Reddy Veerana v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
JUDGMENT
1. Leave granted.
2. The present Civil Appeals arise out of the judgment dat ed
28.10.2021, passed by High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2272 of 2019 filed by appellant Reddy
Veerana (co-petitioner), by which, the High Court intervened in the award
of compensation dated 31.01.2011, passed by Additio nal District
Magistrate (Land Acquisition) for acquired land of appellant, admeasuring
2.18.00 bighas of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427, situated in village Chhalera
Bangar and disposed-off the petition.
3. Assailing the said order, both the parties are before this Court.
Briefly stated, facts are that vide sale deed dated 24.04.1997, appellant
along-with two others purchased the scheduled property land in Khasra
No. 422 admeasuring 3 bighas 9 biswas and in Khasra No. 427
admeasuring 2 bighas 4 biswas and 10 biswansi (i.e., total of 13757.8 sq.
meters) in village Chhalera Bangar, Gautam Buddh Nagar district for a
total sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (One crore only). However,
through the prior land acquisition proceedings in year 1979-1980, a portion
of the purchased land to the extent of 1 bigha 5 biswas 15 biswa nsi in
Khasra No. 427 and 1 bigha in Khasra No. 422 was acquired by State.
Thus, the property which remained unacquired with the appellant was 2
bigha 18 biswa 10 biswansi (i.e. total of 7400 sq. meters) in both the
aforesaid khasra numbers (in short be called as scheduled piece of land).
671
4. As is borne out of the record, pursuant to purchase of land by
appellant, since early 2000s, employees of NOIDA were interfering with
the peaceful possession of the appellant (land-owner), which resultantly
led into Civil Suit No. 416/1998 being filed by appellant for permanent
injunction against NOIDA, with a prayer to not inte rfere with the
possession. For the purpose to demonstrate the utility and value of land,
the averments made in the written statement filed by NOIDA inter-alia
categorically contended, were as thus:
“…..the land in dispute is situated in the centre of development
of authority and the use of land has been prescribed to be
used for commercial. Therefore, this land is very c ostly.
Since………the land of village Chhalera Bangar under t he
provisions of Section 2 of Act No. 6 of 1976 is decl ared as
industrial area and construction on this land witho ut the
permission of defendant is illegal. ”
(emphasis supplied)
5. The Trial Court, after due deliberation on the contentions raised
by both the parties, vide order dated 16.02.2000, partly decreed the suit
in favour of appellant (Reddy Veerana) herein and restrained N OIDA
from taking possession of land which was not the subject matter of the
prior acquisition in year 1979-1980. Further, the Court also declared the
appellant as the owner of the remaining portion of land of Khasra No.
422 and 427 which was purchased vide sale deed as mentioned earlier.
6. Being aggrieved by aforesaid order, NOIDA preferred Civ il
Appeal No. 61 of 2020 before District Judge, which also came to be
dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2001 with certain observations made
in the following manner –
“The lower court has not committed any error in dec reeing
the suit of permanent injunction of plaintiff produced in regard
to the land admeasuring 02-09-00 bigha of Khasra no. 422
and land admeasuring 00-09-10 bigha of Khasra No. 427 of
village Chhalera Bangar, Tehsil Dadri, District – G autam
Buddh Nagar against appellant. The defendant/appellant even
now is free to acquire the remaining land of the af oresaid
Khasra Nos. but until and unless the land is not acquire d, till
then the decree of permanent injunction issued by the lower
court shall remain applicable .”
(emphasis supplied)
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
The judgment and decree granting permanent injunction passed
by District Judge, confirming the order of Trial Court has not been assailed
and therefore, it has become final. Moreover, despite the de cree of
permanent injunction being operative, NOIDA in the year 2003 floated a
tender for development of large piece of land including the remaining
piece of land of Khasra No. 422 and Khasra No. 427 which is the subject
matter of this case. The said tender was widely advertised by NOIDA
in various newspapers and subsequently, nine reputed developers including
MGF, Unitech, Sun City, Sahara India and Omex purchased the bid
documents. It was a known fact that out of the large piece of t he land,
the scheduled piece of land was in dispute and hence, all th e reputed
developers abstained from bidding for the tender. Be that as it may, on
the closing date of tender i.e. 9.03.2004, only one tender on behalf of
respondent No. 7 herein, i.e., M/s DLF Universal Ltd. (he reinafter
referred to as DLF) was received and evaluated by Technical Committee,
whereafter, respondent No. 7 quoted the rate and qualified in the said
tender. Consequently, the large piece of land as mentioned abo ve was
allotted to DLF vide order dated 12.04.2004, including the scheduled
piece of land for which, the decree of permanent injunction w as in
operation.
7. After the allotment of land to respondent No. 7, a preliminary
notification dated 02.09.2005 was issued by NOIDA under Section 4(1)
read with Section 17(1) of the ‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’ (hereinafter
referred to as 1894 Act), followed by a notification dated 22.11.200 5
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act, to acquire the scheduled piece of land
measuring 0.7400 hectare in Khasra No. 422 and 427 at village Chhalera
Bangar, Dadri, NOIDA. The possession of the scheduled piece of land
was taken on 20.01.2006 as per order passed by Additional District
Collector (Land Acquisition) Noida.
8. The aforesaid notifications were challenged by the appel lant
before High Court of Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.
75152 of 2005 and Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 70088 of 2006.
As per interim orders of the High Court in the aforesaid petitions, Revenue
Inspector visited the scheduled piece of land on 05.08.2008 and in his
report noted as under –
“In accordance to the spot, the land of Khasra No. 422 and
427 which in present has been converted in Sector 1 8 in
regards to demarcation , has no identification spot because
673
the NOIDA authority has been fully developed and in absence
of any fixed identification, demarcation of land is not
possible.”
The High Court vide order dated 10.12.2009 disposed-off the
matter and held as under –
“Perusal of record shows that the notification under Sect ion
4 of the Act was issued on 2.9.2005 and in this notific ation
under Section 4 of the Act a direction was also issued under
Section17(4) of the Act to the effect that the prov ision of
Section 5-A of the Act shall not apply. A notificati on under
Section 6 of the Act as contained in Annexure No. 2 t o the
instant writ petition was issued on 22.11.2005 and the urgency
clause was invoked under Section 17(1) of the Act.
