped units sold. 38. The main judgment of this Court has carefully considered and gone into great lengths to examine the file notings which led to the final decision of the State not to acquire such lands. In the case of Fron tier, 745 the records clearly demonstrate that a noting was approved by the State Government at the highest level that All India Service Of ficers of the Jammu & Kashmir cadre had requested for lands for their resident ial housing society. This request was the main basis for the decision not to acquire Frontier’s lands which was the subject matter of Licen se No. 88 of 2008. After said decision, Frontier parted with all its rights to Godrej, as did the owners of other parcels of land, i.e., Balbir Si ngh and Ram Pyari. These facts clearly demonstrate how the entire s tate machinery was subverted. The collaboration agreement with Godrej shows that 50 residential units were committed to the Jammu & Kashmir cadre of All India Service Officers (just above 10% of the total number of flats ultimately constructed). Likewise, in the case of Paradise, Frontier and Karma too, entering into collaboration agreements and the seeking grant of licenses formed the basis for the State’s final decision not to go ahead with the acquisition even though a declaration under Section 6 had been published. 39. It is clear that the collaboration agreements formed th e first element of a two-step process whereby the colonizers / developers (who might have been also land owners) having acquired lands, prior t o the preliminary notification, went ahead and entered into commitments by executing collaboration agreements afterthe notification under Section 4, and even declaration under Section 6, with full knowledge. The consideration for parting with developmental rights was far higher than the market value of the lands which they would have been enti tled to . These acts ultimately culminated with the decision not to ac quire the lands. The second step – and the important one persuading the State not to acquire the lands 10 - was the application for, and the grant of, development licenses. Uniformly, in all these cases, the applications were made prior to the scheduled date of publication of the award (26.08.2007). This is a significant and tell-tale factor because there was no way the applicants would have ordinarily known that an award would not be pronounced on the concerned date. In fact, the applica tion clearly indicates foreknowledge that their lands would not be ultimately acquired. This is what may be characterized as the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ which establishes the complicity of these individuals and entities. 10 In the case of Frontier Developers (earlier known a s Conway), the request for de- notification was made, by a letter dated 17.08.2007 , to the state of Haryana - a fact noted in the status report filed by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter, “ED”) before the Court. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 40. Land ownership typically carries with it a bundle of rights. A landowner has the right to possess, sell, lease, develop, sub-let, occupy, etc. On an overall analysis of the common features of all the collaboration agreements as carried out in an earlier part of the judgment, it is evident that except for the empty husk of a title, the land owner parted with predominant and substantial rights over the property, including possession. In almost all the cases, these rights were parted for consideration which was far above the notified acquisition rates. This observation applies in the case of the two companies – Frontier and Karma, who continued to be the land owners of the land. Such ‘emptying out’ of all impo rtant attributes that constitute rights and interest over the property cannot but be viewed as a ‘transfer’. To hold otherwise would mean tha t after receiving substantial amounts – equal to many times over the existing market rates (that could ordinarily have been claimed by the landowner in respect of their holding in acquisition proceedings) – and entitling the developer to create third-party rights in respect of not a few but hundreds of people, nevertheless, the landowner could still hold out and claim their right to not part with the title. Such a conclusion would defy reason and commonsense and cannot be countenanced. In the circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreements in all these cases which ultimately culminated in the grant of licenses would fall within the mischief of the term ‘transfer’ as envisioned in the main judgment, as it foreclosed the enjoyment and possession by the landowner, who willingly parted with such rights, for valuable consideration and acquiesced to irr eversible changes on it. 41. The above observations are dispositive of the issue. However, this Court cannot be oblivious to the existing state of affairs. The collaboration agreement entered into between Paradise and Green Heights and Frontier and Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari with Godrej have le d to construction of units. This Court has been shown mat erials which establish that in the case of Green Heights, the number of constructed units is 438 (of which 371 have been sold) and in the case of Godrej, the constructed units is 567. It is also on record that Green Hei ghts has received 70.92 crores as against sale value of agreements. Likewise, there is no denial of the fact that Godrej has also receive d substantial amounts in the range of 300 crores towards its residential units sold. In these circumstances, the Court would have to strike a proper balance and protect the interests of such third-party consumers to ensur e that 747 they do not suffer on account of the past sins of the colonizers / developers or land owners, as the case may be. 42. The main judgment recorded that in another transaction, one of the colonizers / developers had paid 4.5 crores per acre at the relevant time (in 2009). During the hearing, learned counsel for the State mentioned that the current value of these contiguous land is to the tune of 5.3 crores. Keeping these facts in mind, this Court is of the opinion that to balance the equities and in the overall interest of the home buyers, for 2.681 acres which is the subject matter of the collaboration agreement between Paradise and Green Heights, and for 13 .743acres, which is the subject matter of collaboration agreement between Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari and Godrej, the following sums should be p aid to HSIIDC: i. A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 2.681 acres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 2.681 acres x 5 crores= 13,40,50,000-/ (rupees thirteen crores, forty lakhs, and fifty thousand only). This amount will be paid by Green Heights which will be entitled to recover from Paradise such proportionate sums it may be entitled to claim having regard to the terms of their agreement. ii. A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 13 .743 acres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 13 .743 x 5 crores = 67, 36, 30,000/- (rupees sixty-seven crores, thirty-six lakhs and thirty thousand only). This amount will be paid by Godrej, which shall be entitled to claim such proportionate sums as it may be entitled to in terms of i ts agreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari in accordance with law. These amounts shall be deposited with HSIIDC within six months, from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be levied from the date of default. The lands covered by these projects shall, subject to such payments be exclu ded from the deemed award. 43. As far as Karma’s lands are concerned, the materials on record disclose that no development has taken place, and there is no allotment in respect of their lands. Karma had in fact entered into a collaboration agreement with M/s Unitech Ltd., and based on that, it applied for license RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] on 15.01.2007. The license was ultimately granted before the date of the decision of the State not to acquire its land. In these circumstances, this Court holds that the collaboration agreement – especially the supplementary agreement which was entered into afte r even the declaration under Section 6 was published – the application for license and the grant of license constituted an irreversible clog in the ownership of the lands. Karma received substantial amounts to the tun e of 15 crores, and in terms of the agreement placed on record, was entitled to far more substantial amounts had the development in fact been completed. In these circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreement and the grant of license amounted to ‘transfer’ within the meani ng of the expression in para 42.6 of the main judgment. Such land will therefore, form part of the deemed award. The State shall take appropr iate steps and issue the supplementary award in respect of these lands within six months from the date of this judgment. 44. It is also clarified that Karma would be entitled to compensation in accordance with the Acquisition Act as on the date of the notification under Section 4. The compensation in such case shall be determin ed within the same time-frame as indicated in the award. Karma shall be entitled to statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on such determined compensation. In the event Karma is aggrieved, it is open to it to seek such recourse or redress in law as is available. 