Ravinder Singh v. the State Govt. of Nct of Delhi
SANJAY KUMAR, J.
1. Convicted and sentenced for the dastardly and most depraved
of offences – the rape of his own 9-year-old daughter, the app ellant is
before this Court.
2. By judgment dated 18.02.2013 in Sessions Case No. 01 of
2013, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Fast Track Court),
Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, held the appellant guilty under Secti ons
376, 377 and 506 IPC. By order of sentence dated 23.02.2013, the
appellant was imposed with imprisonment for life under Sect ion 376
IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; imprisonment for life under Section
377 IPC and payment of fine of ` 25,000/-; and rigorous imprisonment
for 2 years under Section 506 IPC along with payment of fine of
` 10,000/-. Default in payment of fines entailed furthe r periods of
imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Additional Sessions Judge
directed that the appellant should not be given any clemency by the
State before he spent at least 20 years in jail. In appeal, a Division Bench
of the Delhi High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction and sentence,
vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 in Criminal Appeal No. 1509 of 2014.
Hence, this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
3. By order dated 19.03.2018, this Court issued notice to the State
only on the question of sentence.
4. Heard Mr. Sudhir Naagar, learned counsel for the appellant;
and Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State.
5. As the scope of this appeal has been restricted to the sentence
imposed upon the appellant, we need not dilate on or deal with the issues
raised vis-à-vis the merits of his conviction for the offences under Sections
376, 377 and 506 IPC.
6. Section 376(2) IPC, prior to its amendment with retrospective
effect from 03.02.2013 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013,
consisted of clauses (a) to (g). Section 376(2)(f), as it stood then, provided
that whoever commits rape on a woman when she is under 12 years of
age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than 10 years but which may be for life and s hall also be
liable to fine. Section 377 IPC states that whoever voluntarily has carnal
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal
485
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to 10 ye ars, and shall
also be liable to fine. It was in exercise of power under Sections 376(2)(f)
and 377 IPC that the learned Additional Sessions Judge sentenc ed the
appellant to life imprisonment, as the victim was merely 9 years of age
and was also subjected to carnal intercourse against the order of nature.
He, however, added the riderthat the appellant should not be gi ven
clemency by the State until he spent at least 20 years in jail. In effect,
the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment of a minimum term of
20 years.
7. Imprisonment for life, in terms of Section 53 IPC read wit h
Section 45 IPC, means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the prisoner,
subject to the right to claim remission, etc., as provided under Articles 72
and 161 of the Constitution and under Section 432 Cr.P.C. In Gopal
Vinayak Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra 1, this Court held that a
sentence of imprisonment for life must, prima facie, be treated as
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the conv icted
person’s natural life. InMaru Ram Vs. Union of India2, a Constitution
Bench endorsed this view and affirmed that a life sentenc e is nothing
less than life-long imprisonment and would last until the last breath. Again,
in Union of India Vs. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and others3, another
Constitution Bench reiterated that imprisonment for life means
imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict.
8. However, in actual practice, one finds that a sentenc e of life
imprisonment works out only to a term of 14 years, in terms of Section
433 Cr.P.C., and may prove to be grossly inadequate to the gravity of
the offence for which the convict had been so sentenced. In Swamy
Shraddananda Vs. State of Karnataka4, this Court noted that the days
of remission earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual
imprisonment to make up the term of the sentence and the question that
then arises is how such remission can be applied to life imprisonment, as
the way in which remission is allowed can only apply to a fixed term of
imprisonment and life imprisonment, being for the rest of the life, is
indeterminate by nature. It was observed that, in the States of Karnataka
and Bihar, remissionis granted to life convicts by ‘deemed’ conversion
1 AIR 1961 SC 600
2 (1981) 1 SCC 107
3 (2016) 7 SCC 1
4 (2008) 13 SCC 767
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
[SANJAY KUMAR, J.]
of life imprisonment into a fixed term of 20 years by executive order s
issued by the State Government, flying in the face of a long line of decisions
by this Court, and no provision of law exists sanctioning such a course.
