The Vice Chairman Delhi Development Authority v. Narender Kumar & Ors
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 1880 of 2022)
MARCH 08, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ]
Service Law: Delhi Development Authority – Assured Caree r
Progression Scheme – In the instant case, the emplo yees
(respondents) sought applicability of Assured Caree r Progression
Scheme, which if applies, will give them the benefit of grant of s econd
financial up-gradation w.e.f 03.01.2009 – On the ot her hand,
appellant-authority sought application of Modified Assured Career
Progression Scheme upon the ground that the same become operative
from 01.09.2008 – Respondents successfully filed application befor e
the Central Administrative Tribunal – Appellant aut hority
approached High Court – High Court relied on the decision in Union
of India v. Balbir Singh Turn, in which case it was held that the Armed
Forces Personnel had to be given benefit of MACP from the date of
the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission i.e. from
01.01.2006 and not from 1.09.2008 as decided by the Central
Government and therefore upon the same logic, in the in stant case
the MACP shall come into effect from 01.01.2006 – Held: None o f
the employees actually earned a second financial up -gradation,
though they undoubtedly became eligible for considerat ion but the
eligibility does not ipso facto translate into entitlement as per the
scheme of the ACP and therefore second ACP up-grada tion was
not automatic but dependent on external factors, eg . employees’
record – The contention of the employees that they had vested right
is not tenable as benefit under the ACP scheme was by way of
incentive granted to avoid stagnation with respect to those em ployee
who could not get promoted for an ascertained perio d of time –
Such benefit by way of incentive are not embodied under ru les but
is in the form of executive order and since MACP is aimed t o benefit
a sizable section of the employees, and not only the respondent , as
in this case, hence the same cannot be interfered with.
481
Service Law: Assured Career Progression Scheme – Po licy
Behind Financial Up-Gradation – Financial up-gradat ion under
the ACP Scheme was available only if regular promotion during the
stipulated intervals, 12 years and 24 years, was not gra nted to an
employee – Its intent was to extend relief for stagn ation faced by
employees’ due inadequate promotional probabilities – A singular
feature of the ACP scheme was that while the benefit was pay based,
the employee had to fulfil the prescribed criteria to be eligible for
the benefits.
Service Law: Modified Assured Career Progression Sche me
– Essential features and distinction from – Held: Ass ured Career
Progression Scheme – Distinction – The noticeable fe ature of the
MACP Scheme is that three increments are to be granted to employees
on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years of service – According t o the
MACP scheme, financial up-gradation is admissible on com pletion
of 10 years of continuous service -in the same grad e pay – The
distinction between the ACP and the MACP scheme is not only w ith
respect to the number of benefits (i.e., two under the AC P scheme,
and three under the MACP scheme) but also that the former a ssured
the promotional grade, where the latter (MACP scheme) onl y assured
higher pay.
Delhi Development Authority – Scope of Application of MAC P
upon its employees – DDA is an autonomous – statutory-organization
– It largely follows the Central Government’s policies, i n respect of
pay and allowances, and other benefits for its employees, however ,
any revision of pay-structure or revision in other terms and
conditions, of Central Government personnel cannot and do not
automatically apply to the DDA – It has to consider the new or
fresh scheme formulated by the Central Government, and adopt it,
if necessary, after appropriate adaptation, to suit i ts needs.
State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [1983]
2 SCR 287; Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R.
Rangadhamaiah [1997] Supp (3) SCR 63; Shankarsan
Dash v. Union Of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 : [1991]
2 SCR 567; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India
[1984] 3 SCR 252; Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan
Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Union of India v. R.K. Sharma
(2021) 5 SCC 579 – relied on.
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
Union of India v. Balbir Singh Turn (2018) 11 SCC 99
: [2017] 12 SCR 421 –distinguished.
Chandi Prasad Uniyal v. State of Uttarakhand 2012
(8) SCC 417 : [2012] 7 SCR 307; State of U.P. & Ors.
v. U.P. Sales Tax Officer Grade-II Officer 2003 (6) SCC
250 : [2003] 3 SCR 617; Secretary Government (NCT
of Delhi) and Ors. v. Grade-I officers Associations &
Ors. 2014 (13) SCC 296 : [2014] 8 SCR 976; State of
Tamilnadu v. Arumugham (1998) 2 SCC 198 : [1997]
5 Suppl. SCR 295; State of Haryana & Anr. v. Haryana
Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association 2002 (6)
SCC 72 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 118; Himachal RTC v.
