Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Phillips (i) Ltd and Ors.
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order dated 9.12.2016
passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby the writ petiti on filed by
respondent No. 1 1 was allowed and the proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 2 were declared to have lapsed in terms of
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparenc y in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 3.
2. The process of acquisition of land admeasuring 50,000 Bighas
situated in 12 villages for the planned development of Delhi started way
back in 1980. The intention to acquire the land was published vi de
notification dated 5.11.1980 in respect of land situated in villag es of
Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Neb Sarai, Hauz Khas
and Khirki, and vide notification dated 25.11.1980 in respect of the land
situated in villages Chattarpur, Satbari Maidangarhi, Sayoorpur and Rajpur
Khurd. The declarations under Section 6 of the Act were published on
27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986 and the award were
announced on 20.5.1987 or thereafter.
3. M/s. Satluj Bhatta Co. through its partners 4 (1) Shri Ishwar
Chander Gupta; (2) Shri Hari Chand; and (3) Shri Jai Chand were owners
of land admeasuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa. An agreement to sel l was
executed by them on 25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08
Biswa with the purchaser. Thereafter, the purchaser is s aid to have
purchased the land in question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and
27.2.1991.
4. The purchaser for the first time in written synopsis, filed after
the conclusion of the arguments, asserted that the original land owners
in respect of land measuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa situated in reve nue
estate of Village Sayoorpur, had filed a Writ Petition No. 2736 of 1985
titled as Ishwar Chand Gupta v. Union of India before the High Court.
We requisitioned the records of the said writ petition from the High
Court. It transpires that the writ petition was filed on or about 30.10.1985
on the ground that the notification dated 20.5.1985 under Section 6 of
1 For short, the ‘purchaser’
2 For short, the ‘Act’
3 For short, the ‘2013 Act’
4 Hereinafter referred to as “Original land owners”
1199
the Act had been published after a period of more than thre e years of
the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 25.11.1980. There is no
assertion that the original land owners had filed any objecti ons under
Section 5A of the Act. The said writ petition was dismissed on 2.12.1985
when the following order was passed:
“For the reasons recorded in Civil Writ No. 426 of 1981 titled
Muni Lal & Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others decided
on 15 th November, 1983 and Civil Writ 2850 of 1985 titled Hemant
Sharma and Others Vs. Union of India and others decided on 25 th
November, 1985, the petition is without merit. Dismissed.”
5. The Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4169 of 1986 filed against
the said order was withdrawn on 12.9.1989 with two other petiti ons.
The order passed by this Court reads as thus:
“These three special leave petitions along with several other cases
were heard together. They are directed against the ju dgment of
the Delhi High Court rejecting the writ petitions of the pres ent
petitioners challenging a notification issued under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act. It is stated by Mr. Chitale, the lear ned
counsel for the petitioners in the Special Leave Petition No. 1224
of 1986 that on a subsequent writ petition filed by another interested
party, the High Court has struck down the subsequent notification
issued under Section 6 of the Act and in the circumstances the
present special leave petitions have become infructuous and will
not be pressed. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondents
has refuted the proposition. He says that the subsequent judgment
of the Delhi High Court may be impugned in this Court and if the
challenge is successful, the petitioners who are not parties to that
case will not be in a position to take any advantage out of the
afore-said judgment of the High Court. Alternatively, the learned
counsel for the respondents has contended that even if the s aid
notification issued under Section 6 finally stands quashed, the
authorities will be entitled to issue a fresh notification under Section
6 on the basis of the Section 4 notification which has been
unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioners in the present case.
We do not consider it necessary to decide the question as to
whether the special leave petitions have become infructuo us or
not and whether on their withdrawal by the petitioners th ey are
going to suffer in the long run as the learned counsel for the
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
petitioners, even after we made this position clear to them, stated
that the S.L.Ps. would not be pressed. Since the petitioners a re
withdrawing the S.L.Ps. at their own risk, the same are dismissed
as withdrawn. There will be no order as to costs.”
6. The process of acquisition was challenged in a number of other
writ petitions before the High Court and stay of dispossession was granted
therein even before the notification under Section 6 of the A ct was
published. One of such writ petitions was Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi 5. The validity of the declarations under Section 6 of the Act
was challenged inter-alia on the ground that the acquisition proceedings
stood lapsed in view of the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 fixing time limit
for publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Such question
was examined by the Full Bench of the High Court in a judgment dated
27.5.1987 reported as Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India 6. The Full
Bench held that the period during which the acquisition proceedings were
stayed should be excluded while determining the validity of the declaration
under Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, it was found that the notification
under Section 6 of the Act was within the time fixed by the statute. The
matter was remitted to the Division Bench as the Full Bench was of the
view that it would not be convenient or possible for the Full Bench to
consider and pronounce the numerous contentions which may be raised
in each one of the 73 petitions.
7. The Division Bench decided all the writ petitions in the judgment
reported as Shri B.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors. 7 when the
following operative order was passed on 14.10.1988:
“The orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5A and
the notifications issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act together with further land acqu isition
proceedings in all the above writ petition are quashed and se t
aside with cost. There shall be two set of counsel’s fee s at Rs.
1,500/- each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in the
two writ petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counter
affidavits in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets
of petitions with counter affidavits. The rule is made ab solute.
‘Reasons to follow’’.