It was pointed out that life convicts are granted remission and released
from prison upon completing a 14-year-term, without any sound leg al
basis, and one can safely assume that the position would be no better in
other States. This Court, therefore, took judicial notice of the fa ct that
remission is allowed to life convicts in the most mechanic al manner
without any sociological or psychiatric appraisal of the convict and without
proper assessment as to the effect of an early release of a particular
convict on the society. This Court also noted that grant of remission is
the rule and remission is denied, one may say, in the rarest of rare cases.
Faced with this conundrum, while commuting a death sentenc e to life
imprisonment in that case, this Court pondered over what should be
done in such a situation. It was observed that, if the option is limited only
to two punishments - one, being a sentence of life imprisonment, for all
intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years, and the other, death, the
Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death
penalty and such a course would indeed be disastrous. It was therefore
held that a far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to
expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact , lawfully
belongs to the Court, i.e., the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment
and death, and substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by a
term in excess of 14 years and, further, to direct that the convict must
not be released from prison for the rest of his life or for the actual term
as specified in the order, as the case may be. It was emphasized that the
Court would take recourse to this expanded option primarily because, in
the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment w ould
amount to no punishment at all.
9. Affirming the view taken in Swamy Shraddananda (supra),
the majority opinion in V. Sriharan (supra)observed that it could be said
without any scope for controversy that, when by way of a judicial decision
after a detailed analysis, having regard to the proportionality of the crime
committed, it is decided that the offender deserves to be punished with
the sentence of life imprisonment, i.e., till the end of hi s life or for a
specific period of 20 years or 30 years or 40 years, such a c onclusion
should survive without any interruption. It was, therefore, held that in
order to ensure that the punishment imposed, which is legally provided
for in the Penal Code read along with Criminal Procedure Code, operates
487
without any interruption, the inherent power of the Court conce rned
should empower the Court, in public interest as well as in the interest of
the society at large, to make it certain that such punishment will operate,
as imposed, by stating that no remission or other liberal approach should
come into effect to nullify such imposition. It was further observed that
no prohibition is prescribed in the Penal Code, or for that matter any of
the provisions where death penalty or life imprisonment is provided for,
that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a specific period w ithin the
said life span and, when life imprisonment means the whole life span of
the person convicted, it cannot be said that the Court which is empowered
to impose the said punishment cannot specify the period up to which the
said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of t he crime
committed. The majority opinion, therefore, concluded by stating that
the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), that a special
category of sentence, insteadof death, can be subst ituted by the
punishment of imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years
and that category can be put beyond application of remissio n, is well
founded.It was further held that the power to impos e a modified
punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for
such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in
the event of further appeal, by the Supreme Court, and not by any other
Court in the country.
10. In the light of this settled legal position, it was cl early not
within the domain of the learned Additional Sessions Judge to impose a
restriction that the term of the appellant’s life imprisonment should be
for at least 20 years and that he should not be given any c lemency till
then. Such power could only be exercised by the High Courts or by this
Court. No doubt, the Delhi High Court confirmed the sentence pass ed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge but mere affirma tion of the
hollow exercise of a power, that was not conferred, by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge does not qualify as an independent exercise
by the High Court and would not suffice in terms of the legal requirement.
It is only the High Courts or this Court that would have the power, upon
proper application of mind, to take recourse to spe cial category
sentencing, depending upon the nature of the offence and its gravity. To
that extent, the sentence imposed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge was, therefore, without legal basis.
11. That being said, the fact still remains that the appel lant was
held guilty of the most heinous of offences, viz., the rape of his own little
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
[SANJAY KUMAR, J.]
daughter. The trust and faith that a young girl would repose in her father
and the sanctity of the very relationship were destroyed by his debauched
and devastating acts. In such a situation, allowing him the f reedom to
seek liberal remissions, so as to cut short his life imprisonment, would be
nothing short of a travesty of justice. Significantly, Section 376 IPC was
amended with retrospective effect from 03.02.2013. Th e amended
provision now reads very differently. Section 376(2) IPC has been
enlarged and presently comprises clauses (a) to (n). The ne w Section
376(2)(f) states that whoever, being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or
a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits
rape on such woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may e xtend to
imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder
of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Further, Section
376(3) has been inserted in the statute book and it provides that whoever
commits rape on a woman under 16 years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 20 years,
but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which sh all mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall
also be liable to fine. It may also be noted that the new Sections 376A,
376D and 376E, brought into the statute book by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013, and the new Sections 376AB, 376DA and
376DB inserted therein by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018,
provide for the enlarged punishment of life imprisonment for the remainder
of the convict’s natural life.