Retired Employees Union (2021) 4 SCC 502; Govt of
AP v. N. Subbarayadu 2008 (14) SCC 702; Ami Lal Bhat
v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 614; State of
Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad (1990) 3 SCC 368; Union of
India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (1994) 4 SCC 212;
Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai (2001) 9 SCC
356; Council of Scientific & Industrial
Research v. Ramesh Chandra Agrawal (2009) 3 SCC
35 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2017] 12 SCR 421 distinguished Para 11
[2012] 7 SCR 307 referred to Para 13
[2003] 3 SCR 617 referred to Para 14
[2014] 8 SCR 976 referred to Para 14
[1997] 5 Suppl. SCR 295 referred to Para 15
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 118 referred to Para 15
(2020) 5 SCC 421 relied on Para 15
(2021) 5 SCC 579 relied on Para 16
(2021) 4 SCC 502 referred to Para 16
(2008) 14 SCC 702 referred to Para 28
(1997) 6 SCC 614 referred to Para 28
483
(1990) 3 SCC 368 referred to Para 28
(1994) 4 SCC 212 referred to Para 28
(2001) 9 SCC 356 referred to Para 28
(2009) 3 SCC 35 referred to Para 28
[1983] 2 SCR 287 relied on Para 33
[1997] Supp (3) SCR 63 relied on Para 33
[1991] 2 SCR 567 relied on Para 35
[1984] 3 SCR 252 relied on Para 37
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1880
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2020 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No.476 of 2019.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 1881, 1882-1885, 1886, 1887, 1888 of 2022.
Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv., Anshay Dhatwalia, Vishnu Mohan Nair,
Ashwani Kumar, Anand Mishra, Amrendra Kumar Singh, Anant Vijay
Palli, Nikhil Palli, Deepak Goel, Ms. Samta Pushkarna Mishra, Kamal
Kumar Pandey, M. K. Bhardwaj, Ashutosh Kumar, Rajendra Beniwal,
Ms. Bano Deswal, R. C. Kaushik, Mishra Saurabh, Advs . for the
appearing parties.
The following Order of the Court was passed:
ORDER
1. Special leave granted, in all these proceedings. With consent of
counsel, this batch of appeals was heard finally.
2. In all these appeals, the common question which arise s is
whether the reasoning adopted by the Delhi High Court to hold, and
direct that the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (“MACP”)
had to be applied from 01-01-2006, is correct. The appellant, D elhi
Development Authority (hereafter called “DDA” or “the employer”) is
primarily aggrieved by the ruling of the Delhi High Court1. Some of the
successful petitioners (respondents in those proceedings, hereafter called
1 Delivered on 9 January, 2020 in WP 5927/2018, WP 5932/2018 and WP 476/2019.
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
“the employees”), have also appealed to this court, contending that the
High Court’s directions were not correct and seek a modification of the
relief granted by the impugned judgment. The DDA has preferred another
appeal against a subsequent order 2 which followed the previous order
(dated 9th January, 2020).
Relevant facts
3. The Government of India introduced the Assured Car eer
Progression Scheme (in short, ACP Scheme), by an office memorandum,
in August, 19993, to remove stagnation. The salient features of the scheme
are extracted below:
“1. The ACP Scheme envisages merely placement in the higher
pay scale/grant of financial benefits (through fina ncial up-
gradation) only to the government servant concerned on
personal basis and shall, therefore, neither amount to
functional/regular promotion nor would require crea tion of
new posts for the purpose;
2. The highest pay scale up to which the financial up-
gradation under the Scheme was available was to be Rs
14,300-18,300. Beyond this level, there shall be no fina ncial
up-gradation and higher posts were filled strictly on vacancy-
based promotions;
***
4. The first financial up-gradation under the ACP S cheme
shall be allowed after 12 years of regular service and the
second financial up-gradation after 12 years of reg ular
service from the date of the first financial up-gra dation
subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions. In other w ords,
if the first up-gradation gets postponed on account of the
employee not found fit or due to departmental procee dings,
etc. this would have consequential effect on the se cond up-
gradation which would also get deferred accordingly;
***
5.1. Two financial up-gradations under the ACP Sche me in
the entire government service career of an employee shall be
2 Dated 11.02.2020, in WP. 528/2017.
3 OM dated 09.08.1999, which came into force on 09.08 .1999
485
counted against regular promotions (including in si tu
promotion and fast track promotions availed through Limited
Departmental Competitive Examination) availed from the
grade in which an employee was appointed as a direct recruit.
This shall mean that two financial up-gradations und er the
ACP Scheme shall be available only if no regular promotions
during the prescribed periods (12 and 24 years) have been
availed by the employee. If an employee has already got one
regular promotion, he shall qualify for the second fina ncial
up-gradation only on completion of 24 years of regu lar
service under the ACP Scheme. In case two prior promotions
on regular basis have already been received by an employee,
no benefit under the ACP Scheme shall accrue to him;”
4. The Sixth Central Pay Commission submitted its report on 24-
3-2008. These recommended the salary structure and allowances,
conditions of service and retirement benefits of the Central Government
employees and other public bodies, personnel belonging to the Defence
Forces, Officers and employees of the Audit and Accounts Departments
and Chairpersons and Members of Regulatory Bodies, except Reserve
Bank of India. By a resolution dated 29-8-2008, the recommendations
of the Central Pay Commission concerning civilian employ ees were
accepted by the Central Government with respect to revised scales of
pay and dearness allowances. It was resolved that t hese pay and
allowances benefits would be applicable with effect from 01-01-2006.
5. The Central Government, in supersession of the ACP Scheme,
introduced the MACP scheme, by an office memorandum in May, 20194.
The MACP was made applicable from an earlier date, i.e. 1stSeptember,
2008, through a specific condition in that scheme. The res pondent
employees had been appointed as regular Work Charged Malis, by the
DDA, with effect from various dates, beginning from 03.01.1985. They
were granted the first financial up-gradation under the ACP Schem e,
w.e.f. 03.01.1997, i.e., on completion of 12 years of regular service.
