Virendrasing v. the Additional Commissioner and Ors.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
The Factual Scenario:
1. The appellant was elected as a member of the Zilla Parishad,
Chimthane Block, Taluq Shindkheda, District Dhule, on 08.01.2020, as
the candidate of a recognized party. However, he was disqualified from
this position by an order dated 08.11.2021 passed by the Division al
Commissioner, Nashik, which came in a petition filed by respondent no.3,
who had lost the Zilla Parishad election.
2. Respondent no.3 had filed the aforesaid petition under Sections
40 and 16(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’). Respondent no. 3
claimed the appellant’s disqualification on the basis that the appellant
had misused his elected post with the object of gaining undue personal
VIRENDRASING v. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND
ORS.
financial benefit. This financial benefit is stated to have accrued on account
of the role played by the appellant in passing of a resolut ion dated
26.01.2020, whereby the Aarave Gram Panchayat sanct ioned the
repairing and tarring of a road from Aarave Phata to Mau je Aarave.
Thereafter, the Zilla Parishad, Dhule, of which the appell ant was a
member, granted administrative sanction to the project on 05.06.2020.
This sanction order records that the Zilla Parishad, Dhule had approved
the project at a cost of Rs. 15 lakhs, through the exercise of the Zilla
Parishad’s powers under Section 125 of the said Act.
3. Pursuant to the sanction, an e-tender was floated by the Aarave
Gram Panchayat on 29.06.2020. The appellant’s son applied and was
successful in the tender process against two other applicants. Thereafter,
the Aarave Gram Panchayat issued a work order to him on 21.07.2020
for repairing the road at Mauje Aarave for a sum of Rs.14,62,871/-.
4. In the aforesaid scenario, respondent no. 3 alleged that the
appellant had misused his elected post and was liable to be disqualified.
The application was filed under Section 16(1)(i) read with Section 40 of
the said Act. For reference, the provisions are reproduced hereunder:
“16. Disqualifications - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-
section (2), a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and
for being, a Councillor -
...... ...... ......
(i) if he has directly or indirectly by himself or by his partner
any share or interest in any work done by order of the
Zilla Parishad or in any contract with, by or on behalf of,
the Zilla Parishad;”
“40. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 62,
if any Councillor during the term of his office—
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
[(2) If any question whether a vacancy has occurred under this
section is raised either by the Commissioner suo motu or on a n
application made to him by any person in that behal f, the
Commissioner shall decide the question [as far as possible] within
ninety days from the date of receipt of such application; and his
decision thereon shall be final. Until the Commissioner decides
795
that the vacancy has occurred, the Councillor shall not be disabled
from continuing to be a Councillor:
Provided that, no decision shall be given against any Councillor
without giving him reasonable opportunity of being heard.]”
5. The Divisional Commissioner allowed respondent no. 3’s
application in terms of the order dated 08.11.2021 in Disqualif ication
Appeal No. 01 of 2021. The Divisional Commissioner noted that as the
Aarave Gram Panchayat was in the Chimthane Block, which fell under
the purview of Zilla Parishad, Dhule, it was apparent that the appellant
would be able to exert influence over the same. It was also observed
that there was no evidence of the appellant’s son having been awarded
work orders from any other blocks falling under Dhule Zilla Parishad,
and thus there was a prima facie inference of misuse, sufficient for
disqualifying the appellant under Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act. At this
stage, it may also be noticed that the Divisional Commissioner’s order
was passed after considering the appellant’s written st atement as his
argument, as the matter had already been adjourned on multiple occasions
at the appellant’s request.
6. The appellant challenged his disqualification by way of a writ
petition before the High Court, vide Writ Petition No. 12526 of 2021.
His submissions before the High Court can be crystalized as under:
(a) The Act would not be applicable to the case as the ro ad
repair work was being carried out at the behest of the Gram
Panchayat, which is regulated under a different Act, i.e.
the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘VP Act’);
(b) Even assuming the applicability of the said Act, the language
of Section 16(1)(i) indicates that disqualification can occur
only if the work was undertaken by the Zilla Parishad itself.
