EX-CONST/DVR Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India & Ors
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The present special leave petition is directed aga inst the
judgment and order dated 16.11.2021 passed by the High Cour t of
Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur, whereby the Division Bench
has allowed the D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 637 of 2021 filed by the
respondents-Union of India (appellants before the Division Bench), and
has set aside the order dated 17.02.2021 passed by the Sing le Bench,
EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS.
which had allowed the Civil Writ Petition No. 17475 of 2018 filed by the
present petitioner (respondent before the Division Bench).
2. The present petitioner was appointed on the post of constable
in the CISF on 03.11.2007. In April, 2009 the petitioner received a notice/
Memorandum of charge under the Rule 36 of CISF Rule s 2001
(hereinafter referred to as the “the said Rules”) from t he office of
Commandant Discipline, CISF in which it was alleged that the petitioner
at the time of submitting verification of his character c ertificate had
suppressed the fact that he was involved in a criminal case for the offence
under sections 323, 324 and 341 of IPC in respect of which an FIR
being No. 153/2003 was registered against him on 21.10.2003; and that
on the Investigating Officer in the said proceedings having submitted the
charge-sheet before the concerned Court, the case was pending for trial
before the said Court when the character certificate was su bmitted by
the petitioner to the CISF authorities. It was also sta ted therein that
since the act of suppression of information regarding pendenc y of the
criminal litigation in his character certificate file d along with the
appointment letter, was under the category of gross misconduct and
indiscipline, he was not eligible to be appointed in a very disciplined police
force i.e. CISF. Thereafter, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
the petitioner. During the course of disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner
accepted his mistake. The Commandant Discipline, CISF, keep ing in
view the young age and future prospects of the petitioner, im posed
punishment of reduction of pay by one stage from Rs. 6320- 6070/- in
the pay band of Rs.5200-20,200/- with grade pay. Ho wever, on
06.10.2009, the Deputy Inspector General (West Zone), Air Port Head
Quarter – Navi Mumbai – suo motu took the cognizance of the matter
revising the order dated 11.07.2009 and remitted the matter back for
fresh departmental enquiry against the petitioner invoking Rul e 54 of
CISF Rules, 2001. The said departmental enquiry culminated in to the
removal of the petitioner from service on 09.03.2010, against which the
petitioner had filed a departmental appeal, however, the said appeal came
to be dismissed by the appellate authority vide the order dated 23.06.2010.
The revision petition filed by the petitioner before the competent authority
assailing the said order dated 23.06.2010 also came to be dismissed by
the Revisional Authority vide the order dated 21.12.2010.
3. Being aggrieved by the said orders, passed by the variou s
authorities of CISF, the petitioner filed a writ petition being No. 8190 of
801
2012 before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaip ur. The
Single Bench vide order dated 16.02.2018 set aside the order of removal
passed against the petitioner and directed the petitioner to file a detailed
representation before the appointing authority for reconsideration of his
case in the context of the judgment of the Supreme Court in c ase of
Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors 1 and directed the appointing
authority to decide the representation of the petitioner by a reasoned
and speaking order with reference to the said judgment. The Commandant
CISF Unit CSIA, Mumbai after considering the representat ion of the
petitioner in the light of the judgment in case of Avtar Singh (supra),
held that the CISF being an Armed Force of Union of India, whic h is
deployed in sensitive sectors, the force personnel are required to maintain
discipline of the highest order, and that the involvement of the petitioner
in the grave offences debarred him from the appointment to such force
and, therefore, he was not found suitable for the appointment i n CISF
for the post of constable/GD vide order dated 14.05.2018.
4. The petitioner again filed a writ petition being No. 17475/2018
assailing the said order dated 14.05.2018. The Single Bench again se t
aside the said order and allowed the writ petition directing the respondents
to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits vide
the order dated 17.02.2021. The respondents filed the Special Writ Appeal
before the Division Bench, against the order passed by the Sigle Bench,
which appeal came to be allowed by the Division Bench vide the impugned
order.
