Ravi Namboothiri v. K.A. Baiju & Ors
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by the Judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala,
confirming an order passed by the Additional District Judge setting aside
his election as Councilor of Ward No.5 of Annamanada Gram Panchayath,
in the elections held in November-2015, the elected candidate has come
up with the above appeals.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective pa rties.
4. The brief facts essential for the disposal of the abov e appeals
are as follows:-
(i) On 5-11-2015, elections to the Annamanada
Gram Panchayath were held. Apart from
others, the appellant and respondent No.1
contested from Ward No.5.
(ii) On 7.11.2015, the appellant was declared as
having been elected from Ward No.5.
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(iii) Respondent No.1 filed an Election Petition on
the file of the District Munsif Court, on 4.12.2015
challenging the election of the appellant.
(iv) By a Judgment dated 19.11.2016, the Election
Petition was dismissed by the District Munsif
Court, primarily on the ground that there was
no prayer in the Election Petition to declare the
election of the appellant as void, on the grounds
stipulated in Section 102 of the Kerala
Panchayat Raj Act. There was actually a prayer
for cancelling the election held on 5.11.2015.
(v) Aggrieved by the dismissal of the Election
Petition, respondent No.1 filed an appeal in the
Court of the Additional District Judge. The
appeal was allowed by a Judgment dated
18.06.2018 and the election of the appellant was
declared as void on the ground that the appellant
suppressed in his nomination form, his
involvement in a criminal case and that therefore
he had committed a corrupt practice.
(vi) Aggrieved by the said judgment of the District
Court, the appellant filed a revision petition
before the High Court. The Revision Petition
was dismissed by an Order dated 30.10.2018.
The appellant filed a petition for review, but the
same was also dismissed by the High Court.
Therefore, challenging the order passed in the
Revision Petition and the order passed in the
Review Petition, the appellant has come up with
two appeals.
5. The allegation that the appellant suppressed his involvement in
a criminal case and thereby adopted a corrupt practice, ar ose under
very peculiar circumstances, which are as follows:-
(i) On the allegation that on 20.09.2006, a group
of about 40 persons, which included the
appellant herein, formed themselves into an
unlawful assembly and committed criminal
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
trespass into the office compound of the
Annamanada Gram Panchayath and put up a
temporary shed for conducting a dharna, 22
persons were prosecuted before the Judicial
First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy, for
alleged offences under Sections 143, 283 and
447 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal
Code. The appellant herein was cited as
accused No.1 and he was also prosecuted
additionally for an offence under Section 38 read
with Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act.
(ii) By a Judgment dated 07.06.2010 passed in CC
No.1606 of 2006, the trial Court convicted only
A-1 and A-2. The appellant herein who was
A-1, was convicted for the offence under
Section 143 IPC and sentenced to simple
imprisonment for a period of three months
together with a fine of Rs.2000/-. He was also
convicted for the offence under Section 283 and
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.200/-. For the
offence under Section 447, the appellant was
ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of one month and also to pay a fine of
Rs.500/-. Additionally, the appellant was
convicted for the offence under Section 52 of
the Kerala Police Act and sentenced to pay a
fine of Rs.200/-.
(iii) The appellant as well as A-2 filed a statutory
appeal before the Sessions Court, Thrissur. By
a Judgment dated 17.01.2012, the appeal was
partly allowed and the conviction of the appellant
for the offences under Sections 143, 447 and
283 read with Section 149 IPC was set aside.
However, the conviction of the appellant herein
for the offence under Section 38 read with
Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act and the
sentence of a fine of Rs.200/- imposed upon
him, was upheld by the First Appellate Court.
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(iv) Since the appellant is involved in active elect oral
politics and his conviction by the criminal Court
related to a dharna organized by him, the
appellant did not pursue the matter further before
the High Court against a mere conviction under
Section 38 read with Section 52 of the Kerala
Police Act.
(v) However, while filing his nomination in the
elections to the Panchayat held in November-
2015, the appellant failed to disclose, in Form
No.2A, under Rule 6 of the relevant Rules, his
conviction under Section 38 read with Section
52 of the Kerala Police Act, 1961. Therefore,
his election was challenged by respondent No.1
and the matter has now landed up before this
Court.
6. In the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to
as “the Act”), an amendment was made in the year 2005, by Act 30 of
2005 with effect from 22.08.2005. One of the amendments introduced
by the said Act, was the insertion of sub-section (1A) in Sec tion 52.
Section 52 (1A) reads as follows:-
“52. Presentation of nomination paper and
requirements for a valid nomination .-
(1A) Every candidate submitting nomination under sub-
section (1) shall not be deemed to be qualified to be
elected to fill that post unless he submits, along with
such nomination, the details regarding his
educational qualification, criminal cases in which
he is involved at the time of submission of
nomination, property owned by him and other members
of his family, liabilities including arrears due from him to
any Public Sector Undertaking or Government or Local
Self Government Institutions and whether disqualifies
for defection under the Kerala Local Authorities
(Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 in the form and
manner as may be prescribed.”
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
7. Though the language employed in sub-section (1A) of Section
52 mandated only the disclosure of the details regarding “the criminal
cases in which he is involved at the time of submission of nomination”,
the High Court invoked Rule 6 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of
Election) Rules, 1995 to hold that the suppression of any inform ation
relating to past conviction may also amount to supp ression of
“involvement in a criminal case ”.
8. Rule 6 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Conduct of Electio n)
Rules, 1995 reads as follows:-
“6. Nomination of candidates.- (1) A candidate shall
be nominated by means of a nomination paper in Form
No.2 and on an application in that behalf of an elector
in the electoral roll of any constituency of concerned
Panchayat, the Returning Officer shall provide him Form
NO. 2 free of cost.
(2) Every candidate shall make and subscribe an oath
or affirmation before the Returning Officer or the person
authorized by the State Election Commission in the Form
specified in the First Schedule of the Act.
