Karan @ Fatiya v. the State of Madhya Pradesh
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. The present appeals assail the correctness of the judgment and
order dated 15.11.2018 whereby a Division Bench of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, affirmed the death sentence awarded
by the Trial Court and at the same time dismissed the appeal preferred
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by the appellant against his conviction and sentence awarded b y the
Trial Court.
2. The present appellant was charged for offences under sections
363, 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code1, sections 5(m)/6 of the POCSO
Act and sections 302 and 201 IPC. The Trial Court vide judgment dated
17.05.2018 convicted the appellant for all the offences and awarded the
following sentences as against each of the offences:
3. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed b y the
High Court and the death reference forwarded by the Trial C ourt was
affirmed, as already noted above.
4. During the pendency of these appeals, the appellant moved an
application being I.A.No.43271 of 2019 claiming juv enility and
consequently the benefits available under the provisions of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 20152. This application was apparently
filed under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This Court, vide order dated
28.09.2022 required the Trial Court to submit its report after due inquiry
as to whether the appellant was a juvenile on the date when the offence
in question was committed. The order dated 28.09.2022 is reproduced
below:
“Pursuant to directions issued on the last occasion, certain Reports/
Documents have been placed on record.
Without commenting on merits or demerits of the rival submissions,
we direct as under:
a. The copies of the record be sent to the concerned Trial C ourt
as early as possible in physical form as well as in digitized form.
1 In short, “IPC”
2 The 2015 Act
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
b. The accused shall be produced before the concerned Trial Court
within a week’s time.
c. The Trial Court shall endeavour to consider whet her the
appellant was juvenile as on the date when the offence in question
was committed.
d. For arriving at this conclusion, the Trial Court shall be entitled
to call for and consider all the relevant documents as well as have
the facility of medical check-up of the appellant in a manner known
to law.
e. The Report in that behalf shall be submitted in the Registry of
this Court within four weeks.
List this matter for further consideration along with the Report in
the week commencing 31st October 2022.”
5. Pursuant to the said order, a report has been received from the
Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Manawar, District Dhar, Madhya
Pradesh dated 27.10.2022 running into 20 pages along with all the material
evidence both documentary and oral adduced before it on the ba sis of
which the report has been submitted. As per the said report, the appellant’s
date of birth was found to be conclusively proved as 25.07.2002. The
date of the incident being 15.12.2017, the appellant was 15 yea rs 04
months and 20 days of age on the date of the incident. The operat ive
part of the report is reproduced below:
“It is found conclusively proved that date of birth of the applicant/
accused Karan is 25.07.2002. It is also proved taking into account
25.07.2002 as his date of birth, the applicant was 15 years 04
months 20 days of age as on 15.12.2017, and being below 16
years of age, he was Child as per section 2(12) of J.J. Act, 2015.
Accordingly, the inquiry proceedings are concluded.”
6. At the outset learned senior counsel for the appel lant has
clarified that for the present he is only pressing the plea of juvenility and
if he fails on that count would address on the issue of convict ion and
sentence. Further based on the said report, learned senior counse l for
the appellant submitted firstly that the sentence awarded cannot be given
effect to under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. Secondly, it is su bmitted
that from the date of the arrest in December, 2017, the a ppellant has
already undergone incarceration of more than 5 years where as under
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section 18 of the 2015 Act, a juvenile below 16 years, even if convicted
for a heinous offence, the maximum sentence that can be awarded is 3
years stay in a special home. In view of the above, according to learned
senior counsel the appellant is liable to be released forthwith.
7. Learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh has
strenuously urged that the appellant be subjected to an ossification test
to determine the correct age, as according to her, the documents filed
during the inquiry before the Trial Court are not covered under Section
94 of the 2015 Act, and therefore, the only option left was tha t an
ossification test be conducted by a medical board. No other submission
has been advanced on behalf of the State.