Subsequently, they became eligible for grant of the second financial up-
gradation under the ACP Scheme, w.e.f. 03.01.2009, i.e., upon completion
of 24 years of service. This benefit was not given to them by DDA.
There is no dispute that under the MACP Scheme, the employees were
4 OM dated 19.05.2009
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
granted the second MACP benefits- later. The employees’ gr ievance
was that the DDA introduced the MACP scheme with effect from (01/
09/2008) by an order dated 06.10.2009 and according to them, as their
eligibility (indeed, as claimed, their entitlement) to claim the second ACP
benefit had accrued to them earlier, they should have been granted the
benefit of second ACP. Consequently, they approached the C entral
Administrative Tribunal (CAT) by filing original applications5.
Proceedings before CAT
6. Before CAT, the employee- respondents contended that the
ACP Scheme was more beneficial to them, in comparison with benefits
under the MACP Scheme. Therefore, as they had completed 24 y ears
of service on various dates in January, 2009, before introduction of the
MACP Scheme, (by OM dated 19.05.2009) they were entitled for t he
second financial up-gradation under ACP Scheme, even thoug h the
MACP Scheme was introduced with retrospective date, i .e., w.e.f.
01.09.2008.
7. The DDA contended that since the MACP scheme become
operative w.e.f. 01.09.2008, the employees were not qualified for the
second ACP benefits, as they had not completed 24 years of s ervice
on that date. As a result, the grant of second ACP benefits w.e.f. January,
2009 could not arise. The ACP Scheme was valid up-to 31.08.2008. It
was urged that the OM dated 19.05.2009 under which the MACP Scheme
was introduced in supersession of ACP Scheme of 199 9, which
categorically stated that financial up-gradations in term s of the earlier
ACP Scheme would be granted till 31.08.2008. None of the respondent
employees challenged that provision of the MACP Scheme. As a result,
they could not claim that their case for granting of second financial up-
gradation benefits under ACP Scheme had to be consider ed w.e.f.
January, 2009. DDA also relied on Para 11 of the MACP scheme which
is as follows:
“11. It is clarified that no past cases would be re -opened.
Further, while implementing the MACP Scheme, the differences
in pay scales on account of grant of financial up-gra dation
under the old ACP Scheme (of August 1999) and under t he
MACP Scheme within the same cadre shall not be construed
as an anomaly.”
5 O.A.No.2005/2014; OA 1945/2014; OA 434/2016
487
8. The DDA’s contention was that the MACP scheme clearly
envisioned a situation where past benefits, which had actually accrued
and been granted to employees, under the ACP scheme, could not b e
withdrawn; however, the MACP scheme contained nothing enabling the
employees to claim that, though it was introduced with effec t from
1stSeptember 2008, yet since the memorandum was issued on 19.05.2009,
they would be entitled to the benefits of the previous (i.e. ACP) scheme).
9. The CAT, after considering the submission of parties, noticed
judgments of the Delhi, Madras and Bombay High Court and was of the
opinion that employees were entitled to the claim. Therefore, it allowed
the applications preferred by the employees and directed DDA to consider
their cases for granting of the financial up-gradations under the ACP
Scheme till 19.05.2009, i.e., the date of issuance of the MACP Scheme,
if they were otherwise qualified and eligible, and to grant appropriate
pay scales accordingly, with all consequential benefits. Ar rears were
however, denied to the employees.
Proceedings before the Delhi High Court
10. The DDA’s argument before the Delhi High Court, which it
approached, being aggrieved by CAT’s order, was that with effect from
1st September, 2008, the MACP Scheme had become operational and
that the applicants- employees were no longer entitled to re ceive the
benefits under the (erstwhile) ACP scheme. It was contended t hat the
ACP scheme was valid only until 31 st August, 2008. By that date the
employees had not completed 24 years of service. It was submitted that
since the MACP scheme was introduced by the Office Memorandum
(“OM”) dated 19th May, 2009, superseding the earlier ACP scheme, the
question of granting any benefit under the ACP scheme after 31st August,
2008 did not arise.
11. The High Court relied on the decision of this court, in Union
of India v. Balbir Singh Turn 6 where it was held that Armed Forces
Personnel, had to be given the benefit of the MACP from the date of the
recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission (‘CPC’) i.e . 1st
January, 2006 and not from 1st September 2008, as decided by the Central
Government. Based on this logic, the High Court, in the impugned order,
directed that MACP benefits should be extended to the employe es of
DDA from 1st January, 2006.
6 (2018) 11 SCC 99
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
Contentions of parties
12. It was argued by Mr. Kailash Vasudev, Senior Counsel for
DDA that the MACP scheme came into effect on 01.09.2008 and thi s
should be the criteria with respect to which applicability of whether the
old ACP or the MACP should be decided. The employees completed 24
years in January 2009 i.e. after the date of coming into force of the
MACP, and hence were not entitled to up-gradation under the old ACP.