(2a) Every candidate shall submit before the Returning
officer, the details in form No. 2A along with the
nomination paper.
(3) The Returning Officer shall, immediately on receipt
of the nomination paper, number them serially in the
order of their presentation and shall note the date and
time of its presentation in each nomination paper and
shall issue a receipt attached to Form No. 2.”
9. The relevant column of Form No. 2A referred to in Rul e
6 reads as follows:
“1. The following criminal cases are pending against
me for trial before the court/I have been convicted by
the court in criminal cases.
a. XXXX
(b) Those in which punished
(i) Case number
285
(ii) Name and place of court
(iii) Description of the offence for
which punishment was awarded
(iv) Sections of the concerned Act
under which punishment was
awarded
(v) Punishment awarded (period of
imprisonment/quantum of fine
imposed) etc.
(vi) Date of sentence
(vii) Details regarding appeal, revision
etc. filed against the sentence.”
10. The reasoning of the High Court was that any failure to disclose
the correct information regarding the past conviction by a criminal court,
would tantamount to suppression of information relating to “involvement
in a criminal case”. The High Court reasoned (i) that insofar as elections
to the State Assemblies and Parliament are concerned, Section 33A of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 requires the disclo sure of
only those convictions where a sentence of imprisonment for one year
and more had been imposed; and (ii) but that the rules framed in Kerala
relating to the elections to Panchayats are more stringent, as they require
the disclosure of any involvement in any criminal case. The High Court
opined that the Court was obliged to keep in mind the obje ct of such
requirement, in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in Union
of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr. 1 and
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Anr. vs. Union of
India and Anr. 2.
11. Assailing the Judgment of the High Court, it was argued by
Shri Ragenth Basant, learned counsel appearing for the appel lant that
the non-disclosure of the conviction for a petty offence and t hat too
relating to the holding of a dharna on a political issue, cannot be termed
as “undue influence” within the meaning of Section 120(2) of the Act
and that, therefore, the election of the appellant ought not to have been
declared void on the ground that it was vitiated by corrupt practice under
1 (2002) 5 SCC 294
2 (2003) 4 SCC 399
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
Section 102(1)(b) of the Act. It was also contended by the learned counsel
that the reliance placed by the First Appellate Court on the decision of
this Court in Krishnamoorthy vs. Sivakumar & Ors .3 was misplaced.
According to the learned counsel, the non-disclosur e of criminal
antecedents pertaining to heinous or serious offences involving corruption
or moral turpitude alone would tantamount to corrupt practice. It is also
further contended by the learned counsel for the appel lant that the
requirement of a disclosure in terms of Section 52(1A) relat es only to
the involvement in a criminal case at the time of submissi on of the
nomination and that therefore, the requirement under Rule 6 cannot be
read as enlarging the scope of Section 52(1A). According to the learned
counsel for the appellant, even the ground under Section 102(1)(ca) of
the Act cannot be invoked as the same is concerned with a s ituation
where the details furnished by the elected candidate were shown to be
fake. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that the First Appellate
Court and the High Court were completely in error in declaring the election
of the appellant to be void.
12. Supporting the judgment of the High Court it was contended
by Shri P.V. Surendranath, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1
(Election Petitioner) that the deliberate suppression by the appellant, in
the nomination form filed in Form 2A, of his conviction for a criminal
offence, squarely fell within the definition of the expression “undue
influence” under Section 120(2) of the Act. According to the learned
senior counsel for respondent No.1, the Court is obliged to keep in mind
the fact that Section 33B of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
was brought in by the Parliament to nullify the effect of the decision in
Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr (supra). But Section
33B was declared unconstitutional in People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(supra). Relying upon the decision in Resurgence India vs. Election
Commission of India and Anr.4, it was contended by the learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1 that the filing of an affidavit with blank
particulars has also been held to be a ground to reject the nom ination
papers.
13. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. Be fore
we proceed to consider the rival contentions, we must point out that the
case on hand relates to an election to the Panchayat held in November-
3 (2015) 3 SCC 467
4 (2014) 14 SCC 189
287
2015. The term of office of the appellant is already over. But if the
Judgment of the High Court is found to be correct, the appellant might
have incurred a disqualification. Therefore, a decision on merits in this
case is not a mere academic exercise and hence we have to deal with
the rival contentions.
14. To test the correctness of the decision of the High Court, we
may have to begin our discussion from Section 102 of the Act. Section
102 of the Act reads as follows:-
“102. Grounds for declaring election to be void . -
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the
Court is of opinion –
(a) that on the date of his election a returned
candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified,
to be chosen to fill the seat under this Act; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed
by a returned candidate or his election agent or
by any other person with the consent of a
returned candidate or his election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected;
or
(ca) that the details furnished by the elected
candidate under sub-section (1A) of section 52
were fake; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it
concerns a returned candidate, has been
materially affected –
(i) by the improper acceptance of
any nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in
the interests of the returned
candidate by an agent other than
his election agent; or
(iii) by the improper reception,
refusal or rejection of any vote or
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
the reception of any vote which is
void; or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the
provisions of this Act or of any rules
or orders made thereunder, the
Court shall declare that the election
of the returned candidate to be
void.
(2) If in the opinion of the Court a returned candidate
has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent,
of any corrupt practice but the Court is satisfied. –
(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed
at the election by the candidate or his election
agent, and every such corrupt practice was
committed contrary to the orders, and without
the consent, of the candidate or his election
agent;
(b) that the candidate and his election agent took
all reasonable means for preventing the
commission of corrupt practices at the election;
and
(c) that in all other respects the election was
free from any corrupt practice on the part of
the candidate or any of this agents, then the Court
may decide that the election of the returned
candidate is not void.
Explanation.- In this section the term “agent” has the
same meaning as in section 120.”
