Meena Devi v. the State of U.P. and Another
HIMA KOHLI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19th September,
2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad
in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 609 of 2018 whereunder
the application filed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 439 of the
Criminal Procedure Code 1 was allowed and he was enlarged on bail
subject to certain conditions stipulated therein. The original complainant,
wife of the deceased has preferred this appeal by way of special leave
against the said order before this Court.
3. Initially, petitions for special leave to appeal were filed against
two respondents namely, Shivraj Singh alias Lalla Babu [respondent No.
2] and Sonu [respondent No. 3]. However, by an order dated 2 nd July,
2019, the petition qua the respondent No. 3 was dismissed and notice
was issued in respect of the second respondent while taking note of the
fact that vide judgment dated 20th December, 2012, passed by this Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 1416 of 2012, bail granted to the said respondent
had been cancelled. As a result, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl.) No. 5103 of 2019 filed by the respondent No. 3 was disposed of.
4. On the basis of a complaint made by Smt. Meena Devi, wife of
the deceased, FIR No. 173 of 2012 was registered at P.S. Civil Lines,
District Badaun for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
1 For short ‘the Cr.P.C.’
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
Indian Penal Code2. It was stated by the appellant/complainant that when
she and her husband, Narain Singh were returning home on a motorcycle
in the evening of 16th June, 2012, after having visited Badaun where he
was to appear in the Court in a case pending trial against the respondent
No. 2 herein, four out of the five accused persons came in a Jeep,
intercepted them and started firing gunshots at Narain Singh on point
blank range. Though the complainant’s brother, Sanjeev Kumar Singh
accompanied by one Hari Singh, who were following the deceased and
his wife, had tried to save him and take him to the District Hospital, he
succumbed to the injuries on route. The complainant stated that the dispute
between the parties related to the ownership of a school nam ely, Janta
Junior High School, Madhukar Police Station, Tehsil Shahbad, where
her husband was employed as the Head Master. Earlie r, on
13th December, 2011, the same set of the accused persons had abducted
her husband from Asafpur Railway Station, Faizganj, Behata.
Respondent No. 2 who claimed ownership of the aforesaid school was
instrumental in the said abduction. A case relating to the said abduction
was pending trial in a Court in Badaun where the deceased was the
prime witness. While in detention in jail at Badaun, responde nt No. 2
had hatched a conspiracy with four co-accused persons and planned to
eliminate the deceased against whom he bore a grudge of having deposed
against him as a witness in the kidnapping case.
5. After the investigation was complete in FIR No.173 of 201 2,
the respondent No.2 was charged with the offence under Section 302
read with 149 and 120B IPC. Charges were framed against him and the
co-accused persons on 3 rd January, 2014. During the trial, respondent
No.2 was admitted to bail. Vide common judgment dated 6 th January,
2018, the Sessions Court held the respondent No. 2 and the other c o-
accused persons as guilty for the offence under Section 302 read wi th
Sections 149 and 120B IPC. Respondent No.2 was sentenced to undergo
life imprisonment. Resultantly, bail granted to the respondent No. 2 and
three other co-accused was cancelled.
6. The role of the respondent No. 2 in having hatched a conspiracy
with the other co-accused persons of shooting down the deceased, has
been elaborately dealt with in paras 53 to 55 of the judgment dat ed
6th January, 2018 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Badaun wherein the testimonies of the three eye witnesses namely,
2 For short ‘the IPC’
29
P.W.-1, the appellant/complainant herein, P.W.-2, Sanjeev Kumar Singh
(brother of the complainant) and P.W.-3, Hari Singh who was
accompanying P.W.-2, were considered extensively and it was observed
that there was a past history of enmity between the dece ased and the
respondent No.2 relating to the management of the school. The deceased
had even lodged a complaint of his attempted abduction against t he
respondent No.2. Respondent No. 2 had also got FIR Nos. 343/2003
registered against the deceased under Sections 420, 468, 469 and 471
IPC and the latter was even arrested by the police in the said case.
