Jitendra Kumar Rode v. Union of India
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
- ANIL DUTT Vs STATE · 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2735
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The questions which arise for our consideration are; One,
whether, in the absence of the records of the Court of Trial, the appellate
Court could have upheld the conviction and enhanced the quantum of
fine? And Two, whether, given the language employed under Secti on
385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the present situati on
constitutes a violation of the accused’s fundamental rights under Article
21 of the Constitution of India?
3. The captioned appeal arises out of the final judgment in Criminal
Appeal No. 625 of 1999 dated 23.11.2022 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad at Lucknow by which the Appellant’s conviction
by the Special Judge, (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) Lucknow in
Case No. 7 of 1996 was upheld.
4. To facilitate effective adjudication of the present lis, it is
essential to appreciate the judgments rendered by the learne d courts
below.
5. The Trial Court, in its judgment dated 04.12.1999, convicted
the Appellant herein, under Sections 7, 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter, PC Act for short). After a nalysing
the evidence on record, the Trial Court concluded as under:
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
“The prosecution has been successful in proving that accused
J.K Rode being working at the post of a Public Servant as Assistant
Commercial Manager, Northern Railway, Lucknow made a
demand of Rupees Five Hundred from Chief Ticket Inspector Shri
Jai Prakash Narayan Upadhyay on 03.05.95 to dispose of the
charge sheet issued against him and he was caught red handed
receiving the bribe on 03.05.95 and he receivedRs. 500 (Rupees
five hundred) from said J.P.N Upadhya being posted as a public
servant misusing his post as public servant for his gain in corrupt
and illegal manner. Thus, the offence under section 7, 13(1) and
13(2) of the PC Act 1988 is proved against the accused and he is
liable to be punished for these charges. Accused is on bail and his
bail bonds are discharged. Accused should be taken into custody
immediately.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. Having so recorded, the Trial Court sentenced the Appellant
to rigorous imprisonment of one year and rupees five hundred by way of
fine (in default thereof, further imprisonment of six months) under Section
7 of the PC Act and rigorous imprisonment of two years and rupees five
hundred by way of fine (in default thereof, further imprisonment of six
months) under Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
Proceedings before the High Court
7. Assailing the judgment of conviction and sentence, the High
Court admitted the petitioner’s appeal on 07.12.1999. A perusal of the
Order dated 04.03.2016 reveals that despite repeated summoning of
records of the trial, no reply was received from the Court con cerned
and as a result, the District Judge was asked to furnish an expla nation
and, in any event, take steps for reconstruction of the record.
7.1 The record further reveals that “the entire record has bee n
lost and is not traceable” and the documents sent as “re constructed
documents” do not constitute the relevant trial court record. They were
found to be not to be in accordance with Rules nor endorsed by the
Central Bureau of Investigation.
8. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2022,
upheld the conviction despite having noted on an earlier occasion that
the reconstruction of records was not in accordance with rules and t he
519
admission of non-availability of material on record, for which the Appellant
herein was in no manner responsible. Significantly, despite arguments,
the Court did not discuss the merits of conviction.
9. However, the conviction was upheld and taking note of the
decision of this Court in V.K. Verma v. Central Bureau of
Investigation1, the sentence was reduced to time already undergone
and the fine enhanced to Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand.
The Present Appeal
10. Being aggrieved by the Order of conviction being upheld, the
Appellant has preferred the present appeal.
It is apparent on the face of the record that the record could
never be reconstructed in its entirety, especially the relevant ones by the
concerned District Court. The Court, nonetheless, found sufficiency in
the partly reconstructed record, which included only a few documents,
such as the FIR and upheld the conviction on merits.
11. The learned counsel for the Appellant states that the la w is
settled on the issue, and in the absence of such records, a con viction
cannot be stated to be on firm grounds and is liable to be set aside. The
learned counsel places reliance on Shyam Deo Pandey and Others
v. State of Bihar2, State of U.P. v. Abhai Raj Singh and Another 3.
He further placed reliance on High Court decisions, namely Ramesh
Kaushik v. State of Delhi4 of the Delhi High Court; Raghuvir Sahai
and Others v. State of U.P. 5, Avdesh Rai and Others v. State of
U.P.6 and Tej Pal Singh and Others v. State of U.P.7 of the Allahabad
High Court.
Consideration by this Court
12. A conviction of any nature permanently marks a person’ s
character. It would be, in the specific circumstances of this case,
unjustified. This is not to say that five hundred rupees as far back as
1995 was a small or insignificant amount; however, when the possibility
1 (2014) 3 SCC 485, Paragraphs 8 – 13.