It was argued that the decision in Balbir Singh(supra), relied on by the
Delhi High Court, applied only to Armed Forces personnel and not civil
establishments like the DDA.
13. Counsel urged that it has been 12 years since the MACP
scheme was implemented and a decision such as the impugned judgment
would constitute judicial interference in policy matters and result in
enormous financial implications. The decision of this court i n Chandi
Prasad Uniyal v State of Uttarakhand 7 was cited to urge that excess
payments of public money cannot be permitted to be retai ned. It was
contended that the High Court failed to recognise that the respondents
became eligible for the second up-gradation only after the date of issuance
of the MACP and consequently were not entitled to an up-gradation
under the old ACP scheme.
14. It was emphasized, by citing this court’s judgment in State of
U.P. & Ors. Vs. U.P. Sales Tax Officer Grade-II Officer 8, that :-
“decision of expert bodies like the pay commission is not
ordinarily subject to judicial review, obviously beca use pay
fixation is an exercise requiring going into variou s aspects
of the posts held in various services and nature of the duties
of the employees.”
This court’s judgment in Secretary Government (NCT of Delhi)
and Ors. Vs. Grade-I officers Associations & Ors 9, was also relied
on. The court had, in that judgment, refused to interfere with the A CP
Scheme as it would have violated the government’s policy and further
held that exercise of judicial review would not be proper. The court
upheld the ACP Scheme and the conditions therein.
7 2012 (8) SCC 417
8 2003 (6) SCC 250
9 2014 (13) SCC 296
489
15. Learned senior counsel also relied on State of Tamilnadu v
Arumugham10 where it was observed that the state has the right t o
frame a policy to ensure efficiency and proper administratio n and to
provide the suitable avenues for promotion to officers working in different
departments. The court further observed that the Tr ibunal cannot
substitute its own views for the views of the government or direct new
policy based on the views of the tribunal. Likewise, the judgment in
State of Haryana & Anr. v Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff
Association11 was cited to urge that fixation of pay and determination
of responsibilities is a complex matter in the realm of executive decision
making and that the courts should approach such matters with restraint.
The decision of this court in Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair12
was cited to urge that this court had, in its decision, outlined the nature of
the MACP benefits, and also held that the scheme fell within the realm
of executive decision making.
16. Mr. Saurabh Mishra, who also appeared on behalf of the DDA,
relied on the later judgment of this court in Union of India v. R.K.
Sharma13, which held that the benefits from the MACP scheme could
not be given from 01.01.2006, and could be availed of only from
01.09.2008. Counsel also relied on Himachal RTC v. Retired Employees
Union14 that in matters of pay structure or promotion, the choice of a
cut-off date, when the new policy regime has to operate, cannot lightly
be interfered with by courts.
17. Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for some of
the employees, urged that the High Court’s direction to operate the MACP
scheme from 01.01.2006 had not been sought by the employee-applicants.
What they in fact, sought was the grant of ACP benefits, which were in
force, in January 2009, before the MACP scheme was launched – by
an order dated 19 May, 2009, but with effect from 01-09-2008. In other
words, the employees’ eligibility and entitlement was crystallized as in
January and February, 2009 when the MACP scheme had not been
published. It was argued that since on the date of the employees’ eligibility-
or entitlement, they should be granted benefits in terms of the existing
10 (1998) 2 SCC 198
11 2002(6) SCC 72
12 (2020) 5 SCC 421
13 (2021) 5 SCC 579
14 (2021) 4 SCC 502
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
scheme which were ACP benefits, - which in turn meant a higher or
promotional grade, that right could not be defeated on account of a policy
which was adopted later, albeit with effect from an anterior date.
18. Mr. Bhardwaj and other learned counsel stressed that th e
employees’ claim for second ACP was warranted in accordance w ith
the ACP scheme, because it is clearly postulated by the MACP scheme
itself, which, by clause 9 stated as follows:
“9. Any interpretation/ clarification or doubt as to the scope
and meaning of the provisions of the MACP scheme shall be
given by the Department of Personnel and Training
(Establishment-I)). The scheme would be operational w.e.f.
01.09.2008. In other words, financial up-gradations as per
the earlier ACP Scheme (of August, 1999) would be grante d
till 31-08-2008.”
19. It was further submitted by learned counsel that the right to
be considered for the ACP benefits, was in the nature of a vested right,
which had to be granted even after the coming into force, of the MACP
scheme. In this regard it was argued that the rights which crystallize in
accordance with an old scheme, inure and can be enfo rced by the
beneficiary, regardless of the fact that a new scheme repla ces it.
Analysis and Conclusions
20. The original scheme, i.e. the ACP scheme, (introduced by the
OM dated 9-8-1999) granted career progression to Central Government
civilian employees. Its intent was to extend relief for st agnation faced
by employees’ due inadequate promotional probabilities. The ACP Scheme
was introduced by the Central Government -with modifications- based
on the recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission . That
scheme, granted financial up-gradation after 12 years of regular service
and a second, after 12 years of regular service from the date of the first
financial up-gradation, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions. The
relevant conditions, i.e. Nos. 5.1 and 10 are extracted below:
“5.1. Two financial upgradation under the ACP Schem e in
the entire Government Service career of an employee shall
be counted against regular promotions (including in situ
promotion and fast track promotion availed through li mited
departmental competitive examination) availed from the grade
491
in which an employee was appointed as a direct recruit. This
shall mean that two financial up-gradation under th e ACP
Scheme shall be available only if no regular promotion during
the prescribed periods (12 and 24 years) have been a vailed
by an employee. If an employee has already got one regu lar
promotion, he shall qualify for the second financia l
upgradation only on completion of 24 years of regular service
under the ACP Scheme. In case two prior promotions on
regular basis have already been received by an employee, no
benefit under the ACP Scheme shall accrue to him.
