State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das & Ors.
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. By its judgment dated 13 September 2022, a Division Bench of
the High Court at Calcutta allowed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution seeking a writ of quo warranto against the Vice-
Chancellor1 of Calcutta University. The High Court held that the State
government had no authority to appoint or re-appoint the VC under
Section 8 of the Calcutta University Act 19792 or by taking recourse to
the residuary provisions of Section 60 of the Act. As a consequence, the
order issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal
on 27 August 2021 re-appointing the incumbent VC of Calcutta University
was set aside. The High Court has held that the VC had no authority to
hold that office on the basis of the order of appointment. Both the State
of West Bengal and Dr Sonali Chakravarti Banerjee, the VC whose
appointment has been set aside, are in appeal.
2. By a notification dated 28 August 2017, the Chancellor of
Calcutta University appointed Professor Dr Sonali Chakravarti Banerjee
as the VC of Calcutta University. The notification was in exercise of the
powers conferred by Section 8(1)(a) read with Section 8(2)(a) of the
Act. The term of appointment was for a period of four years with effect
from the date on which she joined office or until she attained the age of
sixty-five or until further orders, whichever is the earliest.
3. The term of office of the VC was to end on 27 August 202 1.
The State government in the Higher Education Department submit ted
proposals for the re-appointment of the VC for a period of four years to
the Chancellor on 4 June 2021 and 17 June 2021 which were not accepted
as the Chancellor sought certain clarifications.
1 VC
2 the Act
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
4. On 17 August 2021, the Chancellor suo moto accorded an
extension to the tenure of the VC for a period of three months u nder
Section 8(2)(b) of the Act.
5. The State government issued a notification on 27 August 2021
stating that:
(i) While extending the tenure of the VC, the Chancellor had
invoked Section 8(2)(b) without consultation with the
Minister, which was mandatory;
(ii) The step taken by the Chancellor of the University was
void ab initio, particularly in light of provisions of Rule 9
of the West Bengal State Universities (Terms and Conditions
of Service of the Vice Chancellors and the Manner and
Procedure of Official Communication) Rules 2019;
(iii) The Chancellor of the University had not agreed with the
proposal of the State government and initiated a step without
fulfilling the requisite legal pre-condition of consultation with
the Minister;
(iv) The provisions of the Act are “silent to deal wit h the
situation”;
(v) The State government “has no other option but to invoke
the provisions of Section 60”; and
(vi) The incumbent VC was being re-appointed with effect from
28 August 2021 for a period of four years or until she attains
the age of seventy, whichever is earlier, in terms of the
provisions of Section 60 read with Section 8(2)(b) of the
Act as amended in 2019.
6. The order of the State government re-appointing the VC was
questioned in a public interest petition instituted by an alumnus of Calcutta
University who is also a practicing advocate. The submissi ons before
the High Court in support of the petition under Article 226 were that:
(i) The State government had no power to re-appoint the VC
since both the power to appoint and re-appoint is vested
with the Chancellor;
(ii) In terms of Section 8(6), the procedure which is prescribe d
in Section 8(1) for initial appointment has to be followed for
the purpose of re-appointment as well;
955
(iii) The amended provisions of Section 8(2) do not constitute a
complete code and the entire section has to be interpreted;
(iv) The provisions of the Act could not have been by-passe d
by invoking Section 60;
(v) The re-appointment of the VC without following t he
procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) eliminates competition
and was in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution;
(vi) The appointment of the VC by the State was contrary t o
the UGC (Minimum qualifications for appointment of
teachers and other academic staff in University and Colleges
and measures for the maintenance of standards in Higher
Education) Regulations 2018.3
7. The petition was opposed on behalf of the State government by
submitting that:
(i) In terms of the unamended provisions of Section 8, the
procedure prescribed in sub-Section (1) has to be followed
for re-appointment;
(ii) This position was altered by the 2019 amendment to the
Act;
(iii) The appointment and re-appointment of a VC stand on a
different footing and the power of reappointment is vested
with the State government and not the Chancellor;
(iv) Even if the Chancellor is the re-appointing authority, he has
no discretion once a recommendation is made by the State
government upon its satisfaction; and
(v) Since the Chancellor has not taken any action in terms of
Section 8 (2)(a), the State government had no option but to
re-appoint the incumbent VC by taking recourse to the
provisions of Section 60.