15. As seen from sub-section (1) of Section 102, the election of a
candidate can be declared void, under five different contingencies. They
are: (i) that the returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified
on the date of his election; (ii) that any corrupt practice has been
committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or b y any
other person with the consent of the returned candidate or h is agent;
(iii) that any nomination had been improperly rejected; (iv) that the details
furnished by the elected candidate under sub-section (1A) of Section 52
289
were fake; and (v) that the result of the election, insofar it concerns the
returned candidate, has been materially affected either by the improper
acceptance of any nomination or by any corrupt practice committed in
the interest of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election
agent or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of a ny vote or
the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with
the provisions of this Act or of any Rules or orders made thereunder.
16. Interestingly, sub-section (1) of Section 102 places the f irst
four contingencies listed in the preceding paragraph, {which are relatable
to clauses (a), (b), (c) and (ca) of sub-section (1) } on a different
footing than the fifth contingency { relatable to clause (d) }. The
difference between clauses (a), (b), (c) and (ca) on the one hand and
clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 102 on the other hand is this. For
setting aside an election under any one or more of the contingenci es
mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (ca), it is not nece ssary for the
Court to find if the result of the election, insofar as it concerns the returned
candidate, has been materially affected or not.
17. In contrast, for holding an election to be void on the ground of
improper acceptance of any nomination or the commission of a corrupt
practice by any other agent, but in the interest of the returned candidate
or the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception
of any vote which is void or non-compliance with the provisions of the
Act, the Rules or orders, the Court must be satisfied that the result of
the election has been materially affected.
18. In other words sub-section (1) of Section 102 places, (i) non-
qualification/disqualification of the returned candidate; (ii) commission
of any corrupt practice by the returned candidate or his election agent or
any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election
agent; (iii) the improper rejection of any nomination; and (iv) the furnishing
of details under Section 52(1A) which are fake, on a mu ch higher
pedestal. If a challenge is made to the election of a candidate on any one
of these four grounds, it is not necessary to show that the result of the
election has been materially affected.
19. Sub-section (1) of Section 102 places, (i) improper acceptance
of any nomination; (ii) commission of any corrupt practice in the interest
of the returned candidate, but by any agent other than his own election
agent; (iii) the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
reception of any vote which is void; and (iv) the non-compliance with
the provisions of the Act or any Rules or orders made thereunder, in one
group or class, where the Court is obliged to look into an additional factor
namely whether the result of the election was materially affected due to
any of these factors.
20. The expression “corrupt practice” is defined in Section 120
of the Act which reads as follows:
“120. Corrupt practices .- The following shall be
deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this
Act –
(1) “Bribery”, that is to say, -
(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or
his agent or by any other person with the consent of a
candidate or his election agent of any gratification, to
any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or
indirectly of inducing –
(a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to
withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate
at an election, or
(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting
at an election, or as a reward to –
(i) a person for having so stood, or not stood,
or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his
candidature; or
(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained
from voting;
(B) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any
gratification, whether as a motive or a reward –
(a) by a person for standing or not
standing as, or for withdrawing or not withdrawing
from being, a candidate; or
(b) by any person whomsoever for himself
or any other person for voting or refraining from voting,
or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote
291
or refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw
or not to withdraw his candidature.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause
the term ‘gratification’ is not restricted to pecuniary
gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it
includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of
employment for reward but it does not include the
payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for
the purpose of, any election and duly entered in the
account of election expenses referred to in Section 85.
(2) “Undue influence”, that is to say, any direct
or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the
part of the candidate, or his agent, or of any other person
with the consent of the candidate or his election agent;
with the free exercise of any electoral right:
Provided that –
(a) without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of this clause any such person as is referred
to therein who –
(i) threatens any candidate or any elector,
or any person in whom a candidate or an elector is
interested, with injury of any kind including social
ostracism and ex-communication or expulsion
from any caste or community; or
(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate
or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom
he is interested, will become or will be rendered an
object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be
deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the
electoral right of such candidate or elector within the
meaning of this clause;
(b) a declaration of public policy; or a promise
of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right
without intent to interfere with an electoral right shall
not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of
this clause.
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
(3) The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by
any other person with the consent of a candidate or his
election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any
person on the ground of his religion, race, caste,
community or language or the use of, or appeal to
religious symbols or the use of, or appeal to national
symbols such as the national flag or the national emblem
for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of
that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election
of any candidate:
Provided that no symbol allotted under any rules
made under this Act to a candidate shall be deemed to
be a religious symbol or a national symbol for the
purposes of this clause.
(4) The promotion of, or attempt to promote,
feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes
of the citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste,
community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or
any other person with the consent of a candidate or his
election agent for the furtherance of the prospects of
the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting
the election of any candidate.
(5) The publication by a candidate or his agent or
by other person, with the consent of a candidate or his
election agent, of any statement of fact which is false,
and which he either believes to be false or does not
believe to be true, in relation to the personal character
or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the
candidature, or withdrawal, of any candidate being a
statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the
prospects of that candidate’s election.
(6) The hiring or procuring, whether on payment
or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate
or his agent or by any other person with the consent of
a candidate or his election agent, or the use of such
vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector
(other than the candidate himself, the members of his
293
family or his agent) to or from any polling
station provided under section 45:
Provided that the hiring of a vehicle or vessel by
an elector or by several electors as their joint cost f or
the purpose of conveying him or them to and from any
such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not
be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause if
the vehicle or vessel so hired is a vehicle or vessel not
propelled by mechanical power:
Provided further that the use of any public transport,
vehicle or vessel or any tramcar or railway carriage by
any elector at his own cost for the purpose of going to
or coming from any such polling station or place fixed
for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt practice
under this clause.
Explanation.–In this clause, expression ‘vehicle’
means any vehicle used or capable of being used for
the purpose of road transport, whether propelled by
mechanical power or otherwise and whether used for
drawing other vehicles or otherwise.
(7) The incurring or authorising of expenditure in
contravention of section 85.