8. Before considering the submissions advanced by lea rned
counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to first consider the inquiry
report submitted by the Trial Court dated 27.10.2022. If the said report
is accepted and approved, then the appellant would be declared to be a
child which may then entail necessary consequences as per the 2015
Act. It would be relevant to note here that no objection has been filed by
the respondent-State to the report submitted by the Trial Court. The only
submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-State is for getting the
ossification test conducted.
9. We have perused the report and also the material evidence led
before the Trial Court on the basis of which the conclusion has been
drawn by the Trial Court. The report is based upon documentary evidence
as also oral evidence of the present head-mistress (IW-01), the retired
headmaster (IW-08), five teachers of the primary instituti on (IW-02,
IW-04, IW-07, IW-09 and IW-10) and also the guardian of the appellant
(IW-06). It would also be pertinent to notice that the institution is not a
private institution but is a government primary school and t his Court
does not find any reason to dis-believe or even doubt the testimony of
government servants both working and retired. In addition to the mark
sheets by the institution, there is also the date of birth certificate issued
by the institution (I-3). Further, the original Scholar register and other
documents were also produced before the Trial Court in the inquiry.
This Court, therefore, has no reason to doubt the correctness of the
conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court regarding the date of birth of the
appellant. We, therefore, accept the report of the Trial Court and hold
that the appellant was aged 15 years, 4 months and 20 days on the date
of the incident.
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
10. In order to test the submission of learned counsel for the
respondent-State, Section 94 of the 2015 Act which i s relevant is
reproduced hereunder:
“94 Presumption and determination of age:
(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on
the appearance of the person brought before it under any of t he
provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence)
that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall
record such observation stating the age of the child as ne arly as
may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section
36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation
of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds
for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child
or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, s hall
undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence
by obtaining –
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation
or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board,
if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a mun icipal
authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be
determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age
determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or
the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of
the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen
days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the
age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this
Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
11. On a careful perusal of the above noted provision and the
facts of the present case, the above argument of the learned counsel for
the State is liable to be rejected for the following reasons:
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a) firstly, that during the inquiry before the Trial Court, the State
did not take any objection whatsoever with regard t o the
documents filed on behalf of the appellant and the evidence le d
on behalf of the appellant so much so that the State did not even
cross-examine the witnesses who were examined in the inquiry.
Permitting the State to raise such an objection now on ce the
conclusive finding has been recorded by the Trial Court after an
elaborate inquiry would be unjust and not warranted. The State
had full opportunity to raise such a plea before the Trial Court in
the inquiry and then it was for the Trial Court to take a call as to
whether any ossification test was necessary or not;
b) Secondly, ossification test will only give a broad assessment of
the age. It cannot give an exact age. There is also an element of
margin of plus or minus 1 to 2 years. Even if we permit the said
test, it does not lead us anywhere. It will have no bearing on the
assessment made by the Trial Court after the inquiry;
c) Thirdly, the first preference for determination of age is the
birth certificate issued by the school or a matriculation certificate.
Although it has been submitted that no birth certificate of the
school was submitted, learned counsel for the appellant has pointed
out from the documents attached to the report that in addition to
the mark sheets and the school leaving certificate, t he birth
certificate was also filed which is Annexure I-3 to the report. It is
in the absence of the first category of documents bei ng not
available that the birth certificate from the municipal corporation
is to be considered; and
d) Lastly, if under the first and second columns, documents are
not available, then reference to medical board and holding of an
ossification test comes into play.
12. In the present case, there being birth certificate from the school
available and that too a government primary school, we do not find any
reason to doubt its correctness and all the more when it ha s been duly
proved in the inquiry before the Trial Court. Thus, the objections raised
by the learned counsel for the State are liable to be rejected.
13. The next question is as to what relief the appellant can be
granted in view of the fact that he has been held to be a child and
that too below 16 years of age under the 2015 Act. I n this context
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
Section 9 of the 2015 Act would be relevant. The sa me is reproduced
hereunder:
“9. Procedure to be followed by a Magistrate who has not
been empowered under this Act.—
(1) When a Magistrate, not empowered to exercise the powe rs
of the Board under this Act is of the opinion that the person alleged
to have committed the offence and brought before him is a child,
he shall, without any delay, record such opinion and forward the
child immediately along with the record of such proceedings to
the Board having jurisdiction.
