Ritu Maheshwari v. M/S. Promotional Club
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted, in both petitions. With consent of counsel
for parties, the appeals were heard finally. The two appeals arise out of
judgments of the Allahabad High Court. The first is dated 31.07.20191;
the same appeal impugns an order dismissing the review petition filed
against the first impugned judgment, dated 13.04.2021. The second appeal
is directed against three orders (dated 12.02.2020, 24. 08.2020 and
28.08.2020) issued in contempt proceedings2, initiated by the respondent,
against the appellant.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant (her eafter
referred to as “Noida”), published a scheme in 2010 (hereafter “the old
scheme”) for allotment of industrial plots larger than 2000 sq. meters, in
Phases II and III of the industrial area in Noida. T he scheme was
advertised. Application forms for registration of the available plots were
available with a designated bank upon payment of ` 5,000/. The indicative
price for plots measuring up to 4000sq. mtr. in Phase II was ` 5550/- per
sq. mtr. and in Phase III for ` 5750/- per sq mtr. Under the terms of the
scheme as spelt out by the brochure, apart from individuals, partnership
firms were also eligible to apply for allotment. The applicants were to
submit a processing fee of ` 20,000/- and registration money of ` 8
lakhs for Phase II plots and ` 10 lakhs for Phase III plots. Apart from
these conditions, applicants had to furnish a project report, background
detail of promoters, audited accounts and balance sheet s and other
relevant details. Allotment was to be made (per clause 2 (h) (i)) on the
basis of interviews of registered applicants, by a screening committee,
about the details of the project. The scheme was expressly open ended;
therefore, under clause 2(i) in Appendix 1 to the scheme Noida could
close it any time.
3. It is the common case of the parties that the club applied to the
Noida Authority for two plots. Apparently, Noida decided to terminate
the scheme, based upon its assessment of the feasibility of the scheme,
in its meeting on 05.07.2012. This decision was published and m ade
known to all concerned including the club through the public domain on
12.07.2012. Thereafter, Noida sought to refund the amount deposited by
the club to it.
1 In Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013
2 Contempt Application (Civil) No. 8214 of 2019
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
4. The club was aggrieved and approached the Allahabad Hig h
Court by filing the writ petition 3 contending that according to its
information, Noida received 95 applications of which 65 were rejected
and 15 allotments were made. The club urged that it fulfilled all
requirements of the scheme and paid processing fee, registration amount,
had lodged documents required to be furnished. Therefore, it claime d
that its application deserved to be considered. It also contended that the
club was an export house and operating from rented premises, sorely in
need of a large facility and was unable to afford commerc ial rental
spaces. It was urged that the Noida disregarded the terms and conditions
of its scheme for allotment in that the non-consideration in respect of the
plots under the scheme so far as the petitioner club was concerned was
utterly arbitrary. The club claimed several directions including direction
to cancel allotments already made and a mandatory direction to consider
the petitioner club’s application for allotment.
5. Noida had resisted the petition, arguing that once the schem e
was discontinued, the club had no basis to claim allotment. It was also
urged that the club was aware of the fact that the scheme could be
discontinued at any time, a power which Noida had resorted to, validly.
Therefore, it was urged that even if some plots were available, the writ
petitioner could not lay claim for allotment of any of them.
6. During the pendency of writ petition before the High C ourt,
Noida, launched another scheme (Scheme Code : NOIDA/IP/2013-14/
OES/01 – hereafter called “the 2013 Scheme”) the club applie d under
this scheme as well on 9th November, 2013. This matured into an allotment
on 17.07.2014- when Noida allotted a plot of 4000 sq. mtr, (tentatively
sized plot) @ Rs. 8060/- per sq. mtr. The total premium cl aimed by
Noida was ` 3,46,58,000/-. The club had, by 01.12.2016 deposited
` 1,91,83,700/- towards this allotment; it sought by letter dated 04.09.2016
of change in the allotment to M/s. Maria Exim Pvt. Ltd. Th is request
was followed up with the affidavit dated 27.12.2016. This subsequent
allotment of a plot under the later scheme was however, not disclosed to
the High Court, before which the complaint of arbitrary non-allotment
under the old scheme was pending.
