Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India and Another

HIMA KOHLI, J. 1. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated 31 st May, 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Luc know Bench upholding the order dated 9 th December, 2020 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal1, Principal Bench, that had turned down the challenge laid by him to an order dated 27th September, 2019, passed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India communicating the decision of the President of India to compulsorily retire him, in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules2. 1 For short ‘Tribunal’ 2 For short ‘FR 56(j)’ CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER FACTS OF THE CASE 2. The present case has a chequered history with multiple rounds of litigations spewed between the appellant and the res pondents. To have an overview of the matter, we may briefly refer to some facts relevant for deciding the present Appeal. The appellant was a Permanent Commissioned Officer in the Indian Army, inducted in the year 1980. Due to a physical disability suffered by him in the course of Army operations, he was demobilized and released from service. I n the year 1989, the appellant qualified the Civil Services Examinati on. He was appointed as an Officer and allocated to the 1990 Batch in the Indian Revenue Service. In due course of his service, the appellant was promoted to higher posts and on 12th January, 2012, he was promoted to the rank of Commissioner, in the Department of Income Tax. On 7th July, 2014, the appellant was selected and empanelled for appointment as a Member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 3 by the Selection Committee headed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the then Chief Justice of India. On 15 th July, 2015, the respondents forwarded the name of the appellant to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet4 along with his vigilance clearance for appointment as Member (Accountant), ITAT. In the year 2016, the appellant was empanelled by the ACC for appointment as Joint Secretary to the Government of India. From the year 2017 onwards, started a saga of litigations betwe en the appellant and the respondents, as a result whereof, his appointment as a Member of the ITAT, did not mature. 3. The first hurdle he faced was an adverse Intelligence Bureau5 report. This made the appellant approach the Tribunal for rel ief. Vide judgment dated 10th February, 2017, the Tribunal disposed of the Original Application filed by the appellant with a direction issued to the respondents to resubmit his adverse IB Report to the Selection Committee for it to take a finalview on his appointment to the subject post. The said judgment passed by the Tribunal was assailed by the respondents in a writ petition before the High Court, which came to be dismissed on 30th May, 2017, with further directions issued to make the entire process of reconsideration of the appellant’s candidature by the Selection Committee, timebound. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal preferred by the respondent – 3 For short ‘ITAT’ 4 For short ‘ACC’ 5 For short ‘IB’ 37 Union of India against the order dated 30 th May, 2017 passed by the High Court, was also dismissed by this Court on 15th November, 2017. 4. On 29th November, 2017, a vigilance inspection was carried out in the office of the appellant. Based on the said vigilance inspection, the respondents issued a show cause notice to him on 31 st January, 2018. Ten days before that, on 21st January, 2018, the vigilance clearance earlier granted in favour of the appellant, was withheld by the responde nts. Both the aforesaid orders were assailed by the appellant by filing separate Original Applications before the Tribunal. Initially, an interim order was passed by the Tribunal observing that the show cause notice issued by the respondents would not impede the appellant’s consideration for appointment to the post of Member, ITAT. On 4 th May 2018, another interim order was passed by the Tribunal, observing that withholding of the vigilance clearance of the appellant will not come in hi s way for appointment to the subject post. In the interregnum, on 11th April, 2018, the appellant was placed in the “Agreed List”, which is a list of Gazetted Officers of suspect integrity prepared by the Department. Pertinently, a second Petition for Special Leave to Appeal filed by the res pondents against the interim relief granted by the Tribunal in favour of the appellant and duly confirmed by the High Court in WP (C) No. 22179-22187 of 2018 on 06.08.2018, was dismissed by this Court on 29.03.2019. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action taken by the respondents of placing his name in the Suspect List, the appellant approached the Tribunal for a third time and in the said proceedings, an interim order was granted in his favour. Finally, vide common judgment dated 6th March, 2019,the Tribunal allowed two Original Applications filed by the appellant [O.A. No.137 of 2018 and O.A. No.279 of 2018], quashing inclusion of his name in the “Agreed List” and the consequential proceedings as also the decision taken by the respondents to deny him vigilance clearance. The Tribunal also directed the respondents to forward the name of the appellant to the appropriate Authority for selection/appointment to the post of Member, ITAT. However, the respondents did not comply with the said order and filed a writ petition before the High Court. Admittedly, no interim order was passed by the High Court staying the operation of the judgment dated 06th March, 2019, passed by the Tribunal. 6. Aggrieved by the non-compliance of the order dated 30th May, 2017, passed by the High Court in his favour, the appellant filed a contempt petition before the High Court. Vide order dated 13th August, 2019, the CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] High Court permitted impleadment of the then Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes6 in the contempt petition and issued him a notice to show cause as to why he should not be punished for wilful disobedience of the order dated 30th May, 2017, passed in the writ proceedings. 