Bhola Kumhar v. State of Chhattisgarh
C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
This Special Leave Petition is filed assailing the judgment and
order dated 19.7.2018 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in
Criminal Appeal No. 110/2015 whereby and whereunder the conviction
of the petitioner under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
‘IPC’) was confirmed, but the sentence therefor, was reduced from 12
years to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. Notice wa s issued on
04.03.2022. However, the said order and the subsequent order dated
21.03.2022 would reveal that it was, in troth, a limited one.
Leave Granted, accordingly.
A short prelude may be profitable for a proper considerat ion of
the limited question (which we intend to go into) viz., whether the appellant
is entitled to compensation for being kept in prison beyond the period of
sentence and thereby sustained deprival of personal liberty.
1. While parting with the decision in Rudul Sah’s case1, this
Court made a fervent hope -
“This order will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a
suit to recover appropriate damages from the state and its erring
officials. The order of compensation passed by us is, as we sai d
above, in the nature of a palliative. We cannot leave the petitioner
penniless until the end of his suit, the many appeals and the
execution proceedings. A full-dressed debate on the nice points
of fact and law which takes place leisurely in compensation suits
will have to await the filing of such a suit by the poor Rudul Sah.
The Leviathan will have liberty to raise those points in that suit.
Until then, we hope, there will be no more Rudul Sahs in Bihar or
elsewhere.”
(Emphasis added)
That was a case where Rudul Sah, despite being acquitted by the
Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on 03.06.1968 was released from
the jail only on 16.10.1982, idest, more than 14 years since his acquittal.
A Habeas Corpus petition was then filed before this Court seeking his
release on the ground that his detention in the jail is unlawful. Ancillary
reliefs were also sought for. When the said writ petition was taken up on
1 Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (1983) 4 SCC 141
1179
22.11.1982, the learned counsel for the State of Bihar informed this Court
that the appellant was released from the jail. Though the pr ayer for
release from the jail had become infructuous, this Co urt went onto
consider the writ petition in regard to the other reliefs soug ht for and
held that his detention after his acquittal was wholly unjustified. Thereupon,
this Court held: “Therefore, the State must repair the dama ge done by
its officers to the petitioner’s rights. It may have recourse against those
officers.” It is thereafter that the said writ petition w as disposed of in
the aforesaid manner and with the fervent hope extracted a bove.
2. True that the appellant cannot be said to be another Rudul Sah
inasmuch as his case never ended in his acquittal, but only in confirmation
of conviction with reduction in period of imprisonment. Nonetheless, his
case, to be unravelled hereinbelow, would reveal co ntinuance of
contumacious act on the part of a State Government (of c ourse, its
officials) in keeping a convict in incarceration beyond the period of
sentence of imprisonment, unmindful of the final verdict of the Court .
Such an act is injudicious and indefensible when his/her c ontinued
confinement is uncalled for in connection with any other case. This kind
of levity cannot be viewed with laxity and it is time to consider it on the
legit. Freedom of movement can be curtailed or take n away by
imprisonment or detention ordained after due process of law an d in
accordance with law. Imprisonment or detention sans sanction of law
would violate Article 19(d) as well as the right under Article 21, of the
Constitution of India.
3. In the case on hand the appellant Bhola Kumhar was made to
stand the trial for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) and Sections 3(ii)(v) and 3(1)(xii) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989. He was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of 12 years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for the conviction
for offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. He took up the matter in
appeal and in Criminal Appeal No.110/2015 the High C ourt of
Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur confirmed the conviction, but r educed his
sentence of 12 years rigorous imprisonment to 7 years impri sonment.
Further, it was ordered to compensate the victim in terms of the provisions
under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by paying
Rs.15,000/- within a period of six months. The sentence to pay fine of
Rs.10,000/- and in default, to undergo imprisonment for one more year
was ordered to remain as it is. The orders dated 4.3.2022 and 21.3.2022
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
passed in the SLP are reflective on the disinclination to interfere with
the conviction and the sentence imposed therefor, but indic ative of
inclination to make a probe on the question as to why the appellant was
detained in custody exceeding the period of judicial custody in terms of
the judgment of the High Court dated 19.07.2018.