5 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321
6 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-I’, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 2 27 : AIR 1987 Del 239
7 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-II’, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)
1201
8. The High Court upon recording the reasons on 18.11.1988 set
aside the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act as the writ petitioner
was neither given an opportunity of personal hearing, nor was he actually
heard in the objections filed by the landowners under Section 5A of the
Act and since there was no record maintained for consideration of large
number of objections filed by the writ petitioners/landowners. It was
held that the writ petitioner whose land is being taken by the Government
without his consent has a right to know the reasons as to why his claim
for exemption was being declined. It was held as under:
“16. We may note that there are number of other contentions
raised by the petitioner in the writ petition apart from t he ones
that are mentioned and considered above. We need not go into all
of them and given any finding, since we have already come to the
conclusion that reports under Section 5A and orders under Section
6 cannot be sustained in law on the basis of the contentions already
noted by us.”
9. Many landowners filed writ petitions before the High Cour t
challenging the action of the Delhi Administration to take p ossession
from them even though the declaration under Section 6 of the Act stood
quashed in its entirety in Balak Ram-II . The High Courtin a judgment
reported as Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 8 held on 15.5.1989
that the action of the respondents to take the posse ssion from the
landowners was not sustainable. Thus, the benefit of the judgment was
extended to all the landowners as the entire notification under Section 6
of the Act was found to be quashed. The Court passed the foll owing
order:
“This order will dispose of CW 1373-75/89.............ille gible.
Proceedings u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act right upto the
stage of Award relating to villages, namely, Khan Pur Deoli @
Devli, Tughlakabad, Khirkee, Neb Sarai, Said-ul-Ajaib, Tig ri,
Shayoor Pur, Satbari, Chattar Pur, Raj Pur Khurd, Maidan Ghari,
have been quashed by a Division Bench of this Court in Balak
Ram Gupta vs. U.O.I. C.W.P. 1639/85 decided on 14th October,
1988/18th November, 1988. The prayer of the petitioners is that
in spite of that Judgment, the respondents are trying to t ake
possession of the land.
8 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
2. The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi Developm ent
Authority have taken up a very fair stand before us . Their
contention is that certain land owners have received compensation
and as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land till
the compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration w ith
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date they received
the payment till the date they have refunded the amount. The
contention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further stated
by learned counsel for the respondents that no effort would be
made to take possession of any land from anybody and t he
possession already taken of these lands will be restored back to
the land owners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if made
with interest. It is further con-tended that in certain case s, the
land owners have been allotted alternate plots in leiu of their land
having been acquired and in those cases the alternate plots must
be surrendered before the land owners can take advantage of the
quashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioner accepts
this suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct that
the possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed e xcept in
cases where the compensation has been received by the la nd
owners or alternate plots have been allotted until the compensation
amount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for the
petitioners agree that the land owners who have rec eived
compensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrender
the same as indicated above within two months from today. All
other land owners who have neither received compensation nor
any alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the wa y they
like and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents.
Delhi Administration will see to it that the Revenue rec ords are
amended accordingly. The proper authority i.e. the Land
Acquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with
12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of the
alternate plots when and if offered. The writ petitions are disposed
of in these terms.”
10. The Union of India sought review of the order passed (RA
No. 2766 of 1989) in the all the matters. The review was dismissed on
6.7.1990 on the ground that since the entire notification stands quashed,
therefore, Union cannot keep the possession.
1203
11. The said judgment and order of the Division Bench in Balbir
Singh came up for consideration before this Court in a judgment reported
as Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh in Civil Appeal No.
3847 of 1991 and Civil Appeal Nos. 3801-3847/1991 9. This Court
dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India or by the Delhi
Development Authority on 20.9.1991 except to the extent that the land
of Village Saidul Azab was not part of the writ petiti ons which were
decided in Balak Ram-II .
12. The order of the High Court in C.W.P. No. 2657/85 Abhey
Ram vs. Union of India dated 2.9.1987 was passed in the writ petition
filed by the land owners of Village Khirkee on the ground th at the
notification dated 7.6.1985 under Section 6 of the Act has been issued
after three years of the publication of the notification under Section 4 of
the Act on 5.11.1980. In the said case also, the land owners had not filed
any objections under Section 5A of the Act. The writ p etition was
dismissed. The order of the High Court reads thus:-
“It transpires that this petition challenges the Notification under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 7th June, 1985. The
validity of this Notification has already been upheld by a Full Bench
of this Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India,
CWP No. 1639/85 decided on 27th May, 1987. No other point is
pressed. The writ petition is consequently dismissed”.
13. The said order was the subject matter of appeal before this
Courtin a judgment reported as Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India
& Ors.10 . A three judge Bench in the said judgment inter-alia examined
an argument raised that the benefit of quashing of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act by the High Court in Balak Ram-II should be
extended to the appellants, though the notification had been quashed qua
the writ petitioners before the High Court. This Court ex amined the
question as to whether a declaration under Section 6 of the Ac t in its
entirety stands quashed even when the Court had quashed the declaration
in the case of the land owners who had filed writ petitions after their
objections were not considered under Section 5-A of the Act. This Court
noticed that unfortunately, the operative part of t he judgment (as
reproduced in para 7 of this judgment) in Balak Ram-II had not been
9 (1997) 5 SCC 430
10 (1997) 5 SCC 421
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
brought to the notice of this Court in Sudan Singh. It was held that such
judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of the case as
unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in its entirety specifically,
it does not mean that the entire declaration has been quashed. It was
noticed that the appellants had not filed any objections to t he notice
issued under Section 5-A. This Court held as under:
“9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. UOI and others,
37(1989) Delhi Law Times 150 are obvious with reference to
the quashing of the publication of the, declaration under Section 6
vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein....