7. Similar notices were issued by the Tribunal on two conte mpt petitions filed by the appellant against the respondents for non-compliance of the orders dated 30th May, 2017 and 6th March, 2019. In the meantime, the respondents initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant by issuing him a chargesheet on 17 th June, 2019. In July 2019, a Departmental Promotion Committee7 was convened by the Union Public Service Commission8 to consider promoting the appellant to the post of Principal Commissioner but the decision taken qua him, was placed in the sealed cover due to the pending disciplinary proceedings. The appellant had filed a writ petition before the High Court against the charge memorandum issued to him whereinthe High Court granted stay orders in his favour. While the said proceedings were stil l pending, the respondents proceeded to compulsorily retire the appel lant on 27 th September, 2019, which was about three months short of the date of his superannuation in January 2020. The list of promotions made to the post of Principal Commissioner was declared on 11.11.2019, by which date the appellant was no longer in the reckoning. 8. It may be noted here that the mechanism in place withi n the department for arriving at a conclusion as to who amongst the Group-A Officers in the CBDT deserve to be prematurely retired, starts with an assessment to be conducted by the Internal Committee that i dentifies and recommends the names of the officers and places it b efore the Review Committee. The next stage is before the Review Comm ittee that includes the Chairman, CBDT and the Revenue Se cretary as Members. If satisfied by the records and comments forwarded b y the Internal Committee that the pre-mature retirement of a Group-A Officer is desirable in public interest, the Review Committ ee makes a recommendation to the Appointing Authority in this r egard. The Appointing Authority is then required to examine the recommendations of the Review Committee and if satisfied, pass an order of pre-mature retirement of the concerned Officer. Once the Competent Aut hority 6 For short ‘CBDT’ 7 For short ‘DPC’ 8 For short ‘UPSC’ 39 passes an order of pre-mature retirement under FR 56(j), the aggrieved Officer is entitled to submit a representation to the Representation Committee. As per the records, the appellant had su bmitted a representation to the Representation Committee, which was turned down on 2nd January 2020. 9. The appellant challenged the final order of comp ulsory retirement issued against the appellant on 27th September, 2019 and the subsequent order dated 2nd January, 2020, passed by the Representation Committee declining to interfere in the order of compulsory retirement, before the Tribunal. The said petition was dismissed, vide judgment dated 9th December, 2020 and upheld by the High Court by the impugne d judgment dated 31st May, 2022. THREEFOLD CHALLENGE 10. A threefold challenge has been laid by the appellant to the impugned judgment. Firstly, on the ground of serious prejudice caused to him due to the active participation of the Additional D irector General (Vigilance) as a Member of the Internal Committee when he had a bias against the appellant and the participation of the then Chairman of the CBDT in the meeting of the Review Committee, convened to examine the recommendations of the Internal Committee for pre- maturely retiring him, when he ought to have recused himself knowing that he was facing three contempt notices, one issued by the High Court on 13 th August, 2019 [Contempt Petition No.2681/2017] and two notices issued by the Tribunal [CCP No.15/2019 and CCP No.25/2019] for failing to forward the appellant’s vigilance clearance required for processing his case for appointment as Member, ITAT, to the Selection Committee. Secondly, it has been argued that the impugned order of his pre-mature retirement is punitive in nature and has been passed solely to deprive hi m of an opportunity to be appointed as Member ITAT, a post for which he was selected by the Selection Committee headed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court and his name was placed at Serial No.1 in the All India Ranking, as long back as in the year 2014. This selection of the appellant was reiterated by a subsequently constituted Selection Committee in the year 2018, but did not reach fruition due to persistent obstructions created by the respondents, who withheld his vigilance clearance without a valid reason and subsequently placed his name in the “Agreed List”, followed by initiation of a disciplinary enquiry against him on basel ess charges which was not taken to its logical conclusion, as he was prema turely CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] retired in September, 2019. Lastly, it was urged that the High Court has completely overlooked the fact that all the Annual Performance Assessment Reports 9 of the appellant over the past 30 years were blemishless. In fact, the appellant was graded as ‘Outstanding’ and his integrity was assessed as ‘Beyond Doubt’ for theimmediately preceding 10 years’ APARs, after he was promoted to the post of Commissioner, Income Tax in the year 2012. SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE UNION OF INDIA 11. Refuting the allegations levelled by the appellant and defending the impugned judgment, Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Additional Solicitor General10 who appeared for the respondents – Union of India urged that the impugned judgment is a well-reasoned one and does not deserve interference; that the order of compulsory retirement was passed in the case of the appellant after duly considering his entire ser vice record; that the material relied upon by the respondents for pass ing an order under FR 56(j), was carefully considered