45. I.A No. 112515/2020; I.A. No. 117025/2020; I.A. No. 118401/ 2020; and I.A. No.116268/2020 of M.A. No. 2150/2020 are disposed of in terms of the above findings and directions. I.A. No. 82000/2020 is dismissed as withdrawn as prayed for in I.A. No. 112682/2020 of M.A. 1175/2019. II. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Subros Ltd. 46. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “R.P. Estates”) owned 2.9875 acres of land, and M/s. Subros Ltd. (hereinafter, “Subros”) owned 10.881 acres. The lands of both these concerns were included in the notification under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6. The State decided to release these lands, as indicated by its letter to Subros dated 22.08.2007. This stand was reiterated by the State in these proceedings, where it was submitted that as there w ere no sale transactions with respect to these lands, it was decided no t to include them in the deemed award. It was also stated that no develo pmental rights were parted by them. 749 47. Learned counsel appearing for both the entities reiterated the State’s submissions, that the lands were vested in these tw o concerns and continued to be so vested. In the circumstances, R.P. Estates and Subros had to be treated as bona fide land owners, since they did not enter into any transactions during the suspect period. 48. In three applications (i.e., I.A. Nos. 111557 of 2020, 111562 of 2020 and 111563 of 2020) in M.A. No. 2067 of 2020, R.P . Estates further submitted that it applied for license from the DTCP much after the date of the deemed award and was granted License No. 82 of 2009 on 08.12.2009. It also disclosed that developmental rights were thereafter transferred to another enterprise called M/s. Elan Ltd. in 2013-14. The application and pleadings show that the project was com pleted on 14.01.2020 and the application for grant of occupation certific ate was thereafter made, with 305 units allotted to third parties out of a total of 362. 49. Subros had initially challenged the acquisition by filing a writ petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. 11 However, after it received a letter from the DTCP, communicating recommendatio n for withdrawal from acquisition, Subros withdrew its petition. Thereafter, it applied for license, and was granted the same on 13.06.2008. Subros did not enter into any collaboration agreement or sell its righ ts during the suspect period - it sold the lands to one Akme Projects Ltd. much later on 23.01.2012. 50. Having regard to the overall circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the lands owned by both R.P. Estates and Subros should be excluded from the deemed award. The judgment of the Court dated 12.03.2018 is therefore clarified to the above extent. I.A. No. 11155 7/ 2020; I.A. No. 111562/2020; and I.A. No. 111563/ 2020 of M.A. No. 2067/2020; I.A. No. 116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021 and I.A. No. 123690/2021 of M.A. No. 50/2019 are disposed off accordingly. III. Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd. 51. Express Greens was a project of DLF Home Developers Ltd. (hereinafter, “DLF”). The main judgment of this Court had dealt with the manner in which the land for this project was acquired f rom the original landowners in the village Manesar by a group of companies and 11 M/s Subros Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 2787/2006 (dismissed on 20.09.2007). RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] entities owned or wholly controlled by ABW Infrastr ucture Ltd. (hereinafter, “ABW”). These lands, in aggregate, measured 33.536 acres. ABW and its group of companies obtained License No. 283 and 284 for their development. These lands were part of the 235 acres which ABW had purchased during the subsistence of the acquisition proceedings . Eventually, before the final decision to drop the acquisition was taken by the State on 29.01.2010, the lands and licenses were transferred to DLF for a consideration of 150.95 crores. 52. Several home buyers filed applications (I.A. No. 110995/ 2019; I.A. No. 91793/ 2020 and I.A. No. 113206/ 2020 (in M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019), I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487/2020 and I.A. No. 89570/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888 of 2020; I.A. No. 49986-87/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021 and I.A. No. 49990/2021 and I.A. No. 31079- 81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020). The submission on behal f of these applicants, who sought impleadment and directions, was that in terms of this Courts’ main judgment, they were entitled to clear title over the residential units of flats constructed and allotted by D LF. It was submitted that a substantial number of flats had been handed for occupation to the allottees. However, with respect to many such allottees, sale deeds had not been executed and registered. Furthermore, it was submitted that several flats had not been completed though their all ottees were entitled to the units. In addition, during arguments it was submitted that certain common amenities such as lifts had not been in stalled, and community centres, club houses, etc. had not been completed or w ere not in usable condition. 53. It was urged on behalf of Express Green Home Owner s Association by Mr. A. N. Nadkarni, learned Senior Advocate, t hat in cases where the flats were handed over to the home buyers, no t only would they be entitled to clear title, which necessitated clear directions from this Court, but also that it would be in the overall int erest of the home buyers that the maintenance of common areas as wel l as the completion of unbuilt units should be made over to DLF. 54. This was seconded by Mr. Gopal Shankarnarayanan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for some home buyers, who urged that such buyers invested their hard-earned savings and in some cases even obtained bank advances, on the strength of the reputation and name of DLF. If the entire project were to be made over to HSIIDC, the v alue of the residential units under their occupation and ownership would considerably 751 reduce. Therefore, it was urged that DLF be directed to com plete the project, and maintain the colony, according to the high standards it was known to keep. 55. In its reply (MA (D) 2665/ 2019), and during hearings, DLF represented by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pinaki Misra subm itted that the company was willing to undertake the balance finishing work such as repair and renovation of common areas, stre ngthening of compound walls, construction of club house etc. and bear all associated expenses. However, this was on the condition that DLF be handed over with the entire project including the entitlement to the bal ance sale consideration based upon the existing executed agreements with allottees in respect of units allotted to them. DLF also urged in para 18 of its reply 12 that it should be allowed to utilize FAR of approximately three lakh sq. ft. in the manner it chose. In lieu of this, it was contended that DLF would give up its claim towards 372.83 crores in accordance with the main judgment of this Court. In these circumstances, it was urged that this Court should exclude the area of 33.536 acres, i.e., the subject matter of License No. 283 and 284, from the deemed award to enable further development. 56. The State and HSIIDC resisted these contentions. I t was pointed out that a detailed analysis was made in the main judgment which disclosed the trail of suspect transactions. ABW had acquired more than 235 acres after the notification under Section 4 was issued, by threats to the land owners. Not only was land purchased, even licenses were applied for and obtained – these in fact formed the backbone for the demand to the state of withdrawal from acquisition. It was during the pendency of these proceedings that DLF chose to transact and purchase t he lands that it ultimately did as well as acquire all rights under the two licenses for development of 33.536 acres which ultimately led to the E xpress Greens project. 57. It was highlighted that DLF paid over 150 crores to acquire these rights. The clear intention of this Court in this regard is to be found in para 42.8 of the main judgment where it clarified that third party purchasers/allottees would be entitled to the units allotted to them and would thereafter enjoy perfect title, and in respect of all unallotted lands, residential or constructed units, rights, title and interest would devolve absolutely upon HSIIDC. It was submitted that the sale deeds executed 12 M.A. (D.) No. 26552 of 2021 dated 24.08.2020. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] by DLF would be validated by HSIIDC and wherever sale deeds had not been executed, they would be so executed by HSIIDC after d ue verification in a time-bound manner. It was submitted that likewise with respect to any unfinished work, the rights, title and interests in the colony would be that of HSIIDC and not of DLF. 58. It is evident on a reading of various parts of the main judgments that ABW was in the eye of the storm. This Court’s main judgme nt is explicit about the fact that DLF chose to dip its hands in murky waters by acquiring rights to the 33.536 acres as well all rights under the licenses for 150 crores from ABW. .13 In these circumstances, there can be no question of seriously deliberating upon the application for release of these 33.536 acres of land from the deemed award. There is absolu tely no merit in the submissions on behalf of DLF that the title to lands continued with the original owners. The entire exercise of ABW was t o acquire these lands and then transfer them to those capable of dev eloping the lands, such as DLF. Those contentions are accordingly rejected. However, the rejection of DLF’s claim does not in any way impinge on the rights, title and interest of the allottees, who were handed over pos session of their flats, upon payment of full consideration, or those allottees entitled to it, after payment of the balance sums. The HSIIDC shal l complete the process of validating their title, including the title to the undivided and proportionate land share, within six months from the date of this judgment. 