7. The High Court by its first impugned judgment 4 was of the
opinion that Noida’s failure to call the club’s representative for interview,
3 Writ-C No.-56046 of 2013
4 Dated 31.07.2019 in Writ-C No. 56046 of 2013
603
was not supported by any reason and that its candidature was ne ver
considered for allotment. In support of this conclusion the High Court
reasoned that candidature or the applications which were registered and
were complete in all manner could not have been ignored. In vi ew of
this reasoning, the Noida was directed to consider the petitioner’s tw o
applications under the scheme by permitting the club to re-d eposit the
registration amount of ` 8 lakhs each in respect of its two applications
with Noida within a period of one month and on deposit of such registration
amount, the two applications (Application Nos. 284 and 285) were to
revive. Noida was directed to consider those applications in accordance
with law for the purposes of allotment of the un-allotted remaining plots
in Phase – II and III. The High Court held in its judgment that Noida did
not dispute that some plots remained unallotted in the scheme. According
to the High Court, there were total of 12 such plots.
8. Noida first filed an application for clarification contending that
no plots were available under the old scheme and that 27 plot s were
available under the old scheme, under which 15 were initially allotted.
Later all plots were allotted by the end of 2014 under the 2013 scheme.
That application (Civil Misc. Modification/Clarification Application No.
17/2020) was dismissed on 01.10.2020. Noida therefore preferred a
review proceeding. The High Court by its second impugned order dated
13.04.2021 rejected the Review Petition. The original impugned order
dated 31.07.2019 and the rejection of the Review Petition by judgment
and order dated 13.04.2021 are the subject matter of a common appeal
arising from one Special Leave Petition.5
9. The club complained of non-compliance with the origi nal
judgment and initiated contempt proceedings. In the contempt
proceedings, notice was issued and on 12.02.2020 the H igh Court
recorded that the club’s application was deemed eligible and was taken
on record. By order dated 12.02.2020 the High Court clarified that in
case the main judgment was not complied in the letter and s pirit the
“opposite party” i.e. the Chief Executive Officer of Noida was to be
present in Court. Accordingly, on the next date when the sai d official
was present (i.e. on 24.08.2020) the Court noted that the writ petitioner
was supplied a list of plots for exercising his option regarding two plots
pursuant to the two applications filed by the petitioner and which were
covered by the new scheme issued in January, 2020. Furthermore, the
5 C. A. No. 3619-3620 of 2022
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
Court recorded that the new plots were allotted only in accordance with
the new scheme and that two other applicants had been allott ed those
plots. The court therefore expressed its dissatisfaction and stated that
third party rights was being sought to be created to complicate the issue
to suit Noida’s purposes. These two orders i.e. 12.02.2020 and 24.08.2020
as well as the subsequent order dated 28.08.2020 (which had partly
corrected the earlier order of 24.08.2020) are the subject matter of t he
civil appeal arising out of another common Special Leave Petition,6 by
the Chief Executive Officer of Noida on its behalf.
Contentions of parties
10. It is urged by Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel,
that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019 was passed on the basis
of a wrong factual statement by one Shri N.K. Singh, an Offic er on
Special Duty (OSD) of NOIDA in his affidavit dated 10.03.2019 to the
effect that eight plots remained unallotted in the earlier scheme, which
statement has caused grave prejudice to NOIDA. It is conte nded that
this officer not only made misleading statements on affidavit, but also
facilitated the transfer of the plot, allotted to the club, to another entity.
Learned senior counsel for Noida contended that the se acts were
unauthorized. It was urged that Noida, had before the High Court
specifically stated that a show-cause notice dated 12.06.2020 was issued
against the concerned employee i.e. OSD Shri N.K. Singh for mak ing
the incorrect statement in his affidavit & recommended disciplinary action
against the concerned employee to the Government of Uttar Prade sh.