12. In the case on hand, the new Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(3)
IPC would have had application had the offence been committed after
03.02.2013. However, as it is an admitted fact that the child was raped
by her father during the month of August, 2012, these amended provisions
would have no role to play. Article 20(1) of the Constitution of I ndia
would come to the undeserving rescue of the appellant, as it provides
that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater tha n that which
might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of commission
of the offence.Suffice it to state, at this stage, that this Court is mindful
of the fact that the lawmakers deemed it fit and appropriate to provide
for more stringent punishment for the offence of ra pe in certain
circumstances and made it clear that when imprisonment for life is
imposed upon the perpetrator of the offence in those situations, such a
perpetrator would be liable to remain in prison for the remainder of his
natural life.
489
13. Notably, the law laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (supra)
and V. Sriharan (supra), with regard to special category sentencing,
was in the context of cases where death sentence had be en imposed
and the same was commuted to imprisonment for life. The question
would then arise as to whether the power of the High Courts an d this
Court to impose a modified punishment, specifying the term of life
imprisonment in excess of 14 years, can be exercised even in cases
where the death sentence is not imposed. Reference may be made to
Gouri Shankar Vs. State of Punjab5, wherein the Trial Court passed a
sentence of life imprisonment, directing that it shall be for the remainder
of the convict’s natural life. Noting that such a directi on could not be
passed by the Trial Court, this Court considered it fit to or der that the
sentence of imprisonment for life in that case should mean till the remainder
of the natural life of the convict. Pertinent to note, this w as not a case
where death sentence was imposed and thereafter commuted to life
imprisonment, as was the case in Swamy Shraddananda (supra)and
V. Sriharan(supra). On similar lines, in Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @
Shivamurthy Vs. State of Karnataka6, this Court was considering a
case involving Section 302 IPC, where the Trial Court had s entenced
the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the rest of his li fe.
While noting that the power to impose a modified punishment providing
for a specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict’s life, as
an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Courts
and the Supreme Court and not by any other Court, in terms of the law
laid down in V. Sriharan(supra), this Court observed:
“12. In a given case, while passing an order of conviction
for an offence which is punishable with death penalty, the Tr ial
Court may come to a conclusion that the case is not a ‘rarest of
the rare’ case. In such a situation, depending upon the punishment
prescribed for the offence committed, the Trial Court can impose
other punishment specifically provided in Section 53 of the IPC.
However, when a Constitutional Court finds that though a case is
not falling in the category of ‘rarest of the rare’ case, considering
the gravity and nature of the offence and all other relevant factors,
it can always impose a fixed-term sentence so that the benefit of
statutory remission, etc. is not available to the acc used. The
majority view in the case of V. Sriharancannot be construed to
5 (2021) 3 SCC 380
6 Criminal Appeal No. 942 of 2023, decided on 28.03.2023 = 2023 SCC OnLine SC 345
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
[SANJAY KUMAR, J.]
mean that such a power cannot be exercised by the Constitutional
Courts unless the question is of commuting the death sentence .
This conclusion is well supported by what the Constitution Bench
held in paragraph 104 of its decision, which reads thus:
“104. That apart, in most of such cases where death
penalty or life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by
the trial court and confirmed by the Division Bench of t he
High Court, the convict concerned will get an opportunity
to get such verdict tested by filing further appeal by way
of special leave to this Court. By way of abundant caution
and as per the prescribed law of the Code and the criminal
jurisprudence, we can assert that after the initial finding
of guilt of such specified grave offences and the imposition
of penalty either death or life imprisonment, when co mes
under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court,
it is only the High Court which derives the power und er
the PenalCode, which prescribes the capital and alternate
punishment, to alter the said punishment with one e ither
for the entirety of the convict’s life or for any specific period
of more than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on dependin g
upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise
of judicial conscience befitting such offence found p roved
to have been committed.”
13. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not proposed,
the Constitutional Courts can always exercise the pow er of
imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence by directing that a life
sentence, as contemplated by “secondly” in Section 53of the IPC,
shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years, for example,
of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment
cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate
of Section 433A of Cr.P.C.”