***
10. Grant of higher pay scale under the ACP Scheme s hall
be conditional to the fact that an employee, while accept ing
the said benefit, shall be deemed to have given his unqualified
acceptance for regular promotion on occurrence of vacancy
subsequently. In case he refuses to accept the higher po st on
regular promotion subsequently, he shall be subject to normal
debarment for regular promotion as prescribed in the general
instructions in this regard. However, as and when he accept s
regular promotion thereafter, he shall become eligible for the
second upgradation under the ACP Scheme only after he
completes the required eligibility service/period under the ACP
Scheme in that higher grade subject to the condition that the
period for which he was debarred for regular promotion shall
not count for the purpose. For example, if a person ha s got
one financial upgradation after rendering 12 years of regular
service and after 2 years therefrom if he refuses r egular
promotion and is consequently debarred for one year and
subsequently he is promoted to the higher grade on re gular
basis after completion of 15 years (12+2+1) of regu lar
service, he shall be eligible for consideration for t he second
up-gradation under the ACP Scheme only after rendering ten
more years in addition to two years of service already rendered
by him after the first financial up-gradation (2+10 ) in the
higher grade i.e. after 25 years (12+12+1) of regular servi ce
because the debarment period of one year cannot be t aken
into account towards the required 12 years of regular service
in that higher grade.”
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
21. As is apparent, financial up-gradation under the ACP Scheme
was available only if regular promotion during the stipulated intervals, 12
years and 24 years, were not granted to an employee. A singular feature
of the ACP scheme was that while the benefit was pay based, the
employee had to fulfil the prescribed criteria (i.e . qualifications,
experience, and also possess the requisite service records) to be eligible
for the benefits. The ACP benefit was a promotional grade, d ivorced
from the existence or otherwise of any vacancy, and without necessarily
being functional in the higher grade, with attendant responsibilities.
22. The MACP scheme, which replaced the ACP scheme, with
effect from 01-09-2008 (although the scheme was int roduced on
19.05.2009) was preceded by the Sixth Central Pay Commission report
dated 24-3-2008. That report dealt with the pay-structure, allowances,
conditions of services and retiral benefits of Central Government
employees, etc. By a Resolution dated 29-8-2008, recommendations of
the Pay Commission concerning civilian employees were accepted by
the Central Government regarding revised pay-scales and d earness
allowances with effect from 01-01-2006. As regards revised allowances,
(excluding dearness allowance), the effective date designated by the
memorandum is 1-9-2008.
23. The noticeable feature of the MACP Scheme- is that three
increments are to be granted to employees on completion of 10, 20 and
30 years of service. According to the MACP scheme, financial up-
gradation is admissible on completion of 10 years of continuous service
-in the same grade pay. The distinction between the ACP and the MACP
scheme is not only with respect to the number of benefits (i.e ., two
under the ACP scheme, and three under the MACP scheme) but also
that the former assured the promotional grade, where the latter (MACP
scheme) only assured higher pay.15
15 Para 2 of the MACP scheme- through Annexure I to the Office Memorandum, states
as follows:
“The MACPS envisages merely placement in the immediate next higher grade pay
in the hierarchy of the recommended revised pay ban ds and grade pay as given in
Section 1, Part-A of the first schedule of the CCS (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008. Thus, the
grade pay at the time of financial upgradation under the MACPS can, in certain cases
where regular promotion is not between two successive grades, be different than what
is available at the time of regular promotion. ln s uch cases, the higher grade pay
attached to the next promotion post in the hierarchy of the concerned cadre/organisation
will be given only at the time of regular promotion.”
493
24. The first issue which arises, is the correctness of the impugned
judgment, in applying the reasoning in Balbir Singh. In that decision,
the question which arose for consideration was the correct date from
which the MACP up-gradation scheme, was applicable to emp loyees
(below the rank of officer). This court held that the scheme had to be
applied from 01.01.2006, and not the date designated by the concerned
order (01.09.2008). The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) held that AC P
benefits granted to employees is part of the pay structure which not only
affects pay but also pension. ACP then ruled that it is not an allowance
but a part of pay relied on a Government Resolution to hold th at the
MACP scheme was payable w.e.f. 01.01.2006. This Court in Balbir
Singh Turn (supra) upheld that finding recorded by the AFT. Instructions
issued on 30-5-2011 were found to be contrary to the Resolution dated
30-8-2008 as, according to the resolution 1-1-2006 was the effect ive
date for implementation of Macps in matters relating to pay and dearness
allowance. There is no such parallel, in the facts of this case.