2 (1971) 1 SCC 855
3 (2004) 4 SCC 6
4 2022 SCC Online Del 4185
5 Criminal Appeal No.786 of 1979
6 Criminal Appeal No.346 of 1984
7 2015 SCC Online All 6581
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
of appeal is extinguished due to the absence of essential material, the
perusal and consideration of which is required to take stock of the matter
and then uphold or reverse, as the case may be, then the benefit of the
doubt has to be extended to the accused when he is in no manner
responsible for the same.
13. We must consider whether the non-availability of trial court
records before the High Court and upholding conviction, despite t he
absence thereof, infringes the right to life and liberty of the accused
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
14.It is well settled that following “procedure established by law”
in a criminal prosecution is a sacrosanct requirement.
15. In M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra 8 (three-Judge
Bench), Krishna Iyer J. writing for the Court observed that:
“11. In short, a first appeal from the Sessions Court to t he High
Court, as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code, manifests
this value upheld in Article 21.”
16. It was further observed that every step that makes the right of
appeal fruitful is obligatory, and every action or inaction which stultifies
it is unfair and, ergo, unconstitutional.
17. In Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi )9(two-Judge
Bench), this Court has also noted that the due process of law shall deem
to include fairness in trial. The Court gives a right to the accused to
receive all documents and statements and move applications for the
production of records relating to the case.
18.If a right of production of documents at the trial stage exists,
it is a natural corollary that the High Court, sitting in appeal, must benefit
from those documents. In the considered view of this Court, this is a
demand of the abovementioned sacrosanct requirement.
19. As we have noted earlier, in the present case, despite efforts,
documents such as the witness statements, statements under Section
313 Cr.P.C. are neither available nor have been able to be reconstructed.
Therefore, upholding conviction in the absence of such documents cannot
be said to be in consonance with due process of law and fairness.
8 (1978) 3 SCC 544
9 (2010) 6 SCC 1
521
20.Once a violation of a right under Article 21 is established, that
is undoubtedly sufficient to set aside a conviction. Nonethele ss, it is
essential to appreciate what the law of procedure says i n this regard.
After all, it cannot be gainsaid that personal liberty cut down in the absence
of fair legal procedure is an affront to the sanctity of Article 21. To this
effect, the bench in M.H Hoskot (supra) said:
“24. We may follow up the import of Maneka Gandhi and
crystallise the conclusion. Maneka Gandhi case has laid down
that personal liberty cannot be cut out or cut down without fair
legal procedure. Enough has been set out to establish that a prisoner,
deprived of his freedom by court sentence but entitled to appeal
against such verdict, can claim, as part of his protection under
Article 21 and as implied in his statutory right to appea l, the
necessary concomitant of right to counsel to prepare and argue
his appeal.”
21. The instant case is governed by Section 385 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is extracted for ease of refer ence:
“385. Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed
summarily.—(1) If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal
summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which
such appeal will be heard to be given—
(i) to the Appellant or his pleader;
(ii) to such officer as the State Government may appoint on
this behalf;
(iii) if the appeal is from a judgment of conviction in a case
instituted upon complaint to the complainant;
(iv) if the appeal is under section 377 or section 378, to the
accused, and shall also furnish such officer, complainant
and accused with a copy of the grounds of appeal.
(2) The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the
case, if such record is not already available in that Court, and
hear the parties: Provided that if the appeal is only as to the
extent or the legality of the sentence, theCourt may disposeof
the appeal without sending for the record.
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
(3) Where the only ground for appeal from a conviction is the
alleged severity of the sentence, the Appellant shall not, except
with the leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of a ny
other ground.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22.A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that when appeals
are not dismissed summarily, the Appellate Court shall call for the records
of the Court below except in cases where the question for consideration
is the legality of a sentence. There is undoubtedly a comp ulsion upon
the Appellate Court to call for the record and then proceed to examine
the merits of a case before it. That, as is prima facie observable, is not
the case before us.
23. One of the earlier cases on this issue is the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court in Queen Empress v. Khimat Singh 10, wherein
the District Judge failed to trace or discover the lost records. The Court
observed that this loss of records has lost the Appellant, a right he is
entitled to, that of hearing by a higher court. In such situations, no other
recourse remains than to order trial de-novo. The judgment in Khimat
Singh (supra) has been followed by this Court in Abhai Raj Singh
(supra).
