Prasad Pradhan & Anr. v. the State of Chhattisgarh
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal, by special leave, arises from the judgment and
order of the Chhattisgarh High Court 1, affirming the conviction recorded,
and the sentence imposed, upon the present appellants.
2. The State of Chhattisgarh (hereafter “the state”) pr osecuted
the appellants in relation to an incident, leading to the dea th of one
Vrindawan. The prosecution’s allegation was that the appellant/accused
and Vrindawan, the deceased, were cousins. On the a fternoon of
28.02.2012, when the deceased was getting his land levelled through a
JCB machine, the appellants reached the place and at tacked him.
Vrindawan sustained several injuries including head injuries . He was
taken to the hospital and was examined by Dr. Bhageshwar Patel (PW11).
As serious head injuries were involved Vrindawan was operated u pon
by Dr. S.N. Madhariya (PW15). However, Vrindawan could not survive
and died on 22.03.2012. Dr. S.K. Bagh (PW14) conducted the post-
mortem and in his report (Ex. P-28), stated that death was caused by
injuries sustained by the deceased on the head.
3. The police registered a case under Section 302 read wit h 34
Indian Penal Code (hereafter “IPC”) against all accused, ba sed on a
first information report (hereafter ‘FIR’) lodged by Aarti Pradhan (PW1)
the deceased Vrindawan’s daughter. The FIR (Ex. P-1) alleged that the
appellants reached the spot, abused Vrindawan and then assaulted him.
The allegation against A-1 Prasad Pradhan was that he was armed with
an axe and attacked the deceased on the head. Against A-2 L ingraj
Pradhan, the allegation was that he was armed with an axe an d had
1 Dated 20.02.2019 in Cr. A. No. 178/2013
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH
assaulted the deceased on the legs. Regarding the third accused person
- Soudagar Pradhan, who is grandson of A-1 and son of A-2, the allegation
was that he went to the spot and caught hold of the deceased. Soudagar
Pradhan, however, is not an appellant before this court.
4. After the final report was filed, the trial court charged all three
accused persons of sharing common intention and then committing the
murder of Vrindawan – they were charged for offences under Sec tion
294, 323 read with 34, 302 read with 34, IPC. The appellants, having
abjured guilt, were put to trial. The prosecution examined as many as 15
witnesses. Aarti Pradhan (PW1), Narrotam (PW2), Safed Pradhan
(PW3), Rukni (PW4), Ayodhya Bai (PW5) and Navin Sahu (PW6) are
relatives of the deceased. The appellants examined two defence
witnesses. The court held all the appellants guilty of commission of the
offence alleged against them and sentenced them: life imprisonment, for
the offence of murder, and six months rigorous imprisonment for the
offence under Section 323 IPC. The appellants’ appeal before the High
Court was partly allowed by the impugned judgment. The High Cour t
acquitted Soudagar Pradhan on both counts, but affirmed the conviction
and sentence of the present appellants (A1 and A2). They are, resultantly,
before this court.
Contentions of the appellants
5. The appellants argue that the prosecution evidence ought to be
discarded. The credibility of the three eyewitnesses is im peached, as
they were related to the deceased and further, according to the appellants,
their statements otherwise suffer from material contradi ctions and are
implausible. Learned counsel submitted that taken as a whole, the
evidence cannot lead one to conclude that the finding of common intention
is made out. Learned counsel argued that the dispute arose i n a flash,
suddenly at the spot when the deceased -Vrindawan started getting the
disputed land levelled, due to which the appellants (who lived i n the
same locality in adjacent houses) went out of their houses, and allegedly
assaulted the deceased. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is argued,
the appellants are liable only to the extent of their individual overt acts.
It was argued alternatively, that the incident happened all of a sudden
and without premeditation. The appellants had no intention to cause death
but deter Vrindawan from doing any activity on the dis puted land.
Therefore, the conviction of the appellants may not travel beyond Section
304 Part-II IPC.
247
6. Learned counsel for the appellants also argues that the de ath
of Vrindawan took place after about 20 days of the incident on account
of complication in the surgery and it cannot be said that the cause of
death was injury as the prosecution could not prove that injury caused to
the deceased, in ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death.