by the Tribunal before dismissing the Original Application filed by the appellant, as meritless and that the allegations of institutional malice and bias levelled by the appellant are ill-founded. Learned ASG contended that unlike departmental enquiries, the scope of an enquiry under FR 56(j) is fairly limited and the standard of adjudication is prima facie a subjective opinion as to the suitability of an officer to continue in service, keeping in mind public i nterest. No stigma can be attached to an employee who is compulsorily retired, as compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or remova l. The appellant is still entitled to all retiral benefits and also entitled to be considered for other appointments. It was stated that a c hargesheet was pending against the appellant for major penalty proceedings which had been unsuccessfully challenged by him before the Tribunal. Citing several decisions of this Court on the limited scope of interference in an order of compulsory retirement, it was submitted on be half of the respondents – Union of India that courts should ordinarily refrain from returning findings on merits of the allegations against the conc erned officer. Once an order of compulsory retirement has been passed bona fide and without any extraneous motive, there is no justification for interference. 9 For short ‘APAR’ 10 For short ‘ASG’ 41 ANALYSIS AND CASE LAWS RELATING TO COMPULORY RETIREMENT 12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the records and the judgments cited by both sides. 13. The provision of Fundamental Rule 56(j) reads as under: “FR 56(j) :- The Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, hav e the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice :- (i) If he is, in Group ‘A’ or Group ‘B’ service or post in a substantive, quasi- permanent or temporary capacity and had entered Government service before attaining the age of 35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 years; (ii) In any other case after he has attained the age of 55 years. 14. As is apparent from a perusal of the aforesaid provisi on, it takes in its fold two elements – the first one is the absolute right of the Government to retire an employee and the second is the requirement of meeting the condition of public interest for doing so. The provision also provides for a prior notice of at least three months to th e outgoing employee and mandates that the said provision can be invoked to retire a government servant only after he has attained the age of 55 ye ars. 15. We are conscious of the fact that the scope of judicial review in respect of an order of compulsory retirement from the serv ice, is fairly limited. The law relating to compulsory retirement has been the subject matter of discussion in a number of cases where certain settled legal principles have been laid down which are being elucidated hereinbelow. 16. The object of compulsory retirement of a government servant was highlighted by this Court in Allahabad Bank Officers’ Association and Another vs. Allahabad Bank and Others 11 in the following words:- 11 1996(4) SCC 504 CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] “5. The power to compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorpor ated in Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the deed wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispe nse with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful s o as to preserve purity in the administration. Generally speaking, Service Rules provide for compulsory retirement of a government servant on his completing certain number of years of se rvice or attaining the prescribed age. His service record is rev iewed at that stage and a decision is taken whether he shoul d be compulsorily retired or continued further in service. There is no levelling of a charge or imputation requiring an explanation from the government servant. While misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into the account where the order is on e of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held – and there is no duty to hold an enquiry – is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to ta ke action, in the case of dismissal or removal they form the v ery basis on which the order is made, as pointed out by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. and State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi. Thus, by its very nature the power to compulsorily retire a government servant is dismissal et c. for misconduct. A government servant who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned dur ing service. Thus, compulsory retirement differs both from dismissal and removal as it involves no penal consequences.” “……………… 17. The above discussion of case-law makes it clear that if the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on the Government servant in the sense that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or character, then the court will treat that order as an order of punishment, attracting provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The reason is that as a charge or imputati on is made the condition for passing the order, the court would infe r therefrom that the real intention of the Government was to punish the government servant on the basis of that charge or imputation 43 and not to exercise the power of compulsory retirement. But mere reference to the rule, even if it mentions grounds for compulsory retirement, cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating the order of compulsory retirement as an order of punishment. In such a case, the order can be said to have been passed in terms of the rule and, therefore, a different intention cannot be infe rred. So also, if the statement in the order refers only to the assessment of his work and does not at the same time cast an aspersion on the conduct or character of the Government servant, then it will not be proper to hold that the order of compulsory retirement is i n reality an order of punishment. Whether the statement in the order is stigmatic or not will have to be judged by adopting the test of how a reasonable person would read or understand it.” [emphasis added ] 17. In Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another 12 it has been observed that : “Fundamental Rule 56(j) does not in terms require tha t any opportunity should be given to the concerned government servant to show cause against his compulsory retirement. It says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts though it is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.” 