24. The abovementioned requirement is found in the Old Code
(Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, now repealed), under Section 423 as
well. Section 423 of the 1898 Code, corresponds to Section 385 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
25.The Privy Council in King – Emperor v. Dahu Raut11, stated
that where a conviction is appealed against, once summary dis missal
fails, the provision of Section 423 as to sending for the record are clearly
“peremptory”, and there can be no room for revision at that stage. This
has been reiterated by this Court in In Shyam Deo Pandey (supra),
observing that, calling for the record of the Court below is an obligation,
in the following terms:
“18. Coming to Section 423, which has already been quoted above,
it deals with powers of the appellate Court in disposing of the
appeal on merits. It is obligatory for the appellate Court to send
10 1889 A.W.N. 55
11 AIR 1935 PC 89
523
for the record of the case, if it is not already before the Court.
This requirement is necessary to be complied with to enable the
Court to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of the order
or judgment appealed against not only with reference to the
judgment but also with reference to the records which will be the
basis on which the judgment is founded. The correctness or
otherwise of the findings recorded in the judgment, on the basis of
the attack made against the same, cannot be adjudicated upon
without reference to the evidence, oral and documentary and other
materials relevant for the purpose. The reference to “such record”
in “after perusing such record” is to the record of the case sent
for by the appellate Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
26.This Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. State of W.B.12(two-Judge
Bench) observed that an Appellate Court allowing a conviction without
having the records before it and the evidence adduced by the prosecution
is a flagrant miscarriage of justice.
27. This Court in Abhai Raj Singh (supra) (two-Judge Bench)
while dealing with a conviction by the Trial Court under Section 302 of
the IPC, 1860, while remanding the matter for consideration afresh by
the High Court observed:
“8. It has been the consistent view taken by several High Courts
that when records are destroyed by fire or on account of natural
or unnatural calamities, reconstruction should be ordere d. In
Queen Empress v. Khimat Singh [1889 AWN 55] the view taken
was that the provisions of Section 423(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1898 (in short “the old Code”) made it obligatory for the
Court to obtain and examine the record at the time of heari ng.
When it was not possible to do so, the only available course was a
direction for reconstruction. The said view was reiterated m ore
than six decades back in Sevugaperumal, Re [AIR 1943 Mad
391 (2) : 44 Cri LJ 611] . The view has been reiterated by several
High Courts as well, even thereafter.
9. The High Court did not keep the relevant aspects a nd
considerations in view and came to the abrupt conclusion t hat
reconstruction was not possible merely because there was no
12 (1987) 2 SCC 55
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
response from the Sessions Judge. The order for reconstruction
was on 1-11-1993 and the judgment of the High Court is in Criminal
Appeal No. 1970 of 1979 dated 25-2-1994. The order was followed
in Criminal Appeal No. 1962 of 1979 disposed of on 16-8-1995. It
is not clear as to why the High Court did not require the Sessions
Court to furnish the information about reconstruction ofrecords;
and/or itself take initiative by issuing positivedirections as to the
manner, method and nature of attempts, efforts and exercise to
be undertaken to effectively achieve the purpose in the best
interests of justice and to avoid ultimately any miscarriageof justice
resulting from any lapse, inactionor inappropriate or perfunctory
action, in this regard; particularly when no action was taken by
the High Court to pass necessary orders for about a decade when
it received information about destruction of record. The course
adopted by the High Court,if approved,would encouragedubious
persons anddetractorsof justiceby allowingundeservedpremium
to violators of law by acting hand in glove with those anti-social
elements coming to hold sway,behind the screen, in the ordinary
and normal courseof justice.
10.We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and remit
the matter back for fresh consideration. It is to be note d at this
juncture that one of the respondents i.e. Om Pal has died during
the pendency of the appeal before this Court. The High Court
shall direct reconstruction of the records within a period of six
months from the date of receipt of our judgment from all available
or possible sources with the assistance of the prosecuting agency
as well as the defending parties and their respective counsel. If it
is possible to have the records reconstructed to enable the High
Court itself to hear and dispose of the appeals in the ma nner
envisaged under Section 386 of the Code, rehear the appeals and
dispose of the same, on their own merits and in accordance with
law. If it finds that reconstruction is not practicable butby ordering
retrialinterestof justicecouldbe betterserved—adoptthatcourse
and direct retrial — andfrom that stage law shall take its normal
course. If only reconstruction is not possible to facilitate the High
Court to hear and dispose of the appeals and the further course of
retrial and fresh adjudication by the Sessions Court is also rendered
impossible due to loss of vitally important basic records — in that
case and situationonly,thedirectiongivenintheimpugned judgment
525
shall operate and the matter shall stand closed. The appeals are
accordingly disposed of.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Recently, this Court in Dhananjay Rai alias Guddu Rai v.
