Raza Ahmad v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. This appeal under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal
Act 20101 arises from a judgment dated 2 August 2013 of the National
Green Tribunal2, at its Central Zone Bench in Bhopal.
1 “NGT Act”
2 “NGT”
853
2. In April 2007, the seventh respondent, Steel Authority of India3,
and Jayprakash Associates entered into a Memorandum of Association to
establish a cement grinding unit of 2.2 MTPA capacity at Bhilai,
Chhattisgarh. In pursuance of this goal, they set up the tenth respondent,
Bhilai Jaypee Cement Limited. A parcel of land admeasuring 34.59 acres
belonging to SAIL, falling in the villages of Hingna and Maroda at Bhilai in
District Durg, was leased out to the tenth respondent f or thirty years,
based on a long-term lease dated 16 June 2007. The land use of this parcel
of land had been designated as “green belt” in the 19 91 Development
Plan of Bhilai. On the tenth respondent’s application, an Environmental
Clearance4 was granted to their project of the cement grinding unit on 1
May 20085 by the second respondent, the then Ministry of Environment
and Forests. It was subsequently published in newspapers on 8 May 2008.
3. It is alleged by the appellant that since the EC was incorrectly
issued, the tenth respondent’s constructions on the parcel of land were
illegal. In this regard, several notices were issued to the m by the fifth
respondent, Director, Town and Country Planning, Bhilai and the sixth
respondent, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Bhilai to revert the
land to its original condition or face demolition of the structure . The
tenth respondent then applied for the modification of the land use of the
parcel of land admeasuring 34.59 acres.
4. The first respondent, the State of Chhattisgarh, considered their
case under Section 23-A of Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram N ivesh
Adhiniyam 1973. On 22 May 2010, the State government made a proposal
to change the land use from “green belt” to “industrial purpose” on the
basis that the setting up of the cement grinding unit by the tenth respondent
constituted an “urgent public purpose”. Between 13 July 2010 and 15
July 2010, the State government published circulars in two eve ning
newspapers highlighting the proposed modification in land use and inviting
objections/suggestions from the general public. The appellant allegedly
raised objections against the proposed modification. However, relying
on the EC granted on 1 May 2008, the State government issue d a
notification6 dated 3 February 2011 modifying the land use of the parcel
of land from “green belt” to “industrial purpose”. The notification was
published in the Chhattisgarh Gazette on 18 February 2011.
3 “SAIL”
4 “EC”
5 Letter No J-1101111000112007-IA-ll(I)
6 Notification No F/7-24/32/2010
RAZA AHMAD v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
5. The appellant then instituted a public interest petit ion7 under
Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Chhattisgarh on
8 September 2011. The reliefs which were sought by the appellant were:
(i) Quashing of the notification dated 3 February 2011 of the
State government modifying the land use of the parcels of
land designated in the 1991 Development Plan of Bhilai as
a “green belt” to “industrial purpose”;
(ii) Quashing of the EC issued on 1 May 2008 to the tenth
respondent for its cement grinding unit (the ground of
challenge being that the project had been erroneous ly
categorized in Category B2 instead of Category A, and
hence the mandatory procedures of conducting an
Environmental Impact Study and public hearing/consultation
were not followed); and
(iii) The restoration of 34.59 acres of land designated as a “green
belt”, which was leased out to the tenth respondent, to its
original condition prior to the construction which was carried
out on the land.
6. An objection was raised in regard to the maintainability of the
petition before the High Court by the tenth respondent.
7. By an order dated 28 January 2013, the High Court transferred
the petition to the NGT in view of the decision of this Court in Bhopal
Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan v Union of India8. The NGT,
by its impugned judgment dated 2 August 2013, dismissed the appeal9 on
the ground that:
(i) The appeal is barred by limitation; and
(ii) The NGT is constituted by the NGT Act, and does no t have
jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to the notification dated 3
February 2011 of the State government altering the land use.