Counsel urged that the High Court erred in observing that it is evident
that the affidavit filed in support of the review application lacked necessary
pleadings in respect of the exercise of due diligence by NOIDA. It was
further urged that Noida had specifically stated that of 15 allotments
were made, by the time the impugned judgment was delivered, there
were in fact no plots under the old scheme. Counsel submitte d that
whenever a scheme is discontinued, the land available with Noid a is
never kept aside but is utilized in other, newer schemes. Therefore, there
were in fact no unallotted plots; they had been utilized in s ubsequent
schemes. It is submitted that NOIDA keeps on carving new p lots and
subsequently allots them under different schemes. It had furnished the
list of new plots available and not the plots which were available initially
and all the 27 plots were allotted by 2014 in different schemes.
6 SLP (C) No. 12866-68 of 2020
605
11. It was argued that the club did not challenge the closure of the
2009-2010 scheme. It rather claimed that Noida acted arbitrarily in not
calling its representative for interview, and possible allotment. In fact all
registrants were aware that Noida could, in terms of the sai d scheme,
terminate it and refund the amounts received, for any reason. That option
was in fact exercised. Counsel highlighted that the scheme was in force
barely for two years and very few people were interviewed and granted
plots. Since the writ petitioner could not lay claim for a plot, but only a
right to be considered, in an extant scheme, the first impugned judgment
is erroneous as it proceeds to hold that the club had some right to allotment
of a plot.
12. It was urged that the operative direction of the High Cour t,
was only to reinstate the club’s applications, and consider them for
allotment in accordance with law. Since the cancellation of the old scheme
or its closure was not adversely commented, the only manner in which
the directions could reasonably be complied with, was to c onsider the
applications under the subsequent- extant scheme. In the scheme –
framed in 2020, no applicant can expect allotment on the basis of
interview. Allotment of plots is based on the result of draw of lots. The
club was considered, but was unsuccessful in the draw of lots. Therefore,
the High Court went wrong in holding that the club was entitled to be
considered in accordance with the old scheme which was not in existence.
13. Learned senior counsel argued that the club was disentitled to
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, because it did
not disclose the full and true facts. It was contended that the club was
allotted a 4000 square meter plot, in 2014, for which it made part payments
as well. However, this fact was suppressed from the High Court. Counsel
contended that Noida, at the time of conducting its due diligence, recently
discovered this fact. Furthermore, it was submitted that this suppression
was intentional, and appears to have been facilitated by t he said Mr.
N.K. Singh.
14. Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel for the club,
urged that the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the High
Court in review should not be disturbed. It was submitted that NOIDA
gave no reason for the closure of the scheme; its affidavi t before the
High Court did not provide any reason why the club’s application was
overlooked or why its representative was not called for interview like in
the case of other applicants. This was arbitrary conduct whi ch called
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
for an adverse order. To this extent, the High Cour t’s order is
unexceptionable.
15. It was urged on behalf of the club that the charge of the
pressing information, is unwarranted. Learned counsel urged that Noida
did not point to any rule or guideline which required the club to disclose
that it had applied under any other scheme before, it applied and was
allotted a plot in the scheme framed in 2013-14. In the circumsta nces,
the question of denying relief to it under Article 226 did not arise. It was
further argued that the impugned judgment dated 31.07.2019, had to be
and was understood by the High Court in contempt proceedings, to mean
that the club’s application had to be processed in accordanc e with the
scheme as it existed, in 2009-10 when in fact an application ha d been
made and entertained. In other words, the club’s application ha d to be
treated and considered in accordance with the old scheme. This meant
naturally that its representative had been called for inter view and the
application evaluated accordingly. Instead, the Noida chose to unilaterally
treat the application as one under the extant policy of 2020. In terms of
the latter, allotment is to be made not on the basis of interview but on the
basis of the draw of lots. Mr. Khurshid submitted that this was not the
intent or tenor of the impugned judgment. In the circumstances , the
contempt proceedings drawn for willful non-compliance were maintainable
and the directions issued by the High Court, completely justified.