State of Bihar13 (two-Judges) took note of a Judgment rendered in
Bani Singh v. State of U.P.14, as under :
“14. We have carefully considered the view expressed in the
said two decisions of this Court and, we may state that the vie w
taken in Shyam Deo case [(1971) 1 SCC 855 : 1971 SCC (Cri)
353 : AIR 1971 SC 1606] appears to be sound except for a minor
clarification which we consider necessary to mention. The plain
language of Section 385 makes it clear that if the appellate Court
does not consider the appeal fit for summary dismissal, it ‘must’
call for the record and Section 386 mandates that after the record
is received, the appellate Court may dispose of the appea l after
hearing the accused or his counsel. Therefore, the plain language
of Sections 385-386 does not contemplate dismissal of the appeal
for non-prosecution simpliciter . On the contrary, the Code
envisages disposal of the appeal on merits after perusal and
scrutiny of the record. The law clearly expects the appellate Court
to dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the
reasoning of thetrial court in the judgment,but by cross- checking
the reasoning with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying
itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court
are consistent withthe material on record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29.In a case with similar circumstance, we notice that the Allahabad
High Court in Sita Ram & Others v. State 15 has held that when the
entire record was lost or destroyed and the reconstruction of the record
was not possible, the Appellate Court shall order retria l provided the
time lag date of incident and the date of hearing of appeal is short. If the
same is long and/or the FIR, statement, of witnesses under Section 161
and other relevant papers are not available, the Appellate Court should
not order retrial.
13 2022 SCC Online 880
14 (1996) 4 SCC 720
15 1981 Cr.LJ, 65
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
30. In numerous judgments rendered by various High Courts, a
similar view to the effect that a conviction cannot be upheld in the absence
of the records of the Court below has been expressed. Taki ng note of
Sita Ram (supra), the time elapsed between the occurrence of the
offence and the appeal being finally decided, these courts have held
that in the absence of essential documents such as the FIR or witness
statements, a retrial too cannot be said to be serving the ends of justice.
[Khalil Ahmad v. State of U.P. 16; Vir Pal v. State 17; Hira Lal v.
State of U.P.18 and Bhunda and Ors. V. State of U.P.19]
31.In the present case, the impugned judgment of the High Court
records the statement of the CBI that the records have “ got lost”. The
“reconstructed” record consists of the following:
i. FIR of RC 18(A)/95-LKO;
ii. Complaint dated 03.05.1995 of Sri J.P.N. Upadhyay, CIT,
Varanasi (2 pages);
iii. Photocopy of S.F.-II dated 24.03.1995 (one page);
iv. Pretrap memorandum dated 3.5.95 (4 pages);
v. Recovery memo dated 3.5.1995 (5 pages);
vi. Search list dated 3.5.95 (5 pages);
vii. One file containing charge-sheet (SF-II) of Sri JPN
Upadhyay and Notesheet. (Pages 1 to 6 & Notesheet
PP-2);
viii. Search list dated 4.5.95 (1 sheet);
ix. Site plan dated 3.5.95 (1 sheet);
x. Misc. Papers containing Draft charge-sheet etc. (7 sheets);
xi. Sanction order dated 28.12.95.
Sub-section, 2 of Section 385, requires that the parties are heard
in light of the records received by the Court. The documents undoubtedly
need to include the essential documents necessary to properly appreciate
the appeal on its merits. Even the depositions of the witne sses, both
16 1986 SCC OnLine All 211
17 1999 SCC OnLine All 1348
18 1999 SCC OnLine All 1392
19 2001 SCC OnLine All 864
527
prosecution and defence, have not been re-constructed an d are not
available for the Court. This position of disposal of an appeal on merits
being only after perusal of record, has been held by a three-J udge
Bench in Bani Singh (supra).
32.The Court below, in our considered view, by taking a mutually
contradictory view, proceeded to decide the appeal on merits sentencing
the accused, forgetting that the challenge was also for conviction. And
yet did not deal with the merits of the appeal, laying specific challenge to
the judgment of conviction. The whole approach is illegal and erroneous.
Firstly, it is observed that the record was missing, and then it casts the
onus to produce the same on the Appellant.