8. The incumbent VC who had been re-appointed by the State
government was impleaded as a party to the proceeding and urged that:
(i) There is a distinction in law between appointment and re-
appointment because in the case of the latter, the zone of
3 UGC Regulations
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
consideration is restricted to persons already holding the
post and in such cases the suitability of the incumbent which
was assessed at the time of initial appointment need not be
reassessed;
(ii) In the case of a re-appointment, Section 8(2)(a) pres cribes
that academic excellence and administrative success a re
the only factors which are to be taken into consideration
for re-appointment and the procedure which is prescribed
by Section 8(1) is not attracted; and
(iii) No writ of quo warranto can be issued where the suitability
of the VC for re-appointment is sought to be questioned.
9. The Division Bench of the High Court relied upon the judgments
of this court in Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei
Sahoo4 and Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka 5 andnoted that a
writ of quo warranto can be issued when:
(i) A person holding public office lacks eligibility c riteria
prescribed for such appointment; and
(ii) The appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions
or rules.
10. The reasons adduced by the High Court in support of its
judgment were:
(i) Under Section 7(1), the Governor of the State of West
Bengal is the Chancellor of the University;
(ii) Section 8(1)(b) confers the powers of appointment on the
Chancellor;
(iii) Under Section 8(2)(b), the Chancellor has the power to
continue the VC after the expiration of the term of his office
up to a period of two years or until the attainment of the
age of 70 years whichever is earlier;
(iv) In terms of Section 8(5), a temporary appointment of the
VC may be made by the Chancellor; and
(v) Section 8(7) empowers the Chancellor to remove the VC
on satisfaction of prescribed conditions.
4 (2014) 1 SCC 161
5 (2018) 6 SCC 162
957
On the above premises, the Division Bench held that the scheme
of Section 8 empowers only the Chancellor to appoint, r e-appoint,
temporarily appoint or remove the VC. In other word s, the State
government has no power to appoint or re-appoint the VC. T he High
Court held that Section 60 to which recourse was taken by t he State
government provides only for the removal of difficulties arising in giving
effect to the provisions of the statute.
11. Apart from the reasoning based on the provisions of the Act,
the Division Bench held that the UGC Regulations envisage th at the
appointment of a VC can be made only by a Visitor / Chancellor. This in
the view of the High Court came in the way of the State gov ernment
making the appointment and, in this context, it relied upon a judgment of
this Court in Ghambirdan K Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat.6
12. On behalf of the petitioners before the High Court, it was
urged during the course of those proceedings that the same pro cedure
which was provided for appointment of a VC under Section 8( 1) was
required to be followed at the time of re-appointment. On the other
hand, the State government relied on the amended provisions of Section
8(2)(a). On this point, the High Court disagreed with the petitioner and
noted that amended Section 8(2)(a) which provides for the re-appointment
of a VC for another term does not require that the procedure prescribed
in Section 8(1) should be followed for re-appointment. In the amendment
of 2019, the expression “following the provisions of sub-Sectio n (1)”
were deleted from Section 8(2)(a). The High Court did not ther efore
subscribe to the submission of the petitioner before it t hat the same
procedure was required to be followed for the re-appointment of a VC
as prescribed for the purpose of appointment in Section 8(1).
13. However, ultimately, on the basis of its analysis, the High Court
held that the State government had no authority to re-appoint the VC
either under Section 8 or by taking recourse to the provisions of Section
60 and consequently held that the notification of 27 August 2021 was
contrary to law. It is on that basis, that the re-appointment of the VC has
been set aside.
14. Before we summarize the rival submissions and proceed to
analyse them, it is necessary to advert to the salient p rovisions of the
Act bearing upon the controversy.
6 (2022) 5 SCC 179
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
15. Section 7(1) stipulates that the Governor shall by virtue of his
office be the Chancellor of the University and shall be th e head of the
University and the President of the Senate.
16. Section 8 provides for the VC. Section 8(1)(a) stipulates the
conditions of eligibility for appointment as a VC in the following terms:
“8(1)(a) The Vice-chancellor shall be a distinguished academic
with proven competence and integrity, and having a minimum
of ten years of experience in a University system of which at
least five years shall be as a professor or ten years of experience
in a reputed research or academic administrative organization
of which at least five years shall be in an equivalent position of
professor.”
