Ramveer Upadhyay & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr.
INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
1. This special leave petition is against a final judgment and order
dated 7th March 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being case No.29704 of 2021, whereby
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
the Petitioner had challenged the order dated 17th September 2021 passed
by the 4 th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras taki ng
cognizance of the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section
365 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and
Section 3(1)(Dha) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities Act), 1989, hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.
2. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners opened his arguments contending that this case is a cl assic
example of malicious prosecution of the petitioners, who have been
embroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaint
in the Court of the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special
Judge under the Atrocities Act, under section 156 (3) of the CrP C ,
which has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by the
Respondent No. 2 at the instance of Devendra Agarwal, Ex-MLA , a
political opponent of the Petitioner No. 1. The Petitioner No. 1 and the
said Devendra Aggarwal had fought elections against each other several
times.
3. Earlier, on or about 1st January 2010, Smt. Meera Devi, wife
of the Respondent No.2 had filed a complaint before the District
Magistrate, Mahamaya Nagar District (now Hathras Distr ict) stating
that the Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of the
Petitioner No. 1, to forcibly make him vote in favour of their party, in the
MLC election of 2010. In the said complaint it was alleged th at the
Petitioner had abused the Respondent No.2 by his caste, using f ilthy
language.
4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra Aggarwal
wrote a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the Respondent
No.2. In the aforesaid letter, it was stated that the Petitioners had abused
the Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste.
5. On 2nd January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in the
Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C ), being Complaint No. 412
of 2010 for directions on the Station House Officer (SHO) at Chandappa
Police Station to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.
6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which Crime
Case No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the Circle
Inspector Sadabad, Hathras. After investigation, the Police filed a final
341
report of closure of the case, opining that no incident of abduct ion, as
alleged had taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of political
animosity.
7. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition which was dismissed. The
High Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal of h er Protest
Petition. Meera Devi approached this Court. Pursuant to the order s of
this court, further investigation was held by the C B CID. The
Investigating Officer filed a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour of
the Petitioners. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition. By an or der dated
5th September 2020, the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act, Hathras
rejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera Devi in Case No. 17/2010.
8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assembly
elections from Sadabad Constituency. Mr. Devendra Aggarwa l also
contested the election from the same constituency as a candidate of a
rival political party. It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when the
Petitioner No 1’s son was campaigning for the Petitioner No 1, Devendra
Aggarwal, who was then a sitting MLA of the ruling party, attacked the
Petitioner No 1’s son and his supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.
9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, was
killed in the incident. Pushpendra’s father, Ramhari Sharma lodged an
FIR, arraigning Devendra Aggarwal as Accused No.1, pursuant to which
a criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal an d others,
inter alia, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
10. It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLA
of the ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him. The father
of the deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc.
Writ Petition No.2739/2017 in the High Court praying for action against
Devendra Aggarwal.
11. On 26th October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an application
in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act,
Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C alleging that the Petitioner
No.1 along with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the Petitioner
No.2 and 6-7 other persons had abused him in filthy language and asked
his associates to drag him into the car which they could not do, as a
crowd had gathered, and there was resistance put up. The Respondent
No.2 prayed for direction on the SHO, Chandappa Police Statio n to
register the case against the Petitioners.
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
12. The relevant averments in the said complaint are extrac ted
hereinbelow for convenience:-
“1. The applicant belongs to “Dhobi’ caste – a sche duled
caste and is former BDC Member.
2. ….
3. That on 01.09.2017, at about 2.45 or 3 P.M. in t he
afternoon, the opposite party no.1 Ramveer Upadhyay came
to Village-Bisana along with his convoy of vehicles and after
seeing the Complainant started abusing of his caste and on
the road, he said that Saley dhobi you had forgotte n your
position and your wings have come out and you are running
up to Supreme Court. You will be sent at a place from w here
you will never come back. When the Complainant said y ou
are doing your work and I am doing my work, Ramveer
Upadhyay said to his associates that pull him and put him in
the car, then opposite party no.2 Ranu Pandit and 6-7 othe r
unknown persons, who can be identified by face, dra gged
the Complainant and with the intention to kill tried to kid nap
him but due to gathering of people on the road and d ue to
resistance shown by Annu R/o Jindpatti, Bisana, Prade ep R/
o Gambhirpatti, Bisana, they were not successful an d went
towards Hathras in their vehicles. Due to this inci dent an
environment of fear and terror was created in the villa ge.”