Reference was also made by the trial Court to a lette r sent by the
respondent No. 2 from jail, threatening to eliminate the deceased. Thus
motive to eliminate the deceased due to the past grudge was established
against the respondent No. 2 who was indicated in the crime alongwith
the other co-accused who were closely related to him.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
passed by the trial Court, respondent No. 2 herein and the other accused
persons preferred appeals before the High Court, registered as Criminal
Appeal Nos. 609 and 610 of 2018. Accompanying the said appeals, were
applications moved by them for grant of regular bail. In the i mpugned
order, the High Court has recorded the following submissions made by
the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 :-
“The contention of counsel for the appellant is that the
appellant was on bail during the trial and he has not abused or
misused the liberty of bail granted to him. However, he has a
criminal history of 28 cases including the present two cases which
have been explained in paragraph 36. The further contention is
that if the prosecution story is believed to be true in toto, the only
role assigned to the appellant is of hatching a conspiracy. The
further contention is that the role of conspiracy has also been
assigned only after the letter was received after three days of the
incident and that is also a photostat copy. The original letter has
not seen the day of light. There is no explanation regarding the
original letter.”
8. The said bail application was vehemently opposed by the learned
counsel who appeared for the appellant/complainant herein a nd made
the following submissions before the High Court:-
“The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that
the appellant is a hardened criminal but he does not dispute the
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
fact that the only role assigned to the appellant is that of hatching
a conspiracy and that too from a jail. The appellant is here by
restrained to approach the complainant or his family members to
threaten them. If threat is extended to the complainant or his family
members, liberty is given to the complainant to move a b ail
cancellation application before this Court.”
9. After noting the submissions of learned counsel for the
respondent No. 2 and counsel for the complainant and recording that the
learned counsel for the State had also opposed the prayer for b ail, the
High Court proceeded to pass the following order: -
“In view of the aforesaid, let the appellant - Shivraj Singh
alias Lalla Babu convicted and sentenced in S.T. No. 523 of 2013
arising out of Case Crime No. 605 of 2012 under Section 302/
149, 120B IPC, Police State Civil Lines, District Badaun be
released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond with two sureties
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned.”
10. Assailing the impugned order, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant/complainant has submitted that the
High Court failed to offer any reasons for exercising its dis cretion in
favour of the respondent No.2 and granting him bail; that there w as
sufficient evidence brought on record before the trial Court which would
leave no manner of doubt that the appellant’s husband had been s hot
dead in broad daylight on account of a conspiracy hatched by the
respondent No.2 with the co-accused persons who were closely related
to him, while he was still in jail; that the deceased had suffered six firearm
injuries at the hands of the other co-accused persons who had ac ted
specifically on the instructions of the respondent No.2; that the High
Court has overlooked the fact that the respondent No. 2 is a hi story-
sheeter who is involved in several criminal cases; that t he trial Court
having held the respondent No. 2 as guilty for the offence under Section
302 read with 149 IPC, there was sufficient material on r ecord for
declining him the relief of bail. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant/
complainant handed over a copy of FIR No.517 of 2019 register ed at
P.S. Shahabad District Rampur against the respondent No. 2 and four
others stating that he had extended a threat to one of the eye witnesses
in the case namely, Hari Singh [P.W. 3] on 24th November, 2019 when
he was going with his wife to the local market and he was warned not to
appear and depose against respondent No.2 in the abduction case of the
deceased Narain Singh, that was pending trial.
31
11. Respondent No.1-State has filed a counter affidavit and an
additional affidavit supporting the present appeals by way of special
leave. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel for the State has pointed
out that the impugned order is a cryptic one and unsustainabl e as the
High Court has failed to consider the nature of the accusations levelled
against the respondent No.2, the gravity of the crime and the severity of
the punishment imposed upon him and the fact that there is reasonable
apprehension to the life of the appellant and the other eye wi tnesses.
Learned counsel alluded to a case registered against the resp ondent
No.2 at P.S. Shahbad, District Rampur, under Sections 364 and 506 IPC
bearing FIR No. 450 of 2019 and stated that the bail application moved
by him in the said case was rejected by the court of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Badaun, taking note of the fact that he is a history -
sheeter and involved in a number of criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent
No. 2 had filed Bail Application No. 28461 of 2011 before the High
Court and vide order dated 26 th April, 2012, he was enlarged on bail.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Ash Mohammed, the complainant in
the said case, had filed Criminal Appeal No.1456 of 2012 before this
Court which was allowed vide order dated 20th September, 2012 and the
bail granted to the respondent No. 2 was cancelled.
12. With the additional affidavit filed by the respondent No .1-
State, in terms of the order dated 16 th March, 2022, dilating upon the
criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2 described in the counter
affidavit as a hardened criminal with 25 criminal cases of serious nature
registered against him in different police stations of different districts in
the State of Uttar Pradesh, a tabulated statement of 37 crim inal cases
registered against the said respondent in different districts across the
State of Uttar Pradesh has been filed. Learned State counse l has thus
urged that bail granted in favour of the respondent No.2 ought to be
cancelled forthwith.