18. On similar lines were the observations made by this Court in Swami Saran Saxena v. State of U.P. 13 :- “3. Several contentions have been raised in this appeal by the appellant, who appears in person. In our judgment, one of them suffices to dispose of the appeal. The contention which has found favour with us is that on a perusal of the material on the r ecord and having regard to the entries in the personal file and character roll of the appellant, it is not possible reasonably to come to the conclusion that the compulsory retirement of the appellant w as 12 (1970) 2 SCC 458 13 (1980) 1 SCC 12 CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] called for. This conclusion follows inevitably from the particular circumstances, among others, that the appellant was found worthy of being permitted to cross the second efficiency bar only a few months before. Ordinarily, the court does not interfere with the judgment of the relevant authority on the point whether it is in the public interest to compulsorily retire a government servant. And we would have been even more reluctant to reach the conclusion we have, when the impugned order of compulsory retirement was made on the recommendation of the High Court itself. But on the material before us we are unable to reconcile the a pparent contradiction that although for the purpose of crossing the second efficiency bar the appellant was considered to have worked with distinct ability and with integrity beyond question yet within a few months thereafter he was found so unfit as to deserve compulsory retirement. The entries in between in the records pertaining to the appellant need to be examined and appraised in that context. There is no evidence to show that suddenly there was such deterioration in the quality of the appellant’s work or integrity that he deserved to be compulsorily retired. For all these reasons, we are of opinion that the order of compulsory retirement should be quashed. The appellant will be deemed to have continued in service on the date of the impugned order. 19. In Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India 14, emphasizing the fact that exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56(j) must be bona fide and promote public interest, this Court observed that : - “25. The whole purpose of Fundamental Rule 56(j) is to weed out the worthless without the punitive extremes covered by Art icle 311 of the Constitution. But under the guise of ‘public interest’ if unlimited discretion is regarded acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrarine ss and disguised dismissal. The exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest.” 26. “An officer in continuous service for 14 years crossing the efficiency bar and reaching the maximum salary in the scale and with no adverse entries at least for five years immediately before 14 (1980) 4 SCC 321 45 the compulsory retirement cannot be compulsorily retired on the score that long years ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors had allowed him to cross the efficiency bar without qualms.” 20. In Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar and Another 15 it was observed that in order to find out whether an order of compulsory retirement is based on any misconduct of the government servant or the said order has been made bona fide, without any oblique or extraneous purpose, the veil can be lifted. Following are the pertinent observations made in the said decision: “32. On a consideration of the above decisions the legal position that now emerges is that even though the order of compulsory retirement is couched in innocuous langua ge without making any imputations against the government servant who is directed to be compulsorily retired f rom service, the court, if challenged, in appropriate ca ses can lift veil to find out whether the order is based on any misconduct of the government servant concerned or t he order has been made bona fide and not with any oblique or extraneous purposes . Mere form of the order in such case cannot deter the court from delving into the basis of the order if the order in question is challenged by the concerned government servant as has been held by this Court in ‘Anoop Jaiswal case’. This being the position the respondent-State cannot defend the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant in the instant case on the mere plea that the order has been made in accordance with the provisions of Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Bihar Service C ode which prima facie does not make any imputation or does not cast any stigma on the service career of the appellant. But in view of the clear and specific averments made by the respondent-S tate that the impugned order has been made to compulsorily retire the appellant from service under the aforesaid rule as the ap pellant was found to have committed grave financial irregularities leading to financial loss to the State, the impugned order cannot but be said to have been made by way of punishment. As such, such an order is in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution of India 15 (1990) 3 SCC 504 CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] as well as it is arbitrary as it violates principles of natural justice and the same has not been made bona fide. [emphasis added ] 21. In State of Orissa and Others vs. Ram Chandra Das 16 this Court observed as follows: - “It is needless to reiterate that the settled legal position is that the Government is empowered and would be entitled to compulsorily retire a government servant in public interest with a view to improve efficiency of the administration or to weed out the people of doubtful integrity or who are corrupt but sufficient evidence was not available to take disciplinary action in accordance wi th the rules so as to inculcate a sense of discipline in the service. But the Government, before taking the decision to retire a government employee compulsorily from service, has to consider the entir e record of the government servant including the latest reports.” 