Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. v. Om Parkash
Order
Hrishikesh Roy, J.
1. Heard Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant(s). Also heard Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Amicus
Curiae assisted by Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, learned counsel for the
respondent.
2. The challenge here to the judgment and order dated 26.06.2008 in the
LPA No.6/2003 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh whereunder, the
judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 21.05.2003 was upheld
by the Division Bench. Through the said judgment, the termination of
the respondent ordered by the appellant(s) on 25.06.1996 was found
to be unsustainable on the ground of not providing due opportunity
to the delinquent. The learned Single Judge set aside the penalty
of removal from service granting all consequential benefits to the
delinquent. The Court however observed that the employers were
at liberty to proceed to conduct inquiry on the charges in terms of
the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960 (for
short “LIC Staff Regulation ”, and take necessary action.
3. The disciplinary authority while ordering removal from service of
the respondent through the order dated 25.06.1996 (Annexure P-1)
considered the absence from duty by the respondent to be a case
of abandonment of service under Regulation 39(4)(iii) read with
Explanation 1 of the LIC Staff Regulation. The order notes that the
delinquent failed to respond to the notice(s) issued to him. Moreover
his whereabouts were not known for over 90 days, as specified in
the LIC Staff Regulation. The respondent who was serving as an
Assistant Administrative Officer in the LIC, since 25.9.1995 absented
himself from duties without informing his employer. The LIC’s letters
addressed to him to resume duties remained unanswered by the
delinquent. Then the chargesheet-cum-show cause notice was issued
on 14.02.1996 proposing his removal from service. But the same
was also not answered.
4. The Authority therefore considered it to be a case of abandonment
of service and by invocation of powers under Regulation 39(4)(iii)
ordered from removal of the delinquent. The relevant part of the
Regulation reads as under:-
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“39 (4) (iii) Where an employee has abandoned his post,
the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances
of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit.
Explanations: 1. For the purpose of this regulation, an
employee shall be deemed to have abandoned his post
if he absents himself from duty without leave or overstays
his leave for a continous period of ninety days without any
intimation therefore in writing.
2. All communications under this regulation and copies of
orders passed there under may be delivered personally
to the employee if he is attending office; otherwise they
shall be sent by registered post to the address noted in the
service record. Where such communications or copies of
orders cannot be served on him personally or by registered
post, copies thereof shall be affixed on the notice board
of the office in which the employee is employed, and on
such affixing such communications and orders shall be
deemed to have been properly served on him.”
5. Assailing the judgment of the High Court granting relief to the
delinquent, Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel would
point out that notice(s) were issued on 06.10.1995, 06.11.1995
and 19.12.1995 to the respondent prior to the chargesheet-cum-
show cause notice on 14.02.1996. In those, the delinquent was
informed about his unauthorized absence from office with effect from
25.09.1995 and requiring him to rejoin services immediately or action
would be taken against him under the LIC Staff Regulation. This was
followed by chargesheet-cum-show cause notice which reflected
the endorsement of the Postal Authorities to the communication
dated 06.11.1995 to the effect that on enquiry it was learnt that the
respondent had abandoned his job and left his place of residence.
As all the notice(s) remained unanswered by the delinquent, the
authorities invoked the powers under Regulation 39 (1)(f) and ordered
delinquent’s removal from service.
6. When the appeal of the delinquent was rejected by the Appellate
Authority through order dated 19.08.1997, the respondent filed the
writ petition resulting in the impugned orders of the Single Judge
and Division Bench of the High Court.
Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. v. Om Parkash
7.1 Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel would firstly submit that
the appellant(s) had taken all steps to serve notice on the delinquent
who was not to be found since 25.09.1995 and therefore treated it
to be a case of abandonment of service. The termination of service
was accordingly ordered, under the Regulation 39(4)(iii).
7.2 It is next pointed out that around that period, the respondent secured
employment as AG-III Depot in the Food Corporation of India (FCI)
on 14.04.1997 and although this was an important indication of
abandonment of service by the respondent, he failed to disclose the
same in the Writ Petition No.41 of 1998, which subsequently came
to be filed before the High Court on 05.01.1998.
7.3 The Senior Counsel submits that the respondent absented from
duty for 90 days without intimation to his employer and since
the notice(s) addressed to the delinquent remained unanswered,
conducting an inquiry into the charge of unauthorized absence was
an impossibility. Therefore, the employer had rightly treated it to be
a case of abandonment of service and terminated the respondent.
8. The respondent despite notice, was un-represented and accordingly
Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel was requested to assist
the Court. Mr. Gupta adverts to the circumstances under which the
respondent’s services were dispensed with by the appellant(s) and
points out that service of notice as claimed by the appellant(s), may
have to be treated with caution as the concerned notice(s) were sent
to different addresses.
9. On the above aspect, it is discernible that three notice(s) were sent
to the permanent address. In response to the second notice dated
06.11.1995 which returned back to the appellant(s), the postal remarks
in Hindi reads as under:
“pata karne par pata chala hai ki praptkarta kahin se naukari
chodkar chala gaya hai. R.L. wapas ki jati hai” [English
Translation: on enquiry it has come to know that the
consignee has left job and gone. R.L is returned herewith]”
10. Importantly, the respondent secured employment with the FCI on
14.04.1997 and although his Writ Petition was filed six months after
securing the new job, the employment with the FCI was concealed
in the Writ Petition. If this vital aspect was known the High Court
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possibly would have taken a different view and the respondent
abandoning his job with the LIC, could have been easily inferred.
11. Relief was granted to the respondent by the High Court on the ground
that the termination order was passed without affording a reasonable
opportunity or conducting an inquiry into the charge of absence from
duty. But in granting such relief, the Court overlooked that it was a
case of the respondent abandoning his services without informing
his employer about his whereabouts. Subsequently, it came to light
that he joined the FCI on 09.05.1997.
12. Such conduct of the respondent could not have been condoned
by the employer and therefore, in our assessment, treating the
respondent to have abandoned his service and taking appropriate
action against him, in terms of the LIC Staff Regulation, cannot be
faulted. It is also necessary for us to say that as the delinquent was
guilty of suppression of the fact of his employment with the FCI, he
was disentitled to equitable relief from the High Court in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. With the above conclusion, the High Court in our assessment, erred
in granting relief to the respondent by allowing the Writ Petition. The
impugned order is accordingly set aside and quashed. With this, the
appeal stands allowed leaving the parties to bear their own cost.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
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