10. The question then arises is: whether the quashing of th e
declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other matters
would enure the benefit to the appellants also ? Though, prim a
facie, the argument of the learned counsel is attractive, on deeper
consideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention of
Mr. Sachhar. When the Division Bench expressly limited the
controversy to the quashing of the declaration qua th e writ
petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would be
that the declaration published under Section 6should stand upheld.
11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered,
the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants
had filed the special leave petition in this Court. If it were a case
entirely relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by
the High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to others
also, though they did not file any petition, except to those whose
lands were taken possession of and were vested in the State under
Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. But
it is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to the
quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the persons
qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, the
benefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by the
Division Bench does not enure to the appellants.
12. It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect
of such a quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan
Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : (1991) 45 DLT 602] . But, unfortunately,
in that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlier
has not been brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the
1205
ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. It is also
true that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya case [(1991) 4
SCC 531] this Court had also observed that it would enure the
benefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the notification
under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration
under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declarati on
under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if the
entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is see n that the
appellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued under
Section 5-A.”
14. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. 11 ,
this Court held that the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram is
binding in preference to the judgment of the two Judges in Sudan Singh .
This Court held as under:
“7. We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh case [(1997)
5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] a two-Judge Bench of this Court
confirmed another judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein the
High Court had allowed the writ petition on the basis that the
judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 had quashed
the Section 6 declaration wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] too no objections
were filed by the owners under Section 5-A. But, we are governed
by the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram
case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] where the said
Bench not only referred to the effect of the Division Bench
judgment of the High Court dated 18-11-1988 but also referred to
the judgment of the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] . The three-Judge
Bench in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] is
binding on us in preference to the judgment of the two Judges
in Sudan Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602].
8. In connection with owners or persons interested who have not
filed objections under Section 5-A, in principle, it must be accepted
that they had no objection to the Section 4 notification operating in
respect of their property. On the other hand, in respe ct of those
who filed objections, they might have locus standi to contend that
11 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-I’ (1999) 7 SCC 4 4
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
the Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted properly. We, therefore,
agree in principle with the view of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey
Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] that those
who have not filed objections under Section 5-A, could not be
allowed to contend that the Section 5-A enquiry was bad and that
consequently the Section 6 declaration must be struck down and
that then the Section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, no
objections were filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6
declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are
concerned.
9. But learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contends that
the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta
case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)] had quashed the entire Section
5-A proceedings and that even in case the respondents had filed
objections, the position would not have been different. We cannot
accept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of those
who did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objections
under Section 5-A, the said notification must be treated as being
in force. The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that
in some other cases, the notification was quashed and that such
quashing would also enure to their benefit.
10. Then coming to the effect of the judgment of the Division
Bench dated 18-11-1988 of the High Court, we are of the view
that the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997)
5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] has interpreted or declared the
effect of the said High Court judgment dated 18-11-1988. That
judgment is binding on us. We cannot go by the two-Judge Bench
judgment in Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991)
DLT 602] because we are bound by the judgment of the three-
Judge Bench in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997)
5 SC 354] . Further, the judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5
SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] takes notice of Sudan Singh
case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] and it cannot be
contended that they have not looked fully into the judgment
in Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602]
or fully into the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)].
Nor is the dismissal of the special leave petition in B.L. Sharma
1207
case a precedent which can outweigh Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC
421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] . The opinion of the legal department of
the Government or the Delhi Development Authority which i s
relied upon — apart from not having binding force, cannot
override Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC
354].”
15. In another judgment reported as Delhi Administration v.
Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.12 , this Court considered the Interlocutory
Applications filed by the landowners in Gurdip Singh Uban-I after the
dismissal of review petition on 24-11-1999. This Court, while deciding
such applications noticed that the brief operative order in Balak Ram-
II in each of the 73 writ petitions was not noticed in Sudan Singh. It
was held as under:
“42. On fresh consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion
that Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] was decided correctly — if
we may say so with great respect — and that the latter orde r of
the Division Bench in the writ petitions in the batch in Balak Ram
Gupta [ B.R. Gupta v. Union of India , (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)
(order dated 14-10-1988)] must be confined to the writ absolute
orders dated 14-10-1988 in each of those 73 writ petitions and to
the land covered thereby, because the objections filed were personal
to each case and there was no argument before the Division Bench
or even before us that there was no public purpose or that there
was colourable exercise of power. We are of the view that the
Division Bench of the High Court in its latter order dated 18-11-
1988 containing reasons could not in law have quashed the Section
5-A inquiry and Section 6 declaration covering all other cases not
before the Division Bench when no question going to the root and
covering all cases arose, and contrary to the writ absolute issued
in each case. The order dated 14-10-1988, in our view, would
control the order dated 18-11-1988 and would restrict the same.”
16. With this background, the facts of the present case need to be
examined. The original land owners entered into agreement to sel l on
25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa comprising in Khasra
No. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16),381 (1-2), 383 (4-16), 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6),
386/1 (1-18), 386/2 (2-18), 389 (4-16), 390 (4-6), 391 (4-6), 392/1 (1-0),
12 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-II’, (2000) 7 SCC 296
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
392/2 (3-16), 394 (4-16), 395/1 (0-04), 395/2 (3-0), 396 (4-6) with the
purchaser. The agreement to sell inter-alia recites as under:
“AND WHEREAS some of the owners of the land of the above
village challenged the acquisition proceedings in the High Court
of Delhi. The Hon’ble Court was pleased to release the enti re
above lands from acquisition, the main judgment being passed in
Civil Writ 1639/85 decided on 14-10/18-11-1988 titled “Balak Ram
Gupta Vs. UOI”, Delhi Administration has not filed any appeal
and at present the above lands are free from acquisition.”