Section 8(1)(b) provides for the procedure for the appointment of
a VC:
“8(1)(b). The Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the
Chancellor out of the panel of three names recommended in
order of preference by the Search Committee constituted by
the State Government. While preparing the panel, the Search
Committee must give proper weightage to academic excellence,
exposure to the higher education system in the country an d
abroad and adequate experience in academic and administrative
governance and reflect the same in writing while submitt ing
the panel to the Chancellor.”
Clause (c) of Section 8(1) provides for the constitution of a search
committee. In 2019, the State legislature enacted the We st Bengal
University Laws (Amendment) Act 2019. The amended Ac t was
assented to by the Governor of West Bengal and was publishe d in the
official Gazette on 27 August 2019. As a result of the amending enactment,
amendments were made to the seven state enactments governing sta te
universities. Section 8(2)(a) as it stood prior to the am endment which
was brought about in 2019, was in the following terms:
“(2)(a) The Vice-chancellor shall hold office for a term of four
years or till he attains the age of sixty-five years, whichever is
earlier, and shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term
of four years or till he attains the age of sixty-five years,
whichever is earlier, following the provisions of sub-sect ion
(1).”
959
Sub-Section (2) of Section 8 as amended reads as follows:
“(2)(a) The Vice-Chancellor shall hold office for a period of
four years appointed as such in terms of the provisions of sub-
section (1), and shall be eligible for reappointment for another
term of four years subject to the satisfaction of t he State
Government and on the basis of his past academic excellence
and administrative success established during his term of office
in the capacity of Vice-Chancellor, or till he attains the age of
seventy years, whichever is earlier.”
Section 8(2)(b) as amended is in the following terms:
“8(2)(b) The Chancellor may, notwithstanding the expiration
of the term of the office of the Vice-Chancellor, allow him to
continue in office for a period not more than two years at a
time in consultation with the Minister, which shall under no
circumstances be extended beyond the age of seventy years,
subject to the satisfaction of the State Government and on the
basis of his past academic excellence and administra tive
success established during his term of office in the capacity of
Vice-Chancellor.”
Sub-Sections (5) and (6) of the Section 8 as amended read thus:
“8(2)(5) If –
(a) the Vice-Chancellor is, by reasons of leave, illness or other
cause, temporarily unable to exercise the powers and perform
the duties of his office, or
(b) a vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice-Chancellor by reason
of death, resignation, removal, expiry of term of his office or
otherwise,
then, during the period of such temporary inability or pending
the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, as the case may be ,
the Chancellor in consultation with the Minister may appoint a
person to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the
Vice-Chancellor.
(6) The vacancy in the office of the Vice-Chancellor occu rring
by reason of death, resignation or expiry of the term of h is
office, removal or otherwise shall be filled up by appointment
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
of a Vice-Chancellor in accordance with the provisions of
sub-section (1) within a period of six months from the date of
occurrence of the vacancy, and such period shall be held to
include any period for which a Vice-Chancellor is allowed to
continue in consultation with the Minister to exercise the powers
and perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor under sub-
section (5).”
17. In the present case, the notification issued by t he State
government reappointing the VC specifically notes that the proposal
submitted by it for reappointment of the VC was not ac cepted by the
Chancellor:
“Whereas, the State Government in the Higher Educat ion
Department, considering the above, had submitted the pro posal
of reappointment of Prof. (Dr) Chakravarti Banerjee before t he
Hon’ble Chancellor of the University for a period of four years,
on two occasions firstly on 04.06.2021 and secondly on 17.06.2021.
However, Hon’ble Chancellor of the University did not accept
the proposal given by the Higher Education Department and sought
certain clarifications on some issues not related directly with the
subject matter…”
18. In its counter affidavit filed before the High Court, the State
government submitted that in accordance with the amended provisions
of the Act, the State government considering “the p ast academic
excellence and the administrative success” of the i ncumbent VC
recommended her re-appointment for a further term of four year s or
until she attains the age of 70 years, whichever is earlier . The State
government submitted that since the VC had already been appointed for
an earlier term there was no requirement of a fresh searc h committee
for the purpose of a reappointment. However, according to th e State
government, the Chancellor was not in agreement with the interpretation
of the amended provisions since the State government opined that when
a reappointment was proposed under amended Section 8(2)(a) t here
was no necessity of undergoing a further selection process. The State
government urged that Section 8(2)(a) only postulates satisf action of
the State government and does not require the concurrence of the
Chancellor. In other words, according to the State government, it has
unfettered rights in the matter of reappointment to the post of VC. This
submission has been rejected by the High Court.
