K. Sreedhar v. M/S Raus Constructions Pvt. Ltd & Ors.
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 06.03.2020 passed by the High Court for the State of
Telangana at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.12081/2019 by which the
High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred by t he debtor
and has quashed and set aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal – I (hereinafter referred to as “DRT-I”) in SA No.171/2016 as
well as the Possession Notice dated 05.02.2016 and the Sale Noti ce
dated 10.01.2017 issued by the Indian Bank (hereinafter referred to as
“secured creditor”) and also the sale of Item No.8 property men tioned
in the Sale Notice pursuant to the auction held, the auction purchaser as
well as the secured creditor have preferred the present appeals.
2. The facts leading to the present appeals in nut-shell ar e as
under:
2.1 That, the respondent No.1 herein – M/s. Raus Constructions
Private Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Debtor”) a vailed financial
assistance, credit facilities in the year 2012 from the Indian Bank i.e. the
secured creditor. Due to defaults on the part of the borrowers in servicing
the loan account, the same was classified as NPA. The secured creditor
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS.
initiated the proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Intere st Act, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as “SARFAESI Act”) and issued the demand
Notice to the borrowers including the mortgagors and the guara ntors,
calling upon them to pay the outstanding amount. As the amount of the
Demand Notice was not paid, the secured creditor issued Notice to the
borrowers / mortgagors / guarantors. That, the Possession Not ice was
issued with respect to Item Nos.1 to 8. The secured creditor on 05.02.2016
issued a consolidated Possession Notice detailing the possession of 12
items of properties and the dates on which the possession of the same
was taken. The Possession Notice was published in ne wspapers.
Thereafter, the secured properties including the prope rty Item No.8
(property in question) was put to auction through e-auction notice dated
28.03.2016. That, the borrowers filed the writ petition before the High
Court being aggrieved by the e-auction and sought stay of a ll further
proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act and pursuant to the Possession Notice dated 05.02.2016,
including e-auction Notice, till the disposal of SA No.171/2016 on the file
of DRT-I, Hyderabad. That, the writ petition came to be dism issed by
the High Court in view of the pendency of SA No.171/2016 before the
DRT-I, Hyderabad. A fresh e- auction Notice was issued. That, the
property Item No.8 was purchased by the auction purchaser (appellant
herein) in Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No.14695/
2020 on 17.02.2017. The e-auction was conducted on 17.02.2017 in
which the auction purchaser was declared the successful bidder . He
was issued the Letter of Acceptance on 18.02.2017. The auction
purchaser deposited 25% of the amount of sale consi deration on
18.02.2017. The sale in favour of the auction purchaser came to be
confirmed on 08.03.2017. On deposit of the entire/full sale consideration,
the sale certificate came to be issued in favour of the auction purchaser
on 23.03.2017.
2.2 By an order dated 16.05.2019, the DRT-I, Hyderabad dismissed
SA No.171/2016 filed by the borrowers and confirmed the sale certificate
issued in favour of the auction purchaser. At this stage it is required to
be noted that before the DRT-I, it was the case on behalf of the borrowers
that the property Item No.8 was the agricultural land and therefore, the
same could not have been the subject matter of auct ion under the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act. However, the DRT-I while dismissing
the aforesaid SA No.171/2016 did not accept the same by obser ving
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that apart from the revenue records, the borrowers did not fi le any
evidence to prove that the agricultural activity was going on in the land
mortgaged with the secured creditor whereas the secured creditor filed
photographs showing no agricultural activities were going on. Therefore,
the DRT- I held that the lands in question (property Item No.8) were not
exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the DRT-I, Hyderabad dated 16.05.2019 dismissing the SA
No.171/2016, the borrowers filed the writ petition being Writ P etition
No.12081/2019. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court
has allowed the said writ petition and has quashed and set asi de the
order passed by the DRT- I dismissing the SA No.171/2016. By the
impugned judgment and order the High Court has also set aside the
Possession Notice as well as the Sale Certificate issued in favour of the
auction purchaser with respect to the Sale of Item N o.8 property
mentioned in the auction Notice. While allowing the writ pet ition, the
High Court has observed and held that there was non-compliance of the
Rule 9(3) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter
referred to as “Rules, 2002”) inter alia on the ground that 25% of the
amount of sale price and thereafter 75% of the balance sale price was
not deposited within the time stipulated under Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002.