59. So far as the complaints of the home buyers are concerned , this Court had directed for the latest status report to be placed before it, which was furnished by way of an additional affidavit dated 28.04.2020, by DLF.This affidavit enclosed the details of the project. A total of 1348 units were constructed, of which 1223 were sold, and 510 sale deeds were registered. Possession was granted to 882 allottees. It i s evident therefore that 441 allottees are yet to be handed over possession; furthermore 713 sale deeds are yet to be executed and regis tered. The HSIIDC is therefore directed to ensure that the balance all ottees are notified about the execution of sale deed and the process of execution and registration of sale deed is completed in their case within six months from the date of this judgment. HSIIDC shall ensure that a desi gnated nodal officer is deployed to scrutinize the relevant documents and facilitate the execution of such sale deeds. 13 The status report of ED reveals that on 13.04.2008, a request for transfer of license in favour of DLF was made to the DTCP. DLF also continued to engage in correspondence in this regard (on 26.09.2008, 14.01.2010, 29.09.20 10, etc.) 753 60. The affidavit also discloses that a total of 116 townh ouses/ independent floors were constructed. 77 townhouses/independent floors were sold and the structure of 25 of them was complete. The affida vit further stated that 39 houses/independent floors ar e unsold and construction of 11 townhouses are complete. Thus, all rights, ti tle and interest in respect of unsold 39 townhouses in the independent floors vest with the HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordance with its policies and applicable laws. Likewise, in case of unsold apartments, all rights, title and interest shall vest with HSIIDC. 61. According to the affidavit, 96 apartments on the 15 th tower have been completed but no occupation certificate has yet been issued. In case the application is pending, the DTCP shall ensure due inspection and decision on the occupation certificate. If any deficiency has to be rectified the same shall be completed by the HSIIDC. 62. As far as the complaint with respect to lifts etc. is concerned, the affidavit discloses that all lifts have been installed; the certificates by the concerned State authorities have been placed on the rec ord. With respect to club houses in sector M-1, the club house has not been constructed – only basement structure is complete and for se ctor M- 1(A) the club houses have not yet been issued completion cert ificate. With respect to the boundary wall the additional affidavit states that 218 meters in tower M-1 and 434 meters in tower M-1(A) has been damaged. The HSIIDC is directed to take up work immediately and complete the same with eighteen months from the date of this judgment, as it is in the interest of safety and security of the residents. 63. Having regard to the above discussion, it is held that the request of the Express Green Home Owners Association and DLF to excl ude the project from deemed award is not tenable. It is accordingly rejected. It is further declared that all unconstructed and unallott ed portions as well as construction rights (such as FAR) in respect of unconstructed, unallotted plots etc., including two school sites, shall vest absolutely with HSIIDC. HSIIDC shall be entitled to develop these areas in accordance with its policies within the frame work of the applicabl e Master Plan development laws. DLF is therefore, entitled to collect amounts, if any, in terms of the main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over all records relating to the allottees, and technical data, pertaining to the entire project to HSIIDC within one month from the date of this judgment. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 64. I.A. No. 110995/2019; I.A. No. 91793/2020 and I.A. No. 113206/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; I.A. No. 36484-85/ 2020; I.A. No. 36487 and I.A. No. 89570/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888/ 2020; I.A. No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 9505/ 2021; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020 are disposed off in the above terms. IV. M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd. 65. An application (MA No. 50/2019) was filed by Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd. the first applicant, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the s econd applicant, Anant Raj Ltd. Both applicants are cumulatively r eferred to as “Kalinga”. The claim in this application is for a direction for proper calculation of amounts payable by HSIIDC to Kalinga, in terms of th e main judgment. It is a matter of record, that Kalinga sought NOC from DTCP to purchase the land in October 2009. The same was granted i n January, 2010 and sale deed executed shortly thereafter on 23.04.2010. ABW and its group of companies had acquired License No. 67 of 2009 dated 19.11.2009, which was transferred to Kalinga pursuant to the sale deed on 12.07.2010. Thus, Kalinga’s attempt to purchase the land and rights granted by the license clearly fell within the mischief of the main judgment of this Court. 66. Kalinga submits that it furnished all details and particulars, in support of its claim that it had incurred expenses to the t une of 308 crores 14 , for the construction of the housing project called “Madelia”. It is submitted that Kalinga expended the amounts and deployed resources for the development of the area and construction of 13 towers, of which 10 are complete and in respect of which claims have been received for 257 allottees. 67. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, urged that this Court had sought information from HSIIDC, which filed replies and further affidavits. Despite these, a clear picture has not been given. Instead of verifying all the invoices and materials, apparently HSIIDC has conducted a piece meal inquiry. It was pointed out that HSIIDC had admitted that according to its valuation and verification, the cost payable was 11.68 crores; even that has not crystallized into a concrete ass urance to pay. 68. Learned counsel pointed to an auction notice, issu ed by HSIIDC, in respect of Kalinga’s project, inviting prospective bidders to 14 Detailed at pg. 40 of M.A. No. 50 of 2019. 755 submit offers for completion. It was urged that the reserve price, including price for the land (12.45 acres) and the constructed towers (which were described in detail in the auction notice) were grossly underval ued by HSIIDC, which has offered a pittance of 11.68 crores. It was submitted on behalf of Kalinga that HSIIDC should be compelled to revi se the valuation, within a time bound manner, and this Court should appoint an arbitrator. 69. Counsel for the State and HSIIDC urged that Kalinga cannot claim a grievance, because it was a direct beneficiary of the transactions during the suspect period. It chose to enter into the field, by entering into transactions with ABW, intending fully to make substantial profits, on account of the depressed cost of land. However, this Court ’s main judgment resulted in its land being included in the deemed award - it can be at best entitled to those amounts which it actually expended. It was submitted that HSIIDC was prepared to verify all the bills and invoices, provided they were genuine and arrive at the amounts payable. Counsel also submitted that in the event of a dispute, HSIIDC was prepared to submit the dispute to arbitration. 70. From the above discussion, it is evident that Kalinga’s grievance is regarding the amounts it claims it is entitled to. The gap between its claim ( 308 crore) and what HSIIDC offered at one time ( 11.68 crores) is too excessive. The materials placed on record show that HSIIDC in fact, did put up the entire land, with the construc tion for auction 15 on an ‘as is where is’ basis. The date of e-auctio n was 21.09.2021, with a reserve price of 309 crores. The advertisement also states that 12 towers were constructed with finishing r emaining; other works (EWS, community centre, etc.) were yet to be constructed. The advertisement further states that the successful bidder was t o step into Kalinga’s shoes and complete the project. 71. It is apparent to this Court from the materials on record th at the initial valuation of 11.68 crores made by HSIIDC is inaccurate, particularly in view of the reserve price indicated by it in the auction notice. However, in view of the final order proposed, no final opinion or finding is recorded. 