(8) The obtaining or procuring or abetting or
attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his
agent or, by any other person with the consent of a
candidate or his election agent, any assistance (other
than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of the
prospects of that candidate’s election, from any person
in the service of a Panchayat or of Government, and
belonging to any of the following classes, namely: -
(a) gazetted officers;
(b) members of police forces;
(c) excise officers;
(d) revenue officers; and
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
(e) such other class of persons in the
service of the Government as may be
prescribed;
Provided that where any person, in the service of
the Government and belonging to any of the classes
aforesaid, in the discharge or purported discharge of
his official duty, makes any arrangements or provides
any facilities or does any other act or thing, for, to, or in
relation to, any candidate or his election agent or any
other person acting with the consent of the candidate or
his election agent, (whether by reason of the office held
by the candidate or for any other reason), such
arrangements, facilities or act or thing shall not be
deemed to be assistance for the furtherance of the
prospects of that candidates election.
(9) Booth capturing by a candidate or his agent
or other person acting with the consent of the candidate
or his election agent.
Explanation 1.– In this section the any expression
“agent” includes an election agent, a polling agent and
any person who is held to have acted as an agent in
connection with the election with the consent of the
candidate.
Explanation 2.– For the purposes of clause (8), a
person shall be deemed to assist in the furtherance of
the prospects of a candidate’s election if he acts as an
election agent of that candidate.
Explanation 3 .– For the purposes of clause (8),
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the
publication in the Gazette of the appointment, resignation,
termination of service, dismissal or removal from service
of a person in the service of the Government or of a
Panchayat shall be conclusive proof –
(i) of such appointment, resignation,
termination of service, dismissal or removal from service,
as the case may be, and
295
(ii) where the date of taking effect of such
appointment, resignation, termination of service,
dismissal or removal from service as the case may be,
is stated in such publication; also of the fact that such
person was appointed with effect from the said date, or
in the case of resignation, termination of service,
dismissal or removal from service, such person ceased
to be in such service with effect from the said date.
Explanation 4 .– For the purposes of clause (9),
“booth capturing” shall have the same meaning as in
section 137.”
21. The argument of respondent No.1 is that the case would fall
squarely under Section 102(1)(ca), which deals with the furnishing of
details under Section 52(1A), but which are fake. Alternativ ely, it is
suggested that the case would fall under Section 102(1)(b) which deals
with the commission of any corrupt practice by the returned candidate.
Since the expression “corrupt practice” is defined in Section 120(2) to
include ‘undue influence with the free exercise of any electoral right’,
it is argued by the respondent No.1 that the case may fall under Section
102(1)(b) also, in view of the law laid down in Krishnamoorthy (supra)
22. We have our own doubts about the second limb of the argument
of the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1. The second limb of
his argument is that the failure to disclose correct information in Form
2A would tantamount to ‘undue influence on the free exercise of the
electoral right’, which comes within the definition of the expression
“corrupt practice” under section 120 of the Act. Inspiration for this
argument arises from the decision of this Court in Krishnamoorthy
(supra).
23. Interestingly, the decision of this Court in Krishnamoorthy
arose out of a judgment of the Madras High Court, authored by one of
us (VRS,J.)5. It was a case where the elected candidate failed to disclose
in the affidavit and declaration form accompanying the nomination, details
regarding the criminal cases pending against him. Such detai ls were
required to be furnished in terms of the Notification issued by the State
Election Commission in exercise of the powers conferred by Art icles
243-K and 243-ZA of the Constitution, read with the relevant provisions
5 The judgment of the Madras High Court dated 15-6-2009 was affirmed by this court.
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
of the various Tamilnadu State enactments dealing with loca l bodies.
The election of the returned candidate was challenged in that case under
the provisions of Section 259 read with Section 260 of the Tamil Nadu
Panchayats Act, 1994. While section 259 of the Tamil Nadu Act dealt
with the grounds on which an election can be declared as void, Section
260 of the Act defined what are corrupt practices. Section 2 59 of the
Tamil Nadu Act is similar, though not in pari materia to Section 102 of
the Kerala Act and Section 260 of the Tamil Nadu Act is simi lar to
Section 120 of the Kerala Act. Section 259(1) of the Tamil Nad u Act
and Section 102(1) of the Kerala Act are presented in a tabular column
so that the difference between them can be appreciated:
Section 259 of Tamil Nadu Act Section 102 of Kerala Act
259. Grounds for declaring
elections to be void
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (2), if the District Judge is of
opinion –
(a) that on the date of his election a
returned candidate was not qualified
or was disqualified, to be chosen as a
member under this Act, or,
(b) that any corrupt practice has
been committed by a returned
candidate or his agent or by any
other person with the consent of a
returned candidate or his agent, or
(c) that any nomination paper has
been improperly rejected, or
(d) that the result of the election
insofar as it concerns a returned
candidate has been materially
affected -
(i) by the improper acceptance of any
nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice
committed in the interests of the
returned candidate by a person other
than that candidate or his agent or a
person acting with the consent of
such candidate or agent, or
(iii) by the improper acceptance or
refusal of any vote or reception of any
vote which is void; or
(iv) by the non-compliance with the
provisions of this Act or of any rules
or orders made thereunder, the
Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void.
102. Grounds for declaring election to
be void. –
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) if the Court is of opinion –
(a) that on the date of his election a
returned candidate was not qualified, or
was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the
seat under this Act; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been
committed by a returned candidate or his
election agent or by any other person with
the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been
improperly rejected; or
(ca) that the details furnished by the
elected candidate under sub-section
(1A) of section 52 were fake; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far
as it concerns a returned candidate, has
been materially affected –
(i) by the improper acceptance of any
nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in
the interests of the returned candidate
by an agent other than his election
agent; or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal
or rejection of any vote or the reception
of any vote which is void; or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the
provisions of this Act or of any rules or
orders made thereunder, the Court shall
declare that the election of the returned
candidate to be void.