17. The agreement further states that the Land Acqu isition
Collector had taken possession and paid compensation to the owners of
Khasra No. 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6) and 390 (4-6) and in terms of the order
passed (though not mentioned specifically but the reference is to the
order passed in Balbir Singh ), the compensation has been paid back
and, thus, Khasra Numbers stand released from acquisition.
18. Thereafter, the purchaser is said to have purchased th e land
in question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991. Though, it is
argued by the appellant that the sale deed was not registe red, but Mr.
Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the respondent-purchaser stated
that the sale deeds were registered. However, that is not a relevant
consideration at this stage for the issues arising in the present appeal as
we proceed on the basis that land was purchased by the purchas er.
19. The purchaser filed a writ petition before the High Cou rt
reported as Godfrey Phillips v. Union of India 13 . The said writ petition
along with the other two writ petitions were dismissed by the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court on 18.11.2005. The High Court recorded
a finding that the vendors of the writ petitioners including the purchasers
have not filed any writ petition and have thus accepted the acquisition
proceedings. The High Court held as under:
“13. …The only inference that can be drawn from these facts is
that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners.h1d acquiesced
to the proceedings and the petitioners had remained content with
their acquiescing only a right to claim compensation for the land
purchased by them as they could not acquire by reason of the
said purchase the locus to challenge the proceedings. Even if the
13 2005(125) Delhi Law Times 207
1209
petitioners could legally maintain petitions to assail the validity of
the proceedings, they did nothing from 1991 till 2005 to agitate the
matter in any forum or Court to have the proceedings quashed.
xx xx xx
24. That apart, the right to challenge the notifications available to
the original land owners having been lost by the original owners
by their acquiescence and silence till the year 1991 when the land
was transferred to the petitioner, there was no question of any
such right being exercised bythe transferees 15 years thereafte r.
The inaction and acquiescence of the owners before the sa le of
the land in favour of the petitioners would by itself conclude the
controversy. But even if one were to look at the delay from the
point of the petitioners also, there is no explanation whatsoev er
for their silence from 1991 when they purchased the land till 2005
when they actually filed the petitions.”
20. The Special Leave Petition (c) No. 4642 of 2006 filed against
the said judgment was dismissed on 8.2.2010 along with other Civil
Appeals reported as Om Parkash Vs. Union of India 14 .
21. It was thereafter that the purchaser filed another writ petition
after the commencement of the 2013 Act for declaring that the acquisition
proceedings stand lapsed under Section 24. The purchaser asserted that
the possession of Khasra Nos. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-2), 383
(4-16), 386/1 Min (0-4) and 386/2 Min (0-6) were never taken by t he
revenue authorities, meaning thereby that the physical possessi on has
always been retained by the owners of the said land. The pray er in the
writ petition filed was for quashing of the notification under Sections 4
and 6 of the Act, and the award in respect of land measuring 28 Bigha 8
Biswa, forming part of revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling in
Tehsil Saket, Delhi. The purchaser also claimed a Mandamus to handover
vacant and peaceful possession of the land measuring 28 Bigha 8 Biswa.
The prayer reads thus:
“(ii) MANDAMUS directing, commanding and requiring’ the
Respondents to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the
agricultural land Khasra Nos. 376 (4·6), 377 (4·16), ,381 Min (1
·2), 383 (4·16), 384 (4·6), 385 (4·6), 386/1 Min (0·4), 386/2 Min
14 (2010) 4 SCC 17
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
(O·G) and 390 (4·6) admeasuring 28 Bighas and 8 Biswa forming
part of the revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling in Tehsil
Saket, New Delhi since the acquisition proceedings in res pect
thereof have lapsed in terms of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act.”
22. The stand of the appellant in the counter affidavit before the
High Court was that since the acquisition proceedings have atta ined
finality, there cannot be any lapsing of something which ha s already
achieved finality under the Act. The appellant stated as under:
“(i) I say that the present writ petition is liable to b e dismissed
since there is no question of the acquisition proceedings having
been lapsed. It is submitted that the challenge to the acquisition
proceedings of Award no. 10/87-88 has already attained finality
and there can be no Indirect challenge to the acquisitio n of the
land, which has already assumed finality under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
It would not be out of place to mention here that with the l and
owners having failed in their challenge to the acquisition under
the provisions of ‘The Land Acquisition Act, 1894’, the petitioner
cannot now turn around and say that the acquisition proceedings
was pending and has lapsed.
xx xx xx
l) I say that the physical possession of the acquired land falling in
khasra no. 384(4-16), 385(4-06) &390(4-06) in village Shayoorpur
has been handed over to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development
Authority on 14.07.87 by the LAC/Land & Building Department,
Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi however physica l
possession of khasra no 386/1 Min. (0-04), 386/2 Min(0-06), 376(4-
16), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-02), 383(4-16) has not been handed
over to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development Authority by the
LAC/Land & Building Department, Govt. of National Capital
Territory of Delhi.”
23. The High Court vide the order impugned found that an amount
of Rs.3,87,360/- was refunded by way of Cheque No. 361656 by the
original landowner on 11.7.1989 but since the encashment of cheque
was not confirmed, the purchaser offered to deposit the s aid amount
1211
twice over along with interest, which as on 30.11.20 16, comes to
Rs.16,61,774/-. The High Court accepted the offer made by the purchaser
and held that proceedings stand lapsed.