Learned counsel highlighted that the injury caused by the app ellants,
particularly the head injury, was stitched in and had healed. Learned
counsel emphasized that Vrindawan died as a result of cardio-respiratory
failure, as stated by PW14. Such being the case, the finding of the courts
below that the appellants were guilty of the offence of Section 302 IPC
was clearly in error of law. It was argued that arguendo, if the
prosecution could be said to have proved the attack by the appellants on
the deceased, the cause of death neither being immediate nor a direct
result of it, there is no question of the ingredients of the off ence of
murder under Section 302 IPC having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
7. It was submitted that taken together, the appellants could, a t
the highest, be convicted of the offence of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC since it was neither
their intention to kill the deceased nor was the injury sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature – which was borne out by the
circumstance of him surviving the attack for 20 days. It was submitted
that the appellants should be granted the benefit of a modified conviction
to one, under that provision. Justifying the submission, the learned counsel
stated that there was a prior history of disputes between the appellants
and the deceased. The deceased’s conduct in calling for a he avy JCB
machine, to get the tank on the property repaired, w as a sudden
provocation, given the history of bad blood, which the prosecution witness
PW1 in fact, deposed to. Therefore, the exception to Section 300 IP C
was attracted to the facts of this case.
8. It was submitted that the High Court erred in failing to give the
benefit of doubt to the appellants, in the manner that it did to the t hird
accused - Soudagar Pradhan. It was contended that the evidence and
materials in respect of his alleged involvement were the same as in the
case of the appellants; therefore, they too, were entitled to be treated in
a like manner and acquitted.
Contentions of the state/respondent
9. It was argued, on behalf of the state, that the concurrent findings
of the courts below - as well as the sentence imposed, do not call for
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
interference, as they do not contain any glaring infirmity or error. Learned
counsel relied on the depositions by the two doctors and also highlighted
that the victim never recovered from his injuries; he was not even in a
position to record a statement. It was also argued that for the entire
duration that the victim was alive after the incident, he was in the hospital,
where he never recovered and died there itself.
10. It was argued that the credibility of PW1 as an eye witness
cannot be questioned; she was, in fact, also a victim of the a ttack and
had received injuries on her leg, due to an axe blow given by one of the
accused/appellants. Likewise, learned counsel stated that PW2, another
brother of the deceased, had corroborated the evidence of PW1 on all
material aspects. He had seen both accused, armed in the manner deposed
to by PW1, attacking the deceased. Further, PW3, the wi fe of the
deceased also corroborated the testimonies of the other two witnesses.
Though she did not witness the actual assault, she had seen t he two
appellants armed with axes. PW4, sister-in-law of PW3, to o, deposed
that Vrindawan was attacked by the accused whilst he was eng aged in
cleaning near the septic tank and that the two appellants at tacked him
with axes.
11. Learned counsel argued that the medical examination of the
deceased was conducted by Dr. Bhageshwar Patel (PW11 ), who
prepared the medical report (Ex. P-21). The Surgeon , Dr. S.N.
Madhariya (PW15) deposed that the back of the deceased’s skull w as
broken and was operated upon. Dr. S.K. Bagh (PW14), who conducted
post-mortem, clearly stated regarding cause of the death, in the present
case, which pointed out to cardio- respiratory failure, due to mul tiple
injuries. In the cross examination, the appellants could not elicit from the
witness that the injury caused to the deceased in the ordinary course of
nature was insufficient to cause death or that the death occurred due to
surgical complication and not because of injury.
12. Learned counsel for the state relied on this court’s decisions
in Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi 2, State of Rajasthan v. Arjun
Singh & Ors. 3, State of Rajasthan v. Kanhaiya Lal 4, and State of
Rajasthan v. Leela Ram 5 to urge that the facts of this case, do not
2 1975 (3) SCC 831
3 2011 (9) SCC 115
4 2019 (5) SCC 639
5 2019 (13) SCC 131
249
support the appellants’ contention that the offence of culpable homicide
under Section 304 Part II is made out. It was submitted tha t the pre-
existing dispute, in this case, could not be said to constitute a “grave and
sudden” provocation. Further, the circumstance that the victim survived
for some length of time, ipso facto is an irrelevant factor since the
prosecution established that the cause of the death was directly linked to
the injuries sustained, which in turn were inflicted by the appellants.