(2) In case a person alleged to have committed an offence claims
before a court other than a Board, that the person is a child or
was a child on the date of commission of the offence, or if the
court itself is of the opinion that the person was a child on the date
of commission of the offence, the said court shall make an inquiry,
take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) to
determine the age of such person, and shall record a findi ng on
the matter, stating the age of the person as nearly as may be :
Provided that such a claim may be raised before any court and it
shall be recognised at any stage,even after final disposal of the
case, and such a claim shall be determined in accordance wit h
theprovisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder
even if the person has ceased to be a childon or before the date of
commencement of this Act.
(3) If the court finds that a person has committed an offence and
was a child on the date ofcommission of such offence, it shall
forward the child to the Board for passing appropriate orders and
thesentence, if any, passed by the court shall be deemed to have
no effect.
(4) In case a person under this section is required to be ke pt in
protective custody, while the person’sclaimof being a child is being
inquired into, such person may be placed, in the intervening period
in aplace of safety.”
14. A perusal of the aforesaid section firstly gives a right to a
person alleged to have committed an offence to claim that he is a child
on the date of commission of offence and if such a claim is raised, the
599
Court concerned shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as m ay be
necessary other than the affidavit to determine the age of such person.
The proviso to sub-section (2) further makes it clear th at such a claim
can be raised before any Court and the same could be recognised at any
stage even after the case has been finally decided. The cl aim so made
would be determined in accordance with the provisions of the 2015 Act
and the rules made thereunder even if such person has seize d to be a
child whether on or before the commencement of 2015 Act. The law
provides full coverage to a person who is established to be a child on the
date of the offence to avail the benefits admissible to a child under the
2015 Act even if the case has been finally decided and also such person
has attained majority. Further, sub-section (3) provides that if it is found
in the inquiry that such person was a child on the date of commission of
such offence then the Court is required to forward the child to the Juvenile
Justice Board3 for passing appropriate orders and further if any sentence
has been imposed by the Court, the same shall be deemed to have no
effect. In view of the above statutory provisions and in vi ew of the
findings recorded, the appellant having been held to be a child on the
date of commission of the offence, the sentence imposed has to be made
ineffective.
15. The relief to be extended to the appellant may be exam ined
through a different perspective also, that is, whether he has already
undergone maximum sentence which can be awarded against a child in
conflict with law for committing a heinous offence and who is b elow
age of 16 years. Section 18 of the 2015 Act would be relevant in this
respect and the same is reproduced hereunder:
“18. Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law.—
(1) Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective
of age has committed a petty offence, or a serious offence , or
a child below the age of sixteen years has committe d a heinous
offence, then, notwithstanding anything contrary con tained in
any other law for the time being in force, and base d on the
nature of offence, specific need for supervision or int ervention,
circumstances as brought out in the social investig ation report
and past conduct of the child, the Board may, if it so thinks
fit,—
3 In short, “JJB”
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
(a) allow the child to go home after advice or admonition by
following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such child and to
his parents or the guardian;
(b) direct the child to participate in group counselling and similar
activities;
(c) order the child to perform community service unde r the
supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified person,
persons or group of persons identified by the Board;
(d) order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to pa y
fine:
Provided that, in case the child is working, it may be ensured
that the provisions of any labour law for the time being in forc e
are not violated;
(e) direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct
and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit pers on,
on such parent, guardian or fit person executing a bond, with or
without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour
and child’s well-being for any period not exceeding three years;
(f) direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct
and placed under the care and supervision of any fit facilit y for
ensuring the good behaviour and child’s well-being for any period
not exceeding three years;
(g) direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such period,
not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for providing reformative
services including education, skill development, counselli ng,
behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support during the
period of stay in the special home:
Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has
been such that, it would not be in the child’s interest, or in the
interest of other children housed in a special home, the Board
may send such child to the place of safety.