24. The purchaser filed additional documents before this Court by
way of I.A. No. 50154 of 2022. It has been asserted as under:
“(i) Lands of which possession was taken over by wa y of
Possession proceedings (Kabza Karyawahi) on 14.7.1987 by LAC
and compensation was paid are bearing Kh. No. 384(4-16), 385(4-
6) & 390(4-6) total measuring 12 Bighas and 18 Biswas of Village
Sayoorpur, Delhi.
(ii) Lands of which possession has not been taken but allegedly
compensation amount was placed in RD with LAC, bear Kh. No.
376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4),
386/2 min. (0-6) total measuring 15 Bighas and 10 Biswas of
Village Sayoorpur, Delhi.”
25. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the purchaser
has no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of judgment
of this Court reported as Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi 15 and
three Judge Bench Judgment in M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore
Development Authority 16 .
26. It was further contended that the judgment in Balbir Singh
directing the land owners to deposit the amount of compensation along
with interest ceases to be a binding precedent in view of the judgment of
this Court in Abhey Ram when the judgment in Sudan Singh was not
found to be the correct law. Such proposition that Sudan Singh was not
the correct proposition of law was reiterated in Gurdip Singh Uban-I .
Once the subsequent judgments in Abhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban-
I have held that Sudan Singh was not correctly decided, it would
necessarily mean that the judgment in Balbir Singh ceases to be of any
relevance or a binding precedent.
27. On the other hand, Mr. Kapil Sibal argued that the writ petition
was disposed of on the short ground of lapsing of the acquisition in view
of Section 24 of the 2013 Act but in other similar matters, this Court has
remanded back the matters to the High Court for fresh deci sion after
15 (2008) 9 SCC 177
16 (2015) 17 SCC 1
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
the decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority v.
Manoharlal & Ors. 17 . It was also contended that the subsequent
purchaser has a right to claim lapsing of the acquisition proceedings in
view of the judgment of this Court in Government (NCT of Delhi) v.
Manav Dharam Trust & Anr. 18
28. In the written submissions filed, the purchaser made a reference
to the land comprising in 384(4-16), 385(4-6) & 390(4-6) 12 Bigha 18
Biswa land as Part A ; whereas the land comprising in Khasra Nos.
376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4), 386/2
min. (0-6) total measuring 15 Bigha and 10 Biswa was referred to as
Part B land. In respect of Part A land, the argument was that
compensation was paid but in view of the order of the Hi gh Court in
Balbir Singh , the original land owner had paid back the amount of
compensation by cheque. It was further submitted, that i n the absence
of any proof of encashment of cheque, the High Court in the impugned
order, directed the purchaser to pay the amount of Rs. 16,61,774/- and
such amount stands paid. Therefore, in respect of s uch land, the
compensation had not been paid in law. In respect of Part B land, the
argument was that the amount of compensation had not been paid nor
has the possession been taken.
29. We do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learned
counsel for the purchaser. The writ petition was fi led after the
commencement of the 2013 Act on a short question that the acquisition
proceedings stand lapsed. This Court in Indore Development Authority
has held that twin conditions have to be satisfied before proceedings can
be said to be lapsed i.e., possession not taken and/or compensation not
paid. This Court examining the question of payment or deposit in the
light of the Standing Order No. 28 issued in 1909 by the State of Punjab
and as applicable to Delhi also, provided five modes of payment in Paras
74 and 75. It has been held as under:
“226.Thus, in our opinion, the word “paid” as used in Section 24(2)
does not include within its meaning the word “deposited”, which
has been used in the proviso to Section 24(2). Section 31 of the
1894 Act, deals with the deposit as envisaged in Section 31(2) on
being “prevented” from making the payment even if the amount
17 (2020) 8 SCC 129
18 (2017) 6 SCC 751
1213
has been deposited in the treasury under the Rules framed under
Section 55 or under the Standing Orders, that would carry the
interest as envisaged under Section 34, but acquisition would not
lapse on such deposit being made in the treasury. In case amount
has been tendered and the landowner has refused to receive it, it
cannot be said that the liability arising from non-payment of the
amount is that of lapse of acquisition. Interest would follow in
such a case also due to non-deposit of the amount. Equally, when
the landowner does not accept the amount, but seeks a reference
for higher compensation, there can be no question of such individual
stating that he was not paid the amount (he was determined to be
entitled to by the Collector). In such case, the landowner woul d
be entitled to the compensation determined by the Refe rence
Court.
xx xx xx
244. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, intends that
the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect
to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been
paid or deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, all the
beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case money
has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in
the treasury or in court with respect to majority of landholdings,
the consequence has to follow of higher compensation as per the
proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Even otherwise, if deposit
in treasury is irregular, then the interest would follow as envisaged
under Section 34 of the 1894 Act. Section 24(2) is attracted if
acquisition proceeding is not completed within 5 years after the
pronouncement of award…………………….. The 2013 Act
applies only to the pending proceedings in which possession has
not been taken or compensation has not paid and not to a cas e
where proceedings have been concluded long back, Section 24(2)
is not a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity
of taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s,
1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of
amount in the treasury. The 2013 Act never intended revival of
such claims. In case such landowners were intereste d in
questioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit
with the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
time available with them to do so. They cannot wake from deep
slumber and raise such claims in order to defeat the acquisi tion
validly made. In our opinion, the law never contemplates—n or
permits—misuse much less gross abuse of its provisions to reopen
all the acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the duty of the court
to examine the details of such claims. There are several litigations
before us where landowners, having lost the challenge to the validity
of acquisition proceedings and after having sought enhancement
of the amount in the reference succeeding in it nevertheles s are
seeking relief arguing about lapse of acquisition after sev eral
rounds of litigation.
xx xx xx
247. The question which arises whether there is any differen ce
between taking possession under the 1894 Act and the expression
“physical possession” used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact,
what was contemplated under the 1894 Act, by taking the
possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking
over the possession under the 2013 Act always amounted to taking
over physical possession of the land. When the State Government
acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession,
that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the
large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired , the
Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police
force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is
used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. T he
Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy
it once possession has been taken by drawing the in quest
proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if a ny
further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or
someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in
the outhouse, etc. is deemed to be the trespasser on land which is
in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser a lways
inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government
in the case.”