72. It is directed that HSIIDC shall complete verification of all the relevant documents furnished by Kalinga. Any additional documents 15 In its portal HTTPS://HSIIDC.BIDX.IN . RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] or invoices, or relevant materials which Kalinga may wish to rely upon, shall be furnished to HSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, H SIIDC shall conduct verification, and based upon that exercise, and relevant inquiries (for which it may seek such assistance of Kalinga as is necessary) indicate the final valuation within six months from the date of this judgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuation sha ll be released, within three months of completion of verification. I n case Kalinga disputes the figure, it is open to it to firstly accept the amount offered, on a without prejudice basis, and secondly, indicate its unwillingness to accept that offer towards final settlement. In such event, Kalinga and HSIIDC shall jointly submit the dispute to arbitration, to a mutually agreed person. In the event no agreement is po ssible, the arbitration shall be referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter, “DIAC”). The Chairman of the DIAC shall then nominate an arbitrator, who shall enter upon reference. It would be advisable, in such event, that the arbitrator also seeks the assistance of a technical person, versed in verification of construction related document s, as an expert. The fee for the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties; the proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Arb itration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 73. Some flat owners, who had booked units in the project have applied for appropriate directions to HSIIDC, to refund the amounts deposited by them. HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents, in relation to all those who claim refund as allottees of Kalinga, within six months. Such allottees or flat owners, (who have n ot obtained possession) shall be disbursed the amounts they are entitled to within six months thereafter. 74. In the event of any dispute, with respect to the entitlement or amounts payable, it is open to the concerned allottee or flat buyer to take recourse to appropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing ci vil suit, or complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is clarified that no proceeding, application or contempt petition in this re gard, will be entertained by this court. 75. I.A. No. 46028/2020; IA No. 59743/2020; I.A. No. 118798/ 2020; IA No. 103292/2020 and I.A. No. 137407/2019 in M.A. No. 50/ 2019; I.A. No. 30807/2020; I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020; and I.A. No. 191983/2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45009/2019; I.A. No. 192027/ 2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45026/2019; Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 and 757 Contempt Petition (D) No. 21733/2021 are disposed off in terms of the above directions. V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd. 76. ABW was earlier known as M/s. Aditya Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. ABW and its associated companies had purchased maximu m land measuring over 235 acres. ‘ABW Aditya Niketen’ was floated by ABW in M-I, M-I(A) and M-I(C) adjoining HSIIDC Residential Sec tor-1, Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana. That project was the subject matter of the proceedings throughout culminating in the main judgment of this Court. 77. From 2009 onwards, 1993 allottees booked their flats, built floors, plots shops, commercial space as the case was, wit h ABW. In ABW Aditya Niketan and City Centre,a residential plotted col ony, on 104.912 acres of land with 236 plots, 1488 of floors/flats and 269 shops and commercial places, was to be developed and constructed, pursuant to License No. 66 of 2009 dated 09.11.2009 issued by DTCP. 78. The ABW Manesar Allottee Welfare Society, 118-C, Sector 30, Gurgaon, Haryana (hereinafter, “Society”) was r egistered on 21.09.2012. The Society has filed on behalf of its member allo ttees, several applications, seeking directions. It has filed charts, and proof of payment, by way of copy of receipts issued by ABW, to substantiate its claim of genuine allottees being its members. The Society has s ought impleadment before the High Court, in the original proceedings, out of which the main judgment culminated, in this Court. The society was also impleaded during proceedings in this Court. 79. The Society claims that in adherence to the directions contained in para 42.8 of this Court’s main judgement, the allottees preferred their claims and submitted all required information to HSIIDC pr imarily indicating description of the plot/unit, exact measurement of the area, purchase price and the total payment made to ABW including (a) basic sale price, (b) External and Internal Development Charges, (c) service tax, etc. Along with the claim form, the necessary documents were also enclosed, namely, provisional allotment letter, payment receipts, ID proof and address proof. An attested affidavit duly supporting the contents of the claim was also submitted. 80. The Society claims that as there was no indicat ion of compliance with the direction contained in para 42.8 of the main judgment, on 07.01.2019 it filed an application under the Right to Information Act, RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 2007. The HSIIDC responded by its reply dated 24.01.2019 stating that claims of 220 plot buyers, 1270 flat/floor buyers and 157 commerc ial shop buyers had already been received by it. The Society claims it has regularly and continuously impressed upon HSIIDC as to the dela y in adherence and compliance of the judgement, but with no effect. T he Society’s grievance is that despite diligence by its m embers, HSIIDC failed to verify their claims within a period of two months and after deep slumber of nine months, it moved an application (M.A. No.50 of 2019) for three months extension of time and this Court’s order dated 18.01.2019 granted extension up to 22.04.2019. 81. It was submitted that even in the extended period the necessary compliance was not made and once again I.A. No.68542 of 2019 (in M.A. 864 of 2019) was moved by HSIIDC for yet another extension. It was therefore submitted that although a comprehensive direc tion was passed by this Court specifically in favour of the innocent allottees, HSIIDC’s inaction has resulted in nothing even after a lapse of 15 months. The Society had moved a contempt proceeding, Contempt Pe tition No.2226 of 2018 against HSIIDC as well. The Society is therefore seeking urgent directions, to HSIIDC for completion of its responsibilities. 82. It was further urged that given that HSIIDC has demonstrably failed in complying with the terms of this judgment, it would be in the interest of all allottees that the land is handed over on an ‘as is where is basis’ to the respective buyers of plots, flats or commercial units and a direction issued consequently to HSIIDC to execute conveyance deeds. It is submitted that the Society and the buyers themselves will undertake the work of completing the project having regard to the fact that necessary approvals were granted in terms of License No.66 of 2009; the zonin g plans have been approved and furthermore clearance was gran ted by the concerned Forest and Environment Departments. In addition, to facilitate development, previous deposits of EDC of 29.99 crores and IDC of 14.08 crores was paid long back by the developer, i.e., ABW. . No doubt, the project land stands transferred to HSIIDC. Further, it was submitted that this circumstance is not an impediment to pe rmit the allottees joined together through the Society and to complete the project. 83. On behalf of the State and HSIIDC, it was urged that t he process of verification has been delayed. It was further urged that of the total licensed land measuring 104.682 acres, an extent of 2.306 acres were acquired for Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran through an award 759 dated 27.12.2016. Furthermore, a sum of 8.31 crores was paid over to the erstwhile owner ABW. It was further submitted that the records indicate total compensation paid to ABW for the land which vest ed in the State under the deemed award was 12.51 crores, of which 3.32 crores has been paid by the LAC, with 9.91 crores still pending. 84. It was further argued that there has been no development on the land; that no structure or construction or development was undertaken by ABW as on date. A total of 1995 units were contemplated under the scheme - included 453 plots and 221 commercial units. Furthermore, it was submitted -during the hearings before this Court- that a total of 270 claims for refund had been made. In view of the fact that it was submitted on affidavit by HSIIDC dated 12.04.2022 that it had decided to s ettle 270 claims on pro rata basis for 20.486 crores. Other claims on the lands of ABW measuring 104.282 acres, including buyers’ claims working out to 128.38 crores and third-party claims working out to 172.15 crores. M/s. Alchemist claimed 33.99 crores as an investor, for the credit facility provided to ABW and its associates, which was rejected. Likewise, the claim of 1.28 crores to the land given to ABW and its group companies too was rejected. After the hearings were concluded, the HSIIDC filed an affidavit indicating that the figures indicated have now undergone a change, because more refund claims were rece ived, driving upwards the total amounts needed to be refunded. 85. After obtaining instructions, learned counsel appearing for HSIIDC submitted that since there has been no devel opment or construction, the question of granting any compensation in respect of ABW’s allottees would not arise. Therefore, the HSIIDC would refund all unverified claims on pro rata basis to the allottees and those who had applied under the scheme together with 6% interest per annum from the date of this Court’s judgment. 