13. Learned counsel submitted that Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC is clearly not attracted in the facts of this case because the appellants
had, in fact, behaved in an unusual and cruel manner and also took undue
advantage of the situation because they were fully armed, and inflicted
serious injuries upon the deceased, who was neither armed nor provoked
them.
Analysis and conclusions
14. In this case, the nature of the attack by the appellants and the
quality of eyewitness testimony of prosecution witnesses, especially PW1
to PW5, cannot be doubted. This court is of the opin ion that the
circumstance that most of the witnesses were related to th e deceased
does not per se exclude their testimony. The test of credibility or reliability
when applied, is fully satisfied in respect of the s trength of their
testimonies. Although PW1 is the deceased’s daughter, that is insufficient
to doubt the veracity of what she recounted during the trial, which is that
she saw the appellants attack her father with axes. She tried to intervene
and save the deceased, upon which she was also given axe blows on her
leg. There is no explanation on the part of the appellants as to why the
witness should depose falsely; nor is there any explanation as to how
she could have received her injuries. Most importantly, her testimony is
corroborated by PW2, PW3 and PW4. Therefore, this court is of the
opinion that all the material aspects of the factual ac cusations against
the appellants and how they attacked the deceased in an unpr ovoked
manner, cannot be doubted.
15. The question, then, is whether the appellants are guilty of the
offence of murder, punishable under Section 302, or whether they are
criminally liable under the less severe Section 304, IP C. As noted in
several judgments, this question has engaged the courts for over a century.
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
The distinction between these two is discernible in the manner they are
defined, under Section 299 6 IPC and Section 300 7 IPC. In a decision,
6
Section 299 Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death,
or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
Illustrations
(a) A lays slicks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with
the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby ca used. Z believing the ground to be
firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it A, intending to cause, or knowing
it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here
B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B who is behind a bush;
A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was
not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing
an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
Explanation I.—A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under
a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other,
shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily inju ry, the person who causes such
bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper
remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of child in the mother’s womb is not homicide.
But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part
of that child has been brought form, though the chi ld may not have breathed or been
completely born.
7 300 Murder Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if
the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Secondly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is
caused, or—
Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows th at it is so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the
risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits
murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his
death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of
the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But
251
if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would
not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A,
although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend
to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ord inary course of nature would cause
death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a
man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder,
although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of
them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill
any particular individual.
Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder
if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of se lf-control by grave and sudden
provocation, causes the death of the person who gav e the provocation or causes the
death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
First.—That the provocation is not sought or volunt arily provoked by the offender as
an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law,
or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the
right of private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the
offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally
kills. Y, Z”s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the
child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act
caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to, A, A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at
Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out
of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the
arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing
done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
(d) A appears as witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word
of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these
words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold
of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to su dden and violent passion in
consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as muc h as the provocation was given by
a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending
to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for
that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide,
but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good
faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
which is now considered to be the locus classicus on the issue, Virsa
Singh v. State of Punjab, 8 this court stated as follows:
“The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can
bring a case under S. 300 ‘3rdly’. First, it must e stablish,
quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; second ly the
nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objec tive
investigations. It must be proved that there was an intention
to inflict that particular injury, that is to say that i t was not
accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury
was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be
present, the enquiry proceeds further, and, fourthly it m ust be
proved that the injury of the type just described made u p of
the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause de ath
in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enqu iry is
purely objective and inferential and has nothing to d o with
the intention of the offender.”
by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of
defence without premeditation, and without any inte ntion of doing more harm than is
necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws
out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other
means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoo ts Z dead. A has not committed
murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or
aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers
given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes
to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and
without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which p arty offers the provocation or
commits the first assault.
Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused,
being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his
own consent.”
Illustration
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit
suicide. Here, on account of Z”s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own
death; A has therefore abetted murder.
8 [1958] S.C.R. 1495
253
16. In State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya &
Anr. 9 another oft- cited judgment, this court observed as follows:
“Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and
(3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea
requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the
offender regarding the particular victim being in s uch a
peculiar condition or state of health that the interna l harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact
that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be
sufficient to cause death of a person in normal hea lth or
condition. It is noteworthy that the “intention to cause death”
is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the int ention
of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offen der’s
knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death
of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killi ng within
the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out
by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any su ch
knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases
falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be wher e the
assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given
knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged live r, or
enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to
cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupt ure
of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case
may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge abou t the
disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an in tention to
cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary cour se
of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, e ven
if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.
In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words “l ikely to
cause death” occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of
Section 299, the words “sufficient in the ordinary cour se of
nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies
between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if ov erlooked,
may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference be tween
9 1977 SCR (1) 601
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is
one of the degree of probability of death resulting fr om the
intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degre e
of probability of death which determines whether a culpa ble
homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The
word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sen se
of “probable” as distinguished from a mere possibilit y. The
words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary cour se of
nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most
probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordi nary
course of nature.
For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the
offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues
from the intentional bodily injury or injuries suff icient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. St ate
of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1874: 1966 Supp SCR 230: 196 6
Cri LJ 1509.] is an apt illustration of this point.”
The court then quoted the decision in Virsa Singh (supra) , and
held that:
“Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh’s cas e
(supra) even if the intention of accused was limite d to the
infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause de ath in the
ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention
of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illu stration
(c) appended to S. 300 clearly brings out this point.
Clause (c) of S. 299 and clause (4) of S. 300 both require
knowledge of the probability of the causing death. I t is not
necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the
distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be
sufficient to say that cl. (4) of S. 300 would be a pplicable
where the knowledge of the offender as to the probabil ity of
death of a person or persons in general—as distingu ished
from a particular person or persons—being caused fro m his
imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practic al
certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offend er must
be of the highest degree of probability, the act havi ng been
committed by the offender without any excuse for inc urring
the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. ”
255
A later decision, Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v.
State of Andhra Pradesh 10 considered these aspects and held that:
“29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal
question of intention, with care and caution, as that will dec ide
whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Par t I or
304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters plucking of a
fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utt erance of a
rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to
altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths . Usual
motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be
totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. The re
may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not eve n be
criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be
cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the
penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that t here
was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure
that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 , are
not converted into offences punishable under section 304 Part
I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The
intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a
combination of a few or several of the following, among other,
circumstances;
(i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was
picked up from the spot;
(iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury;
(v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or
sudden fight or free for all fight;
(vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there
was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the
deceased was a stranger;
(viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provoca tion,
and if so, the cause for such provocation;
(ix) whether it was in the heat of passion;
10 (2006) 11 SCC 444
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
(x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue
advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner;
(xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or seve ral
blows.
The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaus tive
and there may be several other special circumstance s with
reference to individual cases which may throw light o n the
question of intention.”
17. The question in cases, like the present one is, therefore, whether
the injury caused due to the attack is one which falls within the description
of Section 300 thirdly ( “If it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury i ntended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of n ature to cause
death”) or if it falls within the mischief of Section 300 fourthly (“ If the
person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dan gerous
that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily i njury as
is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid”).
18. The requirement of Section 300 thirdly is fulfilled if the
prosecution proves that the accused inflicted an injury which would been
sufficient to have resulted in death of the victim. The determinative fact
would be the intention to cause such injury and what was the degree of
probability (gravest, medium, or the lowest degree) of death which
determines whether the crime is culpable homicide or murder.