961
19. Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the State of West Bengal urged that:
(i) The power conferred by Section 8(5) on the Chancellor to
appoint a person to exercise the powers and perform the
duties of the VC during the period of the temporary inability
of an incumbent VC or pending the appointment of a VC
applies only when the power of reappointment has not been
exercised under Section 8(2)(a);
(ii) Likewise, Section 8(6) applies only when the power to
reappoint under Section 8(2)(a) has not been exercised;
(iii) Section 8(2)(a) clearly specifies that a VC shall be eligible
for reappointment for another term of four years subject to
the satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of
their past academic excellence and administrative success
during the term of office as a VC;
(iv) Unamended Section 8(2)(a) stipulated that a VC would b e
eligible for reappointment for a period not exceeding four
years “following the provisions of sub-section (1)”; and
(v) In the amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a), the expression
“”following the provisions of sub-section (1)” was
conspicuously deleted as a result of which the procedure
prescribed in Section 8(1) for the appointment of a VC does
not apply to a reappointment.
20. On the other hand, the petitioner before the High Court,
submitted that:
(i) Section 8(2)(a) does not take away the power of t he
Chancellor to appoint a VC under Section 8(1)(b);
(ii) In effecting the reappointment of a VC, the procedure which
is prescribed by sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of constituting
a Search Committee needs to be followed;
(iii) The UGC Regulations clearly stipulate that the appointment
of a VC has to be made by the Chancellor;
(iv) In terms of Section 7, the Chancellor is the head of the
University;
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
(v) Section 8(2)(a) provides for the satisfaction of the Sta te
government coupled with the eligibility of a VC for
reappointment. But this does not take away the power of
the Chancellor to make the appointment; and
(vi) As a matter of fact, it was on the premise that the power to
reappoint vests with the Chancellor that the file pertaining
to the reappointment of the VC was forwarded to the
Chancellor by the State government.
21. Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the VC submitted that:
(i) Section 8(6) does not stand with Section 8(2) because in
terms of Section 8(6) the appointment of a VC is to be
made in accordance with the provisions of sub-Section (1)
in terms of which the three-member search committee has
to be constituted;
(ii) The judgment of the High Court in the present c ase
specifically holds that the procedure which is prescribed by
Section 8(1)(b) of constituting the search committee does
not apply to a reappointment; and
(iii) Section 8 envisages distinct situations namely:
a. Appointment of a VC by the Chancellor out of a
panel of three names recommended by the Search
Committee constituted by the State government;
b. Reappointment in respect of which the power is
vested in the State government under Section 8(2)(a);
c. Extension of the term of a VC beyond the expiration
of the term of office under Section 8(2)(b) by the
Chancellor in consultation with the Minister;
d. A temporary appointment of the VC which is made
by the Chancellor in consultation with the Minister
under Section 8(5).
22. These rival submissions would need to be analyzed. However,
before we enter into a substantive analysis of the submissions, it would
be appropriate to deal with the procedural objection regarding the limits
of the writ of quo warranto.
963
23. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid out the terms on
which the writ of quo warranto may be exercised. In University of
Mysore v C.D. Govindra Rao, a Constitution Bench of this Court,
speaking through Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), held that:7
6. […]
Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial
enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive
public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by
what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the
inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has n o
valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him
from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto
confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control
executive action in the matter of making appointments to public
offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a
citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have
a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted
subject to the conditions recognized in that behalf, they tend t o
protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases,
persons, not entitled to public office may be allowed to occ upy
them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of
the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the
jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly
invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the
post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen
can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court ,
inter alia, that the office in question is a public offic e and is
held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily
leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the
said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law
or not.
(emphasis supplied)
24. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor
Panchayat,8 in his concurring opinion in a three judge Bench, Justice SB
Sinha, held that:
7 (1964) 4 SCR 575
8 (2003) 4 SCC 712
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter
of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether
a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a
writ of quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a
writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ,
the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider
the respective impact on the candidates or other factors which
may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. ( See R.K.
Jain v. Union of India , SCC para 74.)