5. Ms. Asifa Rashid Mir, learned counsel appearing fo r the
petitioner vehemently submitted that the petitioner was inv olved in a
criminal case when he was hardly aged about 19 years and the said
case had resulted into a compromise between the parties. According to
her, on the basis of the said compromise, the Trial Court had closed the
case on 21.11.2007, and the petitioner was appointed as constable in
CISF on 03.11.2007. Relying upon the various decisions of this Court
and other High Courts, she further submitted that considering the nature
of offence in which the petitioner was allegedly involved, the removal
from service on the ground of non-disclosure of pendency of the said
case could not be said to be a grave misconduct attracting the harsh
punishment of removal from service. The Division Bench of the High
Court, runs the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner, should not
1 (2016) 8 SCC 471
EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
have interfered with the well-reasoned order passed by the Single Bench
which had found the involvement of the petitioner in a case of trivial
nature. According to her, even if a deliberate suppression by the petitioner
as alleged by the respondents was found to have taken place at the time
of filing the character certificate, a lenient view should have been taken
by the respondents considering his age and considering the fact that the
petitioner had accepted his mistake.
6. The Senior Advocate Mr. R. Bala Subramanian, appearing for
the respondents however, taking the Court to the CISF Rules 2001, the
circulars applicable to all Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) including
the CISF regarding the policy guidelines to be followed in respect of the
candidates against whom criminal cases are pending vide OM dated
01.02.2012, dealing with suppression of information or submitting false
information in the verification form, submitted that the CISF being very
disciplined police force and the post of constable being very sensitive
post, the petitioner who was found to be guilty of gross misconduct of
suppressing the material fact of his involvement in the criminal case at
the time of seeking appointment, could not have been continued in service,
and that the Division Bench has rightly considered the facts of the case
and upheld the decision of the respondent authority, which may not be
interfered with.
7. In the instant case, both the learned counsels for the pa rties
have relied upon decision of this Court in Avtar Singh (supra) in which
a three-judge Bench emphasizing the need of verification of character
and antecedents of the person to be appointed in the government service
and after considering the various previous judgments of this Court, had
summarized the principles in para 38 which reads as under:
“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain
and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate
as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency o f a
criminal case, whether before or after entering int o
service must be true and there should be no suppression
or false mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or
cancellation of candidature for giving false information,
the employer may take notice of special circumstances
of the case, if any, while giving such information.
803 EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration th e
government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the
employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false informatio n
of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or
acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the
application/verification form and such fact later comes
to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses
appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had
been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young ag e
or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have
rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, th e
employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppressi on
of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case
which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel
candidature or terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case
involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious
nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean
acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given,
the employer may consider all relevant facts availab le
as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as
to the continuance of the employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still
has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot b e
compelled to appoint the candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in
character verification form regarding pendency of a
criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and
circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint
the candidate subject to decision of such case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact w ith
respect to multiple pending cases such false information
by itself will assume significance and an employer may
pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or
terminating services as appointment of a person against
whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be
proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the
candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may h ave
adverse impact and the appointing authority would take
decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,
holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before
passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the
ground of suppression or submitting false information in
verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information
attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague.
Only such information which was required to be
specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information
not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the
employer the same can be considered in an objective
manner while addressing the question of fitness.
However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis
of suppression or submitting false information as to a
fact which was not even asked for.
38.11 Before a person is held guilty of suppressio ve ri
or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be
attributable to him”.
8. It may be noted that even after the guiding principles laid down
in the case of Avtar Singh by the three-judge Bench, divergent views
were expressed by the various benches of this Court. Therefor e, this
Court in case of Satish Chandra Yadav Vs. Union of India & Others.2,
after taking into consideration the inconsistent views taken in the cases
of Union of India & Ors. Vs Methu Meda 3; Union of India vs. Dilip
Kumar Mallick 4; Pawan Kumar vs. Union of India & Anr. 5;
2 (2022) SCC Online SC 1300
3 (2022) 1 SCC 1
4 (2022) 6 Scale 108
5 (2022) SCC Online SC 532
805 EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited & Anr. v s. Anil
Kanwariya 6; Mohammed Imran Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others 7;
etc., further laid down following principles:
“89. The only reason to refer to and look into the various
decisions rendered by this Court as above over a period of
time is that the principles of law laid therein governin g the
subject are bit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench
decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) different courts
have enunciated different principles.
90. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to
shortlist the broad principles of law which should be made
applicable to the litigations of the present nature . The
principles are as follows:
a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the pub lic
employer concerned, through its designated officials-mor e
so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are
under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessn ess,
since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark
to society’s security. [See Raj Kumar (supra)]
b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration
truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the
employer still has the right to consider the antece dents,
and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. T he
acquittal in a criminal case would not automatically entit le
a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be stil l
open to the employer to consider the antecedents an d
examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and
fit for appointment to the post.
c) The suppression of material information and making a
false statement in the verification Form relating to arre st,
prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing o n the
character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If i t is
found that the employee had suppressed or given fal se
information in regard to the matters having a bearing on
6 (2021) 10 SCC 136
7 (2019) 17 SCC 696
his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be termi nated
from service.
d) The generalisations about the youth, career prosp ects
and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the
offenders’ conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and
should be avoided.
e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority
concerned whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.
f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the
Authority?
g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the
Authority concerned was fair and reasonable?”
9. Having regard to the guiding principles, laid down in case o f
Avtar Singh (supra) and in case of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra) ,
this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Single Bench of the High
Court had committed an error in interfering with the order passed by the
respondents-authorities. The respondents-authorities had after taking into
consideration the decision in case of Avtar Singh terminated the services
of the petitioner holding inter-alia that while the petitioner was appointed
in CISF, a criminal case was pending against him at the time of his
enrolment in the force, but he did not reveal the same and that there was
deliberate suppression of facts which was an aggravating circumstance.
It was also held that CISF being an armed force of Union of India, is
deployed in sensitive sectors such as airports, ports, department of atomic
energy, department of space, metro, power and steel, for internal security
duty etc., and therefore, the force personnel are required to maintain
discipline of the highest order; and that the involvement of the petitioner
in such grave offences debarred him from the appointment. Such a well-
reasoned and well considered decision of the respondent-aut horities
should not have been interfered by the Single Bench in exerci se of its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particular ly when
there were no allegations of malafides or of non-observance of rules of
natural justice or of breach of statutory rules were attributed against the
respondent authorities.
10. The Constitution Bench, in case of State of Orissa & Others
vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra 8 had observed way back in 1963 that
8 AIR 1963 SC 779
807 EX-CONST/DVR MUKESH KUMAR RAIGAR v. UNION OF
INDIA & ORS. [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]
having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing
authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty
was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. A three-
judge Bench in case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors 9
had also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and
not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on t he
charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court or Tribunal would
be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was
held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural j ustice and
statutory rules were complied with.
11. In Om Kumar & Others vs. Union of India 10 this Court had
also after considering the Wednesbury Principles and the doctrine of
proportionality held that the question of quantum of punishme nt in
disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of
the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability
of one or the other of the well-known principles known as “Wednesbury
Principles” 11 namely whether the order was contrary to law, or whether
relevant factors were not considered, or whether irrelevant factors were
considered or whether the decision was one which no reasonable person
could have taken.
12. Again, a three-judge Bench in case of Deputy General
Manager (Appellate Authority) & Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar S rivastava 12
circumscribing the power of judicial review by the constitutional courts
held as under:
“24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial revi ew, of
the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decis ion-
making process and not the merits of the decision itsel f. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fai rness
of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the
proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, i n any
manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mo de of
9 (1995) 6 SCC 749
10 (2001) 2 SCC 386
11 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wedn esbury Corporation [1948] 1
KB 223
12 (2021) 2 SCC 612
enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would
have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the discipli nary
authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on t he
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a wr it of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of ju dicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
25. xxxxxxx
26. xxxxxxx
27. xxxxxxxx
28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisd iction
of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the
Constitution would not interfere with the findings of f act
arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except
in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no
evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such
that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could
have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some
evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by th e
departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.”
13. In view of the afore-stated legal position, we are of the opinion
that the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order
passed by the Single Bench, which had wrongly interfered with the order
of removal passed by the respondent authorities against the petitioner.
The petitioner having been found to have committed gross misconduct
right at the threshold of entering into disciplined force like CISF, and the
respondent authorities having passed the order of his removal from service
after following due process of law and without actuated by mala fides,
the court is not inclined to exercise its limited jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution.
14. In that view of the matter the SLP is dismissed.
Nidhi Jain Petition dismissed.
(Assisted by : Bhavyata Kapoor and Shashwat Jain, L CRAs)