(2) If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub -section
(1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to—
(i) attend school; or
(ii) attend a vocational training centre; or
601
(iii) attend a therapeutic centre; or
(iv) prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a
specified place; or
(v) undergo a de-addiction programme.
(3) Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section
15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said chil d as
an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case
to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try such offences.”
16. On a perusal of the aforesaid Section 18 of the 2015 Act, it is
to be noticed that the JJB having found a child to be in conflict with law
who may have committed a petty or serious offence and where heinous
offence is committed, the child should be below 16 years, can pass various
orders under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) and als o sub-section
(2). However, the net result is that whatever punishment is to be provided,
the same cannot exceed a period of three years and the JJB has to take
full care of ensuring the best facilities that could be provided to the child
for providing reformative services including education, skill development,
counselling and psychiatric support.
17. In the present case, the appellant is held to be l ess than 16
years, and therefore, the maximum punishment that could be awarded is
upto 3 years. The appellant has already undergone more than 5 y ears.
His incarceration beyond 3 years would be illegal, and ther efore, he
would be liable to be released forthwith on this count also.
18. Having considered the facts of the case and the fin dings
recorded above, it would also be appropriate to brie fly deal with the
case law on the point as to whether once an accused after c onviction
at the stage of appeal is held to be a juvenile/child under the provisions
of the 2015 Act,what would be the status of the trial, the conviction
and sentence recorded by the Trial Court and the ap pellate
Courts.Whether the trial itself would stand vitiated for lack of jurisdiction
by the regular Sessions Court and it would be the JJB a lone which
could make an inquiry into the offence committed base d upon the
evidence led by the prosecution. If the inquiry has not been conducted
by the JJB, then whether the entire proceedings need t o be quashed or
only the sentencing aspect would require consideration in accordance
with the 2015 Act.
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
19. We may note here at the outset that the appellant for the
present has chosen not to challenge the conviction but is only claiming
juvenility and consequently the benefit of sentence provided under the
2015 Act, reserving his right to address on conviction and sentence if he
fails on the preliminary issue of juvenility.
20. There are a series of judgments on the said issue. Some have
set aside the conviction, sentence and have terminated the proceedings,
others have upheld the conviction but on the basis of sentence already
undergone being more than the maximum permissible under the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 4 have directed for
release of the accused and third, where after maintaining the conviction,
this Court has referred the matter to the JJB for passing appropriate
orders on sentence. All the judgments delivered earlier which are briefly
discussed hereunder relate to the 2000 Act. Present case falls under the
2015 Act as the offence itself is of the year 2017.
21. In the case of Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and
another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh5, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
confirmed the conviction but as the appellant therein could o nly be
awarded imposition of fine, the existing fine of Rs.100/- was found to be
grossly inadequate and accordingly, the matter was remitted to the JJB
for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on
the appellant and the compensation that should be awarded to the family
of the victim.
22. Justice Madan B. Lokur, the first author of the judgment
dealt with the issue as to whether the conviction could be sustained by
this Court or it was only the sentence which was to be dealt with in
accordance with the 2000 Act. Almost all the previous judgments were
referred to in paragraphs 24, 24.1 to 24.7, 25, 25.1 to 25.2, 26, 26.1 to
26.2 and 27 of the report with respect to all the four cate gories of the
cases wherein different views have been taken by this Cou rt. The first
category was where conviction was upheld but sentence quashed. The
second category was where conviction was upheld but senten ce was
modified to the period already undergone. The third category was where
conviction and sentence both were set aside and the fourth c ategory
was where the conviction was upheld and the matter referred to the JJB
4 In short “2000 Act”
5 2013 (11) SCC 193
603
for awarding a suitable sentence. In paragraph 28 of the report Justice
Lokur sums up the four categories. Further in paragraph 29, reference
is made to section 20 of the 2000 Act and it was finally con cluded in
paragraph 30 that the matter needs to be examined on merits and if the
juvenile is found guilty of the offence, he could not be allowed to go
unpunished but considering the provisions of the 2000 Act, the question
of sentence must be left to the JJB. It would be prope r to reproduce
paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the report of Justice Lokur, which read as
follows:
“28.The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in
one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilt y of the
crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone
virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the se ntence
awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken
the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile i s adequately
punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some
period in detention. In the third set of cases, this C ourt has
remitted the entire case for consideration by the ju risdictional
Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the
juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if t he juvenile is
found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court ha s examined
the case on merits and after having found the juvenile gui lty of
the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile
Justice Board on the award of sentence.