30. It was held that under Section 16 of the Act, vesting of title in
the Government is complete immediately upon taking of possession, and
the acquired land becomes the property of the State under Sections 16
and 17 of the Act without any condition or limitation either as to title or
1215
possession. It was held that if once panchnama had been drawn of
taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that
of the trespasser. This Court held as under:
“249. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the
right to possess and to exclude others, essential i s animus
possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the t hing
which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere
non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not
in possession. The established principle is that the p ossession
follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property.
The element of possession is the physical control or the power
over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus
and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Possessi on
of the acquired land is taken under the 1894 Act under Section 16
or 17, as the case may be. The Government has a right to acquire
the property for public purpose. The stage under Section 16 comes
for taking possession after issuance of notification under Section
4(1) and stage of Section 9(1). Under Section 16, vesting is after
passing of the award on taking possession and under Section 17
before passing of the award.
xx xx xx
345. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as t o
question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been
taken, development has been made, and compensation has been
deposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been colle cted.
The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within
the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn
of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession
is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be
challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived
by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) only
contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five
years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical possession
was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takes
place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner i. e. the
State Government and land has been transferred to t he
beneficiaries, corporations, authorities, etc. for developmenta l
purposes and third-party interests have intervened. Such challenges
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as
it is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act.”
31. This Court concluded as under:
“366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession
and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed
lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five
years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been
paid. In other words, in case possession has been t aken,
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,
if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken
then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court.
The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to
Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respec t to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on
the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the
1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section
31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest
under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the laps e of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to
the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under
the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as
provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him
to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to
non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court . The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section
31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation
or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim
that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act.
1217
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession
under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is
no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as
once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Sect ion
24(2).
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new
cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings
of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on
the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not
revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded
proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode
of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to inva lidate
acquisition.”
32. Further, this Court in a judgment reported as Shyam Nandan
Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. 19 held that the notification
under Section 6 of the Act could not have been set aside and s hould
have individualized justice vis-à-vis each writ petitioner. It was held as
under:
“22. Having thus clarified the law governing the field, we would
open doors for streams of equities and discretions to enter in the
exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. As observed earlier, we are of the view that the
High Court should not have upset the notification under Section 6
of the Act as a whole and should have individualised justice vis-a-
vis each writ petitioner before it, having regard to the equities
interplaying in each case and to the regulation of its discretion
keeping in view host of other factors which weigh with the High
Court to deny, grant or mould relief even when illegalities in
procedure keep staring. Thus for the view afore-expresse d, we
allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the H igh
Court and remit all these matters back to it with the request that
though it may take them up as a batch, it may give individual
attention to each case, view the illegalities pointed out by the writ
19 (1993) 4 SCC 255
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
petitioner in their right perspective having regard to the time factor
and confine the relief, if due, to him separately. We shall not be
taken to have controlled the discretion of the High Cou rt in
administering individualised justice and amongst others it may, with
the cooperation of the Society and of the State Government, as
also the writ petitioners examine the possibility of an equitab le
solution so that the fist of law and the discretion of the court do
not hurt unbearably. We thus remit the matters to the High Court
without any order as to costs.”
33. In Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu
Housing Board & Anr. v. S. Saraswathy & Ors. 20 , this Court held that
Section 6 declaration cannot be treated to be quashed in entirety unless
it is quashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court specifically. It was
held as under:
“11. We are respectfully in accord with the observat ions of
Coordinate Benches that unless the declaration under Section 6
or the notification under Section 4 of the Act is not explici tly
quashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court, the benefits of
relief granted by the Court would be effective only qua the parties
before it. As already adumbrated above, at the time the appeal of
A.S. Naidu came to be decided, the three year limitation period to
publish a declaration under Section 6 of the Act had a lready
expired, making it impossible for the Government to complete a
fresh process culminating in another declaration; and it was for
this reason that the acquisition was quashed by the Court.
12. It has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court that those who
have missed the boat in challenging the acquisition proceedings,
who sat idle and have let the grass grow under their feet cannot,
thereafter, be permitted to jump on the bandwagon of others who
entered the portals of the Court at the appropriate time and
thereafter obtained favourable orders. Significantl y, in
Chandrasekaran [(2010) 2 SCC 786 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 553]
the Court was alive to the reality of utilisation of large chunks of
land by the State for housing scheme; and in this scenario, it was
obviously and rightly reluctant and facially hesitant to quash the
acquisition proceedings in toto, knowing that that would result in
20 (2015) 8 SCC 723
1219
grave consequences to society. In this analysis, the respondent s
including their vendor, P. Velu, cannot be permitted to take any
advantage of the orders passed by this Court in A.S. Naidu [ A.S.
Naidu v. State of T.N., (2010) 2 SCC 801 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ)
568] .”