However, in the present factual scenario the Zilla Parishad
played only a supervisory role;
(c) The appellant had no ‘interest’ in his son’s financial affairs
as the latter had an independent business and the two of
them did not even reside together;
(d) The order of disqualification violated the principles of natural
justice as the appellant was not given an opportunity of being
heard by the Divisional Commissioner.
VIRENDRASING v. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND
ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
7. The aforesaid pleas were however rejected by the High Court
as per the impugned judgment dated 17.11.2021. The conclusion was
based on the following findings:
A. Section (16)(1)(i) of the said Act was broadly worded. It
not only mandated that the councillor should not have any
interest in any work of the Zilla Parishad, but such councillor
should also not have an interest in the work done by the
order of the Zilla Parishad. In the present factual scenario,
the work was ‘ordered’ by the Zilla Parishad, which would
be sufficient to attract the provision. The Zilla Parish ad
had directed the Gram Panchayat to undertake the road
repair work vide order dated 09.06.2020 under the
supervision of the Deputy Engineer, Zilla Parishad. The
Executing Engineer, Zilla Parishad’s communication dated
28.10.2021 also stated that the road was being developed
pursuant to the order of the Zilla Parishad, which was also
the agency that had disbursed the funds.
B. The Divisional Commissioner had reached a plausible
conclusion as to whether the appellant and his son resided
together. The appellant’s only evidence was a ration card
which showed that his son lived with his grandmother. This
however was not conclusive proof about the son’s financial
independence. In any case, it was opined that these facts
could not be really within the purview of the court’s writ
jurisdiction.
C. An opportunity of hearing was not required to be given to
the appellant as all the relevant facts were before th e
Divisional Commissioner already. This legal conclusion was
reached on the basis of the judgment of this Court in
Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of
Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. 1, where it was opined
that a hearing was not required where the same would be a
mere formality and not have any bearing on the final
conclusion of the authority. More than that, the Divisional
Commissioner had adjourned the matter on multiple
occasions at the request of the appellant. On 08.10.2021,
when the appellant again requested for further time on
1 (2015) 8 SCC 519.
797
account of advocate’s illness, although the appellant himself
was physically present, the Divisional Commissioner had
fairly come to the conclusion that the appellant had been
granted multiple opportunities and thus his written statement
should be treated as his submissions. The Divisiona l
Commissioner had also rejected the appellant’s separate
application for an oral hearing vide detailed order dated
01.11.2021, and this had not been challenged by the
appellant.
The Appellant’s Case Before Us :
8. The appellant’s primary plea was that his son was al located
work by Gram Panchayat Aarave and not by Zilla Parishad Dhule. The
allocation was done through an e-tendering process published on the
web portal of the Maharashtra Government. The payment for the work
was also made to the appellant’s son by the Gram Panchayat, although
it was formally sanctioned by the Zilla Parishad. The work order dated
20.07.2020 was also under the seal of the Gram Panchayat, in view of
the authority endowed with them under Article 243(G) read with Entry
13 of the 11th Schedule of the Constitution.
9. The appellant submitted that the Zilla Parishad had merely given
administrative and technical sanction for the said allotment under Sections
100, 100(2) and 125 of the said Act. The Zilla Parishad is stated not to
have directly paid for the work undertaken by the appellant’s son. In this
regard, reliance was placed on the counter affidavit of the Zilla Parishad,
who is respondent no.3 before us.
10. Second, it was pleaded that the appellant had no personal
interest in his son’s business and that they did not even reside together.
Reliance was placed on Gulam Yasin Khan v. Shri Sahebrao
Yashwantrao Walaskar & Ors. 2, where this Court observed that the
mere relationship of an electoral candidate with an employe e of the
Municipal Committee would not disqualify the candidate from standing
in the election.
11. Third, it was contended that the Divisional Commissioner had
not followed the principles of natural justice while disqua lifying the
appellant. It was urged that an elected representative cannot be removed
from his post in a casual manner and without holding an enquiry into the
2 AIR 1966 SC 1339.
VIRENDRASING v. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND
ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
alleged misconduct, as held by this Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v.