86. As found in the main judgment as well as the previous part of this judgment, ABW was one of the prime movers behind the enti re subversion and abuse of the state machinery for acquisition of farmer’s lands. ABW obtained licenses for 104.682 acres and floated schemes for plots with two-three storied structures and residential a s well as commercial units. Despite the fact that licenses were granted way back, even as on the date of the judgment of this Court (and even now), no development has taken place. All that was asserted on behalf of the Society was that IDC and EDC amounts were paid. HSIIDC’s stand is RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] that these charges are in fact in arrears. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the claim by the Society that the lands be made over to it or the residents on an ‘as is where is’ basis for development by them is untenable. 87. The main judgment expressly stated that it is only in ca ses where construction is completed or nearing completion that the interests of third party allottees were protected. However, such is not the situation in the case of 104.682 acres of land that belonged to ABW. There is no denial that such lands have now been vested in HSIIDC as a consequence of the main judgment of this Court and are to be included as part of the deemed award. It is apparent that the when the Court deliver ed the main judgment, it was unaware of the true nature of acts in relation to each project, especially in relation to ABW, i.e., that n o development had taken place and that allottees had merely paid certain instalments to the colonizer / developer. Furthermore, the materials on record disclose that a large number of claims have been made for refund. Having regard to these facts and being aware of the practical reality that were HSIIDC mandated to now proceed with the project, it would not be reasonable to expect completion of such project in the foreseeable future, at least for the next 5-7 years, it would be in the fitness of things tha t HSIIDC refunds the amounts payable to the allottees of the entir e project, i.e., allottees of residential units/plots and commercial or shop space. HSIIDC shall take up this process as expeditiously as possible and facilitate the verification and payment of these amounts at the earliest, so t hat the process is completed within the next twelve months from the date of this judgment. In case, the HSIIDC is unable to refund the amounts, by that date, the sums shall carry interest at 6% p.a. 88. I.A. No. 102358/2019; I.A. No. 189667/2019; I.A. No. 83251/ 2020; I.A. No. 62216/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 24553/2019; I.A. No. 42263/ 2022 and I.A. No. 49262/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022; I.A. No. 76605/2020 and I.A. No. 76602/2020 in M.A. No. 1521/2020; I.A. No. 75955/2020 in Contempt Petition No. 513/2020; Contempt Petition No. 2226/2018; and Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 are disposed off in terms of the above directions. VI. Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd. 89. Eleven applications were preferred in relation to lands that were inter alia, subject of license No. 175 of 2008 dated 30.09.2008 761 pertaining to 2.443 acres of land in village Naurangpur acquired by Girnar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Girnar”) and License No. 76 in favour of one Navin Rao to the extent of 11.519 acres). Girnar was a whol ly owned subsidiary of Unitech, and Navin Rao too was an affil iate of Unitech. Applications were preferred by Unitech, and one Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Speed Town”) which claimed to be entitled to rights to 19.56 acres. 90. In 2008, Girnar obtained license No. 175 of 2008 da ted 30.09.2008 for developing a commercial colony on 2.443 acres out of the 19.56 acres of land. The license was granted by DTCP. Out of the 2.443 acres, an area of 1.5125 acres was notified under Section 4 of Acquisition Act, on 07.08.2013 and under Section 6 on 31.07.2013. Finally, 1.5125 acres of land was acquired under Award No. 13 dated 29.07.2016, for development and utilization of sectors roads (Sector 75 to 80) at Gurugram. Unitech urges that the acquisition of 1.5125 acres rendered the balance area of 0.93 acres to be commercially non-viable for any construction/development thereon as it was not be possible to consume the entire permissible FAR of 2.443 acres on the residual parcel of land. It is contended that an agreement to sell was executed on 14.03.2016 between Girnar as vendor and Speed Town as vendee for the sale of a portion of land admeasuring 9.69 acres, out of balance 17.116 (19.56 - 2.443 = 17.116 acres) at the rate of 4.40 crores per acre, for a total sale consideration of 42.636 crores. Of that consideration, a sum of 33.21 crores was received by Girnar from Speed Town for sale of 9.69 acres from 13.01.2016 to 18.06.2016 while an amount of 9.426 crores ( 42.636 - 33.21 = 9.426) is outstanding in the books of accounts. 91. In terms of the agreement, Speed Town was obliged to clear the balance outstanding amount of 9.426 crores upon submission of the sale deed for registration. 92. Applications are preferred by Unitech and Speed Town. Speed Town claims to have entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar, on 12.02.2016. Subsequently, the agreement to sell was entered into by the parties, and the sum of 33.21 crores was paid to Girnar. Speed Town seeks directions that the lands in respect of which it entered into collaboration agreement (9.69 acres) ought to be released fr om the deemed award directions of this Court in its main judgment. I n the alternative, it claims for a direction that Girnar should refund amounts paid by it. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 93. During the hearing, Mr. Joydeep Gupta, learned S enior Advocate contended that Speed Town was a bona fide purchaser which had first entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar, and later entered into agreement to sell. It was urged that Girnar’s holding company Unitech was under a cloud and its management has been repla ced by virtue of orders of this Court. 94. It was urged that on the basis of the main judgement, the physical possession of Girnar’s entire land parcels, measuring 19.56 acres, (comprising of 2.443 acres of licensed and 17.117 acres of unli censed land), was taken over by HSIIDC in furtherance of District R evenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector’s letter No. 382/LAC da ted 06.07.2018 and correspondingly reflected in the revenue records. 95. Apparently, Speed Town sent a notice dated 24.04.2018 to Girnar to refund the amount of 33.21 crores for the land along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of payment til l the date of actual refund. Speed Town invoked the arbitration claus e, and submitted the dispute for arbitration. This culminated in an award in its favour. 96. It is argued that the site inspection carried out by Unit ech’s land division on 15.03.2021 noted that barring the licensed land of 2.443 acres and 2.08 acres (out of the total unlicensed land parcel of 17.1 17 acres), the residual land was under unauthorized cu ltivation since November 2020. 97. The applicants seek directions for exclusion of the lands from the deemed award, urging that they were not purchased from any farmers but rather from one Angelique International Ltd. (h ereinafter, “Angelique”), a public limited company, through a registered sale deed executed on 23.08.2007. The main judgment was based on the premise that the land sellers were the farmers whose only source of income was agriculture. The entire tenor of the main judgement was therefore farmer- centric. In the case of Girnar, the position is entirely different since the land was purchased from a public limited company which was incorporated on 03.01.1996. It was submitted that the original owner, Angelique was a project engineering and construction company and the other assumptions based on which this Court delivered the main judgment, were inapplicable to it. Furthermore, the land parcels purchased by Angelique were mutated in the name of Girnar on 06.06.2006 and 23.08.2007 and, therefore, their ownership is prior to the dates of mutation. Hence, the seller com pany 763 was not in the business of buying and selling land only for minting quick money by duping innocent farmers. 98. It was argued that Girnar acquired ownership of 19.56 acres from Angelique by registered sale deed dated 23.08.2007 whereas the cut-off date fixed by this Court was 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010, meaning thereby that all land transactions of sale and purc hase during the pendency of acquisition proceedings from 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010 were cancelled by the main judgment. 99. On behalf of the HSIIDC and the State, it was urged that neither Unitech, nor Speed Town, were entitled to any relief. I t was highlighted that the acquisition of the land from Angelique, during the suspect period, was expressly noticed by this court. The sale deed, in the present case, was executed just before the scheduled pronouncement of the award. Furthermore, during the pendency of proceedings, Girnar transferred its development rights to Speed Town, which chose to acquire it, and did so at its own peril. Speed Town later entered into agreement to sell. However, at the root of all these transactions, was the transfer of ownership during the suspect period, i.e., after issuance of the notification under Section 4. Counsel drew the notice of this Court to paras 34.2 and 35 of the main judgment which clarified the issue beyond any doubt. 