13. Pursuant to the aforesaid application, a case was regist ered
and numbered Complaint Case No.19/2018. The Respondent No.2 was
examined under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. The state ment of the
Respondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section
200 of the Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special
Judge, SC/ST Act, Hathras. The statements of one Annu son of Rukamal
and one Yogesh Gupta, son of Dhaniram Gupta were also recorded in
the same Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C.
14. In the meanwhile, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.699/2016 titled
Ashwini Kumar Upadhayay v. Union of India , a three-Judge Bench
of this Court presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated
4.12.2018, taking notice of the fact that there were 4122 cases pending
against legislators including former legislators, out of which 2324 cases
were against sitting legislators. A chart, presented in Court by the learned
343
Amicus Curiae, showed that there were 430 cases involving life sentence
pending against sitting as well as former legislators.
15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court reques ted
each High Court to assign/allocate criminal cases involving former and
sitting legislators to as many as Sessions Courts and Magisterial Courts
as each High Court might consider fit and expedient. Pursuant to
administrative directions issued by the High Court, and pursuant to the
directions of this Court, Complaint Case No.19/2018 was transferred to
the Additional District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as the
Petitioner No.1 was a legislator/former legislator.
16. On being prima facie satisfied that the complaint case No.19/
2018 made out a prime facie case against the Petitioners, the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras passed an order dated
17th September 2021, taking cognizance of the charges against the
Petitioners and issuing summons to the Petitioners.
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17th September 2021,
the Petitioners filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the
High Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No.
19/2018 as well as the cognizance order dated 17th September 2021 be
quashed.
18. By an order dated 5th January 2022, the High Court admitted
the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed furthe r
proceedings in Complaint Case No.19/2018 pending in the Court of
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.
19. However, on 7 th March 2022, the High Court passed the
impugned judgment and order rejecting the application filed by the
Petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras, to take cognizance of the
offence in Complaint Case No.19/2018.
21. Emphasizing Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, Mr. Ranjit Kumar
argued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competent
to pass an order for issuance of summons. He argued that the order of
the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras being
without jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Ranjt Kumar
also argued that Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of malicious
prosecution which stemmed from political rivalry and was in gross abuse
of the process of Court.
22. In Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand Athabhai
Chaudhari and Ors. 1, Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior
counsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2, this Court rejected
the contention that only Special Court could take cognizance of offences
under the Atrocities Act and held:
23. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the considerati on
of this Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is taken
by the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is comm itted
to the learned Special Court, whether entire crimin al
proceedings can be said to have been vitiated consi dering
the second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Ac t which
was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?
24. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislative
history of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act , 1989,
more particularly, Section 14 pre-amendment and pos t
amendment is required to be considered. Section 14 as stood
pre-amendment and post amendment reads as under:
........
Provided that in Districts where less number of cases und er
this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, w ith the
concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Dis tricts,
the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offenc es
under this Act;
Provided further that the Courts so established or
specified shall have power to directly take cogniza nce of
offences under this Act.”
******
28. Considering the aforesaid legislative history whic h
brought to insertion of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocit ies
1 2021 SCC Online SC 974
345
Act, by which, even the Special Court so establishe d or
specified for the purpose of providing for speedy t rial the
power to directly to take cognizance of offences un der the
Atrocities Act, 1989, the issue/question posed whet her in a
case where for the offences under Atrocities Act, t he
cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate and there after
the case is committed to the Court of Sessions/Special C ourt
and cognizance is not straightway taken up by the l earned
Special Court/Court of Session, whether entire crim inal
proceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act , 1989
can be said to have been vitiated, as so observed by the Hig h
Court in the impugned judgment and order ?