District Collector, Raigad & Ors. 3. In the proceedings before the
Divisional Commissioner, the appellant had requested for accommodation
on the day as his lawyer was unwell, but the said r equest was
unreasonably rejected.
Respondent No.3’s Resistance to the Claim of the Appellan t:
12. Learned counsel for respondent no.3 sought to lay emphasis
on the objective of Section 16 of the said Act, i.e., to bring probity into
the working of the Zilla Parishads. With this background, it was urged
that the concerned sub-section (i) of Section 16(1) of the said Act was
worded with a wide ambit so as to encapsulate three categ ories, i.e.,
work done (a) by order of the Zilla Parishad; (b) in any contract with the
Zilla Parishad; or (c) by or on behalf of the Zilla Parishad.
In the present case, the work was carried out by the order of the
Zilla Parishad, and the payment was made through the Zilla Parishad as
well. Thus it was urged that the facts fell squarely within the ambit of
Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act and disqualification was apparent.
13. In the given factual scenario, it was also urged that the appellant
was elected in January 2020, whereas his son was regist ered as a
contractor with the Zilla Parishad, Dhule on 20.02.2020. The contract
awarded to the appellant’s son was really in the nature of a proxy benefit.
Here, we may note that there is also some controversy surrounding the
translated version of the Gram Panchayat’s resolution dated 26.01.2020.
The version adduced by the appellant inter alia states that “So also,
when the said work will be sanction and when the said work w ill be
completed, the Gram Panchayat is ready and willing to bear the expenses
incurred for supervision and repairs of the said work, suc h resolution
was unanimously resolved.” [sic]. Respondent no. 3’s case was tha t
this portion was not present in the original resolution. In any case, the
fact remained that in either eventuality the funds flowed to the Gram
Panchayat through Zilla Parishad, which in turn received them from the
State Government. This was also the stand taken by the Zilla Parishad
in its counter affidavit.
14. Respondent no. 3 relied on the judgment in Zelia M. Xavier
Fernandes E. Gonsalves v. Joana Rodrigues & Ors. 4. Here, this
3 (2012) 4 SCC 407.
4 (2012) 3 SCC 188.
799
Court had distinguished Gulam Yasin’s case5 on the premise that it did
not pertain to the disqualification of a member of the local self-government
on the ground of direct or indirect pecuniary benefit. It was contended
that Zelia M. Xavier’s6 case was of greater relevance as it dealt with
Section 10 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, which was analogous to
Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act.
Our View:
15. We must begin with the objective of the said Act; which is to
introduce local self-governance and administration at the grassroots, and
to entrust Zilla Parishads with the execution of works and developmental
schemes of the State Government. It is in this conspectus that the said
Act provides for the disqualification of elected representatives. Having
been conferred with major financial responsibilities, the statute maintains
a system of checks and balances to ensure transparency in local contracts
and to obviate the possibility of elected representatives exercising undue
influence. It is no doubt true that elected representatives should not be
disqualified on flimsy grounds. However, we are equally bound by the
statutory mandate, whereby activities which tend to defeat the objective
of transparency should not be permitted to prevail.
16. The legislature in its wisdom has defined the grounds for
disqualification in expansive terms under Section 16(1)(i) of t he said
Act. Thus, the use of the terminology – ‘directly or indirectly’, ‘by himself
or by his partner’, ‘any share or interest in any work done’, ‘by order of
Zilla Parishad or in any contract with’, and ‘by or on behalf of the Zilla
Parishad’. All eventualities where the councillor can be said to have any
financial connection with the work of the Zilla Parishad were sought to
be included, with the object of discouraging the practice of financial
patronage that is inherently beneficial to the elected representatives.