13. On the other hand, Ms. Revathy Raghavan, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent No. 2 seeks to defend the impugned order
stating that the same has been passed being mindful of his advanced age
and the fact that he is suffering from several old age ai lments. She
submitted that there are no special supervening circumstances that would
justify cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent No.2 who had
fully cooperated during the trial. She further stated that from out of the
list of 37 criminal cases registered against the respon dent No.2, as
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
furnished by the respondent No.1 – State, he has been acquittal in quite
a few and some are still pending trial and that he has a goo d case on
merits even in the pending appeal where he has been extended the benefit
of bail by virtue of the impugned order. Therefore, the discretion exercised
by the High Court in favour of the respondent No. 2 does not dese rve
any interference.
14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the riva l
submissions of learned counsel for the appellant – complainant, respondent
No.1 – State and the respondent No. 2 – accused and have caref ully
examined the record.
15. This Court is called upon to decide as to whether the Hi gh
Court has rightly exercised the power conferred under Secti on 439 of
the Cr.P.C for granting bail in favour of the respondent No. 2 in the
given facts of the case.
16. It cannot be gainsaid that the power to grant bail under Section
439 Cr.P.C. is wide ranging. Nonetheless, it has been c onsistently
emphasized in several judicial verdicts that exercis e of the said
discretionary powers vested in the Court when considering grant of bail,
ought to be in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. In Ram
Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh And Others3, a Division Bench
of this Court had laid down the following guiding principl es while
exercising the power to grant bail:-
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order – but, however,
calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cog ent
reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that
the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always
vary from case to case…… The nature of the offence is one of
the basic considerations for the grant of bail – more heinous is the
crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the ba il, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.
4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to
be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this junct ure,
though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive,
neither there can be any. The consideration being:
3 (2002) 3 SCC 598,
33
(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the
nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if
the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in
support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampe red
with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant
should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought
always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of
the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is
only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered
in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some
doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course
of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”
17. Holding as above, the Court went on to consider the guiding
factors when called upon to assess the validity of an order passed by the
High Court granting bail and has opined that ordinarily, this Court would
refrain from interfering with an order passed by the High Court, either
granting or rejecting the relief of bail to an accused. However, wherever
it is noticed that such a discretion has been exercised by the High Court
without proper application of mind or in contravention of the directions
issued by this Court, such an order shall be susceptible to interference.
18. In a recent decision, authored by one of us (Dr . D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.) in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia And
Another4, a case where the offence committed was under Section 302
of the IPC, trial was pending before the Sessions Court and the bail
application filed by the respondent was rejected by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge but was subsequently allowed by the High Court , the
following pertinent observations have been made :
“12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the g rant of
bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the
nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima
facie view of the involvement of the accused are important . No
4 (2020) 2 SCC 118
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
straitjacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for
the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a
case is fit for the grant of bail, the court is not requi red to enter
into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused.
That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine
whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believ e
that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of
the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused
subserves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail
has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court mus t be
slow to interfere and ought to be guided by the principles set out
for the exercise of the power to set aside bail.
xxx
14. The provision for an accused to be released on bail touch es
upon the liberty of an individual. It is for this reason that this Court
does not ordinarily interfere with an order of the High Court
granting bail. However, where the discretion of the High Court to
grant bail has been exercised without the due application of mind
or in contravention of the directions of this Court, such an order
granting bail is liable to be set aside. The Court is requir ed to
factor, amongst other things, a prima facie view that the accused
had committed the offence, the nature and gravity of the offence
and the likelihood of the accused obstructing the proceedings of
the trial in any manner or evading the course of justice. Th e
provision for being released on bail draws an appropriate balance
between public interest in the administration of justice and the
protection of individual liberty pending adjudication of the case.
However, the grant of bail is to be secured within the bounds of
the law and in compliance with the conditions laid down by this
Court. It is for this reason that a court must balance nume rous
factors that guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant
bail on a case-by-case basis. Inherent in this determi nation is
whether, on an analysis of the record, it appears that ther e is a
prima facie or reasonable cause to believe that the ac cused had
committed the crime. It is not relevant at this stage for the court
to examine in detail the evidence on record to come to a conclusive
finding.”