29. In our opinion, the course to adopt is laid down in Section 20
of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Ac t,
2000. This reads as follows:
“20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in
respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date
on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued
in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court
finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall reco rd
such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the
juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provis ions of
this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a
juvenile has committed the offence:
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special
reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pas s
appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation.-In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal
or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict
with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a
juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, ev en if the
juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement
of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said
provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material
times when the alleged offence was committed.”
30. It is clear that the case of the juvenile has to be examined on
merits. If it found that the juvenile is guilty of the offence alleged
to have been committed, he simply cannot go unpunis hed.
However, as the law stands, the punishment to be awarded to him
or her must be left to the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
This is the plain requirement of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. In other wor ds,
Ashwani Kumar Saxena (2012) 9 SCC 750, should be
followed. ”
23. Justice T.S. Thakur while concurring with the view taken
by Justice Lokur, in his supplementing opinion also dealt with this aspect
of the matter and in paragraph 82 of the report was of the vi ew that
insofar as the conviction was concerned, the same could be e xamined
by this Court, however, on the sentence part, the benefit admissible under
the 2000 Act ought to be extended. Paragraph 82 of th e report is
reproduced hereunder: -
“82. A careful reading of the above would show that although a
claim of juvenility can be raised by a person at any stage and
before any court, upon such court finding the person to be a juvenile
on the date of the commission of the offence, it has to for ward
the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order s and the
sentence, if any, passed shall be deemed to have (sic no) e ffect.
There is no provision suggesting, leave alone making it obligatory
for the court before whom the claim for juvenility is made, to set
aside the conviction of the juvenile on the ground that on the date
of commission of the offence he was a juvenile, and hence not
605
triable by an ordinary criminal court. Applying the maxim
expression unius est exclusion alterius, it would be reasonable
to hold that the law insofar as it requires a reference to be made
to the Board excludes by necessary implication any intention on
the part of the legislature requiring the courts to set asi de the
conviction recorded by the lower court. Parliament, it appea rs,
was content with setting aside the sentence of imprisonme nt
awarded to the juvenile and making of a reference to the Boar d
without specifically or by implication requiring the court concerned
to alter or set aside the conviction. That perhaps is the r eason
why this Court has in several decisions simply set aside the sentence
awarded to the juvenile without interfering with the convict ion
recorded by the court concerned and thereby complied with the
mandate of Section 7-A(2) of the Act.”
24. Similar view was taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in
the case of Mahesh vs. State of Rajasthan and others 6,wherein this
Court confirmed the conviction. However, the sentence imposed was
modified to the period undergone. The aforesaid judgment relies upon
the law laid down in the case of Jitendra (supra).After framing the
issue as to whether the validity/correctness of the conviction r ecorded
by Trial Court could be maintained, this Court proceeded to giv e due
consideration in paragraph nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the judgment. Thereaf ter
the Bench proceeded to consider the merits of the conviction and upheld
the same in paragraph no.7. Paragraph nos. 4 to 7 of the repo rt are
reproduced hereunder:
“4. In the aforesaid facts, two questions arise for determination in
the present appeals before us. The first is with regard to the validity/
correctness of the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court
and affirmed by the High Court and, secondly, if the conviction to
be maintained what should be the appropriate measur e of
punishment/sentence and whether the same should be imposed
by this Court or the matter be remanded to the Juvenile Justice
Board in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act
of 2000.