The High Court also observed and held that in view of Section 31(i) of
the SARFAESI Act, the property Item No.8 being an agricultural land
could not have been put to auction.
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the sale
with respect to property Item No.8, auction purchaser as well as secured
creditor have preferred the present appeals.
3. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the auction purchaser and learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the secured creditor have vehemently submitted that the High Court
has materially erred in entertaining the writ petition against the judgment
and order passed by the DRT-I. It is submitted that against the order
passed by the DRT-I, the borrower was required to prefe r an appeal
before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as “DRAT”). It is submitted that only with a view to ci rcumvent the
provisions of the appeal before the DRAT and to get out of the deposit
of the pre-deposit amount, the borrower straightway pref erred writ
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
petition before the High Court against the judgment and order passed by
the DRT-I, which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court
in view of availability of alternative statutory remedy under the provisions
of the SARFAESI Act.
3.1 It is further submitted that even on merits also, the High Court
has materially erred in holding that there was breach of Rul e 9(3) and
Rules 8(1) & (2) of the Rules, 2002.
3.2 It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated
and/or considered the amendment in 2016 with respect to Rule 9(3)
whereby 25% of payment could be made within next day of auction. It
is submitted that therefore the High Court has materially erred in setting
aside the sale transaction on the basis of such manifest ignorance.
3.3 It is submitted that in the present case, the auction purchaser
deposited the amount within the time prescribed under Rule 9(4) of the
Rules, 2002 and thereafter the sale certificate was issued on 23.03.2017
for the said item which was registered on 07.02.2018 and the possession
was also handed over to the auction purchaser.
3.4 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the auction purchaser that in the present case t he auction
purchaser quoted Rs.2,76,10,000/- for item No.8 of the Pos session
Notice. He deposited on 14.02.2017, prior to the auction on 17.02.2017,
Rs.26 lakh vide RTGS; that he deposited after the auction was held on
17.02.2017 pursuant to the letter dated 18.02.2017 an amount of Rs.45
lakh again through RTGS. It is submitted that the respondent secured
creditor – Bank vide communication dated 08.03.2017 directed the auction
purchaser to deposit balance 75% of the bid amount within 15 days and
he gave cheque dated 23.03.2017 for an amount of Rs.2,05,10,000/-. It
is submitted that therefore the entire amount was deposited within the
time stipulated. It is submitted that therefore in the facts and
circumstances of the case the High Court has materially erred in quashing
and setting the sale on the ground that there was violation of Rules 8(1)
& (2) and 9(3) of the Rules, 2002.
3.5 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing
for the auction purchaser that the High Court ought to have appreciated
that after the payment of full sale consideration, the sale certificate was
issued in favour of the auction purchaser on 23.03.2017 which was
registered on 07.02.2018 and after the possession was handed over to
587
him, he spent huge amount in leveling the plot; applied for permission to
the Municipal Authorities to construct the house in the plot. It is submitted
that therefore the High Court has seriously erred in quashing and setting
aside the sale.
3.6 Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the auction
purchaser has further submitted that the High Court has also erred in
setting aside the Sale Notice, Possession Notice etc. on the ground that
the properties were exempted from the provisions of the S ARFAESI
Act in view of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act.
3.7 It is submitted that as such the scheduled properties were not
actually put to use for agricultural purposes. It is sub mitted that there
was no proof filed to prove that agriculture is being done in the scheduled
properties in question. It is submitted that there was no agricultural activity
taking place. It is submitted that in fact the photographs were filed which
proved that no agricultural activities were going on. It is submitted that
therefore when the secured properties in question were not put to use
for agricultural purposes and/or no agricultural activity was going on, the
properties in question were not exempted under Section 31(i) of t he
SARFAESI Act. Heavy reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court
in the case of ITC Limited vs. Blue Coast Hotels Limited and
Others reported in (2018) 15 SCC 99 (Para 36) and Indian Bank
and Another vs. K. Pappireddiyar and Another reported in (2018)
18 SCC 252 (Paras 7 & 8).
3.8 Now, so far as taking the possession of Item Nos.1 to 12 and
the issuance of Possession Notice on 05.02.2016 and the findings recorded
by the High Court on Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act that the
Possession Notice was issued after a period of one year is concerned, it
is submitted that there was a typographical error in me ntioning the
possession date. It is submitted that instead of 03.02.2016, 04.02.2016
and 05.02.2016, dates were mentioned as 03.02.2015, 04.02.2015 and
05.02.2015, which were nothing but typographical error. It is submitted
that therefore the Possession Notice cannot be said to be i n breach of
Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
Making above submissions, it is requested to allow the present
appeals.
4. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by Mr. Pratap Narayan
Sanghi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the borrower. It is
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and having
found that there was a breach of Rules 8(1) & (2) and 9(4) of the Rules,
2002 and Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court has not
committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India against the judgment and order passed by the
DRT-I.
4.1 It is further submitted that so far as the property Item No.8 is
concerned, there was a clear breach of Rules 8(1) & (2) and 9(4) of the
Rules, 2002. It is submitted that therefore the High Co urt has not
committed any error in quashing and setting aside the sale with respect
to the property Item No.8.
4.2 It is further submitted that so far as other prop erties are
concerned, as the said properties were agricultural lands / properties, in
view of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, with respe ct to those
properties / agricultural lands, the SARFAESI Act w ould not be
applicable. It is submitted that in the revenue records, properties in
question were shown as agricultural lands and therefo re, the said
properties were exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act in
view of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act.
Making above submissions, it is requested to dismiss the present
appeals.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
secured creditor – Bank as well as the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the auction purchaser of property at Item No.8 and learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the borrower.
6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that what was challenged
before the High Court by the borrower in a writ petition under A rticle
226 of the Constitution of India was the judgment and order passed by
the DRT-I. Against the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I
dismissing the application, the borrower had a statutory remedy available
by way of appeal before the DRAT. If the borrower would have preferred
an appeal before the DRAT, he would have been required to deposi t
25% of the debt due. To circumvent the provision of appeal before the
DRAT and the pre-deposit, the borrower straightway preferred the writ
petition before the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
Therefore, in view of alternative statutory remedy available by way of
appeal before the DRAT, the High Court ought not to have entertained
589
the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitutio n of India
challenging the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I. By entertaining
the writ petition straightway under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India challenging the order passed by the DRT-I, the High Cou rt has
allowed / permitted the borrower to circumvent the provision of appeal
before the DRAT under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
6.1 Even on merits also, for the reasons stated hereinafter, t he
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.
6.2 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has set
aside the sale in favour of the auction purchaser with res pect to the
property at Item No.8 on the ground that there was a violation of Rules
8(1) & (2) and 9(4) of the Rules, 2002. However, while obser ving so,
the High Court has not properly appreciated that in the present case, the
Possession Notices were published in two leading newspape rs having
sufficient circulation in the locality. Even the Possession Notices were
also served upon the borrowers also. Therefore, the High Court has
materially erred in holding that there was a breach of Rules 8(1) & (2)
of the Rules, 2002.
6.3 Now, so far as the finding recorded by the High Court on
Rules 9(3) and 9(4) of the Rules, 2002 is concerned, the findings recorded
by the High Court are just contrary to the provisions of Rule 9 of the
Rules, 2002. The High Court has observed that 25% of the amount was
not deposited on the date of auction and that balance 75% amount was
not deposited on or before 15 th day of confirmation of the sale. Both the
aforesaid findings are just contrary to Rules 9(3) and (4) of the Rules,
2002. Rules 9(3) and 9(4) read as under:
“9. Time of sale, issue of sale certificate and delivery of possession,
etc.
(3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser sha ll
immediately, i.e. on the same day or not later than next working
day, as the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty five per cent of
the amount of the sale price, which is inclusive of earnest money
deposited, if any, to the authorized officer conducting the sale and
in default of such deposit, the property shall be sold again;
(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid
by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth
day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or su ch
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between t he
purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding
three months.”
The purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the amount of the
sale price on the same day of sale or not later than the next working day.
Therefore, 25% of the sale price could have been deposited either on
the same day of the sale or on the next working day. In the present case,
the auction was held on 17.02.2017. The auction purchaser deposited
Rs.26 lakh through RTGS on 14.02.2017 i.e. prior to the auction on
17.02.2017. He deposited a further sum of Rs.45 lakh again through
RTGS on the very next day of the sale i.e. on 18.02.2017 itself. Therefore,
the entire 25% of the sale price came to be deposited by 18.02.2017.