4. When the matter came up for consideration on 04.03.2022, this
Court condoned the delay in filing the Special Leave Petition and took
note of the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant (in fact, Amicus Curiae) that despite suffe ring the full
sentence in terms of the judgment impugned, the appellant was not
released. This Court passed the following order:-
“Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
was convicted for offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and
sentence for 7 years R.I. by the High Court under the impugned
judgment dated 19.07.2018 and despite the petitione r has
undergone the full sentence in terms of the judgment impugned,
still he has not been released and it appears that the Superintendent
Central Jail, Ambikapur, Surguja (C.G.) has not updated their jail
records as it reveals from the certificate placed on recor d.
Issue notice, returnable on 14.03.2022.
Copy of the petition be served additionally to the Standing Counsel
for the State of Chhattisgarh.”
5. On 21.03.2022 this Court passed the following order:-
“The records indicate that the petitioner had undergone 10 years
03 months and 16 days of custody as revealed from the custody
certificate dated 09th November, 2021 and the High Court while
upholding conviction, reduced the sentence to 07 years rigorous
imprisonment(RI).
The submission of the counsel for the petitioner was recorded
by this Court on 4th March, 2022 that despite the petitioner has
undergone full sentence of 7 years RI in terms of the judgment
impugned by the High Court, still he has not been releas ed and
after the notice of the present petition came to be serve d, the
concerned authorities have released the petitioner on 16th March,
2022. This may not be the end of the matter. What is being reflected
to this Court needs a further probe.
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Let the counsel for the State file an affidavit and tender an
explanation as to why the petitioner was detained in cust ody
exceeding the period of judicial custody in terms of the judgment
impugned of the High Court dated 19th July, 2018. At the same
time, the State may also collect the data from all ov er the State
and furnish a report to this Court of such of the incident of which
reference has been made in the present petition.
Copy of this order may also be sent to the Secretary, St ate
Legal Services Authority, Chhattisgarh for taking appropriate steps
and compliance report.”
(Emphasis added)
6. In compliance with the said order dated 21.03.2022, an affidavit
was filed by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Ambikapur, purportedly
to explain the reason for detaining the appellant in custody e xceeding
the period of judicial custody. We find no reason to accept so-called
justification and we will explain the raison d’etre for our disinclination
and also for our inclination to grant compensation.
7. The order dated 21.03.2022 itself would reveal that on behalf
of the appellant it was contended that he was made to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years 03 months and 16 days with remission. Now,
in resistance the respondent would contend that the t otal sentence
undergone by the appellant (excluding the remission period) was only 8
years 01 month and 29 days. It is stated in the affidavit that s ince the
appellant had failed to pay the compensation of Rs.15,000/- to the victim,
as directed under the impugned judgment, he was to undergo
imprisonment by one year over and above the period of 7 years.
8. The counsel for the appellant, in the afore-stated circumstances
contended that the appellant was detained illegally beyond t he legally
permissible period of imprisonment. To be precise, the contention is that
the appellant had suffered imprisonment for a period of 10 ye ars 03
months and 16 days with remission, as is revealed from the cus tody
certificate dated 09.11.2021. In this context it is relevant to refer to the
certificate of custody in detail issued by the very depone nt, viz., the
Superintendent of Central Jail, Ambikapur. The entries therein against
serial numbers 7 to 12 are relevant for the purpose of the case and they
read thus:-
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
“7]Sentence - 12 years
8] Court’s Name - Hon’ble Special Judge, (Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe Prevention
Of Atrocities Act), Jashpur (C.G.)
