H. D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka

Supreme Court of India · 2023 INSC 858 · 2023

Coram: ABHAY S. OKA, SANJAY KAROL

JUDGMENT ABHAY S. OKA, J. 1. This is an appeal preferred by the accused challenging the impugned judgment of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore by which the order of their acquittal, passed by the Sessions Court, was overturned. The appellants were convicted for the oﬀ ences punishable under Part I of Section 304 and Section 324 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). They were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and pay a ﬁ ne of Rs. 5,000/-. FACTUAL ASPECTS 2. We may refer to a few factual aspects of the case. PW-1 (Jagadeesha) is the complainant. The complainant’s family ha d property in the village Hebbale. The appellant no.1 - accused no.1-Mariyappa is PW-1’s uncle, with whom PW-1’s family was having a dispute over water. Manjunatha and Shivarama are the brothers of PW-1, who are the victims of the oﬀ ence. On 29th August 1999, both entered the village Hebbale to engage labourers for plucking ginger. PW-1 followed them. On the road to the village, he found that PW-2 (Sundara) and PW-6 (Ravi) were sitting on a culvert. When he was talking to them, they heard the hue and cry from the village, and therefore, they rushed to the village and found th at the appellants, who are relatives of PW-1, were holding various weapons like sticks, kathi and club and they were assaulting Manjunatha and Shivarama. It is alleged that accused no.1-Mariyappa assaulted Shivarama by using a club. Accused no.8-Puttappa also assaulted Manjunatha by using a club. Accused no.7-Rajappa used a stick as a weapon of assault for assaul ting Shivarama. Accused no.5-Somashekara stabbed Shivarama by using a knife. Accused no.6-Krishnappa assaulted Manjunatha on his head by using a club. Further, an assault was made by accused no.3-Chandrahasa by putting a stone on the chest of Shivarama. Even accused no.4-Rajakumara crushed the leg of Shivarama with a stone. Though PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 tr ied to rescue the deceased, they could not save the deceased. Ac cused no.3- Chandrahasa caught hold of PW-2 (Sundara) and assaulted him by using H. D. SUNDARA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA a sickle (kathi). Accused no. 1 assaulted PW-1 with a club. Accuse d no.1 also assaulted PW-1’s mother on the right hand. 3. The Trial Court acquitted all the accused. However, by the impugned judgment, the High Court has interfered and convicted the appellants a s narrated above. 4. Accused no.6 died during the pendency of the trial. The accused no.1 - appellant no.1 and accused no.7 – appellant no.7 died during the pendency of this appeal. Counsel for the appellants has ﬁ led I.A. No. 71417 of 2023 – application for permission to ﬁ le additional documents. Annexure A-1 and A-2 are copies of the Death Certiﬁ cates of appellant no.1 and appellant no.7 respectively. The said application is allowed and the Cause Title stands modiﬁ ed accordingly. Formal amendment to the Cause Title be carried out accordingly. The appeal stands abated as regards these two appellants. Accused no.2 - appellant no.2, accused no.3 - appellant no.3, accused no.4 - appellant no.4 and accused no.6 - appellant no.6 have so far undergone incarceration for a period of about one year and two months. Accused no.5 – appellant no.5-Somashekar has been incarcerated for ﬁ ve years and three months. SUBMISSIONS 5. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the High Court did not apply its m ind to the evidence on record. Moreover, the High Court has not recorded any ﬁ nding that the only conclusion possible was that the guilt of the acc used has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Without recording a ny such ﬁ nding, the High Court has overturned the order of acquittal. Moreover, no speciﬁ c ﬁ nding is recorded by the High Court that every accused or any particular accused caused the death of the two deceased pe rsons.He pointed out that there is no ﬁ nding about the applicability of Section 149 of IPC. He would, therefore, submit that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Moreover, there is a delay in recording FIR. The learned senior counsel also pointed out that though a grievous injury was suﬀ ered by accused no.1 - appellant no.1, the prosecution oﬀ ered no explanation about the said injury. He submitted that in view of the said injury, in fact, a First Information Report (for short, ‘FIR’) ought to have been registered, and an investigation ought to have been carried out. 51 6. Mr. Nishanth Patil, the Additional Advocate General for the State of Karnataka, submitted that the delay in registering the FIR may be of a very few hours, which has been explained. Moreover, the evidence of eyewitnesses PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-6 and PW-7 proves the appellants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, that would have been the only conclusion which could be drawn on the basis of evidence on record. He submitted that if the impugned judgment is not satisfactory, this Court, after re-appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and other material on record, can satisfy its conscience about the correctness of the ultimate conclusion of the High Court. CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS 7. In this appeal, we are called upon to consider the legali ty and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the