34. In another judgment reported as State of Haryana & Anr. v.
Devander Sagar & Ors. 21 , this Court has held that the acquisition
proceedings cannot be quashed of one or two land owners. It is the duty
of the land owners to challenge the acquisition proceedings at lease
before award is pronounced and possession is taken. It was held a s
under:
“11. It would be pertinent to clarify that the quashing of the entire
acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed. This Court
has in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [ Shyam Nandan
Prasad v. State of Bihar , (1993) 4 SCC 255] , Delhi
Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban [ Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh
Uban , (1999) 7 SCC 44] , Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh
Uban [ Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban , (2000) 7 SCC 296]
and T.N. Housing Board v. S. Saraswathy [ T.N. Housing
Board v. S. Saraswathy , (2015) 8 SCC 723 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ)
443] reiterated and restated the established and consistent view
that quashing of acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or
two landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the entire
acquisition. In A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd. v.
Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao [ A.P. Industrial Infrastructure
Corpn. Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao , (2012) 12 SCC
797 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 731] this Court has reiterated the
established proposition that landowners who are aggrieved by the
acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge to them at
least before an award is pronounced and possession of the land is
taken over by the Government. Numerous decisions of this Court
have been discussed obviating the need to analyse all of th em
once again. However, generally speaking, the courts come to the
succour of those who approach it. In some instances, equities are
equalised by allowing subsequent slothful petitioners, belatedly and
conveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to receive, at the highest,
compensation granted to others sans interest.”
21 (2016) 14 SCC 746
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
35. The original land owner had filed a writ petition b efore the
Delhi High Court but such writ petition was dismissed on 02.12.1985.
The Special Leave Petition was withdrawn on 12.09.1989 even though
the reservation was conveyed by the learned counsel app earing for
the appellant. Such withdrawal was after the judgment of the High
Court in Balbir Singh case. The original land owners have made a
conscious decision not to continue with the Special Leave Petitions.
Thus, all the objections which were available to the original land owner
including the purchaser up to that stage cannot be perm itted to be
raised again.
36. In Balak Ram-II , the acquisition proceedings were
quashedsince the objections filed by the land owners were not heard or
decided in accordance with law. Thus, Balak Ram-II is a judgment in
personam and not in rem , as the grievance of the writ petitioners was
specific to them. The judgment of the High Court in Balbir Singh is
based upon the fact that in Balak Ram-II, the entire notification under
Section 6 of the Act stands quashed. Such aspect has not found favor in
Abhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II . Otherwise also, non-
hearing of objections filed would be limited to those land owners who
have filed objections. The predecessor-in-interest of the purc haser has
not filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the judgment
in Balak Ram-II cannot come to the aid of land owners who have
never preferred any objections.
37. Therefore, the judgment in Balbir Singh does not confer any
right on the other land owners who have not disputed the acquisition
proceedings on the ground of lack of effective hearing of object ions
under Section 5-A of the Act. Since the original land owner never filed
any objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the purchaser cannot seek
the relief which was not available even to the original land owner.
38. The purchaser has purchased the property knowing full y
well that the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings. But
on the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh , it was conveyed and
accepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashed and
original land owner was in possession of the land. Since Sudan Singh ,
affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approved by this
Court in the three judgments referred hereinabove ( Abhey Ram ,
Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II ), no right would
1221
accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser. The High Court in
the impugned order has not noticed any of the three ju dgments of this
Court in Abhey Ram , Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-
II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singh and instead ordered the
purchaser to deposit twice of the amount paid to the original land owner.
The condition of payment of compensation in Balbir Singh by the
land owners does not survive in view of the fact that such judgment
has not been approved by this Court.
39. In the present case, as per the purchaser itself, the possession
of Part A land comprising in Khasra No. 384 (4-6), 385 (4- 6) and 390
(4-6) total measuring 12 Bigha and 18 Biswa was taken by the Appellant
and the compensation was paid. The argument is that in terms of the
impugned orders of the High Court, the purchaser ha d deposited
Rs.16,61,774/-, therefore, the acquisition stand lapsed. Such deposit is
in turn based on the order of the High Court in Balbir Singh . The
deposit by the purchaser, either in terms of the impugned order or the
order passed in Balbir Singh, is wholly inconsequential. The amount
of compensation was paid on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, the
compensation of the acquired land paid by the appellant cannot lead to
lapsing of the acquisition in terms of Indore Development Authority .
The purchaser in its written submissions had made no re ference to the
later judgments of this Court referred to above. The d eposit in terms
of the order of the High Court will not lead to lapsing of the acquisition
proceedings, such orders being absolutely being illegal. Thus, in respect
of Part A land, the purchaser cannot take shelter of th e order, which
had no legal value and stands nullified. Even otherwise, there could
not be any direction to deposit the amount now after more than 25
years. The right which has been lost due to passage of time cannot be
revived by virtue of deposit of the amount subsequent to orders of the
High Court.