9] Under trial period - Year- 00, Month- 10, Day- 10
10] Conviction period - Year- 06, Month- 11, Day- 10
11] Jail Remission - Year- 02, Month- 05, Day- 26
12] Total Conviction - Year- 10, Month- 03, Day- 16
period as on
09-11-2021"
9. The above extract would reveal that the total conviction period
as on 09.11.2021 was 10 years 03 months and 16 days. It would also
reveal that the appellant is entitled to remission and further that 02 years
05 months and 26 days was the jail remission period as on that date.
Bearing in mind afore aspects, the statements made in par agraphs 16
and 17 of the affidavit have to be looked into. They read thus:-
“16. That the Hon’ble High Court vide the Impugned Order had
reduced the sentence of the Petitioner to seven (7) years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand
Only) or to undergo one (1) year imprisonment in default of the
same and to pay Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand Only) as
compensation to the victim to undergo one (1) year imprisonment
in default. It is submitted that the actual sentence undergone by
the Petitioner (excluding the remission period) is as under:
a. Under trial period : 10 months and 10 days
b. Conviction period (from 29 th November 2014 to 16 th
March 2022) : 7 years 3 months and 19 days.
17. That therefore the total sentence undergone by the Petitioner
(excluding the remission period) is 8 years 1 month and 29 days.
It is submitted that the Petitioner had not paid the compensation
of Rs. 15,000/- to the victim as directed by the Hon’ble High
Court therefore he had to further undergo an imprisonment of
one (1) year, over and above the period of seven (7) years held by
the Hon’ble High Court.”
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10. Going by afore-extracted statements in the affidavit filed by
the respondent in compliance with the order dated 21.03.2022 excluding
the remission period the appellant was under actual imprisonment for a
period of 08 years 01 month and 29 days. It is stated therein that by
virtue of the default on the part of the appellant to pay a compensation to
the victim, in terms of the impugned judgment, he was to unde rgo
imprisonment for 01 year more in addition to the term of imprisonment
which he had to suffer by virtue of the impugned judgment. The tenor of
the affidavit revealed from the aforesaid paragraphs would go to show
the stand of the respondent that over and above the period of 7 years the
appellant was to undergo an additional one year of imprisonm ent on
account of his default in payment of the amount of fine. It is in the
aforesaid manner that the respondent is attempting to justify the detention
of the appellant beyond the period of imprisonment awarded by the High
Court in substitution of the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court. We
will deal with this issue further.
11. For a proper consideration of this issue it is apposite to refer to
the following aspects:-
As per Adaptation of Laws Order, 2001 issued as per Notification
No. F-2/13/Jail/2001 dated the 14th June, 2001, in exercise of the powers
conferred under Section 79 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act,
2000 (28 of 2000) the State Government passed an or der called
“Adaptation of Laws Order, 2001”, which came into force in the whole
State of Chhattisgarh on the 1 st day of November, 2000. The schedule
thereunder would reveal that the Madhya Pradesh Jail Manual, 1968
was adopted by the State of Chhattisgarh. It is still i n force. Rule 1 of
Part-I of Madhya Pradesh Jail Manual, 1968 reveals the name of the
Rules as ‘Madhya Pradesh Prison Rules, 1968.’ Rule 2 (g) thereof defines
‘sentence’ as hereunder:
“2(g). “Sentence” means a sentence as finally fixed on appe al,
revision or otherwise, and includes an aggregate of more sentences
than one and committal to or detention in prison in default of
furnishing security to keep the peaceor good behaviour.”