25. In M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) a three judge Bench of this
court held, in the context of a dispute, which asserted that MACP benefits
would result in regular promotional advancement, that:
“The change in policy brought about by supersession of ACP
Scheme with the MACP Scheme is after consideration of a ll
the disparities and the representations of the employee s. The
Sixth Central Pay Commission is an expert body which h as
comprehensively examined all the issues and the
representations as also the issue of stagnation and at th e same
time to promote efficiency in the functioning of th e
departments. MACP Scheme has been introduced on the
recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission which
has been accepted by the Government of India. After accept ing
the recommendation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the
ACP Scheme was withdrawn and the same was supersede d
by the MACP Scheme with effect from 01.09.2008. This is not
some random exercise which is unilaterally done by the
Government, rather, it is based on the opinion of the e xpert
body – Sixth Central Pay Commission which has exami ned
all the issues, various representations and disparities. Bef ore
making the recommendation for the Pay Scale/Revised Pay
Scale, the Pay Commission takes into consideration the
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
existing pay structure, the representations of the gov ernment
servants and various other factors after which the
recommendations are made. When the expert body like Pay
Commission has comprehensively examined all the issues and
representations and also took note of inter-departm ental
disparities owing to varying promotional hierarchies, the court
should not interfere with the recommendations of the e xpert
body. When the government has accepted the recommendation
of the Pay Commission and has also implemented those, any
interference by the court would have a serious impact on the
public exchequer.”
26. This court, in R.K. Sharma & Ors.16, commented on the effect
of M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra) on the MACP scheme, especially the
date from which it was operative. It was held that:
“The judgment in M.V. Mohanan Nair clinches the iss ue.
Benefits flowing from ACP and MACP Schemes are incentives
and are not part of pay. The Resolution dated 29-8-200 8 is
made effective from 1-9-2008 for implementation of
allowances other than pay and DA which includes financial
upgradation under ACP and MACP Schemes. Therefore, the
respondents and other similarly situated officers a re not
entitled to seek implementation of the benefits of Macps with
effect from 1-1-2006 according to the Resolution dated 29-8-
2008. Moreover, the implementation of Macps by gran ting
financial upgradation only to the next grade pay in the pay
band and not granting pay of the next promotional post with
effect from 1-1-2006 would be detrimental to a large number
of employees, particularly those who have retired.”
27. It is therefore, quite clear that both Mohanan Nair(supra)
and R.K. Sharma(supra), examined the MACP scheme; the latter,
especially, ruled that the scheme was operable from 01-09-2008,
and that the respondents “officers are not entitled to seek
implementation of the benefits of Macps with effect from 1-1-2006
according to the Resolution dated 29-8-2008”. Having regard to this
clearly enunciated principle, which, in this court’s opinion, stems from a
correct reading of the scheme, the reasoning of the High Court, that the
MACP scheme is operative not from 01-09-2008, but from 01-01-2006,
16 (2021) 5 SCC 579
495
is untenable. The mere circumstance that the resolu tion of the
Government which led to adoption of the MACP also contained th e
effective date for implementation of the pay-benefi ts of the Pay
Commission recommendations, did not obliterate the fact that the date
from which the scheme was to be made effective, was anot her one.
28. The submissions of the DDA, that the executive agency’s
considerations, while extending a benefit or new regime such as the
promotion or career advancement program, is to be effective, involves
decision making that is complex and nuanced, is justified. The date of
operation of new pay scales cannot be per se the same when the
operation of another scheme (which may also involve pay benefits) need
not be the same. The shifting of dates (once settled by t he executive
after due deliberations) may seemingly have no consequenc es, but
inevitably would have radical financial implications. Given these factors,
it has been held, in previous decisions17 that courts should in the absence
of any facially compelling reason disclosing arbitrariness desist from
stepping into the arena of decision making, and avoid directing their re-
formulation or even requiring such schemes to be administered from
any anterior period.
29. The other reason why the High Court went wrong, in holding
what it did, is that DDA is an autonomous – a statutory – organization.
No doubt, it largely follows the Central Government’s policies, in respect
of pay and allowances, and other benefits for its employees. However,
any revision of pay-structure or revision in other terms and conditions,
of Central Government personnel cannot and do not automatically apply
to the DDA; it has to consider the new or fresh scheme fo rmulated by
the Central Government, and adopt it, if necessary, after appropriate
adaptation, to suit its needs. Therefore, the Central Government’s MACP
scheme did not apply to it automatically. The DDA decided to apply it,
through an office order dated 06.10.2009. 18 The High Court has
overlooked this aspect, and apparently assumed that the MACP scheme
applied automatically, upon its adoption by the Central Government, to
the DDA.
17 Govt of AP v N. Subbarayadu 2008 (14) SCC 702; Ami Lal Bhat v State of Rajasthan
(1997) 6 SCC 614 ; State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad (1990) 3 SCC 368; Union of
India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (1994) 4 SCC 212 Union of India v. Shivbachan Rai
(2001) 9 SCC 356 and Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Ramesh Chandra
Agrawal (2009) 3 SCC 35
18 Establishment Order, dated 6 October, 2009
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
30. This brings the court to the next point, which is whether the
employees can assert what is termed as a vested right . The first
submission in this regard is that according to Para 9 of the MACP scheme,
those who are in employment on the date when MACP scheme was
brought into force and who are entitled to the ACP benefits, especially
the second financial up-gradation had a right to insist that their second
up-gradation should be granted in terms of the ACP scheme. In this
context, the argument advanced is that Rule 9 preserves and p rotects
such a right (for entitlement) to be granted the ACP benefits even after
the introduction of the MACP scheme.