40. In respect of Part B land, comprising of Khasra Nos. 376 (4-
6), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 Min (0-4) and 386/2 Min
(0-6)total 15 Bigha 10 Biswa, the stand of the appellant in the counter
affidavit filed before the High Court was that the physical possession of
the acquired land falling in khasra no. 384(4-16), 385(4-06) &390(4-06)
in village Shayoorpur had been handed over to the respondent no. 2-
Delhi Development Authority on 14.07.87 by the LAC/Land & Building
Department, Govt. of National Capital Territory of De lhi, however
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
physical possession of khasra no 386/1 Min. (0-04), 386/2 Min(0-06),
376(4-16), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-02), 383(4-16) has not been handed
over to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development Authority by the LAC/
Land & Building Department, Govt. of National Capital Territor y of
Delhi. Still further, the purchaser in its IA had asserted that the lands of
which possession has not been taken but compensation amount w as
placed in RD with LAC, bear Kh. No. 376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-
2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4), 386/2 min. (0-6) total measuring 15
Bigha and 10 Biswa of Village Sayoorpur, Delhi. Thus, we find t hat
possession was in fact taken of the entire acquired land and compensation
was deposited. If the appellant had not been able to utilize the land on
account an order of stay of dispossession in various writ petitions filed,
that would not be a material fact to return a finding that t he purchaser
continues to be in possession. As reiterated above, after the panchnama
had been prepared, the possession of the land owners would be that of a
trespasser.
41. The purchaser had in fact filed a Writ of Mandamu s for
delivering the possession of the entire acquired land. Such claim of
Mandamus shows that the purchaser is out of possession. Therefo re,
the condition in Indore Development Authority for lapsing of the
acquisition is not satisfied. Therefore, as per the purchaser, the possession
has been taken of the part of the land and compensation has been
deposited in respect of the remaining land. Thus, the twin conditions as
laid down by this Courtare not satisfied.
42. Even otherwise, the stand of the appellant is that the possession
of the entire land was taken on 14.7.1987 whereas possession of land
measuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was handed over to it, wher eas the
possession of the remaining land measuring 15 Bigha 10 Biswa is with
the Government of Delhi. Therefore, the purchaser is not entitled to any
declaration of lapsing of acquisition proceedings inter alia on the ground
that it has purchased the land after vesting of the land with the State and
the possession has been taken of the land measuring 28 Bigha 8 Biswa
and the compensation has also been deposited in respect of entire land,
though the compensation in respect of land admeasuring 12 Bigha 18
Biswa was disbursed. The remaining amount of compensation was with
the Land Acquisition Collector.
1223
43. Still further, the purchaser had purchased the property a fter
vesting of the land with the State. In fact, in Manav Dharam Trust ,
earlier three Judge Bench judgment in M. V enkatesh was not even
referred to. The purchaser has no right to claim lapsing of ac quisition
proceedings in view of the recent larger Bench judgment of this Court
reported as Shiv Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 22 wherein
the judgment rendered by two-Judge Bench in Manav Dharam Trust
was not found to be a good law. Hence, the purchaser has no right to
claim a declaration sought for. It was held as under:
“26. In Manav Dharam Trust [ State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,
even the provisions of the Act of 2013 have not been taken into
consideration, which prohibits such transactions in par ticular
provisions of Section 11, including the proviso to Section 24(2).
Apart from that, it was not legally permissible to a Division Bench
to ignore the decisions of the larger Bench comprising of three
Judges and of coordinate Bench. They were not per incuri am
and were relevant for deciding the issue of taking poss ession
under the 1894 Act, at the instance of purchaser. In case it
wanted to depart from the view taken earlier, it ought to have
referred the matter to a larger Bench. It has been i gnored that
when a purchase is void, then no declaration can be sou ght on
the ground that the land acquisition under the 2013 Act has lapsed
due to illegality/irregularity of proceedings of taking possession
under the 1894 Act. No declaration can be sought by a purchaser
under Section 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of which
would be to get back the land. They cannot seek declaration
that acquisition made under the 1894 Act has lapsed by the
challenge to the proceedings of taking possession under the 1894
Act. Such right was not available after the purchase in 2000 and
no such right has been provided to the purchasers unde r the
2013 Act also. Granting a right to question acquisition would be
against the public policy and the law which prohibits such
transactions; it cannot be given effect to under the guise of
subsequent legislation containing similar provisions. Subsequent
legislation does not confer any new right to a person b ased on
22 (2019) 10 SCC 229
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
such void transaction; instead, it includes a provision prohibiting
such transactions without permission of the Collector as provided
in Section 11(4).
27. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of larger
Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on the subject, which
still holds the field and were wrongly distinguished. The binding
value of the decisions of larger and coordinate Benches have been
ignored while deciding Manav Dharam Trust case [ State (NCT
of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3
SCC (Civ) 611] , it was not open to it to take a different view. The
decision in Manav Dharam Trust [ State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] is per
incuriam in light of this decision of this Court in Mamleshwar
Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [ Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal,
(1975) 2 SCC 232] , A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372]
, State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [ State of
U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. , (1991) 4 SCC 139] , B.
Shama Rao v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [ B. Shama Rao v. State
(UT of Pondicherry) , AIR 1967 SC 1480] , MCD v. Gurnam
Kaur [ MCD v. Gurnam Kaur , (1989) 1 SCC 101] , State of
M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [ State of M.P. v. Narmada
Bachao Andolan , (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 :
AIR 2011 SC 1989] , Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of
Orissa [ Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa , (2015) 2
SCC 189 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 38] and Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern
Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. [ Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern
Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd., (2010) 13 SCC 336 : (2010)
4 SCC (Civ) 904]
28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust [ State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust , (2017) 6 SCC 751 :
(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] does not lay down the law correctly.
Given the several binding precedents which are available and the
provisions of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the de cision
in Manav Dharam Trust [ State (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav
Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] and
overrule it. “
1225
44. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. Th e order
passed by the High Court is set aside. However, the appellant shall
refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/- to the purchase r, without any
interest as such deposit was a voluntary offer to deposit, in accordance
with law.
Ankit Gyan and Anurag Bhaskar Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Bodhi Ramteke, LCRA)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GODFREY PHILLIPS
(I) LTD AND ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]