297
24. The crucial difference between the Tamil Nadu Act and the
Kerala Act, is the insertion of clause (ca) in sub-section (1) of Section
102. Sub-section (1A) of Section 52 and clause (ca) of sub-section (1)
of Section 102 were inserted by Kerala Panchayat Raj (Am endment)
Act, 30 of 2005. The decision in Krishnamoorthy arose at a time, place
and circumstance (i) when the disclosure regarding criminal antecedents
was made mandatory only under the Notifications of the State Election
Commission; and (ii) the non-disclosure was not yet made a ground in
the Statute, for declaring the election as void. Therefore, the Court found
(pro-actively), a provision already available in the Statute at that time,
namely ‘undue influence in the free exercise of electoral right ’ and
held that the non-disclosure had an undue influence on the free exercise
of choice of the voter.
25. The decision of the Madras High Court in Krishnamoorthy,
traces the historical perspective of the election law relating to disclosure
of criminal antecedents, as follows:
(i) In the year 1999, the Association for Democratic Reforms
filed a Writ Petition on the file of the Delhi High Court, seeking a direction
to the Union of India to implement the recommendations made by the
Law Commission in its 170th Report and to make necessary changes
under Rule 4 of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. On e of the
recommendations made by the Law Commission was for debarring a
candidate from contesting an election, if charges have been framed against
him by a Court in respect of certain offences and the necessity for the
candidates to furnish details of the criminal cases pending against them.
Apart from the recommendations of the Law Commission, the Association
for Democratic Reforms (hereinafter referred to as “ADR” for the sake
of brevity) also relied upon the Report of the Vohra Committee of the
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, which pointed out the
nexus between politicians and those accused of criminal offenc es. In
the light of the Reports of the Law Commission and the Vohra Committee,
ADR sought, in the writ petition filed before the Delhi H igh Court, a
direction to the Election Commission, to make it mandatory for every
candidate to provide information, by amending Forms 2- A to 2-E
prescribed under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
(ii) Though the Delhi High Court held, by its judgment dated
02.11.2000, that it is the function of the Parliament and not that of the
Court, to make necessary amendments in the Representatio n of the
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
People Act, 1951, the Delhi High Court nevertheless issued a direction
to the Election Commission to secure to the voters, the fol lowing
information, from the contesting candidates:-
“(a) Whether the candidate is accused of any offence
punishable with imprisonment and if so, the details;
(b) The assets possessed by a candidate, his or her
spouse and dependent relations;
(c) Facts giving insight into the candidate’s competence,
capacity and suitability for acting as an elected member,
including details of the educational qualifications;
(d) Information considered necessary by the Election
Commission for judging the capacity and capability of
the political party fielding the candidate for election.”
(iii) The above directions issued by the Delhi High Court was on
the basis that a citizen of the country, whether an elector or not, has a
fundamental right to receive information regarding the criminal activities
of a candidate. The High Court took the view that for makin g a right
choice, it is essential not to keep the antecedents of the candidate in the
dark, as it will not be in the interest of democracy and the well being of
the country.
(iv) The judgment of the Delhi High Court was taken on appeal to
this Court by the Union of India and it was taken up along with a Writ
Petition filed by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (re ferred to as
“PUCL” in short), under Article 32 seeking certain similar directions.
(v) After hearing elaborate arguments, this Court framed two
questions, as arising for consideration in the matter and they are as
follows:-
“(a) Whether the Election Commission is empowered
to issue directions, as ordered by the High Court?
(b) Whether a voter-a citizen of the country has a right
to get relevant information, such as the assets,
qualifications and involvement in offences, of candidates,
for being educated and informed for judging the suitability
of a candidate contesting the election as MP or MLA?”
299
(vi) After referring to various decisions, this Court summed up
the legal position in paragraph-46 of its decision. The contents of
paragraph-46 of the decision can be summarised in brief as follows:-
“(a) The jurisdiction of the Election Commission is wide
enough to include all powers necessary for the smooth
conduct of the elections, including the entire process of
election consisting of several stages and embracing
many steps;
(b) The limitation on the plenary character of power is
when Parliament or State Legislature has made a valid
law. In case the law is silent, Article 324 is a reservoir
of power. It is a residuary power and the phrase
“superintendence, direction and control” appearing
in Article 324 (1) should be construed liberally
empowering the Election Commission to issue orders;
(c) Fair election contemplates disclosure by the candidate
of his past, so as to give a proper choice to the candidate
according to his thinking and opinion. Even if this
stipulation is not very much effective for breaking a
vicious circle, it will be a step-in-aid for the voters not
to elect law breakers as law makers;
(d) To maintain the purity of elections and to bring about
transparency, the Commission can ask details of the
expenditure incurred by political parties;
(e) The right to get information in democracy is
recognised throughout as a natural right flowing from
the concept of democracy;
(f) If the field meant for Legislature and Executive is
left unoccupied, detrimental to public interest, the
Supreme Court would have ample jurisdiction
under Article 32 read with 141 and 142 of the
Constitution;
(g) Voters’ right to know the antecedents including the
criminal past of the candidate contesting in the election,
is much more fundamental and basic for the survival of
democracy.”
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
(vii) After summarising the law in paragraph-46, this Court issued
certain directions in paragraph-48, which read as follows:-
“48. The Election Commission is directed to call for
information on affidavit by issuing necessary order in
exercise of its power under Article 324 of the
Constitution of India from each candidate seeking
election to Parliament or a State Legislature as a
necessary part of his nomination paper, furnishing therein,
information on the following aspects in relation to his/
her candidature:
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/
discharged of any criminal offence in the past if any,
whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine.
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether
the candidate is accused in any pending case, of any
offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or
more, and in which charge is framed or cognizance is
taken by the Court of law. If so, the details thereof.
(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.)
of a candidate and of his/her spouse and that of
dependants.
(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are any
over dues of any public financial institution or government
dues.
(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate.”
(viii) Following the above decision, the Election Commission of
India decided to amend Forms 2-A to 2-E appended to the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961 and approached the Government of India seeking
suitable Amendments. But the ECI was informed by the Gover nment
that steps were being taken in consultation with all polit ical parties.