Mr. S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioners made a
statement at bar that the petitioners do not press the relief
claimed in the instant writ petitions and only pray that their
compensation be determined and be paid to them in
accordance with law and also keeping in mind the Judgement
of High Court of Uttaranchal rendered in Bhopendra Sin gh
and others Vs. Awas Vikas Parishad and others, reported in
2005(2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295. According to him this
statement is being made keeping in mind the Commissioner’s
report that the land cannot be demarcated and the petitioners
cannot get back the land.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, but without
prejudice to the merits of the case, the writ petition is disposed
of with the direction to the SLAO to determine the
compensation according to law as laid down in the judgement
rendered in Bhopendra Singh and others (Supra). The
payment of the compensation shall be made preferably within
a period of one month . However, it is further provided that if
as per policy of NOIDA any land is to be given to t he
petitioners, same shall be expedited for rehabilitati on of the
petitioner. Writ petition is disposed of. ”
(emphasis supplied)
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
It may not be out of context to state that, the appellant (land -
owner) gave the concession before the Court in view of the observation
made by Revenue Inspector in the report that the land was fully developed
by NOIDA and demarcation was not possible. Therefore, the direction
for determination of compensation as per the judgment rendered in the
case of ‘Bhopendra Singh and Others Vs. Awas Evam Vikas
Parishad and Others, 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295; MANU/
UC/0270/2005’ was only prayed.
9. Being aggrieved, NOIDA challenged the aforesaid judgment in
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 20196-20197 of 2010 (later admitted
and converted into Civil Appeal No. 731-732 of 2013). During the pendency
of the aforesaid appeal, this Court vide order dated 10.01.2011, issued
notice while observing that ‘in the meanwhile, there shall be stay of
operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 10.12.2009 passed
by High Court’. It is the specific case of the appellant (land-owner) that
NOIDA did not even inform the Court about passing of award unde r
Section 11 of the 1894 Act during the pendency of the said appeal.
10. Be that as it may, after almost delay of 5 years, an award
dated 31.01.2011 was passed by Additional District Magistrate ( Land
Acquisition), NOIDA, Gautam Buddh Nagar, under Section 11 of 1894
Act. In the said award, the compensation was determined by the authority
in the following manner –
“…… a decision was reached in the meeting on the basis of
general acquisition process to pay them compensation at the
rate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard on the basis of sell lette r
dated 04.02.2005 for the land sold in village Sadar par of
this circle, whose borders touch the borders of vil lage
Chhalera Bangar against the land sold in village Chha lera
three years before the advertisement of this Act on 02.09.2005
under Section 4(1), 17 and were not found suitable for getting
compensation, the approval of which was given by
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut through his o fficial
letter No. 452/891/2004-06 dated 18.01.2006. ”
Regarding the pending litigation before this Court, the award dealt
with the same as under –
“With reference to the disposal of Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No. 75152/2005 – Vishnu Pradhan Vs. NOIDA & Ors., Hon.
675
High Court of Allahabad on 10.12.2009 ordered to disp ose
the compensation on the basis of minimum determined circle
rate by the District Collectors as per the order passed by the
Hon. High Court, Uttaranchal, against the petition fi led for
compensation, determination and payment by Bhopendr a
Singh and Others Vs. Resident Development Council a nd
Others, but against the orders of Hon. High Court, a Special
Petition No. CC 20196-20197/2010 was filed in the H on.
Supreme Court of India by Naveen Okhla Udyog Vikas
Pradhikaran, Noida versus Vishnu Pradhan and others , in
which the enforcement of the orders of Hon. High Court dated
10.12.2009 was stopped on 10.01.2001 . Due to the
postponement order issued by Hon. Supreme Court of I ndia,
the determined rate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard re mains
effective for the uncontracted lands as per the decision taken
in the said meeting convened under the chairmanship of
District Collector, Gautam Buddh Nagar and the decision of
acquired land will be taken on this basis only. ”
Finally, the award was passed in following terms subject to t he
decision of this court and compensation was computed as under –
“Therefore, for the 0.828 ha, land acquired by New O khla
Industrial Development Authority for planned indust rial
development in village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana Dad ri,
Tehsil Dadri, District – Gautam Buddh Nagar, the
compensation is Rs. 18,00,481.00 and 30% solatium payable
on it amounts to Rs. 5,40,144.00 and 12% payable on the
compensatory amount is Rs. 53,866.00 which amounts to a
total of Rs. 23,94,491.00 (Rupees Twenty-Three Lacs Ni nety-
Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-One only) and the
decision upon it is being declared today on 31.01.2011. This
decision will be as per the obedience of the order issue d by
the Hon. Supreme Court of India against Special Petition No.
CC 20197-20197/2010 – NOIDA versus Vishnu Pradhan and
others.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, on 04.11.2015, the appeal of NOIDA before this Court
was dismissed for being devoid of merits.
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
11. It is also relevant to note that, vide order dated 04.11.2015,
this Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 1107 of 2009, which assailed
the judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in Bhopendra Singh (supra).
In view of the aforesaid order, Deputy Chief Executive of NO IDA
addressed a letter dated 11.05.2016 to Additional District Ma gistrate
(Land Acquisition) to comply with the order of High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad and Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, the appellant
herein preferred representations before the concerned a uthority and
thereby sought compensation in terms of the aforesaid orders passed by
this Court, however, in vain. The District Magistrate, Gau tam Buddh
Nagar on 08.01.2018, dismissed the representation of the appellant (land-
owner) and observed as under –
“In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that when the matter was
pending adjudication before the Hon. Supreme Court, then
in such circumstances, the award/decision dated 31.01.2 011
was not be announced/passed by then Additional Dist rict
Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar
and the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquis ition),
Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in the matter has to wait f or
the final orders of Hon. Supreme Court . The award/decision
dated 31.01.2011 of Additional District Magistrate (Land
Acquisition) is not the compliance of order dated 10.12.2009
passed by Hon. High Court and stay order dated 10.01.2011
passed by Hon. Supreme Court , but because this award/
decision has already been passed/declared by then Additional
District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Noida, Gautam Buddh
Nagar, therefore, legally it is not appropriate to dis pose-off
this point at the level of District Magistrate. ”
Being aggrieved by the order passed by District Magist rate, the
appellant preferred Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 1841-1842 of 2018 in
Civil Appeal Nos. 731-732 of 2013. This Court vide order dated
22.10.2018, dismissed the aforesaid contempt as withdrawn and granted
liberty to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy before the High Court.