8. We have heard Dr Surender Singh Hooda, counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, Mr Yashraj Singh Deora, counsel appearing
on behalf of the seventh respondent and Mr Sumeer Sodhi, counsel
appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh.
7 Writ Petition (PIL) No 5467 of 2011
8 (2012) 8 SCC 326
9 Appeal No 1 of 2013
855
9. The NGT Act came into force on 18 October 2010, after it was
published in the Gazette of India in pursuance of the provisions of Section
1(2). The NGT has original jurisdiction, conferred by Secti on 14 and
appellate jurisdiction, which is conferred by Section 16. Further, Section
15 empowers the NGT to grant relief to remedy environmental damage,
including compensation and restitution.
10. Section 14 empowers the NGT to exercise jurisdiction over
all civil cases where a substantial question relating to the environment
(including enforcement of any legal right relating to the environment) is
involved and such a question arises out of the implementation of the
enactments specified in Schedule I. Sub-Section (3) o f Section 14
provides that no application for adjudication of a dispute under the provision
shall be entertained unless it is made within a period of six months from
the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first arose. Under
the proviso, the NGT is empowered to entertain an appeal b eyond the
prescribed period for sufficient cause, subject to a limit of sixty days.
11. Section 16, which confers appellate jurisdiction on the NGT,
contemplates in Clause (h) that an appeal can lie against an order made,
on or after the commencement of the NGT Act, granting an EC. Such
an appeal has to be filed within thirty days from t he date of the
communication of the order, decision, direction or determination. The
NGT is entrusted with the power to condone a delay of a period not
exceeding sixty days, for sufficient cause.
12. In the present case, the relevant dates which would ha ve a
bearing on the subject matter of the controversy are as follows:
(i) 1 May 2008 – EC was granted to the tenth respondent’s
project (subsequently published in the newspapers on 8 May
2008);
(ii) 18 February 2011 – publication of the notification dated 3
February 2011 by the State government proposing a
modification of land use for 34.59 acres of land from “green
belt” to “industrial purpose”;
(iii) 8 September 2011 – institution of the writ petition befo re
the High Court by the appellant; and
(iv) 28 January 2013 – transfer of the proceedings to the NGT
by the High Court.
RAZA AHMAD v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
13. Section 38(1) of the NGT Act stipulates that the Natio nal
Environment Tribunal Act 1995 and the National Environment Appellate
Authority Act 1997 10 would stand repealed. Section 38(2) protects
anything done or any action taken under the repealed enactments. Section
38(3) dissolved the National Environment Appellate Authority established
under the above 1997 Act. Section 38(5), however, makes a provisi on
for the transfer of all cases pending before the National Environment
Appellate Authority to the NGT.
14. In the present case, the EC was issued on 1 May 2008, prior
to the enforcement of the NGT Act. No steps were taken by the appellant
to pursue a challenge to the EC under the provisions of the 1997 Act. No
challenge was pending on the date of the enforcement of the NGT Act
and hence, there was no question of transfer of any proceedings to the
NGT. The challenge before the High Court to the EC was raised on 8
September 2011, well beyond three years of the date of the publication
of the EC in the newspapers on 8 May 2008. Consequently, the challenge
to the EC was barred by limitation. As a matter of fact, D r Surender
Singh Hooda has fairly accepted the said position.
15. However, the submission which has been urged on behalf of
the appellant is that besides challenging the EC, the appellant had also
placed in issue the validity of the notification of the Sta te government
dated 3 February 2011 (published on 18 February 2011), by which the
use of the land was sought to be altered to “industrial purpose” . The
NGT came to the conclusion that this part of the notification was beyond
its jurisdiction since the Town and Country Planning Act 1973 of the
State of Chhattisgarh is not one of the notified statutes in relation to
which it has jurisdiction. To challenge this finding, it has been urged on
behalf of the appellant that the appellant, for the purpose of the said
relief, does not challenge the EC, but asserts that the conditions of the
EC would stand violated by the change of land use. In this co ntext,
reliance has been placed on the following conditions of the EC:
“ix. As proposed, green belt shall be developed in 4.62 ha (33
%) out of total 14 ha area to reduce impact of fugitive
emissions. Central Pollution Control Board guidelines shall
be followed in planning and developing green belt and
selection of species etc.