22. In State of Gujarat and Another vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah17, a case where the State Government had challenged the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat that had held that the order of compulsory retirement passed against the respondent therein was bad, as there were no adverse entries in his Confidentia l Report and his integrity was not doubtful at any stage, this Court held thus : - “28. There being no material before the Review Committe e, inasmuch as there were no adverse remarks in the character roll entries, the integrity was not doubted at any time, the charact er roll subsequent to the respondent’s promotion to the pos t of Assistant Food Controller (Class II) were not available, it could not come to the conclusion that the respondent was a man of doubtful integrity nor could have anyone else come to the conclusion that the respondent was a fit person to be retired com pulsorily from service. The order, in the circumstances of the case, was punitive having been passed for the collateral purpose of his immediate removal, rather than in public interest.” 16 (1996) 5 SCC 331 17 (1999) 1 SCC 529 47 23. In State of Gujarat vs. Umedbhai M. Patel 18, this Court has delineated the following broad principles that ought to be followed in matters relating to compulsory retirement : - “11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into a definite principle, which could be broadly summarized thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsoril y retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not t o be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitu- tion. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having the regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of t he officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitiv e mea- sure. 24. In Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand and Others19 this Court has once again highlighted the permissibility of ascertaining the existence of valid material by a Court for the authorities to pass an order of compulsory retirement and observed thus: - “34. It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for compulsory retirement is based on the subjective 18 (2001) 3 SCC 314 19 (2012) 3 SCC 580 CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] satisfaction of the authority concerned but such satisfacti on must be based on a valid material. It is permissible for t he Courts to ascertain whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on which the subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority is based . In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfact ory, has selectively taken into consideration the service record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACRs. There appears to be some discrepancy.“ [emphasis added] 25. In a recent judgment in the case of Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India 20, confronted with the question as to whether action taken under Rule 135 of the Research and Analysis Wing (Recruitment Cadre and Service) Rules, 1975 is in the nature of “a penalty or a dismissal clothed as compulsory retirement” so as to attract Artic le 311 of the Constitution of India, this Court has held that “ the real test for this examination is to see whether the order of compulsory retire ment is occasioned by the concern of unsuitability or as a p unishment for misconduct”. For drawing this distinction, reliance has been placed on the judgment in State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Doshi 21, where a distinction was made between an order of dismissal and order of compulsory retirement in the following words : “9 … Under the rules, an order of dismissal is a punishment laid on a government servant, when it is found that he has been guilty of misconduct or inefficiency or the like, and it is penal in character, be- cause it involves loss of pension which under the rules would have accrued in respect of the service already put in. An order of removal also stands on the same footing as an order of dismissal, and involves the same consequences, the only difference between them being that while a servant w ho is dismissed is not eli- gible for re-appointment, one who is removed is. An order of retire- ment differs both from an order of dismissal and an order of re- moval, in that it is not a for m of punishment prescribed by the rules, and involves no 20 (2020) 13 SCC 56 21 AIR 1957 SC 892 49 penal consequences, inasmuch as the person retired is entitled to pension proportionate to the period of se rvice standing to his credit.” [emphasis added] EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE ON HAND 26. We may now proceed to examine the facts of the case i n hand in the light of the case laws discussed above in order to find out as to whether the order of compulsory retirement passed by the respondents in respect of the appellant was based on valid material and was in public interest. First, we propose to examine the personal file a nd character roll of the appellant. As per the material placed on record, the APARs of the appellant reflect that over the past several years , his integrity was being regularly assessed as “ Beyond doubt ” and this remained the position till as late as 31 st July, 2019, when his work performance was assessed for the period from 1 