Therefore, the deposit of 25% was permissible not later than next working
day and the entire 25% was deposited on 18.02.2017 i.e. on the next day
of the sale dated 17.02.2017. Therefore, the High Court has committed
an error in observing and holding that there was a breach of Rule 9(3) of
the Rules, 2002.
6.4 Similarly, the High Court has also erred in holding that there
was a breach of Rule 9(4) of the Rules, 2002. The High Court has held
so by observing that the auction purchaser did not deposit the b alance
75% of the sale price on or before 15 th day of confirmation of sale.
However, it is required to be noted that by communication / letter dated
08.03.2017, the secured creditor – Bank directed the auction purchaser
to deposit the balance 75% of the bid amount within 15 days and the
auction purchaser deposited the balance 75% of the sale price on
23.03.2017, i.e., on the 15 th day from the date of communication by the
secured creditor– Bank to deposit balance 75% of the bid amount within
15 days. As per Rule 9(4) of the Rules, 2002, the balance amo unt of
purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the Authorized
Officer on or before 15 th day of confirmation of sale of the immovable
property or such extended period , in any case not exceeding three
months. Therefore, the communication dated 08.03.2017 can be said to
be the extended period by the secured creditor / Bank. Theref ore, on
the 15 th day from the date of communication dated 08.03.2017, when
the entire 75% of the sale price was deposited, it can be said that the
entire sale price was deposited within the time prescribed under Rules
9(3) and (4) of the Rules, 2002. Therefore, the High Court has committed
an error in holding that there was a breach of Rules 9(3) & (4) of the
Rules, 2002.
591
7. Now, so far as with respect to remaining properties / s ecured
assets viz. Item Nos.3 and 9 to 12 and the submission on behalf of the
borrowers that as the said scheduled properties wer e agricultural
properties, therefore the said properties were exem pted from the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act in view of Section 31 (i) of the
SARFAESI Act is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that
except the revenue records, the borrowers did not file any ev idence to
show that the agricultural work was being done in the said pro perties.
On the contrary, the secured creditor produced the photographs to show
that there was no agricultural activities being done and no agricu ltural
activity was going on. The High Court has observed and held tha t the
scheduled properties in question were exempted from the provisions of
SARFAESI Act in view of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act on the
ground that the revenue records and Pattadar pass-books and the title
deeds show that the properties were agricultural properties / lands and
that no evidence is produced by the secured creditor that these properties
are non- agricultural lands and have been put to non-agricultural use
after obtaining permission from the competent authorities. There fore,
the High Court has shifted the burden upon the secured creditor to prove
that the properties are non-agricultural lands. The view t aken by the
High Court is just contrary to the two decisions of this Court in the case
of Blue Coast Hotels Limited and Others (Supra) and K.
Pappireddiyar and Another (Supra). In both the aforesaid decisions,
this Court has specifically observed and held after considering the object
and purpose of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act that merely because
in the revenue records the secured properties are shown as agricultural
land is not sufficient to attract Section 31(i) of the SARFAES I Act. In
the aforesaid decision, it is specifically observed and held t hat for the
purpose of attracting Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, the properties
in question ought to be actually used as agricultural lands at the time
when the security interest was created. In the case of Blue Coast
Hotels Limited and Others (Supra), it is also further observed by
this Court that since no security interest can be created in respect of
agricultural lands and yet it was so created, goes to show that the parties
did not treat the land as agricultural land and that the debtor offered the
land as security on this basis. After following the decision of this Court
in the case of Blue Coast Hotels Limited and Others (Supra), in
the case of K. Pappireddiyar and Another (Supra), it is obs erved and
held in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under:
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
“8. The expression “security interest”, both before and after the
amendment, excludes what is specified in Section 31. Clause (i)
of Section 31 stipulates that the provisions of the Act will not be
applicable to any security interest created in agricultural land. The
statutory dictionary in Section 2 does not contain a definition of
the expression “agricultural land”. Whether a particular piece of
land is agricultural in nature is a question of fact. In the decision
of this Court in Blue Coast Hotels Ltd., 4 a security interest was
created in respect of several parcels of land which were meant to
be a part of a single unit, for establishing a hotel in Goa. Some of
the parcels were purchased by the debtor from agriculturists and
were entered as agricultural lands in the revenue records. The
debtor had applied to the revenue authority for the conversion of
the land to non-agricultural use, but the applications were pending.