12. In view of the order passed in Contempt Petition by this Court,
the appellant (land-owner) again approached the High Court i n Writ
Petition No. 2272 of 2019, wherein the High Court vide imp ugned
judgment and order dated 28.10.2021, with regard to question of title of
appellant on the scheduled land, the High Court held as under –
677
“31. We would first be dealing with the issue as to whether
the writ petition filed by the sole petitioner to c laim
compensation of land measuring 2.18.00 bighas of
Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 is maintainable. The
respondents have produced a copy of the order dated
12.09.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Gautam Buddha Nagar to deny acceptance of
compromise and accordingly, allegations have been
made about suppression of aforesaid fact. It is also that
no compromise deed or decree has been issued by the
competent Court and for that reason, one co-owner of
the land, namely, Vishnu Pradhan contested the case
separately to challenge the acquisition of the land. We,
however, find that petitioner has produced a copy of
the Khatauni of Fasli Year 1407- 1412 when the land
was recorded solely in the name of the petitioner. It was
pursuant to the order dated 01.09.2010 in Suit No. 2441
of 2010 under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996
and the judgment of Civil Judge (Senior Division) dated
17.06.2010 to record entire land of Khasra Nos. 422
and 427 in the name of the present petitioner. A copy of
the Khatauni was submitted alongwith the
supplementary affidavit, thereby the objection on
maintainability of the writ petition in the hands of the
petitioner is not tenable rather the petitioner bec ame
sole owner of the property in dispute after an orde r
under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act and the
judgment of the Civil Court dated 17.06.2010. His name
was accordingly entered in the khatauni. The
respondents have ignored the subsequent orders by
which land was entered in the name of the petitioner
alone.”
Further, on the aspect of whether the schedule property was an
agriculture land or commercial land, the High Court referred to the
pleadings of respondents themselves in Suit No. 416 of 1998 and provisions
of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976, to conclude that the
schedule land was a commercial property and the compensation shall be
determined accordingly.
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
Regarding the deduction towards development charges, the High
Court held as follows –
“63. The respondents were expected to take into account the
circle rate of the land in question and thereupon to make
reasonable deductions towards the development which
may be between 20% and 50% as per the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Viluben Jhalejar
Contractor (supra).
64. If the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court
in the judgment cited above is applied, then
determination of compensation should have been made
after taking the circle rate of Rs.1,10,000/- per squ are
meter of the land in question and thereupon to make
deduction towards the development. The development
charges can be maximum to the extent of 50% of it and
accordingly respondents should have taken
Rs.55,000/- per square meter to be the market value of
the land.
65. The official respondents while doing it could ha ve
noticed that the land was allotted to respondent no.7
one and half years back prior to the notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894. It was by the allotme nt
letter dated 12.04.2004. The circle rate was determined
thereupon on 16.04.2004. The allotment of land to the
respondent no.7 was 8 times bigger than the land of the
petitioner and it was one and half years back. Whil e
applying the judgment of the Apex Court, the market
value should have been taken @ Rs.55,000/- per square
meter. However, due to the interim order of the Ape x
Court dated 11.01.2011 against the judgment dated
10.12.2009, the respondents did not determine the
compensation as per the direction given by this Court. ”
And lastly, the High Court disposed-off the petition with the
following directions –
“69. Accordingly, we find reasons to cause interferen ce in
theaward dated 31.01.2011 and direct the respondents
to determine the compensation as under –
679
1. The respondents are directed to take into consideration
the circle rate of Sector – 18 since 16.04.2004 given in
Annexure – 7 of supplementary counter affidavit file d
by the respondent no. 5. It was Rs. 1,10,000/- per square
meter for Sector – 18.
2. After making 50% deduction towards the developmen t
charges, it would come to Rs. 55,000/- per square meter
and accordingly the compensation would be determined
on the aforesaid rate for the land admeasuring 2.18
bighas.
3. The addition of solatium of 30% would be made
thereupon. The amount arrived as per the direction in
paras (1) and (2) would be payable with interest @ 9%
per annum for one year from the date of possession i.e.
February, 2005 and thereupon 15% per annum as per
the Proviso to Section 34 of the Act of 1894.
4. The amount deposited in the year 2017 would earn
interest @ 15% only till it was deposited. The amount
so deposited would be paid to the petitioner with t he
interest earned on it.
5. The amount of compensation would be paid thereupon
to the petitioner.”
13. The High Court on the issue of applicability of Section 24 of
‘Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acq uisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’ (hereinafter ref erred to as
2013 Act), held that, the argument of lapsing of acquisition for an award
passed beyond a period prescribed under Section 11(a) cannot be accepted
in view of the ratio of judgment of this Court in ‘Indore Development
Authority Vs. Manohar Lal & Ors., 2020 (8) SCC 129’ . After going
through the said judgment, it is clear that Section 24(1)(a) of 2013 Act,
starts with non-obstante clause and states that in case where the
proceedings have been initiated under 1894 Act, but, the award has not
been made under Section 11, the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to
the determination of compensation would apply. In the case at hand, the
award was made on 31.01.2011 after grant of stay on 10.01.2011 in
Civil Appeal No. 731-732 of 2013, though it was by a delay of 5 years.
By the final order passed on 04.11.2015, the said appeals were dismissed.