Analysis and Conclusions
16. The terms of the old scheme were noticed in an earlier part of
the judgment. Other terms included stipulated that rates indicated were
subject to change by Noida [clause 2 (d)]; the area of the plot could be
varied [clause 2 (e)]. Clause 2 (i) read as follows:
“This scheme is an open-ended scheme. However, NOID A
reserves the right to close the scheme at any point of time
without any notice and without assigning any reasons.”
17. The club’s grievance was that its application was not considered
– its representatives were not interviewed. Noida pointe d out that it
closed or terminated the scheme. In the writ proceeding, the club did not
challenge the closure of the scheme; rather its case wa s that Noida’s
omission to consider its application for allotment was arbitrary. Once the
club accepted the closure of the scheme and did not challenge it, there
was no question of its agitating any right or grievance re garding non-
607
consideration of its application. The club does not deny that there were
other registrants, similarly circumstanced, who did no t secure any
allotment. They presumably were treated in the same mann er as the
club was. In the circumstance, the club could not without establ ishing
any discrimination, merely on the strength of closure of the scheme,
allege arbitrariness. It is well established that when a policy decision like
the closure or termination of a benefit available to a class of persons, is
not challenged, the consequence of such closure (which is the impact on
the pendency of those wishing to be considered) cannot ordinarily be
subject matter of a grievance. What the club had was a right to be
considered for allotment of the plots its applied for, so long as the
old scheme subsisted.
18. In the opinion of this court, an applicant or registrant of a
scheme has no right to insist that they should be provided allotment under
a scheme. Much depends on the terms of the scheme. In Delhi
Development Authority vs. Pushpendra Kumar Jain 7 this court had
enunciated the applicable principle as follows:
“8. Now coming to the other ground, we are unable to find
any legal basis for holding that the respondent obt ained a
vested right to allotment on the drawl of lots. Since D.D.A. i s
a public authority and because the number of applicants are
always more than the number of flats available, the system of
drawing of lots is being resorted to with a view to ide ntify the
allottee. It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify the
allottee, i.e., it is a process of selection. It is not al lotment by
itself. Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not
clothe the person selected with a legal right to al lotment at
the price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The schem e
evolved by the appellant does not say so either expre ssly or
by necessary implication. On the contrary, Clause (14) ther eof
says that “the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure a re
illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending
upon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction e tc.”
In The Bihar State Housing Board & Ors. v Radha Ballab h
Health Care and Research Institute (P) Ltd8 this court again reiterated
the same position:
7 1994 (Supp3) SCR 770
8 2019 (10) SCC483
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
‘‘…the Respondent does not get any right of allotment o f a
plot merely because it has applied for allotment earli er. The
response to an advertisement does not lead to any obligation
on the Appellant to allot any plot. Admittedly, there wa s no
allotment in pursuance of the offer submitted by th e
Respondent. Mere fact that the Respondent had appli ed for
allotment of a plot does not confer any legal or eq uitable
right to seek allotment of any plot.”
19. In the absence of any ambiguity- in the law, and the scheme,
the writ petitioner club, in this court’s opinion could not have insisted that
after the closure of the old scheme (which went unchallenged by it),
nevertheless, it had a right to allotment. In holding otherwise, and
proceeding to direct Noida to consider the club’s applications the impugned
judgment erred in law.
20. The High Court had directed that the club’s applications should
be considered “in accordance with law”. Noida proceeded to c omply
with that direction, and reinstate those applications- and, furthermor e,
consider them in accordance with the existing scheme. The High Court,
in contempt proceedings, has taken exception to this course of action- in
this court’s opinion, in an entirely unnecessary and unwarranted manner.
As held earlier, once the legality of closure of the old sc heme was
undisputed, there was no manner of right inhering with the club, to insist
that its claim for any plot had to be considered. If at all, it ought to have
applied under subsequent schemes, and waited like other applicants (of
that scheme), Noida’s interpretation of the High Court’s jud gment (to
consider) in this context, was quite correct. Neither did N oida, in its
announcement while closing the old scheme nor in any condition of the
2013 or later scheme, stipulate that old scheme applica nts would be
dealt with according to the terms of that (i.e. 2010) scheme. This meant
that Noida had to consider the club’s applications, in accorda nce with
terms of the prevailing scheme. It did so, and incurred – quite unjustifiably-
the wrath of the High Court in contempt proceedings. There is authority
for the proposition that when regulations or schemes, or policies change,
applicants for their benefits have no inherent right to be considered under
the old policy; rather the consideration has to be under the new regime,
unless the latter contains an express stipulation to the contrary.