100. This Court’s main judgment, has noted in more than one place, from paras 26.1 to 26.9, and traced the sequence of events which led to the notification of 912 acres for acquisition, the resultant panic and scramble on the part of landowners to get rid of their holdings, the purchase of these lands, and in many places, their entering into agreements of sale or development agreements, by builders, which made no mention of the impending acquisition, leading to a demand to drop acquisition, which was ultimately done at two points of time, i.e. 24.08.2007 and 29.01.2010. The transactions relating to lands owned by Girnar, and Un itech’s associates, squarely fall within the suspect period. In these given circumstances, Unitech’s plea, or that of Speed Tow n, that the collaboration agreement with the latter- and the agreement t o sell, - were executed after the suspect period, are untenable. The taint that attaches with the initial transaction (i.e., Girnar acquiring the lands during the acquisition process) attaches equally, to Speed Town’s transaction, because the entire premise, which persuaded the vendor to sell the lands, was that the acquisition proceedings would go through, divesting their title. However, the vendee and its holding company appeared to have full knowledge of the nature of future events, in which they probab ly RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] had a hand. Thus, the request for exclusion of these lands, from t he deemed award, is untenable and is accordingly rejected. Spee d Town shall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, in re spect of the land, on the same basis as in the case of all others entitled to it. 101. I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020 and I.A. No. 53868/2022 in M.A. No. 2228/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No. 31180/2021; I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. Nos. 128798-99/2021; and I.A. No. 128801/2021 in MA (D) No. 5699/2021 are disposed off in the above terms. VII. Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. a. Legend Height Owners Welfare Association 102. 3.35 acres of agricultural land in Naurangpur was purchased by two individuals, i.e., Shri Ashok Kumar Lakhotia and Shri Subhash Chand Goyal by sale deeds dated 26.02.2004 and 08.03.2004. It was claimed that these two also obtained possession. The lands became the subject matter of acquisition in the notification under Secti on 4. The original owners sought for release of land and thereafter objected under Section 5A of the Acquisition Act. Some lands were relea sed from acquisition, however, the major portion was included in the declaration under Section 6. Request for release of these lands for acquis ition was made. This was followed up by an order dated 31.07.2007 releasing the land from acquisition. M/s. Innovative Infradevelop ers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Innovative”) thereafter entered the scene on 15.10.2007. Subsequently, they sought for and were granted license to develop t he lands on 20.06.2008 (License No. 128 of 2008). Apparently, meanwhile on 19.12.2007, Innovative purchased the two parcels of lands. Innovative claims that pursuant to the license granted by DTCP, it developed the land and constructed commercial tower. 103. After the main judgment was delivered, the state wh ile ensuring the publication of the deemed award also included the l ands which were the subject matter of License No. 128 of 2008. Aggrieved, Innovative approached the Punjab and Haryana High Cou rt in writ proceedings. 16 The writ petition however was rejected by the High Court by an order which has been impugned in the present case by special leave. 17 16 M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 18336 of 2020 (dismissed on 03.11.2020). 17 M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana , SLP (C) No. 2147 of 2021. 765 104. The construction put up by Innovative is a commercial building known as “Legend Heights”. Several individuals and entities claimed to have purchased spaces within it. They have approached t his Court by filing an application - i.e., the Legend Height Owners Welfare Association (hereinafter, “Legend Heights Association”). It claims to represent 35 individuals who allegedly paid substantial amount ranging between 13 lakhs and 65 lakhs. The details of the application filed by Legend Heights Association list the amounts paid to Innovative and also describes the units allotted in the building to the individuals. b. Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd. 105. Another set of applications has been preferred by Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paramveer”) a non-banking financial institution. It alleges having entered into an agreement with Innovative on 08.06.2017, whereby an area measuring 96,216.03 sq. ft. was agreed to be purchased by it for a total consideration of 16 crores. The areas sold was for a hotel block. The relevant condition stipulated that out of 16 crores payable by the buyer, 8.05 crores, by way of outstanding dues of one Ms. Saraswati Devi was agreed to be adjust ed. Another sum of 4.24 crores by way of outstanding dues of Paramveer, was agreed to be adjusted. The balance amount was to be paid in the ratio of 55:45 respectively. 106. Paramveer therefore contends that it is entitled to the built- up space in respect of the hotel block constructed by Innovative. c. Analysis of VII (a) and (b) 107. HSIIDC in its response to the special leave petition and the applications (by Legend Heights Association and Paramveer) submits that no construction has been undertaken with respect to the hotel block. It is argued that this Court should not take cognizance of submissions on behalf of Paramveer since no credible material has been placed on record to establish the genuineness of the transactions claimed by it. As far as the commercial complex of Legend Heights is concerned, HSIIDC points out that since the land transactions for sale of lands, a s well as the license in respect of these lands, was issued during the suspect period, it has to be included in the deemed award. 108. From the factual narrative it is evident that the original owners of lands themselves purchased the lands in early February 2004. This Court cannot per se attribute the foreknowledge about the acquisition. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] However, their subsequent conduct in seeking for denotification which led to the ultimate withdrawal from acquisition of those lands (even though they were included in the notification under Section 6) is an established fact. Innovative concededly entered into transactions for pur chase of lands in 2007 and applied and obtained the requisite license in 2008. 109. At the same time, this Court is cognizant of the fact that a number of allottees appear to have invested substantial am ounts (in respect of the commercial building of Legend Heights, and not the hotel building of Paramveer). Although HSIIDC is silent as to whe ther the occupation certificates have been granted, there is som e material on record (by way of averments in the special leave petition a s well as in the application by the Legend Heights Association) that se veral sale deeds/conveyance were executed and registered. 110. The larger interest of justice would lie in ensuring that such of the allottees who are either granted occupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance has been executed, should be handed over the commercial units that they had originally booked. As far as othe rs are concerned, HSIIDC should first verify the claims of all persons/entities who claim to have paid substantial amounts and have not been allotted their spaces, and shall, depending on the stage and nature of construction and the extent of amount paid (it is more than 75 per cent of the total consideration) hand over possession of the units, after due completion. 111. In case any allottee seeks refund, HSIIDC should ensure that the amounts are duly verified and repaid within six months of the date of this judgment. In the case of default, HSIIDC shall pay 6% per annum as interest. In respect of all unallotted units and areas which can be constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively with HSIIDC. 112. So far as Paramveer is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that the agreement entered into with Innovative records that certain amounts (over 12 crores) were due and payable to the allottees, which was subsequently adjusted in the builder buyer agreement for the hotel. The details of those transactions have nowhere been verified or placed on record. In addition, Innovative has stated that construction of t he hotel block has not taken place. In the circumstances, all rights, title and interest in those portions of Innovatives’ properties shall vest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award. 113. Needless to add, Innovative shall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all other developers/owners in accordance with the main judgment. HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any dispute in 767 this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim in substantiative legal proceedings and not their miscellaneous applications b efore this court. I.A. No. 41690/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; I.A. No. 84064-67/2020; I.A. No. 91091/2020; I.A. No. 84067 of 2020 in M.A. No. 50/2019 and SLP No. 2147 of 2021 are disposed off in the above terms. VIII. Dharamvir & Ors. 114. 