33. In light of the abovementioned discussion, the Accused, in
appeal, has a right to have the record perused by the Appell ate Court
and, therefore, upholding a conviction by merely having noted that the
counsel for the accused not having the record at the time of f iling the
appeal is “doubtful” and that “no one can believe” the appeal would
have been filed without perusing the record, as observed by the High
Court is not correct. The job of the Court of Appeal is not to depend on
the lower Court’s judgment to uphold the conviction but, based on the
record available before it duly called from the Trial Cou rt and the
arguments advanced before it, to come to a conclusion thereon.
34. In the facts at hand, the alleged offence in question wa s
committed on 21.3.1995, and the judgment of the Trial Court was delivered
on 7.12.1999. More than 28 years have passed since the commission of
the offence. As already indicated, the relevant Trial C ourt record has
not been able to be reconstructed, despite the efforts of the courts below.
Hence, in our considered view, as discussed above, ordering a retrial is
not in the interest of justice and will not serve any fruitful purpose. The
time elapsed must be taken into consideration by the Court, and we may
stress on that, only after taking due note of and taking steps to abide by
the warning issued by this Court in Abhai Raj Singh (supra), as was
correctly done in Sita Ram (supra).
Conclusions
35. Protection of the rights under Article 21 entails protection of
liberty from any restriction thereupon in the absenc e of fair legal
procedure. Fair legal procedure includes the opportunity for the person
filing an appeal to question the conclusions drawn by the trial court. The
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]
same can only be done when the record is available with the Cour t of
Appeal. That is the mandate of Section 385 of the CrPC. Therefore, in
the considered view of this Court, it is not within prudence to lay down a
straightjacket formula, we hold that non-compliance with the mandate
of the section, in certain cases contingent upon speci fic facts and
circumstances of the case, would result in a violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, which we find it to be so in the instant case.
36. The language of Section 385 shows that the Court sitting in
appeal governed thereby is required to call for the records of the case
from the concerned Court below. The same is an obligation, power coupled
with a duty, and only after the perusal of such records would an appeal
be decided.
37.In the view of the aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
judgment and the conviction dated 07.12.1999 passed by Special Judge
(Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), Lucknow, in Case No.7/1996 is
set aside, subject thereof, is set aside.
38. The impugned judgment had directed the accused to pay, by
way of an enhanced fine, Rupees 25,000. Given the above, the fine, be
it of whatever amount, if deposited, is liable to be returned to the Appellant.
39.Before parting with the present leave petition another important
issue must be dealt with, i.e. the digitization of records. Technology has,
in the present time become increasingly enmeshed with the systems of
dispute resolution and adjudication with the trends pointing leading to all
the more interplay, both supplementary and complimentary between
technology and law.
40.On 24.9.2021, the learned E-committee of the Supreme Court
of India issued an SOP for digital preservation. St ep by step
implementation of the digitization process involves eighteen steps therein.
Primarily, it requires all High Courts to establish Judicial Digital
Repositories (JDR) as well as the standardized system therefor; A
digitisation cell at each of the High Courts is to be established to monitor
the progress on day to day basis; It is the work of the cell to manage
contracts with vendors for specialized services; an online data tracking
system to keep track of the data transferred to the High Cour ts and to
facilitate the receipts for each set of transferred re cords to the District
Courts as well; District Courts to have back-ups of all data transferred
529
to the High Court on a monthly basis while maintaining an independent
record thereof.
41. It cannot be doubted that had there been properly preserved
records of the Trial Court, the issue in the present appeal as to whether
the High Court could uphold a conviction having not perused the complete
Trial Court record, would not have arisen. Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that, in accordance with the SOP issued, private entities providing
specialized service have been contracted, and therefore considering the
importance and essentiality of such record, a robus t system of
responsibility and accountability must be developed and fostered in order
to ensure the proper protection and regular updation of all r ecords
facilitating the smooth functioning of the judicial process.
42.Therefore, this Court finds it fit to issue the following directions:
1. The Registrar General of the High Courts shall ensure tha t in
all cases of criminal trial, as well as civil suits, the digitization of
records must be duly undertaken with promptitude at all District
Courts, preferably within the time prescribed for filing an appeal
within the laws of procedure.
2. The concerned District Judge, once the system of digitization
along with the system of authentication of the digitized records is
in place in their judgeship, to ensure that the records so digitized
are verified as expeditiously as possible.
3. A continually updated record of Register of Records digitized
shall be maintained with periodic reports being sen t to the
concerned High Courts for suitable directions.
4. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)
JITENDRA KUMAR RODE v. UNION OF INDIA
[SANJAY KAROL, J.]