35
19. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee And
Another5, where the accused was facing trial for an offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC and though his persistent bail applications
were rejected by the trial Court, the High Court had gra nted him bail,
which order was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court, the following
guidelines were enunciated for assessing the correctness of a n order
passed by the High Court while granting bail:
“9. ………It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail
to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly
in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in min d while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if release d
on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;
and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of
bail.”
20. The aforesaid principles have been underscored in sever al
decisions rendered by this Court including Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Another6, Narendra K. Amin
(Dr.) v. State of Gujarat and Another 7, Dipak Shubhashchandra
5 (2010) 14 SCC 496
6 (2004) 7 SCC 528
7 (2008) 13 SCC 584
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
Mehta v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another8, Abdul Basit
alias Raju and Others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhar y and
Another9, Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 10,
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another 11, Mahipal
v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia and Another 12, and as recently as in
Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Mon u and
Another13, Ms. Y. v. State of Rajasthan and Another 14 andMs. P. v.
State of Madhya Pradesh and Another 15.
21. At the cost of repetition, it may be highlighted t hat the
considerations that weigh with the Appellate Court when called upon to
examine the correctness of an order granting bail is n ot on the same
footing when it comes to examining an application moved for cancellation
of bail. The yardstick for testing the correctness of an or der granting
bail is whether the court below has exercised its discretion in an improper
or arbitrary manner thereby vitiating the said order. Whe n it comes to
assessing an application seeking cancellation of bail, the Appellate Court
looks out for, amongst others, supervening circumstances or any violation
of the conditions of bail imposed on the person who has been accorded
such a relief. In this context, we may profitably cite the de cision of a
Division Bench of this Court in Prakash Kadam and Others v.
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and Another16, where it was held thus :
“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also
to consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie
case against the accused, the position and standing of the accused,
etc. If there are very serious allegations against the accused his
bail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the bail granted
to him. Moreover, the above principle applies when the same court
which granted bail is approached for cancelling the bail. It will not
apply when the order granting bail is appealed against before an
appellate/Revisional Court.
8 (2012) 4 SCC 134
9 (2014) 10 SCC 754
10 (2014) 16 SCC 508
11 (2018) 12 SCC 129
12 (2020) 2 SCC 118
13 (2022) SCC online SC 453
14 2022 SCC OnLine SC 458
15 Criminal Appeal No.740 of 2022 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3564 of 2022) decided
on 05.05.2022.
16 (2011) 6 SCC 189
37
19. In our opinion, there is no absolute rule that once bail is granted
to the accused then it can only be cancelled if there is likelihood
of misuse of the bail. That factor, though no doubt important, is
not the only factor. There are several other factors als o which
may be seen while deciding to cancel the bail.”
22. The aforesaid principles guiding the grant of bail have been
restated in Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh And Another 17, in
the following words:
“12. We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind
while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time
to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is
granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some
supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have
occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an or der
granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case,
the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration
while dealing with the application for bail have not been ta ken
note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, indisputably
the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail.
Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a se parate
realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the court does
not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the
supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It,
on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of
the order passed by the court.”
23. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in
Imran v. Mohammed Bhava and Another18 it has been held as follows:
23. Indeed, it is a well-established principle that once bail has been
granted it would require overwhelming circumstances for its
cancellation. However, this Court in its judgment in Vipan Kumar
Dhir v. State of Punjab has also reiterated, that w hile
conventionally, certain supervening circumstances impeding fair
trial must develop after granting bail to an accuse d, for its
cancellation by a superior court, bail, can also be revoke d by a
superior court, when the previous court granting bail has ignored
17 (2014) 16 SCC 508
18 2022 SCC Online SC 496
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
relevant material available on record, gravity of the offence or its
societal impact. It was thus observed:—
“9. …… Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances
which may develop post the grant of bail and are non conducive
to fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail . This Court
in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana observed that:
“Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and
the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and
dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming
circumstances are necessary for an order directing the
cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking,
the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and
not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with
the due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attempt
to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession
granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the
court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the
possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason
justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted
should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner witho ut
considering whether any supervening circumstances have
rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the
accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during the trial.”
10. These principles have been reiterated time and again, more
recently by a 3 Judge Bench of this Court in X v. State of
Telegana and Another.
11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s),
bail can also be revoked where the court has consider ed
irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on
record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable.