5. The position in law in this regard is somewhat unsettled as has
been noticed and dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh alias
6 (2018) SCCOnline SC 3655
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
Babboo Singh and another versus State of Uttar Pradesh wherein
in paragraphs 24 to 27 four categories of cases have been culled
out where apparently different approaches had been adopted by
this Court. The net result is summed up in paragraph 28 of the
aforesaid report which explains the details of the categorization
made in the earlier paragraphs of the said report. Paragraph 28 of
the said report, therefore, would require a specific notice and i s
reproduced below:
“28. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in
one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilty of the
crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone
virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the sentence
awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken
the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately
punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some
period in detention. In the third set of cases, this Court has
remitted the entire case for consideration by the jurisdictional
Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the
juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if the juvenile is
found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court has examined
the case on merits and after having found the juvenile guilty of
the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juve nile
Justice Board on the award of sentence.”
6. The validity of the conviction in respect of the incident which
occurred almost two decades back, in our considered view, ought
to be decided in these appeals and the entire of the proceedin gs
including the punishment/sentence awarded should not be interfered
with on the mere ground that the accused appellants were juveniles
on the date of commission of the alleged crime. Judicial approaches
must always be realistic and have some relation to the grou nd
realities. We, therefore, adopt one of the possible approaches that
has been earlier adopted by this Court in the four categori es of
cases mentioned above to examine the correctness of the
conviction of the accused appellants under the provisions of the
IPC, as noticed above.
7. In this regard, having perused the materials on record we find
no ground whatsoever to take a view different from what has
been recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the High
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Court. The conviction of the accused appellants under Sections
323, 324, 325, 427, 455 read with Section 149 IPC accordingly
shall stand affirmed.”
25. In the case of Satya Deo alias Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh7, following the ratio and legal position laid down in Jitendra
Singh (supra), this Court upheld the conviction and after setting aside
the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant, it was directed
that the jail authorities would produce the appellant before the JJB within
seven days, and thereafter, the JJB would pass approp riate orders
regarding the detention and custody with respect to the appellant therein.
26. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Raju
vs. State of Haryana8, wherein Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
speaking for himself, Justice N.V.Ramana (as he then was) and Justice
Indira Banerjee, set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant
therein and as the appellant therein had already undergone a lmost six
years’ incarceration but had been released on bail, the bail bonds were
discharged and all proceedings against the appellant were declared to
have terminated.
27. In the aforesaid case, the appellant had not taken the plea of
juvenility before the Trial Court, however, such plea was raised before
the High Court but the same was rejected. However, this Court got an
inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court wh o found
him to be aged less than 18 years. The judgment in this case mainly dealt
with the issue as to whether the report of Registrar (Judi cial) of this
Court could be accepted over and above the finding of the High Cou rt
which was different. The judgment proceeds to deal with this issue and
ultimately comes to the conclusion that this could be done provided this
Court itself tests the correctness of the report of the Registrar (Judicial).
It is only in the penultimate paragraph no. 27 while allowing the appeal it
granted the relief of setting aside the conviction, sentence a nd further
terminated the entire proceedings. There is no prior discus sion on the
issue whether conviction was required to be set aside or not on this
technical ground. Merits of the conviction was not gone into. No ratio is
laid down in the said case on this issue. Only while granting r elief,
conviction has also been set aside.
7 (2020) 10 SCC 555
8 (2019) 14 SCC 401
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
28. Following the above judgment in the case of Raju (supra), a
two-judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Mehra
and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others9 set aside the judgment
of conviction and sentence awarded to appellant no. 2 therein who had
claimed to be a juvenile. Paragraph No. 14 of the said judgment which
grants the relief is reproduced herein:
“In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that since Appellant 2 was a juvenile on the da te of
commission of the offence and though till date he has already
undergone considerable jail sentence partly as an undertrial and
partly as a convict, yet the appeal filed by Appellant 2 has to be
allowed as was done in the case of Raju (supra) without going
into the merits of the case and passing any other consequenti al
order in that regard.”