23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern
Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy. to
Govt. of Haryana .)
25. In B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply
& Drainage Board Employees’ Assn.,9 the limitations of the writ of
quo warranto were elaborated upon by a two judge Bench of this Court.
The court observed:
“49. […] The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ
of quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issued
when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.
[…]
51. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court
cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Government
in the choice of the person to be appointed so long as the
person chosen possesses the prescribed qualificatio n and
is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K. Jain
v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 119] was pleased to hold that the
evaluation of the comparative merits of the candidates would not
be gone into a public interest litigation and only in a proceeding
initiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be considered.
It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law that
it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail
the legality or correctness of the action and that a third party has
no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action.
Further, it was declared that public law declaration would only be
9 (2006) 11 SCC 731
965
made at the behest of a public-spirited person coming before the
court as a petitioner…”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei
Sahoo10, another two judge Bench of this Court reiterated that:
21. […] the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a
writ of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issued
when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility
criteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutory
rules. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly
applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing
the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to
have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of
quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic purpose of a
writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on t he
constitutional courts to see that a public office is no t held
by usurper without any legal authority.
(emphasis supplied)
27. More recently, in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka11, a
three judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Justice DY
Chandrachud) was a part, noted the line of precedent clarifying the remit
of the writ of quo warranto.
28. Through these decisions, the Court has settled the position
that the writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment h as
not been made in accordance with the law. Accordingl y, the rival
contentions must be analyzed by dealing with the scheme of the statutory
provisions governing the appointment and reappointment of the VC.
29. Section 8 of the Act envisages several situations:
(i) Appointment of a VC (Section 8(1)(b));
(ii) Reappointment of a VC (Section 8(2)(a));
(iii) Continuation of the term of a VC upon the expiry of t he
term of office (Section 8(2)(b)); and
10 Supra
11 Supra
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
(iv) Appointment of a person to exercise the powers and perform
the duties of the VC, occasioned by
a. The temporary inability of the VC to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of the office by
reasons of leave, illness or other causes; and
b. A vacancy occurring in the office of VC upon the
death, resignation, removal, expiry of term of office
or otherwise. (Section 8(5)).
30. Section 8 makes provisions for firstly, the conditions of eligibility
for holding the office of a VC; secondly, the term for which the office
would be held; thirdly, the procedure for appointment; and fourthly, who
has the power to make the appointment.
31. The conditions of eligibility for holding the post of VC are
stipulated in Section 8(1)(a) namely (i) a distinguished academic with
proven competency and integrity; (ii) (a) minimum of ten years of
experience in a University system of which at least five ye ars shall be
as a professor; or (b) ten years of experience in a repute d research or
academic administrative organization of which at least five years shall
be in a position equivalent to a professor.
32. The term of office of a VC, including in the cas e of a
reappointment, is four years or until the attainment of the age of 70
years, whichever is earlier. Where the term of office of a VC has expired,
Section 8(2)(b) postulates that, notwithstanding the expiration of the term,
the VC may be allowed to continue in office for a period not exceeding
two years at a time but such an extension shall not be grante d beyond
the age of 70. In case of a temporary inability of an incumbent VC due
to leave, illness or other cause, Section 8(5)(a) c ontemplates the
appointment of a person to exercise the powers and perform the duties
of that office during the period of such temporary inabili ty. Where a
vacancy occurs by reason of death, resignation, removal, expiry of the
term of office or otherwise, a person may likewise be appoi nted to
exercise the powers and perform the duties of a VC pending the
appointment.
33. The procedure for appointing a VC is prescribed in cla uses
(b) and (c) of Section 8(1). Clause (b) postulates that (i) a search
committee has to be constituted by the state government; (ii) the search
committee has to prepare a panel of three names in order of preference;
967
(iii) in preparing the panel, the search committee has to give proper
weightage to academic excellence, exposure to the higher edu cation
system in the country and abroad, adequate experience in academic and
administrative governance; (iv) the search committee has to reflect its
consideration of the above in writing while submitting the panel to the
Chancellor; and (v) the search committee has to consist of three persons
as stipulated in Section 8(1)(c).