19. The case law on the issue of the nature of injury bei ng so
dangerous as to result in death (Section 300 fourthly), have emphasised
on the accused’s disregard to the consequences of the inj ury, and an
element of callousness to the result, which denotes or signif ies the
intention. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, 11 this court
held that:
“Although Clause fourthly is usually invoked in thos e cases
where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular
person (as the illustration shows) the Clause may on its terms
be used in those cases where there is such callousness t owards
the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that
the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In the present case,
Ram Prasad poured kerosene upon the clothes of Mst. R ajji
11 1968 (2) SCR 522
257
and set fire to those clothes. It is obvious that such fire sp reads
rapidly and burns extensively. No special knowledge is neede d
to know that one may cause death by burning if he sets fire to
the clothes of a person. Therefore, it is obvious t hat Ram
Prasad must have known that he was running the risk of
causing the death of Rajji or such bodily injury as was like ly
to cause her death. As he had no excuse for incurring that
risk, the offence must be taken to fall within 4thly o f Section
300, Indian Penal Code. In other words, his offence was
culpable homicide amounting to murder even if he di d not
intend causing the death of Mst. Rajji. He committed an ac t
so imminently dangerous that it was in all probability likely to
cause death or to result in an injury that was likely to c ause
death. We are accordingly of the opinion that the High Court
and the Sessions Judge were both wrong in holding that the
offence did not fall within murder.”
Similarly, three Judges of this Court, in Santosh S/o. Shankar
Pawar v. State of Maharashtra 12 observed ,
“13. Even assuming that the Accused had no intention to cause
the death of the deceased, the act of the Accused falls u nder
Clause Fourthly of Section 300 Indian Penal Code that is the
act of causing injury so imminently dangerous where it will in
all probability cause death. Any person of average intellig ence
would have the knowledge that pouring of kerosene a nd
setting her on fire by throwing a lighted matchstic k is so
imminently dangerous that in all probability such an act would
cause injuries causing death.”
20. Turning back to the facts of this case, the concurrent findings
which this court sees no difficulty in accepting are that firstly, the
appellants were aggressors; secondly, they attacked the deceased, with
axes; thirdly, the deceased was unarmed; fourthly, during the attack,
the victim’s daughter, PW1 reached the spot, and tried to dissuade the
appellants; fifthly, the appellants continued their assault on the victim
and also attacked the witness with an axe; sixthly, since three injuries
sustained by the appellant, were on the head, he fell down; seventhly,
the victim was rushed to the hospital, and had to be shifted t o another
speciality hospital, for surgery. Eighthly , the deceased was not able to
record his statement; he was never discharged and died in the hospital,
12 (2015) 7 SCC 641
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
after 20 days. Lastly, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem (PW-
14), stated that the injuries were caused by a hard and blunt object, and
death of the deceased was due to cardio respiratory failure “as a result
of multiple injuries on his body and their complica tions”. Apart
from the head, there were several other injuries, in the form of abrasions,
contusions on the elbow, the lower back, fracture of rib cage, etc. At the
time of death, Vrindawan was aged 55 years.
21. There is evidence in the form of statements of both P W1
(Vrindawan’s daughter) and PW2 (Vrindawan’s brother, Narottam) that
the deceased and the appellants had pre-existing disputes. Ho wever,
both these witnesses corroborated each other and stated that the quarrel
or dispute pertained to land had existed for a long time. P W2, in fact,
stated that partition of properties had taken place amongst the brothers,
despite which these quarrels had persisted.
22. The question then is - was there a “sudden quarrel” between
the deceased and the appellants so that the case would not be murder,
but culpable homicide, in terms of Exception 4 ( “if it is committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage
or acted in a cruel or unusual manner” ). In the opinion of this court,
there was no “sudden quarrel”. The testimonies of the two impo rtant
eyewitnesses, PW1 and PW2, establish that when the deceased w as
levelling the septic tank on his property, the accused/appellants started
abusing him; he asked them not to. The appellants, who were in t he
adjacent property, climbed the wall, entered the deceased’s house, and
attacked him with axes. These facts do not constitute a “sudden quarrel”,
given that the appellants abused the deceased, in an unprovoked manner,
and then they went to where he was, armed with axes, and ass aulted
him. Arguendo, even if the facts are assumed to disclose that there was
a sudden fight, it cannot be said that the accused failed to act in a cruel
manner, or did not take undue advantage. This is because they were
armed: a fact which shows pre-meditation on their part. Moreover, they
both attacked Vrindawan on the head, which is a vital part of the body,
thus taking undue advantage of their situation.