31. Para 9 recognises the fact that if there is any ambiguity in the
interpretation of the MACP scheme it would be resol ved by the
Department of Personnel and Training. It also clarifies in the last sentence
that financial up-gradation would be granted till 31.08.2008 (given that
the MACP scheme itself became operative on 01.09.2008), althou gh
the office memorandum was issued on 19.05.2009. In the opinion of this
Court the undue influence placed upon the last sentence cannot be met
much of by the employees given that the ACP scheme itself ended on
31.08.2008. This provision (i.e. Para 9) was made to cater to the situations
where the grant of ACP benefits was under process, this woul d mean
both types of benefits i.e. the first and the secon d up-gradation.
Doubtlessly, the first up-gradation under the ACP scheme was to be
granted after 12 years. If Para 9 were to be considered in the context of
the first up-gradation it is a clarification to the effect that the individual
concerned who has crossed 12 years’ service (and therefore b ecame
eligible and whose case is under active consideration) would get the
ACP benefits. However, this provision cannot be understo od as an
independent transitional provision, enabling all employees awaiting the
up-gradation to insist that the benefit of the ACP scheme should
indefinitely continue despite its ceasing to exist after 31.08.2008.
32. The second aspect in this regard is the argument that a vested
right accrued in favour of the employees who had completed the eligibility
for a financial up-gradation to insist that such up-gradation ought to be
only under the ACP scheme and not under the MACP scheme.
33. The concept of “vested right” has arisen for considerat ion
before this court in several contexts especially with respect to alteration
of service condition of public employees. That the Central Government
in the exercise of its legislative powers conferred under pr ovision of
497
Article 309 of the Constitution can frame rules which has the force of
law has been settled several decades ago. This court has also held that
such rules can be made to operate from anterior dat e by giving
retrospective effect to them. The determination of an anterio r date for
the operation of a rule which has the effect of nullifyi ng or refacing
intervening events or invalidating benefits which had been gra nted to
public employees was held to be unconstitutional in State of Gujarat vs
Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni19. Several previous judgments of this Court
dealing with the question that what is accrued or vested right were
considered in Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah 20
wherein the impugned rule in question sought to disturb the method of
calculating the last pay drawn for the purposes of pensio n and related
allowances. This impacted the pension disbursement of a large number
of employees who had retired much earlier. The court observed that the
amendments applied to employees who had already retired and were no
longer in service on the date the impugned notifications were issued, and
adversely impacted the pension they were drawing. In such context the
court held as impermissible, those benefits which accrued or i n other
words had been actually enjoyed and were taken away by the devise of
giving retrospective effect to the rule. The court observed as follows:
“22. In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal
Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33] decided by a Constitution Bench of
the Court, the question was whether the status of ex-ministe rial
employees who had been allocated to the Panchayat serv ice
as Secretaries, Officers and Servants of Gram and N agar
Panchayats under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 as
government servants could be extinguished by making
retrospective amendment of the said Act in 1978. Striking down
the said amendment on the ground that it offended A rticles
311 and 14 of the Constitution, this Court said:
“52. … The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate
with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested
right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made
under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do’s
and don’ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor
retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene
19 (1983) 2 SCR 287
20 1997 Supp (3) SCR63
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
Fundamental Rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution today taking into account the accr ued or
acquired rights of the parties today. The law canno t say,
twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefo re, the
requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is
dated back by twenty years. We are concerned with to day’s
rights and not yesterday’s. A legislature cannot legislate to day
with reference to a situation that obtained twenty y ears ago
and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rig hts
accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most
arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history.”
23. The said decision in Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (1983) 2
SCR 287 of the Constitution Bench of this Court has been
followed by various Division Benches of this Court. ( K.C.
Arora v. State of Haryana (1984) 3 SCR 623; T.R. Kap ur v.
State of Haryana [(1987) 1 SCR 584]; P.D. Aggarwal v. State
of U.P. [(1987) 3 SCR 427] ; K. Narayanan v. State of
Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 44] ; Union of India v. Tushar
Ranjan Mohanty [(1994) 5 SCC 450] and K. Ravindrana th
Pai v. State of Karnataka [1995 Supp (2) SCC 246).
24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights”
or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down t he
impugned provisions which had been given retrospect ive
operation so as to have an adverse effect in the ma tter of
promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc. , of the
employees. The said expressions have been used in the contex t
of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought
to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby
taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at
that time. It has been held that such an amendment having
retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a
benefit already available to the employee under the existi ng
rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We
are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance
with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [ (1968) 1 SCR 185]
B.S. Vedera [ (1968) 3 SCR 575] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal
Soni [(1983) 2 SCR 287] .