Therefore, finding that the time limit fixed by the Supreme Court in the
above case was running out, the ECI issued an order bearing No.3/ER/
2002/JS-II/Vol-III dated 28.6.2002 under Article 324 of the Constitution.
(ix) However, almost simultaneously with the issue of the above
order of the ECI, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance known
as “Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance 2002”. The
301
validity of the Ordinance was challenged by the People’s Union of Civil
Liberties and a few others under Article 32. During the pendency of the
proceedings, the Ordinance was repealed and the Representation of the
People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 was notified with retrospective
effect. By the Amendment, Sections 33-A and 33-B were inserte d to
the Act and they read as follows:-
“33-A. Right to information. — (1) A candidate shall,
apart from any information which he is required to
furnish, under this Act or the rules made thereunder, in
his nomination paper delivered under sub-section (1)
of Section 33, also furnish the information as to
whether —
(i) he is accused of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case in
which a charge has been framed by the Court of
competent jurisdiction;
(ii) he has been convicted of an offence other than any
offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),
or covered in sub-section (3), of Section 8 and sentenced
to imprisonment for one year or more.
(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case may be,
shall, at the time of delivering to the Returning Officer
the nomination paper under sub-section (1) of Section
33, also deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the candidate
in a prescribed form verifying the information specified
in sub-section (1).
(3) The Returning Officer shall, as soon as may be after
the furnishing of information to him under sub-section
(1), display the aforesaid information by affixing a copy
of the affidavit, delivered under sub-section (2), at a
conspicuous place at his Office for the information of
the electors relating to a constituency for which the
nomination paper is delivered.
33-B. Candidate to furnish information only under the
Act and the rules .— Notwithstanding anything contained
in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or any
direction,order or any other instruction issued by the
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
Election Commission, no candidate shall be liable to
disclose or furnish any such information, in respect of
his election, which is not required to be disclosed or
furnished under this Act or the rules made thereunder.”
Since the ordnance under challenge was replaced by
the Act,during the pendency of the proceedings, the
pleadings and the prayer in the writ petitions were
amended so as to confine the challenge to Section 33-
B.”
(x) Ultimately, a three Member Bench of this Court, in Peoples
Union of Civil Liberties, held Section 33-B of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, brought forth by the Third Amendment Act, 2002,
to be unconstitutional.
(xi) After this court declared Section 33-B to be unconstitutional,
the Election Commission of India issued revised orders dated 27.03.2003
requiring every candidate, at the time of filing his nomination paper for
any election to the Council of States, House of the People, Legislative
Assembly of a State or the Legislative Council of a State having such a
Council, to furnish full and complete information in regard to the matters
specified by this Court, in an affidavit, the format whereof was annexed
as Annexure-I to the order.
26. Despite the judgment of this Court in PUCL, Section 100 of
the Representation of the People Act,1951 was not amended so as the
make the non-disclosure or false disclosure, as one of the gr ounds for
declaring an election as void. Section 100 (1) continues to contain only
four grounds for declaring an election void. These four grounds are
comparable to clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 102 of the Kerala
Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. The special feature of the Kerala Act is the
insertion of clause (1-A) in Section 52 and the insertion of clause (ca) in
sub-section (1) of Section 102.
27. In the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as well as the
Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act (out of which the decisio n in
Krishnamoorthy arose) the candidate challenging an election had to
rely upon subordinate legislation to seek a declaration that the election
was void. Non-disclosure/false disclosure was not made availab le in
those Statutes themselves as one of the grounds for declaring an election
void. Therefore, the Court had to fall back upon the Rules and the Orders
303
of the Election Commission and bring those violations within the scope
of “undue influence” leading to “corrupt practice” which is available
as one of the grounds.
28. In so far as the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act is concerned, there
is no necessity, after the amendment under Act 30 of 2005 to tak e a
circuitous route. Non-disclosure and false disclosure can straight away
be traced to Section 52(1A) and 102(1)(ca) of the Act.
29. Coming back to Section 102(1)(ca), it enables a Court to declare
the election of a returned candidate to be void, if the details furnished by
him under Section 52(1A) are found to be “fake”. Interestingly the Statute
uses the expression “ fake” and not expressions such as “ false”,
“suppression” etc. The word “fake” is not defined in the Act. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines the word “ fake” to mean “ to make or
construct”. The Oxford Dictionary defines “fake” as follows:
“fake – º%adj. not genuine, º%n. a person or thing this
is not genuine, º% v.1. forge or counterfeit (something).
- %pretend to feel or suffer from (an emotion or illness).
2.(fake someone out ) N. Amer, informal trick or
deceive someone.
-DERIVATIVES faker n. fakery n.”
30. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon , (Volume
2, 5th Edition, 2017), the entry relating to the word “fake” simply directs
the reader to the entry relating to the word “ forgery”. Therefore, one
has to go to the entry relating to the word “ forgery” to understand the
meaning of the word “fake”. The entry relating to the word “forgery”
is quite long and it begins with a reference first to Section 463 of the
IPC, 1860 which defines “forgery”. The entire Entry reads as follows:-
“ Forgery . “Forgery” whoever makes any false
document or false electronic record, or part of a
document or electronic record, with intent to cause
damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to
support any claim or title, or to cause any person to
part with property, or to enter into any express or
implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or
that fraud may be committed commits forgery. [IPC
(45 of 1860), S. 463]
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
“A man’s signature of his own name may amount to
forgery.” [IPC (45 of 1860), S. 464, Expln. 1]
“While it is true that there is a distinction between fraud
and forgery, and forgery contains some elements that
are not included in fraud, forgeries are a species of
fraud. In essence, the crime of forgery involves the
making, altering, or completing of an instrument by
someone other than the ostensible maker or drawer
or an agent of the ostensible maker or drawer.” 37
CJS Forgery S. 2, at 66 (1997).