st April, 2018 to 31 st March, 2019 and found to be upto the mark. In his APARs for the past one decade, till the period just prior to the order of his premature retirement, the respondents were consistently grading the appellant as “Outstanding”. No adverse entries were made by his superiors in the APARs of the appellant insofar as his work performance was concerned. No aspersion was cast eit her on his conduct or character during all this period. As per t he service records, his efficiency and integrity remained unimpeachable throughout his career. The inference drawn from the above is that the appellant’s service record being impeccable could not have been a factor that went against him for the respondents to have compulsorily retired him. 27. Coming next to the stand taken by the respondents that several complaints were received against the appellant that had cast a cloud on his integrity, it is noteworthy that the respondents have referred to nine complaints against the appellant, stated to be pending in the Vigilance Directorate that have been pithily summarized by the Trib unal in a tabulated format in para 30 of its judgment dated 6 th March, 2019. Juxtaposed against the said tabulated statement of complaints listed by the respondents, is a separate tabulation of the response of the appellant to each of the said complaints. For ready reference, the t wo tables of contents are extracted below :- CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] Response of the Appellant 51 Response of the Appellant CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] 28. As can be seen from the above, out of the aforesaid nine complaints, four complaints mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2, 6, 7 and 8 had already been closed by the department in the year 2016- 2017. With regard to the complaint listed at Sr. No.1, is stated to have been levelled by another officer of the department against the appellant, re lating to harassment and interference in work. The Tribunal h as noted the submission of the appellant, which has gone unrefuted that the Ant i- Corruption Bureau of the Central Bureau of Investigation 22 had at a later date, arrested the said officer on charges of corruption. The appellant has also stated in the remarks column that no explanation had ever been called for from him on the said complaint, status whereof is shown as “Under examination”. In respect of the complaints at Sr. Nos. 3 and 4, the respondents have stated that they are “Under examination”. In reply, the appellant has stated that the complaint at Sr. No.3, of the year 2016 22 For short ‘ CBI’ 53 was closed by the ADG (Vigilance)(NZ) on 10th February, 2016 and the complaint at Sr. No.4, made by a relative of an office r within the Department, was rejected because the complainant did not provide his PAN number despite being afforded two opportunities. There is no rebuttal to the said assertions. Coming to the complaint at Sr. No. 5, the Review Committee constituted by the respondents has recorded the statu s of the said complaint as having been closed on 22nd January, 2019. This is apparent from a perusal of para 26 of the judgment dated 09th December, 2020, passed by the Tribunal. Now remains the complaint at Sr. No.9, which was made by the appellant’s ex-wife alleging bigamy, m oral turpitude etc. against the appellant. In the remark s column, the respondents have stated that necessary information in respect of the said court proceedings between the parties was sought by the department. The appellant has clarified that a decree of divorce was granted to the parties by the concerned Court and a copy of the said order w as duly supplied to the department against receipt on 21st March, 2018. 29. Insofar as the matrimonial dispute of the appellant is concerned, the material placed on record reveals that the same had attained quietus by virtue of a settlement arrived at between him and his estranged wife, vide Settlement Agreement dated 18th June, 2016 recorded by the learned Mediator appointed by the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre. The said Settlement Agreement was duly taken on record by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi vide order dated 14th July, 2016 passed in MAT. APP. (F.C.) Nos.148 of 2014, 34 of 2016 and 36 of 2016. Both the parties had agreed that they would take joint steps to get their marriage dissolved by filing a petition before the concerned Family Court. One of the terms and conditions of the Settlement wa s that the appellant would arrange a residential flat for his wife, which his brother had agreed to purchase in her name, as a one-time settleme nt towards all her claims of maintenance, alimony, stridhan, etc. This condition was subsequently complied with and is borne out from the Sale Document of the flat dated 3 rd October, 2016 that records the fact that a sum of ` 6,00,000/- (Rupees six lakhs) was paid by the appellant’s brothe r to the seller towards the sale price of the flat. 30. Once the parties had arrived at a settlement and a dec ree of divorce by mutual consent was passed by the concerned Court , the allegations of bigamy etc. levelled by the appellant ’s wife loses significance since the case was never taken to trial for any findings to CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] be returned by the Court on this aspect. In the above backdrop, there appears no justification for the respondents to have raised the spectre of a series of complaints received against the appellant during the cour se of his service that had weighed against him for compulsorily retiring him, more so, when these complaints were to the knowledge of the respondents and yet, his service record remained unblemished throughout. Nothing has been placed on record to show a sudden decline in the work conduct of the appellant so as to have compulsorily retired him. 31. We may now proceed to examine the background in which vigilance clearances were initially given to the appellant and subsequently withheld