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
Thereafter, the representation was made by the appel lant asking
compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mtrs. as d irected by
High Court inter-party relying upon judgment of Bhopendra Singh
(supra) was rejected vide order dated 08.01.2018. Th ereafter, the
contempt petitions were filed alleging non-compliance of t he order of
the High Court which were dismissed as withdrawn while granting the
liberty to appellant to avail appropriate remedy. Thus, o n the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, the possession was taken and the award
was passed, though as alleged it was non-est. In our opinion, by the
impugned order, the determination of compensation as per circle rate of
Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mtrs for commercial land was the question re s-
integra in the light of Bhopendra Singh(supra) judgment and the award,
whether rightly or wrongly passed, was in existence on t he date of
commencement of 2013 Act. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the
High Court has rightly refused to interfere on the issue of applicability of
2013 Act for determination of compensation and rightly relied upon the
judgment on Indore Development Authority (supra).
14. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant (land-
owner) and NOIDA have filed separate appeals, which are heard
analogously.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.B .
Suresh for appellant, in addition to the point of applicability of Section 24
of 2013 Act as discussed above, contended as under –
a. That, the award dated 31.01.2011 passed by Distri ct
Magistrate was in violation of order of this Court as well as
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad;
b. The award itself acknowledged that it was contingent in
nature;
c. There was no personal hearing granted to the appellant, even
though NOIDA knew about the interest of the appellant in
the scheduled property;
d. The impugned award was a void exercise since the public
notice of the same was given two days after the designated
date of hearing under Section 9 of the 1894 Act;
e. The award itself was passed after a delay of 5 years si nce
the date of hearing, which violates the mandate under Section
681
11A of the 1894 Act. Therefore, the date of award of
compensation should be shifted or in alternate, since the
compensation was deposited in the year 2017, therefore, the
amount of compensation be determined as per the provisions
of 2013 Act.
f. Deduction with respect to development charges could not be
levied as the plot was already developed even before the
acquisition;
g. NOIDA illegally sold the schedule property even before the
acquisition which is a clear-cut violation of right to property
under Article 300A of the Constitution. Such Constitutional
tort should not be allowed to be left unpunished and the
respondent authorities should not take benefit of their own
wrongful acts.
15. Per contra, Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing on behalf of NOIDA, contended as under –
a. Appellant cannot be entitled for a compensation more than
Rs. 31,850/- which was the price tendered by respondent no.
7 (DLF);
b. The said price of Rs. 31,850/- has been adjudicated by this
Court in ‘Anil Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P., (2004)
8 SCC 671’ to be reasonable;
c. It has been conceded that allotment to respondent no. 7 (DLF)
was prior to the date of acquisition of the scheduled land;
d. Appellant (land-owner) acquired the property in year 19 97
for a sale consideration of Rs. 1 crore. One of the earlier
land owners namely Vishnu Vardhan had entered into an
agreement to sale dated 07.06.2006, for a sale consideration
of Rs. 3 crores only. These transactions indicate that the
aforesaid land was an agricultural plot, however, the scheduled
land has to be characterized as agriculture land or at be st
residential;
e. Jurisdiction of reference court constituted under Section 18
of 1894 Act has been by-passed by the High Court while
determining the compensation;
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
f. Development charge amounting to 75% has to be deducted
instead of 50%;
g. Compensation granted by the High Court would amount to
unjust enrichment for the appellant which cannot be sustained
under the law.
16. Mr. Rayzada, Additional Advocate General appearing for the
State has submitted that, the subject land was bought as benami property
and hence, appellant is only entitled for 1/3rd of the amount.
17. Learned counsel for respondent no. 7 has submitted that, the
dispute is inter-se NOIDA and appellant herein and resp ondent no. 7
has nothing to add other than to state that the allotment of land was
subject matter of litigation before this Court in Anil Kumar Srivastava
(supra), which has upheld the allocation through the process of auction.
However, the compensation, if any, enhanced, may be directed only
against NOIDA.
18. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions raised
by both parties, at the outset it is relevant to mention that, the legality
and validity of judgment dated 10.12.2009 passed by High Court in Civil
Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 75152/2005 has sustained the scrutiny
of this Court and has been upheld vide order dated 04.11.2015 in Civil
Appeal No. 731-732 of 2013. The judgment has attained finality inter-se
the parties. It is not the case of respondents that the previous judgment
as well as the impugned order has been rendered by an incompe tent
authority. In other words, the said judgment has effectively put the
controversy inter-se the parties to rest. Thus, incidentally, what remains
in the matter is mere observance of those directions given by the High
Court in the light of prevailing law. Therefore, the contention disputing
the payment of compensation altogether for the acquired land is untenable
and cannot be entertained at this stage. The conclusion arrived at by
High Court has been given seal of affirmation by this Court and hence,
the right of the appellant herein to get compensatio n in terms of
determination as directed has been crystallized and cannot be interfered
with. It would be unjust and improper to allow re-agitation of issues and
vexing the appellant twice when the matter has already been put to rest
by impugned judgment inter-se the parties.
19. At this juncture, we consider it appropriate to refer ‘R.
Unnikrishnan and Another Vs. V.K. Mahanudevan and O thers,
683
(2014) 4 SCC 434’ , wherein para 19, the Court while dealing with
finality to binding judicial decisions observed as follows –
“19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial
decisions pronounced by courts that are competent to
deal with the subject-matter. Public interest is again st
individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind
of litigation. The binding character of the judgment s
pronounced by the courts of competent jurisdiction has
always been treated as an essential part of the rule of
law which is the basis of the administration of justice in
this country . We may gainfully refer to the decision of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in ‘Daryao v. State
of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457]’ where the Court succinctly
summed up the law in the following words:
9. …It is in the interest of the public at large that a
finality should attach to the binding decisions
pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and
it is also in the public interest that individuals should
not be vexed twice over with the same kind of
litigation.