105 individuals approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court, through a common writ petition, claiming directions that they were residents of village Manesar. 18 The claim put forth by them was that they were bona fide and innocent purchasers who had acquired the lands which were included in the notification under Section 4. They acquired rights in respect of lands – presently under their oc cupation during the suspect period, i.e., between 27.08.2004 and 29.01.2010. It is alleged that assuming the transactions to be free from any cloud on the title, these petitioners had even proceeded to construct upon lands. The claim made to the Punjab & Haryana High Court was that their lands should be excluded from the deemed award. The High Court declined the claim, reasoning that the purchases were made by them dur ing the suspect period and this court’s judgment provided relief only to the original land owners who had not transferred, alienated or in any manner sold or parted with rights in respect of the land. Since these petitioners admittedly claimed to have purchased the land when they were facing acquisition, no relief could be granted to them. It was argued on behalf of these petitioners by Mr. Rathi that all the petitioners invested their hard-earned money and had built houses in which they have been living all this while. It was urged that many of those dwellers are ex-army personnel . 115. During the course of hearing, HSIIDC submitted that the land occupied by such individuals are to the extent of 27 acres. HSIIDC expressed practical difficulties in verifying the transactions claimed to be bona fide . It was pointed out that these petitioners proceeded to complete the alleged transactions even though the lands wer e facing imminent acquisition. This court has granted relief only to those land owners who were coerced into selling lands to devel opers. Such developers used the acquisition proceedings to make profit and ultimately ensure that the acquisitions were dropped. These individuals, however, ran the risk of acquisition being completed. 18 Dharamvir v State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 5490 of 2021. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] 116. The entire tenor and reasoning of the main judgment is that proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were used as device, whereby through a web of holding or shell companies, devel opers ultimately entered into transactions and paid valuable amounts towards developmental rights – during pendency of acquisition proceedings. Those rights in turn were exploited to persuade the state machinery to withdraw from the acquisition. The prices of land had risen astronomically by then. Taking all these facts into consideration, as well as the fact that developers had proceeded to develop properties and construct buildings in which units were sold or allotted, this Court allowed only one kind of exception, i.e., that bona fide purchasers of such units, flats or shops etc. to be vested with title. In respect of all unallotted, unconstructed land as well as buildings and land forming part of each of such project, title was to vest in HSIIDC. 117. Wherever development agreements were entered into and licenses issued, and no activity took place in the form of construction or development, land was to vest in HSIIDC. If the abo ve thread of reasoning were to be considered, it is apparent that third-pa rty bona fide purchasers who secured allotment by paying valuable considerations which is verifiable as a matter of fact (by independent material) was protected. In the case of all other transactions, however, such protection was not extended for the simple reason that there is no manne r for verifying whether in fact a bona fide transaction of the kind alleged took place. For these reasons, this Court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity with the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 118. As a result of the above, the right and title in respect of lands under occupation of these petitioners is vested with HSIIDC. It is up to the HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissible in accordance with its parent enactment and a non-discriminatory manner by a scheme, in regard to such land (i.e. the 27 acres to which the petitioners and others like them may claim relief) as it may deem appropria te. In case the HSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by all provisions of the Master Plan and Zoning and such other rules and regulations as are applicable, in the area and shall strictly enforce them. IX. Other issues 119. During the hearing, it was submitted that out of the 688 acres finally notified under Section 6, 420 acres were finally included as part 769 of the deemed award. Learned counsel urged that HSIIDC has sought to grant benefit to developers who made colossal profits and have sought to wriggle out from the impact of the judgment to various st ratagem, including by filing applications for extension/clarification etc. During the course of hearing, all these applications, the submissions of all p arties and that of HSIIDC (which has also preferred this a pplication for directions and clarifications) were considered. Out of the 912 acres originally notified under Section 4 of the deemed consid eration of objections under Section 5A, 688 acres were apparently notified under Section 6. The entire acquisition was abandoned on 29.01.2010. This Court, in its main judgment has, in many places - held, in the that the state’s decision to not to go ahead with the acquisition was mala fide and amounting to a fraud under the Acquisition Act. The HSIIDC through its applications sought clarifications about whether the term ‘transfer’, includes only conveyance or formal transfer of lands or would it include parting with valuable developmental rights. In an earlier portion of this judgment, this aspect has been elaborately dealt with, and c oncluded that the expression ‘transfer’ has to be interpreted wide ly and not in a narrow or technical manner. Thus, in all cases where colla boration agreements were entered into or developmental rights were p arted for valuable consideration or where licenses were applied for dur ing the suspect period whether in favor of the original land owner who might have entered into collaboration agreement and received moni es, the transactions would fall within the mischief of transfer. Having regard to these conclusions, the applicants’ apprehensions are unfounded. 120. As far as other steps with respect to acquisition are concerned, during the course of hearing, the Court was told that in respec t of 365 acres of land, 185 references have been received. The State shall ensure that these are answered as expeditiously as possible the concerned reference courts are hereby directed to conclude all the proceedi ngs in 185 references and pronounce the award in accordance with law within a period of one year from the date of this judgment. All rights and contentions of the parties are kept open. I.A. No. 118408/2020; I .A. No. 118410/2020 and I.A. No. 126826/2020 in M.A. No. 2149/2020 are disposed off in the above terms. The applications on behalf of the State and HSIIDC (I.A. 2254/2019 and I.A. 100745/2020 in M.A. No. 50/ 2019; and I.A. 93822/2019 in M.A. No. 1175/2019) are also accordingly disposed off. RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] Conclusions and Directions: 121. In the light of the above discussion, this Court’s findings are summarized as follows: a. The expression ‘transfer’ used in the main judgme nt, especially in light of para 42.6, is not confined to sale, lease or other encumbrance. It includes development and/or collaboration agreements, as well as licenses issued (for development) during the suspect period, whether or not in favour of the developer. b. As a corollary to the above, the lands covered by licenses issued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights); Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with Unitech); Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontie r (ultimately used by Godrej); ExpressGreens (DLF); Kalinga and Innovative amount to transfer. c. With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC. Therefore, the final amount payable is 2.681 acres x 5 crores = 13,40,50,000 /- (rupees thirteen crores, forty lakhs, and fifty thousand only) within six months from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be levied from the date of default. Green Heights is entitled to recover from Paradise such proportionate sums it may be entitled to claim having regard to the terms of their agreement. d. With respect to Godrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Godrej to HSIIDC. Therefore, final amount payable is 13 .743 acres x 5 crores = 67,36,30,000 /- (rupees sixty-seven crores, thirty-six lakhs and th irty thousand only) within six months from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be levied from the date of default. Godrej is entitled to claim such proportionate sums as it may be entitled to i n terms of its agreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari in accordance with law. e. Upon full compliance with directions above, the lands covered by Green Heights and Godrej’s projects shall be excluded from the deemed award. 