by the respondents. It is not in dispute that in the year 2013, the appellant had applied for the post of Member, ITAT and in th e year 2014, the Selection Committee had placed him on the top of the list of 48 selected candidates. Based on the vigilance clearance iss ued by the de pa rtme nt in Augus t, 2013 a nd once a ga in on 15th July 2015, the appellant was recommended by the respondents to the ACC for his appointment to the subject post. 32. However, sometime later, the respondents withhe ld the vigilance clearance given earlier on the ground that there was an adverse IB Report against the appellant. It is not out of place to mention here that the aforesaid adverse IB report had also arisen from the complaint received from the appellant’s wife during the very same matr imonial dispute which had already been amicably settled in Court. The factum of the said settlement was well within the knowledge of the respondents, who had stated in O.M. dated 15 th July, 2015 that “the alleged acts of bigamy against Shri Bajaj emanating from matrimonial d ispute is not established”. Aggrieved by the withholding of his vigilance report, the appellant had approached the Tribunal for relief in OA N o.95 of 2016. Vide interim order dated 10th February, 2017, the Tribunal directed the respondents to resubmit the adverse IB report in res pect of the appellant before the Selection Committee within one month for the said Committee to take a view in the matter. As noted earlier, the aforesaid order dated 10th February, 2017, passed by the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court, on 30th May, 2017 and affirmed by this Court, vide order dated 15th November, 2017. 33. Undeterred by the aforesaid judicial orders, the respondents continued to withhold the vigilance clearance of the appellant, this time claiming that there were some adverse findings again st him in an 55 Inspection Report dated 20 th April, 2018 stated to have been prepared on the basis of an inspection of the office of the appellant conducted on 29th and 30th November, 2017 which was done within a few days of this Court upholding the order dated 10 th February, 2017 passed by the Tribunal, calling upon the respondents to place his adverse IB report before the Selection Committee, for it to take a view in the matter. It is rather ironical that the irregularities noticed by the respondents in the Inspection Report dated 20th April, 2018, that made them withhold the vigilance clearance of the appellant were to their knowledg e ten days before and yet they had issued a letter dated 11th April, 2018, giving him vigilance clearance. 34. It is noteworthy that the appellant had challen ged the proceedings initiated against him by the respondents on the basis of the inspections conducted on 29th and 30th November, 2017 in OA No.77 of 2018. In the said proceedings, the Tribunal had passed an interim order on 2nd February, 2018 directing that the said proceedings will not come in the way of promotion, appointment and deputation prospects of the appellant. Regardless of the above directions, the respondents not only denied vigilance clearance to the appellant on 20th April, 2018 they went a step ahead and proceeded to place his name in the “Agreed List” i.e., the list of suspected officers. This act of the respondents was also assailed by the appellant before the Tribunal in O.A. No. 279 of 2018. Ultimately, both the captioned Original Applications were collectively decided by the Tribunal in favour of the appellant by a detailed judgement dated 6th March, 201, which has not been stayed by any superior Court. 35. Aggrieved by a separate Memo dated 30th January 2018 issued by the respondents on the basis of the aforesaid inspection of his office conducted on 29th and 30th November, 2017 calling for his explanation in respect of some orders passed by him in his judicial/quasi-judicial capacity as Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), the appellant had to file O.A. No.332 of 2018 that was decided by the Tribunal in his favour vide judgment dated 28th May, 2019. In its judgment, the Tribunal relied on the order dated 15th May 2018, passed by the High Court in W.P. No.13390 of 2018 (SB), declaring that the inspection conducted by the Department was without jurisdiction and that there was no justification for withholding the vigilance clearance of the appellant on the basis of the said inspection. Noting that the Memo dated 30th January 2018 issued by the respondents calling for an explanation from the appellant was premised on the very CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] same inspection conducted by the Department, the Tribunal reit erated the string of findings returned by it in favour of the appellant in its earlier common judgment dated 6 th March 2019 [passed in O.A. No. 137 of 2018 and O.A. No. 279 of 2018] and proceeded to quash the Memo dated 30th January 2018 issued by the respondents. It was further held that the said order will not adversely impact forwarding of the name of the appellant as Member, ITAT, in terms of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee in its meeting held on 26th August 2018. 36. In the teeth of the series of orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court in favour of the appellant, the respondents elected to withhold his vigilance clearance, thereby compelling the appellant to file contempt petitions against the concerned officers for non-compliance of the orders passed. Both, the High Court as well as the Tribunal, issued notices for wilful disobedience of the orders passed. In the proceedings before the High Court, on the one hand, the respondents kept se eking adjournments on the ground that steps were being taken to forward the appellant’s name to the ACC for being processed for his appointment as Member, ITAT, till as late as on 31 st May 2019 on which date they were granted one last opportunity for making compliances and at their request, the matter was adjourned to 9 th July 2019 and on the other hand, the respondents slapped the appellant with a Charge Memorandum date d 17th June 2019 and suspended him on 1st July, 2019. 