***
11.…The binding character of judgments pronounced
by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an
essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law
obviously is the basis of the administration of justice
on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. ”
20. Therefore, in view of settled legal position with resp ect to
binding nature of the judgment that has attained finality, there is no iota
of doubt that NOIDA is under mandatory obligation to determine the
compensation as per law laid down in Bhopendra Singh (supra). The
relevant extracts from Bhopendra Singh (supra) are being reproduced
herein below for ready reference –
“4. Learned reference court has assessed the market value
of similar land @ of Rs. 6/- per square feet on the
ground that other land of the same area which was
acquired with land in question was also valued at the
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
said rate by the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
However, learned Counsel for the Appellants argued
that the land in question is adjoining to the main road
unlike the land which was taken into consideration by
the reference court. It is further argued that the land in
question should not have been valued less than
Rs. 50/- Square feet. On perusal of the oral evidence
adduced by the parties we found that P.W.-1 Smt. Raj
Dulari has stated that in the year 1976 value of land in
question was Rs. 50/- per square feet. P.W.-2 Arvin d
Singh, P.W.-3 Ranvir Singh and P.W.-4 Harpal Singh
have also made the similar statements. But in the matters
of Land Acquisition, best way to assess the market value
is to examine the value in the light of price paid by t he
purchaser of similar land in the neighbourhood of the
land in question. Such transaction if nearer the date of
notification of acquisition, facilitates the court to assess
the more accurate market value of the land. However,
in the present case none of the above witnesses have
adduced any evidence as to the exemplar sale deed
pertaining to the nearby similar land. In absence of such
sale, deeds we are compelled to see the valuation of the
surrounding land made by the Collector Nainital under
Rule 340-A of the U.P. Stamp (first amendment) Rules,
1976. Paper No. 44-C/1 is copy of the Circle rate
showing market value assessed by the Collector for the
purposes of registration of instrument of sale. The sai d
documents shows that the circle rate of the land in
question for imposing the stamp duty over the documents
is Rs. 95/- to Rs. 135/- per sq. meter as market value of
the land adjoining to road and Rs. 67/- to Rs. 80/- per
sq. meter for the land away from the road . From the
evidence on record, it is clear that the land in question
was near the main road. As such the market value as
per the circle rate was treated for the purpose of
realizing stamp duty not less than Rs. 95/- per sq. meter.
It would be injustice to the owner of land if for realizing
the stamp duty we apply the circle rate and deny at -
least the said rate in making payment of compensation
685
on acquisition of his land. The total area of the land in
question is 2900 sq. yard. The learned reference court
has erred in law by multiplying the rate mentioned per
sq, feet with area in terms of sq. yard. That is why due
to miscalculation the amount has been stuck at meager
Rs. 17,400/-. Area measuring 0.6 acre is equal to 2900
Sq, yard which is equal to 2397 sq. meter. If we assess
the market value relying on the circle rate it would b e
Rs. 95/- per sq. meter, the market value of the land i n
the year 1976 comes out to be Rs. 95/- A – 2397.80 sq.
meters = 2,27,791/-.
xxx xxx xxx
12. The market value determined for the circle, is t he
minimum statutory market value, in accordance with the
statutory rules framed under the Stamp Act, as amended
by the U.P. Act, on the basis of which, stamp duty is
paid as per schedule appended to Section 3 and sale
deed is to be entertained only after the payment of the
stamp duty paid on the said minimum market value and
if in the opinion of the Registering Authority the value
of the property is more than the minimum value
determined as per the rules, he may refer the matter to
the Authority who may further proceed to require the
vendee to pay more stamp duty. And if not paid they
may impound the sale deed. Thus, the basis of exercise
of power, is the minimum market value determined
according to rule. If for the augmentation of the
revenue, government fixes the market value of the
property in a circle why that not be taken as minimum
market value of the property for the purpose of Land
Acquisition Act. The procedure of determination of
market value provided under Section 23 of Land
Acquisition Act is pari-materia to the rules framed under
the Stamp Act. Therefore, we hold that while avoiding
compensation for land acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, the compensation cannot be paid at a
lesser rate than that of market value determined for
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
the purpose of payment of stamp duty under the Stamp
Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. Bare perusal of the aforesaid makes it clear th at, the
determination of the compensation has to be made by taking into
consideration the circle rate which has been determined as per the market
value. The market value of a property is the price that a willing purchaser
would pay to a willing seller for it, taking into account its current condition,
all existing advantages, and potential possibilities when led out in the
most advantageous manner, while excluding any benefit resulting from
the implementation of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily
acquired. Therefore, the market value is to be determined in the light of
price paid by the purchaser of similar land in the neighbourhood of the
land in question and in cases, where no records for such transacti on/
purchase is available, the minimum statutory value in accordance with
Stamp Act must be taken as market value for circle rate.
22. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on the
scheduled piece of land has not been contested by the respondents and
the adjudication is confined only to the quantum of compensation, we
deem it appropriate not to interfere with the findings of the High Court
with respect to the ownership. Be that as it may, moving fur ther, the
order dated 27.03.2004 passed by District Magistrate, Gautam B uddh
Nagar notifying the circle rate to be Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt. as
applicable on commercial properties, residential properties etc., situated
in Noida is also on record. Further, the nature of acquired land is also not
in dispute for the reason that, NOIDA while contesting the Civil Suit No.
416/1998 filed by appellant herein seeking permanent injunction, itself
admitted that the land has been determined for use of commercial
purposes and hence, it is a valuable land. This fact is also fortified by the
Revenue Inspector’s report dated 05.08.2008, submitted in compliance
of interim order passed by High Court in Writ Petition No. 75152 of
2005. By the said report, it is apparent that, on spot the land of Khasra
No. 422 and 427 was converted into a part of Sector 18, for which
demarcation is not possible because of absence of any fixed identification
points for demarcation since the land is fully developed. Thus, NOIDA
cannot turn around to say in this case that the land is either agricultural
or at best residential. Thus, the arguments as advanced is contra ry to
record, far from truth and cannot be countenanced.