Holding so, this Court modified the sentence passed by the Trial
Court and directed that the appellant should undergo imprisonment for
life and should not be released till he completed 30 years of ac tual
sentence.
14. Significantly, both Gouri Shankar (supra) and Shiva Kumar
(supra) were cases wherein the Trial Court could have imposed a death
491
sentence had the circumstances warranted it, as those cases arose under
Section 302 IPC. The question would then arise as to whether the power
to pass a modified sentence of life imprisonment would be available to
the High Courts and this Court even in cases where the law does not
prescribe the death sentence as one of the punishments and li mits the
maximum punishment to imprisonment for life with nothing further, as in
the case on hand. In this context, we may note that the observati ons
made in Swamy Shraddananda(supra) and V. Sriharan(supra) clearly
indicate the existence of such power, though the Court stopped short of
declaring so and linked the special category sentences passe d in those
cases to substitution for a death sentence. As pointed out in Swamy
Shraddananda(supra), the Court would take recourse to the expanded
option primarily because the life sentence of 14 years imprisonment may
amount to no imprisonment at all in a given case. This obse rvation is
wide enough to take within its ambit all sentences of life imprisonment.
Similarly, in V. Sriharan (supra), the majority opinion noted that there is
no prohibition in the Penal Code, where death penalty or life imprisonment
is provided for, that imprisonment cannot be imposed for a spec ified
period within the said life span and when life imprisonment means the
whole life span of the convict, the Court which is empowered to impose
the said punishment would also have the power to specify the period up
to which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of
crime. Again, this edict would hold good for all sente nces of life
imprisonment. No doubt, the majority opinion also linked it to capital
punishment, by observing that such special category of sentences could
be substituted for death. More recently, in Shiva Kumar (supra), this
Court affirmed that even in a case where capital punishm ent is not
‘proposed’, Constitutional Courts would have the power to impose a
modified or fixed-term sentence.
15. The above observations manifest the applicability of the same
principle in cases where the maximum punishment prescribed by law is
imprisonment for life with nothing further. Even in such cases, it would
be a parody of justice to allow the convicts so sentenced to avail the
benefit of remissions and the like, liberally conferred by the State, and
cut short the length of their life sentence to a mere 14 year s. We are,
therefore, of the considered opinion that the law laid down i n Swamy
Shraddananda(supra) and V. Sriharan(supra) with regard to special
category sentencing to life imprisonment in excess of 14 years by fixing
a lengthier term would be available to the High Courts and this Court,
RAVINDER SINGH v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
[SANJAY KUMAR, J.]
even in cases where the maximum punishment, permissible in law and
duly imposed, is life imprisonment with nothing further. We must, however,
hasten to add that exercise of such power must be restri cted to grave
cases, where allowing the convict sentenced to life imprisonment to seek
release after a 14-year-term would tantamount to trivializin g the very
punishment imposed on such convict. Needless to state, cogent reasons
have to be recorded for exercising such power on the facts of a given
case and such power must not be exercised casually or for th e mere
asking.
16. In the case on hand, the appellant was found guilty of one of
the most monstrous and horrific of offences, viz, the physical violation of
his own daughter, who was not even in the first flush of yout h. In the
event he secures release after putting in just 14 years in jail, his possible
re-entry into his daughter’s life, while she is still in her twenties, may
cause her further trauma and make her life difficult. His inc arceration
for a sufficiently long period would not only ensure that he receives his
just deserts but also allow his daughter more time and maturity to settle
down and move on with her life, even if her villainous father is set at
liberty. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit and deserving
case for exercise of the power vesting in this Court to impose a modified
special category sentence of fixed-term life imprisonment . As pointed
out by this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad Vs. Naval Dubey and
another7, Judges who bear the sword of justice should not hesitate to
use that sword with utmost severity to the full and to the end, if the
gravity of the offence so demands.
17. The ends of justice would be sufficiently served if the life
imprisonment of the appellant is for a minimum of 20 years of a ctual
incarceration before he can seek remissions under the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or any other enacted law. We,
accordingly, direct so. Imposition of fines and imprisonment in default of
payment thereof shall stand confirmed.
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the above directions.
Ankit Gyan Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
7 (1992) 3 SCC 204