29. On fair reading of Sections 207, 209 and 193 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and insertion of proviso to Section 14
of the Atrocities Act by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, we
are of the opinion that on the aforesaid ground the entire
criminal proceedings cannot be said to have been vi tiated.
Second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which has
been inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016 confers power
upon the Special Court so established or specified for the
purpose of providing for speedy trial also shall ha ve the
power to directly take cognizance of the offences und er the
Atrocities Act. Considering the object and purpose of inser tion
of proviso to Section 14, it cannot be said that it is not in
conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and 209 of the Cr iminal
Procedure Code, 1973. It cannot be said that it takes away
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance a nd
thereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for trial for
the offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely because, learned
Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences and
thereafter the trial/case has been committed to Special Court
established for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, it
cannot be said that entire criminal proceedings including FIR
and charge-sheet etc. are vitiated and on the aforesaid ground
entire criminal proceedings for the offences under Se ctions
452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860
and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to be
quashed and set aside. It may be noted that in view of insertion
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act and conside ring
the object and purpose, for which, the proviso to Sectio n 14
of the Atrocities Act has been inserted i.e. for the purpos e of
providing for speedy trial and the object and purpose st ated
herein above, it is advisable that the Court so established or
specified in exercise of powers under Section14, fo r the
purpose of providing for speedy trial directly take cogni zance
of the offences under the Atrocities Act. But at the same time,
as observed herein above, merely on the ground that
cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act is not taken
directly by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of
the Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings c annot be
said to have been vitiated and cannot be quashed an d set
aside solely on the ground that cognizance has been taken
by the learned Magistrate after insertion of second proviso
to Section 14 which confers powers upon the Special Court
also to directly take cognizance of the offences un der the
Atrocities Act and thereafter case is committed to the Spe cial
Court/Court of Session.
30. In support of the above conclusion, the words used in
second proviso to Section 14 are required to be consid ered
minutely. The words used are “Court so established or specified
shall have power to directly take cognizance of the o ffences
under this Court”. The word “only” is conspicuously missing.
If the intention of the legislature would have to c onfer the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences und er the
Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in t hat case,
the wording should have been “ that the Court so established
or specified only shall have power to directly take cogni zance
of offences under this Act ”. Therefore, merely because now
further and additional powers have been given to the Special
Court also to take cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act and in the present case merely becau se the
cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate for the offence s
under the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case ha s been
committed to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said that
entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same are
required to be quashed and set aside.”
347
23. In view of the judgment of this Court in Shantaben Bhurabhai
Bhuriya (supra), the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that the Additional
District Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.
24. There was apparently political rivalry between the Petitioner
No.1 and Devendra Aggarwal. However, Complaint Case No. 19/2018
has not been lodged against the Petitioners, by Devendra Aggarwal, but
by the Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste.
It cannot be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make out
offence under the Atrocities Act. It is specifically a lleged that the
Petitioners had abused the Respondent No.2 in filth y language by
reference to his caste. The allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of
2018, if established, could result in conviction under the relevant sub-
sections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities Act.
25. Respondent No.2 being an employee of Devendra Aggarwal,
it is possible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been prompted
by political vendetta against the Petitioner No.1. However, since as
observed above, the allegations in the complaint case make out an offence
under Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the
complaint in the bud, more so, when there are statements re corded in
Court under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation on
the part of the Petitioners by the acts alleged in th e complaint, after
closure of the earlier complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruled o ut.
Quashing the criminal proceedings at the very inception might result in
injustice.
26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:-
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court .—Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessar y
to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure t he
ends of justice.”
27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,
such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.
Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for
the asking.
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P 2., this Court held
that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to b e
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only wh en such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid dow n in the section
itself.
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court,
the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would only be
justified when complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 3.
30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason
of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the c riminal
proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar and Others4. It is a well established proposition of law
that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate
evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political
vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of
Bhagawti, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,
there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote
Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh 5, “if the use of
power is of fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation
by malice is not legicidal.”
31. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
and Ors.6 A three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is
the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This
provision confers a separate and independent power on the
High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases
where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where
the process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not
merely a revisional power meant to be exercised again st the
orders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section
2 (2008) 8 SCC 781
3 AIR 1990 SC 494
4 (1987) 1 SCC 288
5 (1980) 2 SCC 471
6 (1983) 1 SCC 1
349
that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the
proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against
witnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thu s, the
scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section
482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present
Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in
some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would
be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be
exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant
and not where a specific remedy is provided by the st atute.
Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be
exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,
there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and
397(2) of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were cle arly
defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980 ) 1 SCC
43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
follows: [SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law
when a specific provision is made: easy resort to i nherent
power is not right except under compelling circumst ances.
Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power
should not invade areas set apart for specific power under
the same Code.”
. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind
is as to when the High Court acting under the provisi ons of
Section 482 should exercise the inherent power inso far as
quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matte r
was gone into in greater detail in Smt Nagawwa v. Veera nna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where t he
scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code w as
considered and while laying down the guidelines and the
grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this C ourt
observed as follows: [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri ) pp.
511-12]
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases
an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused
can be quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against
the accused or the complaint does not disclose the e ssential
ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the
accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are
patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent
person can ever reach a conclusion that there is su fficient
ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been bas ed
either on no evidence or on materials which are who lly
irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint
by legally competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and p rovide
sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High
Court can quash proceedings.”
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Co urt
in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505
: 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146]
where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed as
follows: [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the
complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any of fence,
it is competent to the High Court exercising its in herent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Crimi nal
Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking
cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against
an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the
351
face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same ,
no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking
the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding
or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the
High Court will be justified in quashing the procee dings in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code .”
32. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gourieshetty Mahesh7, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there is
reasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.
33. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand8, this Court held:-
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Sectio n 482
of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power i s
to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of prev enting
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence
or not depends 14 upon the nature of facts alleged the rein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are p resent
or not has to be judged by the High Court. …”
34. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre9, a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarized
the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:-
“The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at
the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be a pplied
by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted alleg ations
as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also f or the
court to take into consideration any special featur es which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expe dient
and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecut ion to
continue. This is so on the basis that the court ca nnot be
utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
the court chances of an ultimate conviction are ble ak and,
7 (2010) 6 SCC 588
8 (2013) 11 SCC 673
9 (1988) 1 SCC 692
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by all owing
a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while tak ing
into consideration the special facts of a case also quas h the
proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
35. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal 10, this
Court observed:-
“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
not used as an instrument of harassment or for seek ing
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to press urise
the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we
are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern th e
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdi ction of
the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with cauti on and
only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cas es. In
view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgm ent
cannot be sustained.”
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others 11,
this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve
the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to
generate into weapons of harassment.
37. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 12,
this Court held:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV a nd of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a seri es of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordin ary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above ,
we give the following categories of cases by way of i llustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to pre vent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
10 (2007) 12 SCC 1
11 (2021) 5 SCC 524
12 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335
353
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay d own any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelis ed and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such p ower
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information rep ort
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their fa ce value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie con stitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information repo rt and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cogizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except un der an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make ou t
a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not consti tute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cogniz able
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without
an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sect ion
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of whic h no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused .
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which
a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institu tion and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there i s a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggriev ed party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the acc used
and with a view to spite him due to private and per sonal
grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power
of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the ra rest
of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embar king
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuinenes s or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not conf er
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.
37. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the
Court is spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions under
Section 482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result in
miscarriage of justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed and
Others13.
39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped
in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is
possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a
political opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interference
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As
observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners
by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be
ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute offence under the
Attrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have
to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in
a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear
that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence . The
Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed
at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly
dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
40. For the reasons discussed above, we are not inclined to interfere
with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The special
leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
13 (2008) 1 SCC 474
355
41. Documents have been brought on record by the Petitioners
which show that the Petitioner No.1 is a patient of lung canc er of an
advanced stage. He is on strong medication. Considering the condition
of the health of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may consider
exempting the personal appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if suc h an
application is made to the Trial Court.
Nidhi Jain SLP dismissed.
RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]