687
23. Now, the argument advanced by learned Additional Solicitor
General for State and counsel for respondent no. 7 relyin g upon the
judgment of Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra), which was a PIL filed
before the Allahabad High Court and later transferred to this Cour t, is
also required to be analyzed. This Courtin the aforesaid case dealt with
the challenge made to tender floated by NOIDA in 2003 and dismissed
the said PIL while observing as thus –
“7. In reply, respondent no. 2 has pointed out that t he
impugned Scheme was given wide publicity; that the
development of the plot admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m.
became necessary to decongest Sector 18 where car
parking has become an acute problem; that decongestion
could be achieved by constructing shopping malls with
matching parking facility ; that although the area of the
plot in question is 54,320.18 sq. m., FAR is restricted to
150 and ground cover is restricted to 30% unlike th e
instances of plots submitted by the petitioner where fo r
a smaller plot of 6000-7000 sq. m., FAR is 150 and for
still smaller plots of 600 sq. m., FAR is 250 (see Annexure
P-1). That by offering the said plot admeasuring
54,320.18 sq. m., the Authority is saving on internal
development for amenities, parking, etc ……..
xxx xxx xxx
9. Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the
reserve price fixed by respondent no. 2 at the rate of Rs
27,500 per sq. m. is contrary to clause 2(e) of the Board
resolution dated 10-7-2003; that under the said clause,
the reserve rate of commercial plots admeasuring 5001
sq. m. or more was one-and-a-half times the sector rate;
that the sector rate was Rs 90,000 per sq. m.; that the
reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. for the plot
admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m., without sub-division, was
abysmally low and understated………. It was submitted
that transfer of the said plot admeasuring 54,320.1 8
sq. m. at such a low reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq.
m. would result in causing huge loss of Rs 340 crores to
the State exchequer.
xxx xxx xxx
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
14. Applying the above tests to the facts of this cas e, we
find that there is no material on record to show that the
tender price of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. is a low price. The
entire edifice of the petition is based on the chall enge
to the reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. As sta ted
above, fixation of the reserve price is to facilita te the
conduct of the sale. It was open to the petitioner to
challenge the tender price of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. as
understated, notwithstanding the fixation of the reserve
price. No comparative sales instances, with similar
parameters of ground cover of 30% and 150 FAR, have
been placed before us. No figures of cost of 2800 ECS
have been placed before us as such costs would increase
the reserve price. On the other hand, we find that th e
reserve price has been fixed by taking into account
several factors. Firstly, in the past tenders invite d for
relatively smaller plots with higher reserve price had
failed. It is important to bear in mind that the te nder
process is an expensive exercise. To resort repeatedly to
this exercise is a costly affair. Secondly, in the p resent
case, the reserve price was fixed by taking into account
the comparative offers/sales in the adjoining
sectors……..
15. Reading of the said clause indicates that the figure of
Rs 90,000 is not mentioned. It is a figure alleged by the
petitioner. As stated above, there is a difference betwee n
the circle rate and the sector rate. The petitioner h as
confused the two. The circle rate is notified by th e
Government for the guidance of the Sub-Registrar. They
are notified for revenue purposes. There is nothing to
show that Rs 90,000 per sq. m. was the sector rate. In
the present case, we are concerned with a larger plot of
54,320.18 sq. m. with different variables of 30% ground
cover and 150 FAR. Keeping in mind all these factors,
the Authority has fixed the reserve price. In the present
case, undue importance has been given to the fixation
of the reserve price. As stated above, notwithstand ing
the reserve price, the petitioner could have brough t
before the Court material, if any, to show
689
undervaluation. In the present case, the tender price is
Rs 31,850 per sq. m. It is higher than the reserve price.
There is no material to show whether the tender price is
understated. In the circumstances, there is no merit in
the contention of the petitioner that the land is sold a t
an abysmally low price. ”
(emphasis supplied)
24. From reading of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that in the
PIL, petitioner had only challenged the reserve rate as being abysmally
low and did not challenge the tender price of Rs. 31,850 per sq. m trs.
Further, the PIL petitioner inter-alia had not led any evidence to show
exemplar deeds as to the actual market value of the plot or the circle
rate determined under the Stamp Act. On the pleadings and evidence as
existed before it, this Court concluded that the reserve price of land was
reasonable and accordingly dismissed the PIL. It was fairly admitted by
the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for NOIDA that, at
the time of arguments before this Court, NOIDA had not revealed this
fact that they were intending to auction third party lands without there
being formal acquisition as such. It is not out of place to mention that,
emphasis in the PIL was on the act of handing over of the land by
NOIDA to respondent no. 7 being arbitrary. While in the present case,
the emphasis is on grant of compensation for the land of third party,
whose land has been malafidely and forcefully handed over to respondent
no. 7 in contravention of the decree of permanent injunction, wi thout
any formal acquisition, though made subsequently. In the said PIL, what
may be the just and reasonable amount of compensation was not t he
question for determination. Therefore, the emphasis made by lear ned
Additional Solicitor General relying on the judgment of Anil Kumar
Srivastava (supra) in this regard is bereft of any merit.
25. As discussed above, with regard to determination of the
compensation in the present case, the judgment of Bhopendra Singh
(supra), wherein the circle rate showing market value assessed by the
Collector for the purpose of registration of instrument of sale was made
valid. The said judgment was not interfered with by this Court thereafter.
In the case of the land owner itself, the High Court by orde r dated
10.12.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005, directed the Special
Land Acquisition Officer to determine the compensation accordin g to
the law as laid down in judgment rendered in Bhopendra Singh(supra),
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
which is sustained by this Court. Therefore, the iss ue of basis of
determination of compensation has been settled inter-party and also un-
interfered by this Court. Now, on the said issue, relying upon the judgment
of Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra) cannot be interfered with in this
case. In no event, the compensation can be paid at a rate les ser than
that of market value as determined for the purpose of payment of stamp
duty under Stamp Act.
26. As previously stated, the land in dispute was not only designated
for commercial use, rather it was also declared to be p art of industrial
development plan area. After development, even a mall has been
constructed on it. In our view, the High Court in the impugned order has
rightly determined payment of compensation at the r ate of
Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter as per circle rate. We, therefore, confirm
the findings of High Court for grant of compensatio n with rate
Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. mt.