10 “1997 Act”
857
x. Other necessary statutory clearances from the concerned
Departments including ‘No Objection Certificate’ from the
Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board (CECB)
shall be obtained prior to commencement of construction
and/or operation.”
16. The submission is that the EC has been issued in pursuance of
the EIA notification, which in turn traces its source of powe r to the
Environment (Protection) Act 198611. The 1986 Act is a statute which is
listed at Entry 5 of Schedule I of the NGT Act. Thus, it has been submitted
that any breach of the EC by a proposed change of land use c an be
made the foundation for invoking the remedy before the NGT. Moreover,
it has been urged that it was open to the appellant to invoke the jurisdiction
under Section 14 of the NGT Act for contending that the change of land
use notification dated 18 February 2011 would result in a violation of the
EC conditions noted above and this could be remedied before the NGT
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Section 14. It has been
urged that Parliament has given overriding force to the NGT Act by
Section 33.
17. The notification in question by which the change of land use
was proposed was published on 18 February 2011. The writ petiti on
before the High Court was instituted on 8 September 2011. In terms of
Section 14 of the NGT Act, any recourse to the original jurisdiction of
the NGT has to be taken within a period of six months from the date on
which the cause of action of such dispute first arose. The NGT has the
power to condone a delay of a further period not exceeding sixty days.
Between 8 September 2011, when the writ petition was instituted, and
28 January 2013, when the High Court transferred the proceedings, the
appellant was agitating the issue before the High Court. In the event
that the NGT considers that the appellant has shown suffici ent cause
within the meaning of the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 14, the
institution of the proceedings on 8 September 2011 would fall within the
period of limitation as specified in sub-Section (3) of S ection 14 read
with its proviso.
18. Mr Sumeer Sodhi, counsel appearing on behalf of the State of
Chhattisgarh, submitted that, in the present case, the appellant had invoked
the appellate jurisdiction of the NGT under Section 16, which is why the
proceedings were not numbered as an OA, but as an appeal.
11 “1986 Act”
RAZA AHMAD v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
19. What seems to have transpired is that the appellan t had
instituted a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, which was transferred to the NGT and upon transfer, the
proceedings were numbered as an appeal. The reliefs w hich were
claimed, as already noted earlier, involved a challenge to the EC as well
as a challenge to the notification dated 3 February 2011, by which t he
use of the land was proposed to be changed to “industrial purpose”. The
challenge to the EC, as we have already noted above, is barred by
limitation. However, the challenge to the change of land use, on t he
ground that such a change would violate a condition of the EC, is
something which in the submission of the appellant would fall within the
jurisdiction of the NGT provided the NGT decides to exercise its discretion
to condone the delay within the meaning of Section 14(3) read with its
proviso. Whether the delay should be condoned is entirely a matter for
the NGT to decide.
20. We accordingly issue the following directions:
(i) The challenge to the EC dated 1 May 2008 is barred by
limitation;
(ii) The proceedings are remitted back to the NGT fo r
determining as to whether the challenge to the proposed
modification of the land use to “industrial purpose” through
the notification dated 3 February 2011 can be entertained
within the extended period as prescribed by the proviso to
Section 14(3) of the NGT Act;
(iii) The NGT, in considering the aspect which is referred to in
(ii) above, shall be at liberty to determine whether sufficient
cause has been shown by the appellant for condoning the
delay; and
(iv) We clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the rival contentions. Should the delay be condoned,
the NGT would be at liberty to take a decision on all the
issues and contentions raised by the rival parties.
21. The appeal shall stand partly allowed in the above terms with
no orders as to costs.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Devika Gujral Appeal partly allowed.