29. It will be pertinent to mention that in this judgment also there
is no discussion with regard to the issue as to whether the conviction
should be set aside. This judgment also does not lay down any ratio that
if with respect to a juvenile a trial has been conducted by a Sessions
Court without the accused having claimed juvenility before it, conviction
could be set aside as being vitiated in law if subsequently it is held that
the accused was a juvenile.
30. The above judgments relate to an offence covered by e ither
the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 10 or the 2000 Act. We now proceed to
briefly discuss the provisions under the 2015 Act. Section 9 of the 2015
Act is already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. According
to sub-section (3) of section 9 of the 2015 Act, the Court whi ch finds
that the person who committed the offence was a child on the dat e of
commission of such offence would forward the child to the JJB for
passing appropriate orders and sentence, if any, passed by t he Court
shall be deemed to have no effect. This does not specificall y or even
impliedly provide that the conviction recorded by any Court with respect
to a person who has subsequently after the disposal of the case found to
be juvenile or a child, would also lose its effect rather it is only the
sentence if any passed by the Court would be deemed to have no effect.
9 In 2019 (6) SCC 132
10 “the 1986 Act”
609
31. There is another reason why a trial conducted and conviction
recorded by the Sessions Court would not be held to be vitiated in
law even though subsequently the person tried has bee n held to be a
child.
32. The intention of the legislature was to give benefit to a person
who is declared to be a child on the date of the offence only with respect
to its sentence part. If the conviction was also to be made ineffective
then either the jurisdiction of regular Sessions Court would have been
completely excluded not only under section 9 of the 2015 Act but also
under section 25 of the 2015 Act, provision would have been made that
on a finding being recorded that the person being tried is a child, a pending
trial should also be relegated to the JJB and also that such trial would be
held to be null and void. Instead, under section 25 of the 2015 Act, it is
clearly provided that any proceeding pending before any Board or Court
on the date of commencement of the 2015 Act shall be continued in that
Board or Court as if this Act had not been enacted. Section 25 is
reproduced hereunder:
“25. Special provision in respect of pending cases. -
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in
respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending
before any Board or court on the date of commencement of this
Act, shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not
been enacted.”
33. Having considered the statutory provisions laid down in section
9 of the 2015 Act and also section 7A of the 2000 Act which is identical
to section 9 of the 2015 Act, we are of the view that m erits of the
conviction could be tested and the conviction which was recorded cannot
be held to be vitiated in law merely because the inquiry was not conducted
by JJB. It is only the question of sentence for which the provisions of the
2015 Act would be attracted and any sentence in excess of wh at is
permissible under the 2015 Act will have to be accordingly amended as
per the provisions of the 2015 Act. Otherwise, the accus ed who has
committed a heinous offence and who did not claim juvenility before the
Trial Court would be allowed to go scot-free. This is also not the object
and intention provided in the 2015 Act. The object under the 2015 Act
dealing with the rights and liberties of the juvenile is only to ensure that
if he or she could be brought into the main stream by awar dinglesser
sentence and also directing for other facilities for welfare of the juvenile
KARAN @ FATIYA v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
[VIKRAM NATH, J.]
in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under
the 2015 Act.
34. In view of the above discussion and the position in law as laid
down by the aforesaid judgments and many others referred t o in the
above judgments, we approve the view taken by this court in the case of
Jitendra Singh (supra), Mahesh (supra) and Satya Deo (supra).
35. For all the reasons recorded above, it is ordered as follows:
The conviction of the appellant is upheld;however,the sentence is
set aside. Further as the appellant at present would be mor e than 20
years old, there would be no requirement of sending him to the JJB or
any other child care facility or institution. Appellant is in judicial custody.
He shall be released forthwith. The impugned judgement shall stand
modified to the aforesaid extent.
36. Both the appeals stand partly allowed.
37. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of.
Divya Pandey Appeals partly allowed.
(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)