The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal
impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation
is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a
Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administratio n of
criminal justice system…”
39
24. xxxxxxx
25. xxxxxxx
26. Thus, while considering cancellation of bail already granted
by a lower court, would indeed require significant scrutiny at
the instance of superior court, however, bail when granted can
always be revoked if the relevant material on record, gravity
of the offence or its societal impact have not been considered
by the lower court. In such instances, where bail is granted in
a mechanical manner, the order granting bail is liable to be set
aside. Moreover, the decisions cited herein above, enumerate
certain basic principles which must be borne in mind whe n
deciding upon an application for grant of bail. Thus, while each
case has its own unique factual matrix, which assume s a
significant role in determination of bail matters, grant of bail
must also be exercised by having regard to the abov e-
mentioned well-settled principles.
24. Coming back to the case in hand, a glance at the impugned
order passed by the High Court is to state the least, cr yptic and non-
speaking, amply demonstrating non-application of mind. The High Court
appears to have shut its eyes to the common submissions made by learned
counsel for the appellant/complainant and the counsel for the State that
the respondent No.2 is a hardened criminal with several cases registered
against him. Enclosed with the additional affidavit filed by the respondent
No. 1- State, is a list of cases registered against the r espondent No. 2
which reveals that he has faced/is still facing trial in the following thirty-
seven cases registered against him under the IPC, The Arms Act, 1959,
The Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1986, The U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970, The Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, etc., where
the offences are grave in nature:-
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
41
23. 187/88
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 3(1) Gangster Act A.D.J.-5 Acquitted
24. 485/94
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/148/324/504/506
IPC & 3(1)10 S.S .. T Act
A.D.J. – 2 Acquitted
25. 158/97
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 3(1) Gunda Act A.D.M. Closed
26. 345/99
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/148/149/325/307 IPC J.M. Final Report
27. 169/10
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/323/504/506 IPC J.M. Acquitted
28. 841/11
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 307/326 IPC J.M. Final report
29. 507/11
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/506 IPC J.M. Acquitted
30. 623/05
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 302 IPC A.D.J. – 1 Life
imprisonment
31. 380/19
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 364/323/504/506 IPC A.C.J.M.
– 2
Final report
for
cancellation
of crime
32. 450/19
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/148/341/279/338/504/307/506
IPC
A.C.J.M.
– 2
Final report
for
cancellation
of crime
33. 499/19
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -do- 147/148/307/506 IPC A.C.J.M.
– 2
Pending
investigation
34. 1031/2009
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur State Vs.
Munna
Lal &
Ors.
147/148/149/323/283/
7-Act
A.C.J.M.
– 2
District
Rampur
Under trial
35. 3633/2016
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur State Vs.
Shivraj
Singh
420/467/468 IPC A.C.J.M.
– 2
Under trial
36. 232/2012
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur -State Vs.
Bajraj
Singh
3(1) Gangster Act A.S.J.
Gangster
Rampur
Under trial
37. 195/2021
P.S.
Shahbad
Rampur State Vs.
Sonu &
Ors.
304/120-8 IPC Special
Judge/
S.C.S.T.
Rampur
Under trial
25. Even if one ignores eighteen cases, out of the aforesaid list of
casesregistered against the respondent No.2, fact remains that he is
continuing to face trial in the remaining cases.
26. In one such case, subject matter of Criminal Appeal No.770
of 2011 registered against the respondent No.2 for offe nces under
Sections 364 and 506 IPC, the bail application moved by him was rejected
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur. When the respondent
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
No.2 moved a similar application before the High Court under Section
439 of the Cr.P.C., the same was allowed vide order dated 26 th July,
2012. Aggrieved by the said order, the complainant therein, Ash
Mohammed preferred an appeal before this Court registered as Criminal
Appeal No.1456 of 2012. After taking into consideration the involvement
of the respondent No.2 in several crimes, duly extracted in par a 27 of
the judgment in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu
And Another 19, a Division Bench of this Court had questioned the
propriety of the order granting bail to the respondent No.2, and had set
aside the impugned order. Speaking for the Bench, Justice Dipak Misra
(as the then Hon’ble Chief Justice was) held as under:
“30. We may usefully state that when the citizens are sc ared to
lead a peaceful life and this kind of offences usher in an impediment
in establishment of orderly society, the duty of the court becomes
more pronounced and the burden is heavy. There should have
been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needle ss to
say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the order admitting
an accused to bail. The question should be posed whether the
accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and only thereafter
issue of imposing conditions would arise. We do not deny for a
moment that period of custody is a relevant factor but
simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the cri minal
antecedents are also to be weighed. They are to be weighed i n
the scale of collective cry and desire. The societal concern has to
be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual liberty. Regard being
had to the said parameter we are inclined to think that the social
concern in the case at hand deserves to be given priority ove r
lifting the restriction on liberty of the accused.”