34. In the case of a reappointment, the unamended provisions of
Section 8(2)(a) provided earlier that a VC would be eligible for
reappointment for a period not exceeding four years, “subject to the
provisions of this section”. The provisions of Section 8(2) (a) were
substituted by the Amending Act of 2019. Section 8(2)(a) as amended
stipulates that a VC shall be eligible for reappointment for another term
of four years “subject to the satisfaction of the State government and on
the basis of his past academic excellence and administrat ive success
established during his term of office in the capacity of VC”.
35. In other words, Section 8(2)(a) establishes, firstly, the eligibility
of a VC for reappointment for another term of four years; the expression
“another term” signifying that the new term will be in a ddition to the
earlier term of four years; and, secondly, the require ment that the
eligibility for reappointment would be subject to the satisfaction of the
State government on the basis of academic excellence and administrative
success during the period when the individual held offi ce of VC.
Significantly, Section 8(2)(a) is a provision which prescribes the term,
namely, the initial term of four years and if an incumbent is reappointed,
a further period of four years. Moreover, Section 8(2)(a) stipulates the
conditions subject to which the VC would be eligible for reappointment
for another term of four years.
36. Section 8(2)(a) is sought to be interpreted by the appellants as
indicating that the power of reappointment is taken away fr om the
Chancellor and is entrusted to the State government. This would be an
incorrect reading of the statutory provision. Section 8(2)(a) provides for
(i) the term of office of a VC; (ii) eligibility for reappointment; (iii) the
term of office upon reappointment; (iv) the conditions subject to which a
person shall be eligible for reappointment; and (v) the outer age limit of
70 years. The expression “subject to the satisfactio n of the State
government” cannot by a process of inferential reasoning be construed
to vest the power of reappointment in the State government.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
37. The provisions of Section 8 envisage diverse situations. While
the eligibility for appointment is indeed determine d by the State
government’s satisfaction, the power of making the a ppointment
continues to vest in the Chancellor in terms of the provisions detailed
below.
38. The Chancellor has been described in Section 7(1) as the
head of the University. The power of appointing a VC is vest ed by
Section 8(1)(b) in the Chancellor. That provision stipulates that “the VC
shall be appointed by the Chancellor”. Section 8(2)(b) emp owers the
Chancellor to allow a VC to continue, notwithstanding the expiration of
its term, for a period of not more than two years at a time in consultation
with the Minister. Here again, the continuation is “subject to the
satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of his past academic
excellence and administrative success” established duri ng the term of
office in the capacity of VC. These words are in terms identical to those
contained in Section 8(2)(a). Section 8(5) entrusts to the Chancellor the
power to appoint the VC as a result of the temporary inability of the VC
to perform the duties of the office or pending the appointment of the VC
when a vacancy has arisen in the office.
39. The issue is whether the deletion of the expression “subject to
the provisions of this section” in the amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a)
would lead to the inference that the power of reappointment ha s been
taken away from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government.
The submission to that effect which has been urged on beh alf of the
appellants cannot be accepted.
40. The effect of the words “subject to the provisions of t his
section” in Section 8(2)(a) in its unamended form w as that the
reappointment would have to be in a manner provided in Section 8, which
obviously included Section 8(1). Deletion of those words in Sect ion
8(2)(a), as amended, would mean that the procedure which has b een
prescribed for making the appointment of a VC, namely the appointment
of a search committee and the preparation of a panel, wo uld not be
attracted in the case of a reappointment. In the case of a reappointment,
a VC who has completed a term of four years would be eligible subject
to the satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of their past
academic excellence and administrative record during the term of office
held as a VC. Significantly, Section 8(2)(a) speaks of the satisfaction of
the State government and past academic excellence and administrative
969
success during the term of office. Fulfilment of those conditions makes
a person eligible for being reappointed as a VC.
41. It is a settled principle of law that a statute mus t be read to
avoid a construction which would make certain provisions or term s
meaningless or redundant. In Union of India v Hansoli Devi ,12 a
Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated the dictum in the decision of
the Constitution Bench in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose,13
that “it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have ap propriate
application in circumstances conceivably within the contemp lation of
the statute.” The Court in Hansoli Devi14 reiterated the decision of the
Privy Council in Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co.
Ltd. v. Vandry15 observing that the “legislature is deemed not to waste
its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes
redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling
reasons.” An effort must be made to read the provisions of the statute in
a holistic manner so as to imbue it with meaning and content.