23. Again, on the question of whether the facts of this case a re
covered by the first exception to Section 300, i.e., that the acc used/
appellants did what they were accused of (which is to attack and inflict
grave injuries that led to the death of Vrindawan), because of their loss
of self-control, on account of a grave and sudden provocation – the
answer must be the same, which is that the provision (Except ion 1 to
259
Section 300) cannot be attracted. Apart from a long-standing pre- existing
dispute, what caused “sudden” provocation to the appellants, has not
been shown by them. Neither did they lead any evidence, to fall within
Exception 1, nor did the evidence on record substantiate such a contention.
Speaking of what is grave and sudden provocation, this court in K.M.
Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra 13 explained the standard of
reasonableness for applying the “grave and sudden” provocation, in the
following manner:
“84. Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the
application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden”
provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be
laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain
circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, wa y of
life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, soci al and
emotional background of the society to which an Acc used
belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging
from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any standard wit h
precision: it is for the court to decide in each ca se, having
regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not nece ssary in
this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man pla ced in
the position of the Accused would have lost his sel f-control
momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to
him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satis fied on
the evidence that the Accused regained his self-contr ol and
killed Ahuja deliberately.
85. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, ma y be
stated thus: (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocati on
is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of
society as the Accused, placed in the situation in wh ich the
Accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his sel f-
control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under
certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provoca tion
to an Accused so as to bring his act within the First Excep tion
to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The me ntal
background created by the previous act of the victim may be
taken into consideration in ascertaining whether th e
subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for
committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be c learly
traced to the influence of passion arising from tha t
13 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 567
PRASAD PRADHAN & ANR. v. THE STATE OF
CHHATTISGARH [S. RA VINDRA BHAT, J.]
provocation and not after the passion had cooled do wn by
lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope f or
premeditation and calculation”
24. If one were to apply the above tests to the present case, what
is evident is that while there were pre-existing disputes of some vintage,
between the appellants and the deceased, there is nothing to show th at
they had been aggravated. It is also, likewise, not clear whe ther the
deceased said anything to the appellants which triggered their ire, leading
to loss of self-control as to result in “grave and sudden provocation”. In
any case, if there were something, the appellants ought to have brought
the relevant material or evidence on record, as what facts did exist, was
within their peculiar knowledge.
25. During the hearing, the appellants counsel had urged that
Vrindawan died 20 days after the attack, and the lapse of such a time
shows that the injuries were not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. On this aspect, there are several judgm ents, which
emphasize that such a lapse of time, would not per se constitute a
determinative factor as to diminish the offender’s liability from the offence
of murder to that of culpable homicide, not amounting to murder. In Om
Parkash v. State of Punjab, 14 the death occurred 13 days after the
attack; the accused was convicted of murder. Similarly, in Patel Hiralal
Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, 15 the death occurred a fortnight after the
attack, and in Sudershan Kumar (supra), the death occurred 12 days
after the attack.
26. There can be no stereotypical assumption or formula that where
death occurs after a lapse of some time, the injuries (which might have
caused the death), the offence is one of culpable homicide. Every case
has its unique fact situation. However, what is important is the nature
of injury, and whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course to lead
to death. The adequacy or otherwise of medical attention is not a relevant
factor in this case, because the doctor who conducted the post-mortem
clearly deposed that death was caused due to cardio respiratory failures,
as a result of the injuries inflicted upon the deceased. Thus, the injuries
and the death were closely and directly linked.
27. In view of the above discussion, this court is of the opinion
that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The conviction and
sentence imposed on the appellants do not therefore, call for interference.
The appeal is consequently dismissed, without order on costs.
14 1992 (3) SCR 921
15 2002 (1) SCC 22
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Kritika, LCRA)