12. Thus, it is evident that in the State of Chhattisgarh, the Madhya
Pradesh Prison Rules, 1968 is in force and thereunder the term ‘sentence’
takes the meaning sentence as finally fixed on appeal, revision or
otherwise and it includes an aggregate of more sentences than one and
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
committal to or detention in prison in default of furnishing sec urity to
keep the peace or good behaviour. As stated hereinbefore, in the instant
case the Court of Special Judge the Scheduled Castes and Sche duled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Jashpur, which tried the appellant
convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 12 years and to pay
a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of its payment to undergo additional
one year rigorous imprisonment. In the appeal, while confirming the
conviction, the High Court reduced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment
for 07 years under Section 376 IPC and retained the order of pay ment
of fine of Rs.10,000/- as it is. Additionally, it was ordered that the appellant
should compensate the victim in terms of the provisions of Section 357
Cr.P.C. by paying Rs.15,000/-. In the aforesaid circum stances, the
indisputable position is that the sentence finally fixed on the appellant
was 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. It is true that h e was also to
suffer one more year of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. But,
what is disturbing us is the purposeful omission to make any mention
about the period of remission to which the appellant was entitled to in
the affidavit dated 24.4.2022. This requires to be taken seriously n ot
solely due to the applicability of the afore-mentioned Prison Rules but on
account of certain other aspects as well. Whatever be the actual period
of remission to which the appellant was entitled to, the factum is that his
entitlement to remission is indisputable in the circumstances mentioned
above. Going by the custody certificate the period of jail remission as on
9.11.2021 was 2 years, 5 months and 26 days. It is pertinent to note that
the deponent of the affidavit dated 24.04.2022 who himself issued the
Custody Certificate, did not dispute the entitlement of the appellant for
remission. What exactly was the period of imprisonment undergone by
the appellant with remission was not mentioned at all in the said affidavit
though in the order dated 21.03.2022 this Court recorded that going by
the records the appellant had suffered, 10 years, 3 months and 16 days
of custody as per the Custody Certificate dated 9 th November, 2021.
Add to it, even going by the affidavit dated 24.04.2022 the appellant had
suffered imprisonment in excess of what was he was to su ffer legally.
In paragraph 17 of the said affidavit what is stated :
“That the total sentence undergone by the petitioner (excluding
the remission period) is 8 years 1 month and 29 days.”
(Emphasis added)
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13. We will, now, consider another serious aspect. A scanning of
the affidavit dated 24.04.2022 would reveal that the respondent is feigning
ignorance about the judgment of the High Court dated 19.07. 2018.
According to the respondent though the High Court had communicated
the judgment to the District and Sessions Judge, Jashpur on 30.07.2018,
the same was not communicated to jail authorities a nd on being
communicated the order dated 4th March, 2022 passed by this Court on
10th March, 2022 immediate action was taken. We have no hesitation to
hold that the very statement made in the said affidavit dated 24.04.2022
and the documents annexed therewithal would reveal the hollowness of
the said contentions. How can the respondent feign ignorance about the
judgment of the High Court dated 19.7.2018, reducing the sentence
imposed on the appellant.
14. In Annexure-A1, which is the letter dated 20.01.2020 of the
Superintendent of Central Jail, Ambikapur, to Secretary of the High Court
Legal Service Committee, a reference was made as follows :
“Ref : Letter No.F.No.2477 / CGSLSA / CONVICT PRISNOERS
/ 2018 / BILASPUR DATE 28-092018 ad letter No. L/24/2018 –
Petitioner / dated 27.09.2018 of the petitioner received through
email.”
Even after making such a reference, purposefully or otherwi se,
the respondent has not chosen to produce those letters along wi th the
affidavit dated 24.04.2022. Annexure A-1 dated 20.01.2020 produced
along with the affidavit dated 24.04.2022 reads thus:-
OFFICE OF THE JAIL SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL
JAIL, AMBIKAPUR, SARGUJA (C.G)
Letter No. – 590/Kalyan/2020, Ambikapur,
Dated: 20.01.2020
To
The Secretary,
High Court Legal Service Committee,
High Court Compound, Bodri, Bilaspur(C.G)
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
Sub: Filing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) of the Convicted Prisoner
Bhola Kumar, son of Barju Ram Kumhar in the Hon’ble Supreme
Court- reg.