27. In the light of the preceding discussion, the only question that
remains now for our consideration is with regard to d eduction of
development charges to the extent of 50% made by High C ourt in
impugned order. On the said issue, there is no straight jacket formula to
arrive at the quantum of deduction of development charge and s ame
must be assessed based on the facts of the individual case a fter due
consideration of all the factors which might affect such qua ntum. As
evident, the High Court did not take into consideration all the fa ctors
encircling the issue and routinely proceeded with the maximum deduction
of 50% development charge. We say so because, on perusal of the
impugned judgment, it is clear that the High Court has inter-alia highlighted
the glaring mischiefs played by NOIDA in the whole acq uisition
proceedings but at the same time, it has failed to accord a substantial
reason for maximum deduction of development charges. It is fur ther
observed that, it is not for the first time that NOIDA is in cross-roads
before this Court for playing hand-in-glove with large developers.
28. Be as it may, it is uncontroverted from the material available
on record that, the scheduled piece of land was allotted by NO IDA to
respondent no. 7 in absence of formal acquisition, whereafter, the said
scheduled land was developed in the line of commercial hub and even a
mall was constructed on it. Hence, in our considered opinion, the quantum
of deduction of development charges should have been evaluated by
High Court from the contextual perspective of all the relevant fa ctors,
691
which clearly has not been done in the instant case. Neverth eless, to
cure the anomaly, it is trite at this juncture to refer t o the doctrine
enunciated by this Court in case of ‘Bhagwathula Samanna Vs. Special
Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, (1991) 4 SCC 506’, wherein
while dealing with the question of principle of deduction in the land value,
this Court held as follows –
“11. The principle of deduction in the land value covered by
the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive
at the market value of the acquired land. In applying
the principle, it is necessary to consider all relevant facts.
It is not the extent of the area covered under the
acquisition which is the only relevant factor. Even in
the vast area there may be land which is fully developed
having all amenities and situated in an advantageous
position. If smaller area within the large tract is already
developed and suitable for building purposes and have
in its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity,
communications etc. then the principle of deduction
simply for the reason that it is part of the large tract
acquired, may not be justified .
12. ….. The land involved in these cases is of even level
and fit for construction without the necessity of levelling
or reclamation. The High Court has itself concluded on
the evidence that the lands covered by the acquisitio n
are located by the side of the National Highway and the
Southern Railway Staff Quarters with the town planning
trust road on the north. The neighbouring areas are
already developed ones and houses have been
constructed, and the land has potential value for being
used as building sites. Having found that the land is to
be valued only as building sites and having stated the
advantageous position in which the land in question lies
though forming part of the larger area, the High Court
should not have applied the principles of deduction. It
is not in every case that such deduction is to be allowed.
Where the acquired land is in the midst of already
developed land with amenities of roads, electricity etc .,
the deduction in the value of the comparable land is not
warranted.
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
13. The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly
fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are
sold is not absolute proposition and in given
circumstances it would be permissible to take into
account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If
the larger tract of land because of advantageous
position is capable of being used for the purpose f or
which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in
a developed area with little or no requirement of further
development, the principle of deduction of the valu e
for purpose of comparison is not warranted. With regard
to the nature of the plots involved in these two cas es, it
has been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on record
that the land has facilities of road and other amenities
and is adjacent to a developed colony and in such
circumstances, it is possible to utilize the entire ar ea in
question as house sites. In respect of the land acquired
for the road, the same advantages are available, and it
did not require any further development. We, are,
therefore, of the view that the High Court has erred in
applying the principle of deduction and reducing th e
fair market value of land from Rs 10 per sq. yard to Rs
6.50 per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction is
justified in the facts and circumstances of these case s.
The appellants, therefore, succeed .”
29. Further, this Court in ‘Trishala Jain Vs. State of Uttaranchal,
(2011) 6 SCC 47’, while dealing with determination of compensation
and deduction of development charges held as under –
“44. It is thus evident from the above enunciated principl e
that the acquired land has to be more or less developed
land as its developed surrounding areas, with all
amenities and facilities and is fit to be used for the
purpose for which it is acquired without any further
expenditure, before such land could be considered for
no deduction . Similarly, the sale instances even of
smaller plots could be considered for determining the
market value of a larger chunk of land with some
deduction unless, there was comparability in potential,
693
utilization, amenities and infrastructure with hardly any
distinction. On such principles each case would hav e
to be considered on its own merits.
Further, this Court in ‘Kasturi and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana,
(2003) 1 SCC 354’ , while dealing with various factual factors to be
taken into consideration while applying the cut in payment of compensation
towards developmental charges held as under –
“7. ........ However, in cases of some land where there are
certain advantages by virtue of the developed area
around, it may help in reducing the percentage of cut to
be applied, as the developmental charges required may
be less on that account. There may be various factual
factors which may have to be taken into consideration
while applying the cut in payment of compensation
towards developmental charges, maybe in some cases
it is more than 1/3rd and in some cases less than 1/3 rd. It
must be remembered that there is difference between a
developed area and an area having potential value,
which is yet to be developed. The fact that an area is
developed or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso
facto make every land situated in the area also
developed to be valued as a building site or plot,
particularly when vast tracts are acquired, as in t his
case, for development purpose. ”
The aforesaid judgments postulate general factors that are to be
taken into consideration for deciding the quantum of deduct ion of
development charges. As iterated above, such factors major ly include
the nature of land to be acquired, the extent of area to be acquired, the
extent of development in the adjoining land as well as land proposed to
be acquired, the commercial potentiality and so on. Therefore, deduction
of development charge in the instant case should have been made while
considering the said factors. However, it is made clear that this observation
is being made in peculiar facts of the present case and not in general.