27. It is also noteworthy that in the past decade, six cases mo re
have been registered against the respondent No.2, as would be apparent
from a comparison of the list forming a part of the order in the case of
Ash Mohammad (supra) with the current list extracted above. It is
also relevant to note that the list that has been furnished to this Court by
the respondent No.1-State, does not mention eleven cases that had been
mentioned in the list of cases pending against the respondent No.2 and
extracted in para 27 of the order passed in Ash Mohammad (supra), at
Sr. Nos. 4, 12, 17 and 23 to 30. If the said cases are added to the current
19 (2012) 9 SCC 446
43
list of thirty-seven criminal cases registered against the respondent No.2,
the number of criminal cases registered against the him would swell to
fifty.
28. In the above facts and circumstances, we are compelle d to
observe that the High Court has failed to factor in the relevant material
before passing an order enlarging the respondent No.2 on bail. Not just
that, the High Court has seriously erred in not offering any reason, good,
bad or indifferent, for exercising its discretion in favour of the said
respondent. There is no reference made to any particular elem ent that
has persuaded the High Court to pass the impugned order granting bail
to the respondent No.2. Mechanically recording the submissions made
by the learned counsel for the accused and the complainant and noting
the protest of the learned counsel for the State and thereafter proceeding
to release the respondent No.2 on bail by pre-fixing the operative para
of the order with the words “In view of the aforesaid” , can hardly
reflect application of judicial mind by the Court. As an Appellate Court,
we are completely at seas to discern the factors that have weighed with
the High Court to enlarge the respondent No.2 on bail.
29. In Puran v. Rambilas20 pointing out the vice of arbitrariness
in an unreasoned order, this Court held that: -
“8. …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or
demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of
evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the ca se
ha not to be undertaken. What the Additional Sessions Judge ad
done in the order dated 11-9-2000 was to discuss the merits and
demerits of the evidence. That was what was deprecated. Th at
did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for pri ma
facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be
indicated.”
30. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
Yadav And Another21it was observed by this Court that : -
“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very w ell
settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the
stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and
20 (2001) 6 SCC 338
21 (2004) 7 SCC 528
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]
elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be
undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for
prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly
where the accused is charged of having committed a ser ious
offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from
non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting
bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors
also before granting bail; they are:
(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in
case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.
(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”
31. Citing the aforesaid decision, in Mahipal (supra), this Court
has stressed the necessity of recording reasons for gr anting bail in
offences that are non-bailable in nature in the following words: -
“25. Merely recording “having perused the record” and “on the
facts and circumstances of the case” does not subserve the purpose
of a reasoned judicial order. It is a fundamental premise of open
justice, to which our judicial system is committed, that f actors
which have weighed in the mind of the Judge in the rejection or
the grant of bail are recorded in the order passed. Open justice is
premised on the notion that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The duty
of Judges to give reasoned decisions lies at the heart of this
commitment. Questions of the grant of bail concern both liberty
of individuals undergoing criminal prosecution as well as t he
interests of the criminal justice system in ensuring that those who
commit crimes are not afforded the opportunity to obstruct justice.
Judges are duty-bound to explain the basis on which they ha ve
arrived at a conclusion.”
32. In the instant case, looking at the gravity of the of fence
committed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 302 of the IPC for
which he has been convicted by the trial Court and awarded a sentence
of life imprisonment and noting that the period of custody undergone by
him is only for nine months and further, having regard to his criminal
antecedents, we have no hesitation in quashing and setting aside t he
45
impugned order dated 19th September, 2018 passed by the High Court.
The bail bonds of the respondent No.2 are cancelled and he is directed
to surrender forthwith. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
33. Before parting with the case, it is clarified that the present
judgment shall not be treated as an expression on the merits of the appeal
preferred by the respondent No.2 against the judgment dated 6th January,
2018 passed by the Sessions Court, which is pending consideration before
the High Court. It is also clarified that this order shall also not preclude
the respondent No.2 from applying afresh for bail at a later stage, if any,
new circumstances are brought to light.
34. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the High Court
and the concerned Police Station for perusal and compliance.
Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)
MEENA DEVI v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
[HIMA KOHLI, J.]