42. There is neither an express provision nor a nec essary
intendment by which it could be inferred that the power which is entrusted
to the Chancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in t he case of a
reappointment. There is no intrinsic reason or rationale to ac cept the
interpretation which has been urged on behalf of the State of West Bengal.
A reappointment is the appointment of an existing incumbent who fulfils
the conditions of eligibility. The fulfilment of the conditions makes a person
eligible for reappointment. The power of appointment inc luding of
reappointment is entrusted to the Chancellor and not to the State
government. The amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) cannot therefore
be construed to mean that the power of reappointment has be en taken
away from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government. Reading
the provisions in such a manner, would make the provisions entrusting
the power of appointment of the VC with the Chancellor redundant.
43. Moreover, in the present case, the State government itse lf
made a reference to the Chancellor when the issue a s regards the
12 (2002) 7 SCC 273
13 1953 SCR 1
14 Supra
15 AIR 1920 PC 181
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
reappointment of the VC came up. Evidently as the State gover nment
stated before the High Court, the Chancellor was in disagreement with
the State government. Therefore, it is clear that the State government
was in agreement with the interpretation of the Act as laid out above.
44. The High Court has in the course of its judgment also extracted
the communication of the Chancellor dated 17 August 2 021 which
indicated that he was not agreeable to such an appointment. While turning
down the proposal to reappoint the VC, the Chancellor had ob served
that:
“The proposal dated 4.6.2021 emanating from the Sta te
Government seeking reappointment of Prof. Sonali Chakravarti
Banerjee, Vice Chancellor of Calcutta University for second term
of four years, is not in consonance with the applicable statutory
prescriptions as is amply reflected in the note dated 2. 8.2021. I
need to indicate here that without being a participant in selection,
and consequent selection, as incumbent Vice Chancellor cannot
get another term in view of section 8(2)(a) of the Ca lcutta
University Act 1979.”
45. It would be appropriate to also analyse whether t he re-
appointment of the VC has to follow the same process as a fresh
appointment, by setting up a selection committee under Section 8(1) of
the Act, as indicated by the Chancellor.
46. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy in the
office of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation, expiration
of the term of office, removal or otherwise shall be filled up. The provision
indicates that such vacancy shall be filled up in accordance with the
provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section 8. Section 8(6) has to be read in
conjunction with Section 8(1) since the former expressly re fers to the
latter. The reference to the provisions of sub-Section (1) for filling up a
vacancy on the expiration of the term of office will not obviously apply
to a case of reappointment because the procedure contem plated by
Section 8(1)(b) of a search committee would not att ach to a
reappointment. On this aspect, the High Court has correctly di sagreed
with the petitioner before it and noted that amended Section 8(2)(a)
which provides for the re-appointment of a VC for another te rm does
not require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1 ) has to be
followed for re-appointment.
971
47. Faced with the view of the Chancellor, the State government
attempted to get around the situation by purporting to exercise its powers
under Section 60. Section 60 provides as follows:
“If on account of any lacuna or omission in the provisions of this
Act, or for any other reason whatsoever, any difficulty arises as
to the first constitution of any authority of the University unde r
this Act, or otherwise in giving effect to the provisions of this Act,
the State Government, as occasion may require, may by order do
anything which appears to it to be necessary for the purpose of
removing the difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law.”
48. Section 60 contemplates a situation where inter alia any
difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act “on account
of any lacunae or omission” in its provisions or for any other rea son
whatsoever. In such cases, the State government is empowered, as the
occasion may require, to do anything which appears to it to be necessary
for removing the difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrar y
contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law. Where there is a specific
provision, as in the present case Section 8(2)(a), it was not open to the
State government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedly
exercise the power to remove difficulties. A “removal of difficulty clause”
has been construed in Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union of India 16,
which reads as follows:
“39. To keep pace with the rapidly increasing responsibilities of a
welfare democratic State, the Legislature has to turn out a plethora
of hurried legislation, the volume of which is often matched with
its complexity. Under conditions of extreme pressure, with heavy
demands on the time of the Legislature and the endurance and
skill of the draftsman, it is well nigh impossible to foresee all the
circumstances to deal with which a statute is enact ed or to
anticipate all the difficulties that might arise in its working due to
peculiar local conditions or even a local law. This is particularly
true when Parliament undertakes legislation which gives a ne w
dimension to socio-economic activities of the State or extends the
existing Indian laws to new territories or areas freshly merged in
the Union of India. In order to obviate the necessity of approaching
16 (1975) 3 SCC 765
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
the Legislature for removal of every difficulty, howsoever trivial,
encountered in the enforcement of a statute, by going through
the time-consuming amendatory process, the Legislat ure
sometimes thinks it expedient to invest the Executive with a very
limited power to make minor adaptations and periphe ral
adjustments in the statute, for making its implementation effective,
without touching its substance. That is why the “removal of
difficulty clause”, once frowned upon and nick-named as “Henry
VIII clause” in scornful commemoration of the absolutist ways in
which that English King got the “difficulties” in enforcing his
autocratic will removed through the instrumentality of a servile
Parliament, now finds acceptance as a practical neces sity, in
several Indian statutes of post-independence era.”