30. Applying the ratio of said judgments in the facts of the case at
hand, as per the stand taken by NOIDA, the scheduled piece of land is
a costly land, being situated at the centre of development of aut hority
and has commercial use. On spot, the demarcation was not possib le
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
because the land was fully developed. In the backdro p, without
acquisition, the piece of land belonging to appellant was transferred to
respondent no. 7. The acquisition was made subsequently in view of the
observations made by the District Court confirming th e decree of
permanent injunction for the said piece of land. At the time o f taking
over of possession, the amount of compensation was not made and now,
the appellant is running from pillar to post to receive th e adequate
compensation. Even after settling the dispute for payment of compensation
at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- inter-party in the previous round of
litigation, the NOIDA in its own volition neither de termined the
compensation nor paid to the appellant. The possession of s cheduled
piece of land, though taken long back in year 2004-2005, but till date, the
appellant has not been able to reap the fruits of compensation and kept
litigating before courts even up to subsequent rounds. Consideri ng all
this aspect, deduction made to extent of 50% in by High Court in the
said cannot be sustained and is set aside without touching the findings on
the point of payment of solatium.
31. As determined hereinabove, the compensation at the circle
rate of Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. meter be payable to the appellant – Reddy
Veerana. Now, the issue of interest is required to be looked into in the
context of provisions of Section 34 of 1894 Act, which reads as thus:
“34. Payment of interest - When the amount of such
compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking
possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded
with interest thereon at the rate of [nine per centum] per annum
from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so
paid or deposited:
[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not
paid or deposited within a period of one year from the dat e on
which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum
per annum shall be payable from the date or expiry of th e said
period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof
which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such
expiry.]”
On perusal, it is clear that if amount of compensation is not paid
or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, interest @ 9%
p.a. leviable from the time of taking of possession until it shall have been
695
so paid or deposited. It further provides that if the amount of compensation
has not been paid or deposited within one year, the interest would be
payable @ 15% p.a. on expiry of the period of one year. On perusal of
the aforesaid, it is clear that if the amount of compensation is not paid or
deposited, 9% interest would be leviable and payable. In case th e said
amount is not deposited or paid within one year, then interest would be
payable @ 15% p.a. In the case at hand, as discussed above, the land
was given initially in the year 2003 to respondent No. 7 and the acquisition
was made subsequently. The additional award was passed on 31.1.2011
after a delay of five years from the date of taking over of possession.
The amount was deposited in the year 2017 by a delay of approximately
14 years. In the peculiar facts of this case, in our view, the civil right of
appellant Reddy Veerana is violated in breach of Article 300 -A of the
Constitution of India. Such action of the NOIDA clearly amounts t o
constitutional tort. In the context of acquisition as made in this case in
violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, judgment of this
Court in the case of ‘Kalyani (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Sulthan
Bathery Municipality & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3189 o f 2022’ is
relevant, wherein it was observed as under –
“20. Article 300A clearly mandates that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law. In
the present case, we do not find, under which authority
of law, the land of the appellants was taken and th ey
were deprived of the same. If the Panchayat and the
PWD failed to produce any evidence that appellants
have surrendered their lands voluntarily, depriving the
appellants of the property would be in violation of
Article 300-A of the Constitution.
21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in this case of ‘K.T.
Plantation Private Limited Vs. State of Karnataka, 2011
(9) SCC 63’ , apart from others, dealt with an issue
relating to payment of compensation where a person is
deprived of his property after deletion of Article 31(2) .
It laid down that there are two requirements to be
fulfilled while depriving a person of his property.
Requirement of public purpose is a pre-condition and
right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in Article 300-
A. While answering the reference in paragraph 221 (e),
it provided as follows –
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS
“221. We, therefore, answer the reference as follows:
xxxxxx
(e) Public purpose is a precondition for deprivation
of a person from his property under Article 300-A
and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt
in that Article and when a person is deprived of his
property, the State has to justify both the grounds
which may depend on scheme of the statute,
legislative policy, object and purpose of the
legislature and other related factors. ”
32. Taking note of the aforesaid and in the peculiar facts of this
case, we are of the view that in addition to the statutorily paid interest,
the additional amount of penal interest must be paid in place of shifting
the date for determination of the amount of compensation or to determine
the compensation as per 2013 Act, as demanded by the appellant Reddy
Veerana. It is not out of place to mention here that the nature of interest
is essentially a consideration paid either for the us e of money or
forbearance from demanding it after it has fallen due. Interest, whether
it is statutory or otherwise, represents the profit, the creditor may have
made if he had used the money or from the loss, he may have suffered
because he could not use the amount. Therefore, in the present case, on
the amount of compensation, in our view, the amount of compensation
be payable along with statutory interest, as directed by the High Court
and 3% penal interest, in the peculiar facts and circumstanc es of the
case, is directed.
33. In view of the foregoing, Civil Appeal No. 3637 of 2022,
preferred by NOIDA is dismissed, whereas the Civil Appeal No. 3636
of 2022 filed by appellant Reddy Veerana is hereby allowed in part with
the following directions:
1. Respondents are directed to compute the amount of
compensation by taking the circle rate of Sector-18, i.e.,
Rs. 1,10,000/- per square meter;
2. The judgment of the High Court directing 50% deduction
towards development charge stands set-aside. In the
peculiar facts of the present case, the respondents are
directed not to make any deduction towards the development
697
charge while computing/calculating the amount of
compensation as per circle rate, specified in para 1 above;
3. As directed by the High Court, the amount of solatium of
30% in terms of Section 23(2) of 1894 Act is also payable;
4. The statutory interest on the amount of compensation shall
be payable @ 9% from the date of taking over of
possession, i.e., February, 2005 for a period of one year.
Thereafter, @ 15% p.a. be paid as per the proviso of Section
34 of 1894 Act. In addition to the said statutory interest,
3% penal interest is further directed to be paid in the peculiar
facts of this case.
5. It is made clear here that the amount so deposited in the
year 2017 would also earn the interest at the same rate, as
directed in para 4 above till the date of realization.
6. Since, the acquisition of the land in question was made by
NOIDA which was purchased by respondent No. 7 in public
auction, therefore, the liability to pay the amount of
compensation would be of NOIDA. The entire amount shall
be paid within a period of six weeks from the date of this
judgment.
Nidhi Jain Appeals disposed of.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)
REDDY VEERANA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
OTHERS