499
34. In the present context, none of the employees actually earned
a second financial up-gradation. They undoubtedly became eligible for
consideration. However, the eligibility ipso facto could not, having regard
to the terms of the ACP scheme translate into an entitlement. The eligibility
was, to put it differently, an expectation. To be entitled to the benefits,
the public employer (here DDA) had to necessarily review and consider
the employees’ records, to examine whether they fulfilled the eligibility
conditions and, based on such review individual orders had to be made
by DDA. In other words, second ACP up-gradation was not automatic
but dependant on external factors. Furthermore, as held by this Court in
M.V. Mohanan Nair (supra), MACP benefits are only an incentive
meant to relieve stagnation – framed under the executive polic y. Its
continued existence cannot be termed as an enforceable right.
35. Such expectation is akin to a candidate being declared successful
in a recruitment process and whose name is published in the select list.
That, such candidate has no vested right to insist that the public employer
must issue an employment letter, has been held by a Constitution Bench
Judgment of this Court in Shankarsan Dash vs Union Of India 21.
Therefore, it is held that employees’ contention that they acquire a vested
right in securing the second ACP benefit is insubstantial.
36. The employees in this case approached the High Co urt,
complaining that their vested right, which was the assumed entitlement
to be given by second ACP, was taken away by the MACP, introduced
with effect from 01-09-2008, by an order dated 19-05-2009. No doubt,
the MACP scheme is an executive order. Usually, suc h orders are
expressed to be prospective. However, the executive has the option of
giving effect to such an order, from an anterior date; espe cially if it
confers some advantages or benefits to a sizeable s ection of its
employees, as in this case. The nature of benefits- as em phasized by
this court earlier, were by way of incentives. They are not embodied
under rules. In such circumstances, a set of employees, who might
have benefitted from the then prevailing regime or policy, cannot in the
absence of strong and unequivocal indications in the later policy (which
might be given effect to from an anterior date, like in this case), insist
that they have a right to be given the benefits under the superse ded
policy. It is noteworthy that a larger section of employees would benefit
from the MACP benefits, because they are to be given afte r 10-, 20-
21 (1991) 3 SCC 47
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.
and 30-years’ service (as compared with two benefits, falling due after
12 and 24 years of service) and further that such benefits under MACP
scheme are subjected to less rigorous eligibility requirements, than under
the ACP scheme.
37. The myriad intricate details which the executive has to consider,
while framing a scheme applicable generally, to a large se ction of the
employees, may not always admit of one, or one set of solutions . To
insist that a particular kind of benefit, hitherto applicable, should be
continued for a set of employees, while the others should be governed
by another, new set or scheme, would be imposing a significant burden
on the administration, apart from swelling financial costs as well as
administrative energies. Such directions would result in creating different
time warps, rendering efficient administration of personne l policies
impracticable. Sans palpable or facial arbitrariness, the courts should be
circumspect in adding conditions, or tampering with such arrangements.
In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India 22 a five judge Bench of this
court had emphasized this aspect in the following terms:
“46…. The legislature however is free to recognise the degre e
of harm or evil and to make provisions for the same. Making
dissimilar provisions for one group of public secto r
undertakings does not per se make a law discriminatory as
such. It is well-settled that courts will not sit a s super-
legislature and strike down a particular classification on the
ground that any under-inclusion, namely, that some others
have been left untouched so long as there is no viola tion of
constitutional restraints…… The same principle was reite rated
by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica
Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad [1974 (3) SCR 760]. In that case, this
Court was of the view that in the matter of economic legislation
or reform, a provision would not be struck down on the v ice
of under-inclusion, inter alia, for the reason that the
legislature could not be required to impose upon administrative
agencies task which could not be carried out or which must
be carried out on a large scale at a single stroke. It was furthe r
reiterated that piece meal approach to a general pr oblem
permitted by under-inclusive classifications, is so metimes
22 (1984) 3 SCR 252
501
justified when it is considered that legislatures deal with s uch
problems usually on an experimental basis. It is impossible to
tell how successful a particular approach might be, what
dislocation might occur, and what situation might develop and
what new evil might be generated in the attempt. Administrative
expedients must be forged and tested. Legislators recognizing
these factors might wish to proceed cautiously, and courts
must allow them to do so….”
This court is of the opinion that the same considerations apply in
the present case. That, some employees could have benefi tted more
under the ACP benefits, if the MACP scheme had not been introduced
from an earlier date, is no ground to hold so and compel an exec utive
agency to grant the claimed benefits.
38. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order
is set aside. The appeals filed by the DDA are hereby allowed. During
the pendency of the proceedings before the CAT, the benefits sought by
the employees were granted, under interim orders, but subje ct to the
final outcome. In these circumstances, the benefits claimed by such of
the applicant/employees, granted to them under the ACP schem e, can
be reversed by the DDA. However, where the applicants were given
MACP benefits by DDA, on its consideration that they were entitled to
it, from later dates (such as from 2010-2011 or later dates) shall not be
disturbed. The appeals preferred by the employees claim ing that they
ought to be given ACP benefits from the date as claimed by them for the
same reasons are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Devika Gujral Appeals disposed of.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
THE VICE CHAIRMAN DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
NARENDER KUMAR & ORS.