37. Having regard to the fact that the respondents did not take the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant to its logical conclusion and instead issued an order compulsorily retiring him , this Court does not deem it expedient to delve into the allegations levelled in the said Charge Memorandum; all the same, we have cursorily gone through the Charge Memorandum that mentions three charges – one alleging that the appellant failed to seek permission from the department to purchase a flat in relation to the matrimonial dispute between him and his estranged wife and the second one is in respect of the allegation of bigamy levelled against him by his estranged wife. We have a lready noted earlier that during the course of the matrimonial dispute, the parties had arrived at a settlement and the flat that was agreed t o be given to the wife, was not purchased by the appellant but by his brother, which fact is amply borne out from the documents placed on record. The matrimonial dispute between the parties stood closed on a de cree of divorce being granted on the basis of mutual consent. That the respondents 57 were also cognizant of the said fact, is apparent from the c ontents of O.M. dated 15th July, 2015 which records inter alia that the said allegations levelled by the wife had not been established. The third charge was relating to the appellant having attended Court hearings w ithout sanctioned leave. However, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant on 17th July, 2019 were abandoned by the respondents on the order of compulsory retirement being passed against him in less than three months reckoned therefrom, on 27th September, 2019. 38. The appellant has made allegations of institutional bias and malice against the respondents on the plea that the Chairm an, CBDT who was a Member of the Review Committee, was facing three contempt proceedings relating to the appellant’s service dispute, wherein notices had been issued by the High Court as well as the Tribunal. There is no doubt that rule of law is the very foundation of a well-governed society and the presence of bias or malafides in the system of governance would strike at the very foundation of the values of a regulated soc ial order. The law relating to mala fide exercise of power has been the subject matter of a catena of decisions [Refer: S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab23; Jaichand Lal Sethia v. State of W.B 24; J.D. Srivastava v. State of M.P And Others 25; and Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. And Others v. Union of India And Others 26]. It has been repeatedly held that any exercise of power that exceeds the parameters prescribed by law or is motivated on account of extraneous or irrelevant factors or is driven by malicious intent or is on the face of it, so patently arbitrary that it cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, must be struck down. I n the instant case, though the appellant has levelled allegations of institutional bias and prejudice against the respondents, particularly against the then Chairman, CBDT who was a Member of the Review Committee, the said officer was not joined by the appellant as a party before the Tribunal or the High Court, for him to have had an opportunity to clarify his stand by filing a counter affidavit. Hence, these allegations cannot be looked into by this Court. 39. Dehors the aforesaid allegations of institutional bias and malice, having perused the material placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds taken by the appellant. It is noticed that t hough FR 56(j) 23 AIR 1964 SC 72 24 AIR 1967 SC 483 25 (1984) 2 SCC 8 26 (1986) 1 SCC 133 CAPTAIN PRAMOD KUMAR BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [HIMA KOHLI, J.] contemplates that the respondents have an absolute right to r etire a government servant in public interest and such an order could have been passed against the appellant any time after he had attain ed the age of fifty years, the respondents did not take any such decision till the very fag end of his career. The impugned order of compulsory retirem ent was passed in this case on 27th September, 2019 whereas the appellant was to superannuate in ordinary course in January, 2020. There appears an apparent contradiction in the approach of the respondents who had till as late as in July, 2019 continued to grade th e appellant as ‘Outstanding’ and had assessed his integrity as ‘ Beyond doubt’. But in less than three months reckoned therefrom, the respondents had turned turtle to arrive at the conclusion that he deserved to be c ompulsorily retired. If the appellant was worthy of being continued in servi ce for little short of a decade after he had attained the age of 50 years and of being granted an overall grade of 9 on the scale of 1 - 10 on 3 1st July, 2019 it has not been shown as to what had transpired thereafter that made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and invoke the public intere st doctrine to compulsorily retire him with just three months of service left for his retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is inclined to pierce the smoke screen and on doing so, we are of the firm v iew that the order of compulsory retirement in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public. 40. In view of the above discussion, it is deemed appropriate to reverse the impugned judgment dated 31st May, 2022 and quash and set aside the order dated 27 th September, 2019 passed by the respondents, compulsorily retiring the appellant. Resultantly, the adverse consequences if any, flowing from the said order of compulsory retirement imposed on the appellant, are also set aside. The appeal is allowed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms while leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed. (Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)