771 f. With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land subject of License No. 206 of 2008 forms part of the deemed award. The State shall take appropriate steps and issue th e supplementary award in respect of these lands within six months from the date of this judgment. Karma is entitled to compensation in accordance with the Acquisition Act as on the date of the notification under Section 4, and is entitled to statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on such determined compensation. g. Lands measuring 2.9875 acres and 10.881 acres respectively belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros, ar e excluded from the deemed award. h. With respect to Express Greens (DLF), contentions to exclude the project from the deemed award are rejected. It is directed that: (i) HSIIDC shall complete the process of validating the title of allottees, including the title to the undivided and proportionate land share, within six months from the date of this judgment; (ii) HSIIDC shall notify the balance allottees about the execution of sale deed - the process of execution and registration of sale deed to be completed within six months from the date of this judgment.HSIIDC shall ensure that a designated nodal officer is deployed to scrutinize the relevant documents and facilitate the execution of such sale deeds; and (iii) All rights, title and interest in respect of the unsold 39 townhouses in the independent floors vests with the HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordance with its policies and applicable laws. Likewise, in case of unsold apartments, all rights, title and interest shall vest with HSIIDC. (iv) With respect to 96 apartments on the 15 th tower which have been completed but no occupation certificate has yet been issued, the DTCP shall ensure due inspection and decision on the pending occupation RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] certificates. HSIIDC to complete any deficiency that has to be rectified. (v) With respect to club houses and boundary wall in sector M-1 and M-1(A), the HSIIDC is directed to take up work immediately and complete the same with eighteen months from the date of this judgment. (vi) All unconstructed and unallotted portions as well as construction rights (such as FAR) in respect of unconstructed, unallotted plots etc., including two school sites, shall vest absolutely with HSIIDC. HSIIDC is entitled to develop these areas in accordance with its policies within the frame work of the applicable Master Plan development laws. DLF is entitled to collect amounts, if any, in terms of the main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over all records relating to the allottees, and technical data, pertaining to the entire project to HSIIDC within one month from the date of this judgment. i. With respect to Kalinga, it is directed that (i) HSIIDC shall complete verification of all the re levant documents furnished by Kalinga. Any additional documents or invoices, or relevant materials which Kalinga may wish to rely upon, shall be furnished to HSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, HSIIDC shall conduct verification, and based upon that exercise, and relevant inquiries (for which it may seek such assistance of Kalinga as is necessary) indicate the final valuation within six months from the date of this judgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuation shall be released, within three months of completion of verification. (ii) HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents, in relation to all those who claim refund as allottees of Kalinga, within six months. Such allottees or flat owners, (who have not obtained possession) shall be disbursed the amounts they are entitled to within six months thereafter. 773 (iii) In the event of any dispute, with respect to th e entitlement or amounts payable, it is open to the concerned allottee or flat buyer to take recourse to appropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing civil suit, or complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is clarified that no proceeding, application or contempt petition in this regard, will be entertained by this Court. j. With respect to ABW, it is directed that HSIIDC to refu nd the amounts payable to the allottees of the entire projec t, i.e., allottees of residential units/plots and commercial or shop space, within the next twelve months from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be levied from date of default. The lands of ABW shall form part of the deemed award. k. With respect to Speed Town, the contentions to exclude the land from the deemed award are rejected. It is held that Speed Town shall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, in respect of the land, on the same basis as in the case of all others entitled to it. l. With respect Paramveer, the contentions to exclud e the hotel block from the deemed award are rejected. All rights, title and interest in those portions of Innovative’s properties shall vest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award.Innovative shall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all othe r developers/owners in accordance with the main judgment. HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any dispute in this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim in substantiative legal proceedings and not their miscellaneous applications before this Court m. With respect to Legend Heights, HSIIDC is directed to: (i) Hand over commercial units to allottees who were either granted occupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance was executed. As far as others are concerned, HSIIDC to first verify the claims of all persons/entities who claim to have paid substantial amounts and have not been allotted their spaces, and RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] shall, depending on the stage and nature of construction and the extent of amount paid (it is more than 75 per cent of the total consideration) hand over possession of the units, after due completion. (ii) Duly verify and pay refunds sought by any allottee within six months of the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be levied from date of default. (iii) In respect of all unallotted units and areas which can be constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively with HSIIDC. n. With respect to Dharamveer and other petitioners, as we ll as similarly placed individuals the rights and title in respect of lands under their occupation is vested with HSIIDC. It is up to the HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissible in accordance with its parent enactment and a non- discriminatory manner by a scheme, in regard to such land (i.e., the 27 acres to which the petitioners and others like them may claim relief) as it may deem appropriate. In case the HSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by all provisions of the Master Plan and Zoning and such other rules and regulations as are applicable, in the area and shall strictly enforce them. o. The State is directed to ensure that all references pe rtaining to the acquisition are answered as expeditiously as possible. The concerned reference courts are hereby directed to conclude all the proceedings in 185 references received for 365 acres of land and pronounce the award in accordance with law within a period of one year from the date of this judgment. p. It is clarified that wherever the allottees have not paid the full amounts (payable in terms of the agreements) HSIIDC shall be entitled to the same rights in law as in the case of the original builder/developer, which include, but are not limited to, insisting full payment before handing over possession to the allottees. 775 122. I.A. No.112515/2020; I.A. No.117025/2020; I.A. No.118401/ 2020; I.A. No.116268/2020; I.A. No.111557/ 2020, I.A. No. 111562/ 2020; I.A. No.111563/2020; I.A. No.116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021, I.A. No.123690/2021; I.A. No.110995/ 2019, I.A. No. 91793/ 2020; I.A. No. 113206/ 2020; I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487; I.A. No. 89570/ 2020; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022; I.A. No.102358/2019; I.A. No. 189667/2019; I.A. No. 62216/2020; I.A. No. 42263/2022; I.A. No. 49262 of 2022; I.A. No. 75955/2020; I.A. No. 83251/2020; I.A. No. 76605/ 2020; I.A. No. 76602/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No. 31180/2021; I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020; I.A. No. 128798-99/2021; I.A. No. 53868/2022; I.A. No. 128801/2021; I.A. No. 91091/2020;I.A. No. 41690/2021; I.A. No. 84064-65 of 2020; I.A. No. 84066 of 2020; I.A. No. 84067/2020; I.A. No. 118408/2020; I.A. No. 118410/2020; I.A. No. 126826/2020; I.A. 2254/2019; I.A. 93822/ 2019; I.A. 100745/2020; I.A. No. 46028/2020, I.A. No. 30807/2020; I.A. No. 191983/2019; I.A. No. 192027/2019; I.A. No. 137407/2019; I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020; I.A. No. 59743/2020; I.A. No. 118798/2020; I.A. No. 103292/2020; I.A. No.68542 of 2019; I.A. No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in MA No. 50/2019; M.A. No. 864/2019; MA (D) 24553/2019; MA (D) 45009/2019; M.A. (D) No. 45026/2019; M.A. No. 1175/2019; M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; M.A. (D) No. 7888/2020; M.A. No. 1521/2020; M.A. No. 2067 of 2020; M.A. 2150 of 2020; M.A. No. 2149/2020; M.A. No. 2228/2020; M.A. (D) No. 5699/2021; M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021; M.A. (D) No. 6705/2020; M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022 and Contempt Petition No. 2226/2018, Contempt Petition No. 513/2020, Contempt Petition No. 716/2021, SLP (C) No. 2147/2021 and SLP (C) No. 5490/2021 are thus disposed off in the aforementioned terms. Nidhi Jain Applications disposed of. (Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA) RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]