49. The State government chose the incorrect path under Section
60 by misusing the “removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power of
the Chancellor to make the appointment. A government cannot misuse
the “removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstacle s in its path
which arise due to statutory restrictions. Allowing such actions would be
antithetical to the rule of law. Misusing the limited powe r granted to
make minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments in a s tatute for
making its implementation effective, to side-step the provisions of the
statute altogether would defeat the purpose of the legislation.
50. Accordingly, the High Court in our view was justified in coming
to the conclusion that “in the guise of removing the difficulties, the State
cannot change the scheme and essential provisions of the Act”.
51. In the view taken above on the construction of the provision
of the Calcutta University Act 1979, while it is not necessary to advert
to the provisions of the UGC Regulations which were also relied upon
by the High Court in support of its conclusion, for the purposes of
completeness, they are dealt with as well.
52. The University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications
for appointment of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities
and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher
Education) Regulations 2018 have been issued to prescribe, inter al ia.
the minimum qualifications for appointment and other service conditions
of University and College teachers.
973
53. Regulation 1.2 of the UGC Regulations provides that they are
applicable to:
“every University established or incorporated by or under a Central
Act, Provincial Act or a State Act, every Institution including a
Constituent or an affiliated College recognized by the Commission,
in consultation with the University concerned under Clause (i) of
Section 2 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and
every Institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 of the
said Act.”
54. Regulation 7.3 provides for the minimum qualifications of a
VC, selection procedure and the appointment procedure. Regarding the
appointment of the VC, Regulation 7.3 states that:
7.3 Vice Chancellor:
[…]
(iii) The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor out
of the Panel of names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection
Committee.
55. In Gambhirdan K Gadhvi v State of Gujarat,17 the Sardar
Patel University Act 1955, expressly vested the power of appointment
of the Vice Chancellor in the State government (ins tead of the
Chancellor). Despite the appointment being in terms of the sta tutory
provisions of the Sardar Patel University Act 1955, the Court issued a
writ of quo warranto setting aside the appointment of the Vice Chancellor
by relying upon the UGC Regulations 2018. This Court, holding that the
UGC Regulations were binding, held that:
49. Therefore, when the appointment of Respondent 4 is found to
be contrary to the UGC Regulations, 2018 and the UG C
Regulations are having the statutory force, we are of the opinion
that this is a fit case to issue a writ of quo warranto and to quash
and set aside the appointment of Respondent 4 as the Vice-
Chancellor of the SP University.
50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC Regulations are enacted
by the UGC in exercise of powers under Sections 26(1)( e) and
26(1)(g) of the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the UGC Act
17 (2022) 5 SCC 179
STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
every rule and regulation made under the said Act, shall be
laid before each House of Parliament. Therefore, being a
subordinate legislation, UGC Regulations becomes part of
the Act. In case of any conflict between the State legislati on
and the Central legislation, Central legislation shall preva il
by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated
in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject “education”
is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution. Therefore, any appointment as a Vice-
Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the UGC Regulations
can be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions, warranting
a writ of quo warranto.
(emphasis supplied)
56. In view of the decision in Gambhirdan K Gadhvi,18 even if
the provisions of the Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellor
by the State government, it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations.
The Regulations become part of the statute framed by Parli ament and
will prevail.
57. For the above reasons, we hold that the judgment of the High
Court is correct in law and on fact and does not warrant interference in
appeal. The State government could not have issued the order re-
appointing the VC.
58. The appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.
59. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)
18 Supra