Hig h Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. can be summarised as follows: - (a) The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumpti on of innocence; (b) The Appellate Court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; (c) The Appellate Court, while deciding an appeal against acquitt al, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (d) If the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (e) The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a ﬁ nding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. H. D. SUNDARA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 8. Normally, when an Appellate Court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the Appellate Court is to ﬁ nd out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The Appellate Court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to ﬁ nd out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the Appellate Court must ﬁ rst decide whether the Trial Court’s view was a possible view. The Appellate Court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, i t is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only by recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal can not be reversed unless the Appellate Court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the Appellate Court must see whether the view taken by the Trial Court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the Trial Court is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot interfere with t he order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken. 9. There is one more aspect of the matter. In many cases, the learned Trial Judge who eventually passes the order of acquittal has an occasion to record the oral testimony of all material witnesses. Thus, in such cases, the Trial Court has the additional advantage of closely observing the prosecution witnesses and their demeanour. While deciding about the reliability of the version of prosecution witnesses, their demeanour remains in the back of the mind of the learned Trial Judge. As observed in the commentary by Sarkar on the Law of Evidence, the demeanour of a witness frequently furnishe s a clue to the weight of his testimony. This aspect has to be borne in mind while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. 10. Coming back to the facts of the case, after having carefully perused the impugned judgment, we ﬁ nd that there is no discussion about the testimony of eyewitnesses for deciding whether their testimony c ould be believed. In fact, there are no ﬁ ndings recorded by the High Court after re-appreciating the evidence. There is not even a ﬁ nding to indicate that the High Court considered the question whether the view taken by the Trial Court 53 was a possible view. Without recording any reasons and without recording any ﬁ nding regarding the role played by the appellants individually and collectively, the High Court has jumped to the conclusion that the guilt of the accused has been established. The judgment does not throw any light on the question who were the authors of the injuries sustained by the deceased and the injured witnesses. There is no ﬁ nding as to how Section 149 of IPC gets attracted. 11. Thus, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the High Court, as an Appellate Court, while hearing the appeal against acqui ttal, has not done its duty. 12. However, we cannot take recourse to the order of remand since the subject oﬀ ence has taken place about twenty-three and half years back. We have perused the evidence of the eyewitnesses, namely PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-6 and PW-7, and the Trial Court ﬁ ndings. We ﬁ nd that the Trial Court has made a very detailed analysis of the depositions of the witnesses. The incident was of 9:00 p.m. The Trial Court noted that at 11:40 p.m. on the date of the incident, PW-1 was examined by a doctor in a hospital. FIR was not lodged immediately thereafter. It was registered at 1:30 a.m. on the next date. The Trial Court noted that the appellant no.1’s thumb was disﬁ gured. For this grievous injury suﬀ ered by the appellant no.1 - accused no.1, there was no explanation by the prosecution. 13. The Trial Court found that the failure to investigate the cause of injury suﬀ ered by the accused no.1 is a serious lacuna in a prose cution case. On facts, it is further noted by the Trial Court that on the basis of prior complaint ﬁ led by the accused no.1 - appellant no.1 alleging commission of assault by PW-1, PW-2, PW-7, and PW-12, all of them got anticipatory bail from the competent court. 14. There was a ﬁ ght over property between the accused and the family of the complainant. After in-depth scrutiny of the testimony of the eyewitnesses, for the reasons recorded, the Trial Court was unable to accept their testimony. After having examined the evidence of the material prosecution witnesses and ﬁ ndings of the Trial Court, we must hold that the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court were possible conclusions which could have been recorded on the basis of the evidence on record. H. D. SUNDARA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ABHAY S. OKA, J.] 15. Therefore, the appeal succeeds, and we set aside the impugned Judgment dated 21st September 2010. We direct that unless the appellants are required to be detained in custody in connection with some other case, they shall be forthwith set at liberty. 16. The Appeal is accordingly allowed.