17. If we now turn to the applicable precedent, this Court in Zelia
M. Xavier’s case had distinguished the applicability of Gulam Yasin’s7
case. It was opined that in Gulam Yasin, this Court had held that to
invite disqualification, any interest or share had to be in th e contract
itself, and a mere relationship between the electoral can didate and an
employee of the Municipal Committee would not suffice to invite
disqualification.
5 (supra).
6 (supra)
7 (supra).
VIRENDRASING v. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND
ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]
18. In our opinion, both of these cases stand on a different footing
as compared to the factual scenario before us. Gulam Yasin 8 was
concerned with the interpretation of the Section 15(1) of the Central
Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, which disqualifie d a
candidate from standing for election if he had ‘an interest’ in the Municipal
Committee. Moreover, another factor that weighed with the Court was
that the appellant in that case was subject to Mohammeda n law, and
thus he and his son could not be said to be members of an undi vided
family having common ‘financial interests’. On the other hand, in Zelia
M. Xavier9, this Court was examining a situation where the appellant
was a Panchayat member who was disqualified as her husband had
entered into a contract with the said Panchayat for the colle ction of
market fee. The Court’s decision ultimately took note of the fact that the
money affairs of the husband and appellant-wife were regulated by the
Portuguese Civil Code, 1860, whereby the property of the spouses got
merged upon marriage. Thus, it was held that the appellant-wife had a
financial interest in the Panchayat’s contract with her husband.
19. Despite these factual differences, we find that the common
principle that can be culled out from the aforementioned case s is that
this Court had cautioned against interpreting disqualification provisions
in an overly restrictive or narrow manner. In both cases, this Court had
noted that the salutary purpose of such provisions was to en sure the
purity of administration in Municipal Committees.
20. On turning to the factual scenario of the present case, it may
be noticed that this was not even a situation where the appel lant’s son
was carrying on any existing contractual work. It was only soon after
the election of the appellant that his son was registered as a contractor.
He had no other contracts in that area or otherwise. The only cont ract
awarded to him was the one where the funds flowed to t he Gram
Panchayat from the Zilla Parishad of which the appellant was a member.
The appellant had attempted to justify this situation by claiming that his
son was registered as a contractor soon after the appellant’s election as
he had just completed his studies. In our view, this fact rais es further
suspicions about the appellant’s interest in his son’s business.
21. The Zilla Parishad, Dhule issued a work order to the Aarave
Gram Panchayat for the repair of roads on 09.06.2020. This document,
8 (supra)
9 (supra)
801
and the Zilla Parishad’s counter affidavit, reveal that the funds flowed
from the State Government to the Zilla Parishad, and in turn to the Gram
Panchayat. This is notwithstanding the translation of the resolution dated
26.01.2020 adduced by the appellant, whereby an impression is sought
to be given as if the Gram Panchayat was willing to spend its own funds
on the project. In any case, this translation has been seriously disputed
by respondent no. 3. In our view, the issuance of the work order dated
09.06.2020 by the Zilla Parishad itself shows the Zilla Parishad’s
supervisory and sanctioning role in the contract, which falls within the
wide ambit of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act.
22. We believe that probity in such financial transactions should
be the rule rather than the exception. The appellant h ad a greater
responsibility as a father to make sure that his son does not enter into a
contract that is sanctioned by the Zilla Parishad itself. We may note the
finding of fact by courts below that nothing had been placed on record to
show even a separation of residence between the son and t he father,
other than a ration card purporting to show that the son was living with
his grandmother. It was rightly observed that this was neither here nor
there, more so when the son had just completed his education.
23. We may also note that sufficient opportunities were made
available to the appellant to present his arguments. There cannot be a
birthright to seek adjournments, especially when th e Divisional
Commissioner was mandated to decide the issue of ap pellant’s
disqualification within a period of ninety days from respondent no. 3’s
application, as per Section 40(2) of the said Act. The Divisional
Commissioner thus rightly treated the appellant’s written submissions as
his defence.
Conclusion:
24. In the aforesaid conspectus, we are thus of the view that the
appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The consequential
disqualification would take effect from the date of the judgment.
25. The appeal is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.
VIRENDRASING v. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND
ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]