Ref: Letter No. F.No. 2477/CGSLSA/CONVICT PRISONERS/
2018/BILASPUR DATE 28-092018 and Letter NO. L/24/2018-
Petitioner/dated 27.09.2018 of the petitioner received through
email.
Sir,
It is submitted with regard to the above cited subject and reference
that the convicted prisoner Bhola Kumar son of Barju Ram
Kumhar, resident of Village Tamamunda Farsabahar, Po lice
Station Farsabahar, District Jashpur (C.G) being convict ed in
Sessions Trial No. 04/2014 under Section 376 IPC by the Court
of Ld. Special Judge, District Jashpur (C.G) on 29.11.2014 with
an award of Life Imprisonment and on dismissal of his Criminal
Appeal No. 110/2015 by the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh
at Bilaspur on 19.07.2018, he is undergoing the sentence in this
jail. The convicted prisoner wants to prefer his Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl) in the Hon’ble Supreme Court through the Legal
Aid.
Therefore, by forwarding the related documents (01) Vakalatnama,
(02) Affidavit for S.L.P., (03) Jail Detention Certificate, (04)
Affidavit for Legal Aid, (05) Application for condonation of delay,
(06) F.I.R., Copy of the Judgment Passed by the Ld. Trial Court
and copies of other deposition documents, (07) Application for
Legal Service, toward you, it is most respectfully submitted that
by supplying all the rest documents (01) Judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court (02) Paper Book of the Hon’ble High Court and (03)
English Translation, please file the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl)
in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Sd/- Illegible
Jail Superintendent
Central Jail Ambikapur
Sarguja Chhattisgarh
Endorsement No. 590-A/Welfare/2020, Ambikapur,
Date: 20.01.2020
1187
Copy forwarded to the Secretary, District Legal Aid S ervice
Committee, District Sarguja, Ambikapur (C.G.) for respe ctful
information.
Sd/-Illegible
Jail Superintendent
Central Jail Ambikapur
Sarguja Chhattisgarh
(Emphasis added)
15. After having written such a letter on 20.01.2020 and specifically
making a request to the High Court Legal Services Committ ee to file
Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against j udgment of
dismissal by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No.110/
2015 the Superintendent of Central Jail, Ambikapur could not have feigned
ignorance about the action to be initiated in the absence of further
interference with the judgment dated 19.7.2018 in Criminal Appeal No.110
of 2015 and at any rate, on the expiry of the permissible pe riod of the
imprisonment on the strength of the said judgment. There is no justification
for not complying with the judgment dated 19.07.2018. If on receipt of
the order of this Court dated 4 th March, 2022 action could be taken
swiftly, as has been explained in paragraphs 11 to 13 of the affidavit
dated 24.4.2022, why such a recourse was not done immediately before
or, at least immediately after the expiry of permiss ible period of
imprisonment. If he was to get 2 years remission, as stated in the custody
certificate, of course in terms of the relevant Prison Rules on expiry of
the period of sentence less the period of remission thus earned and the
additional period of imprisonment of one year on account of default in
payment of fine he should have been released much before the actual
incarceration period of 8 years, 1 month and 29 days.
16. There is no case for the respondent that it or the victi m had
challenged the judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh dated 19/07/
2018 successfully. In the said circumstances, it can only be taken that
the deponent was unscrupulously telling untruth. There was absolutely
no justifiable reason, in the said circumstances, for the lap se in taking
appropriate action to comply with the said judgment and to release the
appellant on expiry of the legally permissible period of sentence. There
is absolutely no case for the respondent that the appellant he rein was
not entitled to remission. In the light of the Certificate of Custody issued
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Ambikapur, as also in the light of
the provisions in the Prison Rules, referred hereinbefore, applicable in
the State of Chhattisgarh the entitlement of the appellant for remission is
indisputable and in fact, it is not at all disputed by the respondent. Rule
715 of the afore-mentioned Prison Rules, 1968 provides that the total
remission awarded to a prisoner under the said rules shall not, without
the special sanction of the State Government, exceed one thi rd of his
sentence. In other words, that is the maximum remissi on normally
awardable.