609
21. In Usman Gani Khatri of Bombay v Cantonment Board 9
this court affirmed the decision of the High Court, which held that old
rules could not be applied, and that new rules were applic able, for
considering applications for sanction of buildings. It was held that
“In any case, the High Court is right in taking the view th at
the building plan can only be sanctioned according to the
building regulations prevailing at the time of sanctio ning of
such building plans. At present the statutory bye-l aws
published on 30.4.1988 are in force and the fresh bu ilding
plans to be submitted by the petitioners, if any, shall now be
governed by these bye-laws and not by any other bye- laws
or schemes which are no longer in force now.
If we consider a reverse case where building regulations a re
amended more favourably to the builders before sanctionin g
of building plans already submitted, the builders w ould
certainly claim and get advantage of the regulations amende d
to their benefit.”
Likewise, in Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v Ganges Rope
Co. Ltd. & Ors 10. a similar question arose for consideration. The
municipal corporation was required to decide an application for sanction,
in a time bound manner, by the court. The applicable rules changed. The
corporation decided the application in the light of the amended rules.
This court, negativing the applicant’s contention that it had a right to be
considered under the old rules, held as follows:
“20. The provisions of the Act, therefore, contempl ate an
express sanction to be granted by the Corporation before a ny
person can be allowed to construct or erect a building. Thus,
in ordinary course, merely by submission of applicati on for
sanction for construction, no vested right is created in favou r
of any party by statutory operation of the provisions.
------
In our considered opinion, by the order of the Cour t
dated 23.12.1993 observing that the petitioner is ‘ not
prevented from applying’ for further sanction of ad ditional
floors above fourth floor and the ‘expectation’ expres sed in
9 1992 (3) SCR 1
10 [2003] Supp (6) SCR1212
RITU MAHESHWARI v. M/S. PROMOTIONAL CLUB
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. ]
the subsequent order of the Court dated 24.6.1994, from t he
Corporation to decide the pending application for s anction
within four weeks, no vested right in favour of the respondent
- company can be said to have been created to obtain sanction
on the unamended rules, as they existed on the date of their
second application.”
In the light of the above position in law, it is clear t hat the club
could not have claimed that its application had to be dealt with in terms
of the old scheme, which had ended in 2012. The direction of the High
Court, could only have meant that the applications had to be revived, and
dealt with the scheme prevailing as on the date of its consideration, i.e.
after 31.07.2019. The interpretation placed by the High Court, that there
were existing plots, which could have been dealt with under the old
scheme is entirely misplaced. In such events, given that the legality of
closure of the old scheme attained finality, there was no question of any
land or plot being attached or belonging as it were to an old scheme. If
any land or plot, or industrial unit were in fact “left-over” it was always
up to the development authority or agency (here Noida) to dete rmine
how they are to be dealt with. The directions issued in contempt
proceedings, which are subject matter of another appeal, are accordingly
held erroneous.
22. As noticed earlier, the club was allotted a plot, in 2014; it paid
substantial amounts. The area of that plot is 4000 square metres. Now,
while it is true that this fact could not have been disclosed t o the High
Court, when filing the writ petition (in 2013), the club, in this court’s
opinion, had an obligation to disclose it, during the pendency of writ
proceedings. This fact was material, given that the jurisdiction invoked
is equitable and discretionary. Furthermore, whether the grievance was
justified and well founded, given that state agencies develo p and allot
such industrial units at prices which are reasonable, and that an applicant
subsequently succeeded in securing a plot, are relevant fac ts, which a
court should be appraised of. The failure by the club, to do so, in this
court’s opinion, disentitled it to any relief.
23. For the foregoing reasons, Noida’s appeals are allowed; the
impugned judgment and orders of the High Court are hereby set aside.
There shall be no order on costs.
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.