This Court held that the fact that the debtor had created a security
interest was indicative of the position that the parties did not treat
the land as agricultural land. The undisputed position was that the
hotel was located on 1,82,225 sq m of land of which 2335 sq m
were used for growing vegetables and fruits for cap tive
consumption. In this background, the two-Judge Bench of this
Court held that:
“49. The mortgage is thus intended to cover the entire property
of the Goa Hotel. Prima facie, apart from the fact that the
parties themselves understood that the lands in question are
not agricultural, it also appears that having regard to the use to
which they are put and the purpose of such use, they are indeed
not agricultural.”
The Court further held that: (SCC OnLine SC para 57)
“57. …having regard to the character of the land the purpose
for which it is set apart, we are of the view that the la nd in
question is not an agricultural land. The High Court misdirected 5
itself in holding that the land was an agricultural land merely
because it stood as such in the revenue entries, even though
the application made for such conversation lies pending till
date.”
9. The classification of land in the revenue records as agricultural
is not dispositive or conclusive of the question whe ther the
593
SARFAESI Act does or does not apply. Whether a parcel of land
is agricultural must be deduced as a matter of fact from the nature
of the land, the use to which it was being put on the date of the
creation of the security interest and the purpose for which it was
set apart.”
7.1 The purpose of enacting Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act
has been considered by this Court in the case of Blue Coast Hotels
Ltd. (Supra) in paragraph 36, which reads as under:
“36. The purpose of enacting Section 31(i) and the meaning of
the term “agricultural land” assume significance. This provision,
like many others is intended to protect agricultural land held for
agricultural purposes by agriculturists from the ext raordinary
provisions of this Act, which provides for enforcement of security
interest without intervention of the Court. The plain intention of
the provision is to exempt agricultural land from the provisions of
the Act. In other words, the creditor cannot enforce any security
interest created in his favour without intervention of the court or
tribunal, if such security interest is in respect of agricultural land.
The exemption thus protects agriculturists from losing their source
of livelihood and income i.e. the agricultural land, under the drastic
provision of the Act. It is also intended to deter the creat ion of
security interest over agricultural land as defined in S ection
2(1)(zf) 35 . Thus, security interest cannot be created in respect of
property specified in Section 31.”
7.2 Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
two decisions, only in a case where the secured property is actually put
to use as agricultural land and solely on the basis of the revenue records
/ Pattadar and once the secured property is put as a security by way of
mortgage etc. meaning thereby the same was not treated as agricultural
land, such properties cannot be said to be exempted from the provisions
of the SARFAESI Act under Section 31(i) of the SARFAES I Act.
Applying the law laid down in the aforesaid two decisions to the facts of
the case on hand and when no evidence was led at all on behalf of t he
borrowers that the secured properties in question were actu ally put to
use as agricultural land and/or any agricultural activity was going on, the
High Court has committed an error in applying Section 31(i) of the
SARFAESI Act and quashing and setting aside the entire Possessi on
Notice, Auction Notice as well as Sale etc.
K. SREEDHAR v. M/S RAUS CONSTRUCTIONS PVT. LTD.
& ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
7.3 The High Court has also materially erred in shifting the burden
upon the secured creditor to prove that the properties were not non-
agricultural lands or have been put to non-agricultural use. When it was
the case on behalf of the borrowers that in view of Section 31(i) of the
SARFAESI Act, the properties were agricultural lands, the same were
being exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the burden
was upon the borrower to prove that the secured pro perties were
agricultural lands and actually being used as agricultural lands and/or
agricultural activities were going on. Therefore, the High Cour t has
materially erred in shifting the burden upon the secured creditor to prove
that the properties are non-agricultural lands or have been put to non-
agricultural use.
8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable
and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. According ly, the
impugned judgment and order dated 06.03.2020 passed by the High Court
for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No.12081/2019
is hereby quashed and set aside and the judgment and orde r dated
16.05.2019 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, H yderabad
dismissing SA No.171/2016 is hereby restored.
Presently appeals are allowed accordingly. No costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.
(Assisted by : Abhishek Pratap Singh, LCRA)