17. We are not oblivious of the fact that the appellant herein was
held guilty in a grave offence. But then, when a competent court, upon
conviction, sentenced an accused and in appeal, the s entence was
modified upon confirmation of the conviction and then the appellate
judgment had become final, the convict can be detained only up to the
period to which he can be legally detained on the basis of the said appellate
judgment. When such a convict is detained beyond the actual rel ease
date it would be imprisonment or detention sans sanction of law and
would thus, violate not only Article 19(d)but also Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. This is what was suffered by the appell ant for a
very long period. Considering the fact that the appellant is a youth, this
long and illegal imprisonment beyond the period of sentence, taking into
account the long and illegal deprivation of the right to move freely and
thereby, the violation of right under Article 19 (d) of the Constitution of
India, the violation of right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India and the mental agony and pain caused due to
such extra, illegal detention, we are of the view that the appellant is
entitled to be compensated in terms of money.
18. We are aware that the present proceeding is not one under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India. It is one under Article 136 of the
Constitution. We are of the view that reference to Section 3 86 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) would be apposi te.
Clause (a) thereof, deals with appellate powers available in an appeal
from an order of acquittal whereas clause (b) deals with appellate power
in an appeal from conviction. Clause (c) deals with the appellate power
in appeal for enhancement of sentence and clause (d) deals w ith the
appellate power in an appeal from any other order.
Now, clause (e), unlike clause (a) to (d), does not say as to what
particular nature of appeal that the power to make any amendm ent or
1189
any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper may be
passed in invocation of the power thereunder. The conclusion that can
be reached in the absence of such specific mention is that the power
specified under clause (e) would be available, of course in appropriate
cases falling under any of the four categories of appeals mentioned under
clauses (a) to (d). Our view is fortified by the fact that the twin provisos
under clause (d) carry restrictions in the matter of exer cise of power
under clause (e), with respect to enhancement of sentence and infliction
of punishment. According to us, the power thereunder can be exercised
only in rare cases. In this case, we found that the appellant was kept
illegally in prison far in excess of the legally permissi ble period of
incarceration despite coming to know about the appellate judgment of
the High Court dated 19.07.2018. As noted above, he was released only
on 16.03.2022, which is much beyond the permissible period of sentence
in terms of the said judgment dated 19.07.2018. In other words, he served
out the period of permissible period of imprisonment on the basis of the
judgment dated 19.07.2018. The appellant is a youth and he suffered
long and illegal deprivation of fundamental rights besides the mental agony
and pain on account of such extra, illegal detention. Is it not a case
inviting a consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. In
the decision of Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat (AIR 1987
SC 1073), this court held that ‘all interpretations must subserve and
help implementation of the intention of the Act’. This possess ion is
applicable while interpreting any provision in any statute especially when
the power under that provision is conferred to pass orders that m ay be
just or proper.
19. It is also apposite to refer to the decision of this court in A.R.
Antulay V. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602] in the context of this
case. Going by the same this Court can grant appropriate relief when
there is some manifest illegality or where some palpable injustice is shown
to have resulted. Such a power, going by the decision, can be tra ced
either to Article 142 of the Constitution of India or powers inherent as
guardian of the Constitution.
Without making any observation as to his civil remedy, we think it
only just and proper to pass an order granting compensation to the tune
of Rs.7.5 Lakhs (Rupees Seven Lakhs and Fifty Thousand) to be paid
by the State holding that it is vicariously liable for the a ct/omission
BHOLA KUMHAR v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]
committed by its officers in the course of employment. We also make it
clear that while holding the State vicariously liable as abov e the State
must have recourse against the erred officer(s).
The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Ankit Gyan Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)