The fraudulent making or altering of an instrument that
apparently creates or alters a legal liability of another.
The offence of making a false instrument so that it can
be accepted as genuine.
The fraudulent imitation of a document or the writing or
signature of a signatory in order to pass it off as written
by another.
The fraudulent making or alteration of any record, deed,
writing, instrument, register, Stamp, etc. to the prejudice
of another man’s right. (4 Comm. 247.) A false making
of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud or
deceit; including every alteration of or addition to a
true instrument. (2 East’s P.Cc. 19, C. 1. 49. Tomlin)
Forgery has its origin in the French word ‘forger’ which
signifies:
“….to frame or fashion a thing as the smith doth his
work upon the anvil. And it is used in our law for the
fradulent making and publishing of false writings to
the prejudice of another man’s right. ( Termes de la
Ley).
In WEBSTER’S Comprehensive Dictionary,
International Edn., ‘forgery’ is defined as :
“The act of falsely making or materially altering, with
intent to defraud; any writing which, if genuine, might
be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal
liability.”
305
This definition as adopted in Rembert v. State, 25 AM
Rep. 639. In another case, namely State v. Phelps,
34 AM Dec 672, it was laid down that forgery is the
false making of any written instrument, for the purpose
of fraud or deceit. This decision appears to be based
on the meaning of forgery as set out in Tomlin’s.
Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd ., AIR
1996 SC 2592.
Forgery is the false making or materially altering with
intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine,
might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation
of a legal liability. (2 Bishop Cr. L. sect. 523; Rembert
v. State, 25 Am. Rep. 639).
OTHER DEFINITIONS. “The false making of any
written, instrument, for the purpose of fraud or deceit.”
(State v. Phelps, 34 Am. Dec. 672.) “The fraudulent
making or alteration of a written instrument to the
prejudice of the rights of another.” “The fraudulent
making of a false writing, which, genuine, would
apparently be of some legal efficacy.”
FORGERY, UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENT,
FALSE PRETENCES DISTINGUISHED. Where
the false pretence made use of to obtain money or
property is a written instrument, the resulting crime is
sometimes forgery or the uttering of a forged
instrument, and sometimes obtaining property by false
pretence. If the instrument used is false in itself and
is one which if genuine would create some right or
liability, obtaining property on the faith of it is forgery
or the uttering of a forged instrument as the case may
be. [People v. Peacock, 6 Con. (NY) 72]
Forgery constitutes fraud, and no legal title passes to
the transferee. [Thorappa Devanappa v. Umedmalji,
AIR 1924 Bom 205, 87 IC 226, 25 Bom LR 604; Brij
Basi v. Moti Ram, AIR 1982 All 323; Banku Behari
Sikdar v. Secretary of State for India in Council ,
(1909) ILR 36 Cal 239; Karachi Bank v. Kodumal
Kalumal, AIR 1923 Sind 54; Firm Kalka Pd Ram
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
Charan v. L Kunwar Lal Thapper , AIR 1957 All
104; Kodumal Kalumal v. Karachi Bank Ltd ., AIR
1921 Sind 172; Mahabir Prasad Bubna v. Union
Bank of India, AIR 1992 Cal 270]
Bankers are specially protected under special conditions
against claims based on forged documents [See the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, S. 85]
Since forging prejudices the person whose signature has
been forged, no action is maintainable on the
promissory note even against the real executant of
the note. [Satya Narayan Tewari v. Sital Missir, AIR
1934 Rang 345, 153 IC 631]”
31. A reading of the above entry in the Law Lexicon shows that
the word “forgery” has its origin in French, signifying “the framing or
fashioning of a thing as the smith doth his work upon th e anvil.”
Essentially “forgery” appears to include the false making of any writing.
32. Thus, it appears from the above that the elements of forgery
are also identified as the ingredients of faking something.
33. If the false making of an instrument is a common ingredient of
“faking” and “ forgery”, the non-disclosure in Form No.2A of the
conviction suffered by the appellant in the past, may certa inly come
within Section 102(1)(ca). The reason for this is that a person having
criminal antecedents, poses himself to be one witho ut any such
antecedent, when he fails to make a true disclosure. In law, he passes
off or comes out as a person without any criminal antecedent. Therefore,
the failure to make a true disclosure in Form 2A, regarding the past
conviction, will certainly come within the meaning of the word ‘fake’,
mentioned in clause (ca) of sub-section (1) of Section 102.
34. It may be true, as contended by Shri Ragenth Basant, learned
counsel for the appellant that Rule 6, in terms of which Form No.2A has
been drafted, is a subordinate legislation, which cannot go beyo nd the
scope of Section 52(1A). But unfortunately for the appellant, Rule 6 is
not under challenge on the ground that it is ultra vires the Act. Therefore,
the appellant cannot now be heard to contend that Rule 6 cannot travel
beyond or enlarge the scope of Section 52(1A).
307
35. If not for Rule 6 and Form No.2A, it is possible to accept the
argument that the requirement under Section 52(1A) is limited t o “the
disclosure of involvement in a criminal case at the time of filing of
the nomination”. At the time of filing of the nomination, the appellant
was not involved in any criminal case.
36. We do not agree with the argument of Shri P.V. Surendranath,
learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 that the phrase “involvement
in a criminal case” would include past conviction also, especially when
Section 52(1A) uses the rider “at the time of filing of the nomination”.
37. In our considered view, the words “involvement in a criminal
case at the time of filing of the nomination ” would only mean (i)
cases where a criminal complaint is pending investigation/trial; (ii) cases
where the conviction and/or sentence is current at the time of fil ing of
the nomination; and (iii) cases where the conviction is the subject matter
of any appeal or revision pending at the time of the nomination.
38. Therefore, in the absence of Rule 6 and Form No.2A we
could have easily concluded that the case of the appellant w ill not be
covered by Section 52(1A) as he was not involved in any criminal case
on the date of the nomination. But Rule 6 and Form No.2A taken together
with what the law means to be “ fake”, makes things difficult for the
appellant.
39. We have extracted in paragraph 9 above, the relevant portion
of Form No.2A. Column No.1 in Form 2A requires the details not only
of the criminal cases pending trial before the Court but also the criminal
cases in which the contestant was convicted. The contestant is required
to furnish in Form No.2A, details regarding the cases in which he is
punished, the case number, the Court, the offences for which punishment
was awarded, the nature of the punishment and the details regardi ng
appeal or revision etc. Therefore, Form No.2A goes far beyon d the
requirement of Section 52(1A). The appellant admittedly failed to furnish
details of his past conviction in Form No.2A. Therefore, the ground on
which his election was sought to be declared void, falls squarely within
Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act.
40. But that is not all. The offences for which the appellant was
eventually convicted, were under Section 38 read with Section 52 of the
Kerala Police Act, 1960 (Act 5 of 1961).
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
41. Section 38 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 reads as follows:
“38. Persons bound to conform to reasonable
directions of police.— (1) All persons shall be bound
to conform to the reasonable direction of a police officer
given in fulfilment of any of the duties enjoined on, or in
exercise of any of the powers vested in him under this
Act.
(2) A police officer may restrain or remove any person
resisting or refusing or omitting to conform to any such
direction as aforesaid.”
42. Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act,1960 reads as follows:
“52. Penalty for failure to conform to lawful and
reasonable directions of police officers .— Every
person who disobeys any direction given by a police
officer under this Act or rules made thereunder shall on
conviction be liable to fine not exceeding two hundred
rupees.”
43. It could be seen from both the above provisions that t he
conviction of the appellant was actually for the disobedienc e of the
directions issued by a police officer. This was admittedly in connection
with a dharna which the appellant staged in front of the Panchayat
office, along with a group of his supporters. Therefore, the question that
we are obliged to consider is as to whether the non-disclos ure of the
conviction for such offences would also come within the purvie w of
Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act.
44. As we have seen from the way in which the law developed
from the decision in Association for Democratic Reforms (supra), the
primary object of compelling the disclosure of criminal antecedents of
candidates contesting the elections, is to decriminalize p olitics and to
make the voters aware of the choice that they have. This is why this
Court was very careful in formulating the principles of law, in paragraph
94 of the decision in Krishnamoorthy (supra). Paragraph 94 of the
decision in Krishnamoorthy (supra) may be usefully extracted as
follows:-
“94. In view of the above, we would like to sum up our
conclusions:
309
94.1. Disclosure of criminal antecedents of a
candidate, especially, pertaining to heinous or serious
offence or offences relating to corruption or moral
turpitude at the time of filing of nomination paper as
mandated by law is a categorical imperative.
94.2. When there is non-disclosure of the
offences pertaining to the areas mentioned in the
preceding clause, it creates an impediment in the fre e
exercise of electoral right.
94.3. Concealment or suppression of this
nature deprives the voters to make an informed and
advised choice as a consequence of which it would come
within the compartment of direct or indirect interference
or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the right
to vote by the electorate, on the part of the candidate.
94.4. As the candidate has the special
knowledge of the pending cases where cognizance has
been taken or charges have been framed and there is a
non-disclosure on his part, it would amount to undue
influence and, therefore, the election is to be declared
null and void by the Election Tribunal under Section
100(1)(b) of the 1951 Act.
94.5. The question whether it materially affects
the election or not will not arise in a case of this nature.”
45. While offences under the Indian Penal Code or under special
enactments such as Prevention of Corruption Act, Arms Act and so on
and so forth are substantive offences, the commission of w hich may
make a person a criminal, an offence under certain enactments such as
Kerala Police Act are not substantive offences. Just as strike is a weapon
in the hands of the workmen and lock-out is a weapon in the hands of
the employer under Labour Welfare legislations, protest is a tool in the
hands of the civil society and police action is a tool in the hands of the
Establishment. All State enactments such as Kerala Police Act, Madras
Police Act etc., are aimed at better regulation of the poli ce force and
they do not create substantive offences. This is why these Acts themselves
empower the police to issue necessary directions for the ma intenance
RAVI NAMBOOTHIRI v. K.A. BAIJU & ORS.
[V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]
of law and order and the violation of any of those directions is made a
punishable offence under these Acts.
46. Once the object behind the provisions of the Kerala Police
Act are understood, it would be clear that neither Section 52(1A) rea d
with Rule 6 and Form 2A nor Section 102(1)(ca) of the Act nor the
decisions in Association for Democratic Reforms , People’s Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) or Krishnamoorthy can be stretched to
such an extent that the failure of the appellant to disclose his conviction
for an offence under the Kerala Police Act for holding a dharna in front
of the Panchayat office, is taken as a ground for declaring an election
void.
47. It may be of interest to note that the Kerala Police Act, 1960
repealed (i) the Travancore-Cochin Police Act, 1951; and (ii) the Madras
District Police Act, 1859 as applied to the Malabar District referred to in
Section 5(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. It also repealed the
provisions of (i) the Police Act, 1861; and (ii) the Madras City Police
Act, 1888, which were earlier extended to the Malabar District . Thus
Kerala Police Act, 1960 is actually the successor legislation of certain
police enactments of the colonial era, whose object was to sc uttle the
democratic aspirations of the indigenous population. This aspect should
be kept in mind before applying blindfold, the principle ‘what is sauce
for the goose is sauce for the gander ’.
48. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Distr ict
Court and the High Court were wrong in declaring the election of t he
appellant to be void on the ground that the failure of the appe llant to
disclose in Form 2A, his conviction under the Kerala Police Act amounted
to ‘undue influence on the free exercise of the electoral r ight’ and
also a violation of Section 52(1A) read with Section 102(1)(ca) of the
Kerala Panchayat Raj Act. Hence, the appeals are allowed, the impugned
orders are set aside and the Election Petition filed by respondent No.1 is
dismissed. No costs.
Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Rahul Kumar, LCRA)