Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors
TABLE OF CONTENTS*
Introduction................................................................................... 1
Facts ............................................................................................. 2
Submission of Counsels ............................................................ 7
Scheme of the Act ...................................................................... 8
The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights ................ 15
The Right to notice .................................................................. 19
The Right to be heard ............................................................. 20
The Right to a reasoned decision ......................................... 21
The Duty to acquire only for public purpose ....................... 22
The Right of restitution or fair compensation ..................... 23
The Right to an efficient and expeditious process .............. 24
The Right of conclusion ........................................................ 26
Conclusions ................................................................................ 28
Judgment
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
1. Leave granted.
Introduction: The Kolkata Municipal Corporation claims to have
acquired the property of respondent no. 1 in exercise of powers under
Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. A single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have concurrently held
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
that there is no such power of compulsory acquisition of immovable
property under Section 352. While upholding the decision of the High
Court, we have given our additional reasons by interpreting the text
and the context in which Section 352 is placed in the Act. Rejecting
the alternative argument of the appellant-Corporation that there is also
a provision for compensation under Section 363 of the Act when land
is acquired under Section 352, we have examined the constitutional
position of acquisition of immovable property whereunder the mere
presence of power to acquire coupled with a provision for payment
of fair compensation by itself is not sufficient for a valid acquisition.
Interpreting “authority of law” in Article 300A of the Constitution,
we have held that a minimum content of a constitutional right to
property comprises of seven sub-rights or procedures such as the
right to notice, hearing, reasons for the decision, to acquire only for
public purpose, fair compensation, efficient conduct of the procedure
within timelines and finally the conclusion. These sub-rights have
synchronously formed part of our laws and have attained judicial
recognition. Therefore, as Section 352 does not provide for these
sub-rights or procedures, it can never be a valid power of acquisition.
Before we deal with the submissions and analyse the provisions, we
will first narrate the necessary facts.
2. Facts: The property in question, Premises No. 106C, situated
at Narikeldanga North Road, Kolkata – 700011 1, belongs to Mr.
Birinchi Bihari Shah 2 having succeeded it through a deed of
settlement executed by his father. As Birinchi Shah was minor at
the time when his father passed away, his elder brother managed
and administered the Property and, in that process, he also let
out the premises admeasuring 2 bighas 18 kathas 6 chitaks and
40 square feet in favour of one M/s Arora Film Corporation. Upon
attaining majority, the Property was mutated in the name of Birinchi
Shah in the assessment book of the appellant-Corporation. It is
affirmatively stated that all municipal dues including taxes with
respect to the Property were paid regularly. It is also stated that
the appellant-Corporation acknowledged the same and by its letter
dated 07.04.2000 admitting that there are no outstanding dues with
respect to property tax.
1 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Property”.
2 Hereinafter, referred to as “Birinchi Shah”.
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3. In the year 2009, when an attempt was made by the appellant-
Corporation to forcefully enter and occupy the Property, Birinchi
Shah filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 126 of 2009 before the High
Court seeking a restraint order against the appellant-Corporation.
4. As there was no real contest about the title in the Property and the
appellant-Corporation having not filed any affidavit-in-opposition, the
High Court disposed of the writ petition by an order dated 17.09.2009
directing that the appellant-Corporation must hold an enquiry about
the encroachments. The High Court further directed the appellant-
Corporation not to make any construction over the Property.
5. In July 2010, Birinchi Shah received information that the appellant-
Corporation had deleted his name from the category of owner and
had inserted its own name in the official records. Aggrieved, he
approached the High Court by filing a writ petition bearing W.P.
No. 981 of 2010, not only for correction of the entries but also to
restrain the appellant-Corporation from interfering with his peaceful
possession over the Property. What happened in this writ petition is
of seminal importance. The learned single Judge, by an order dated
08.01.2015, recorded the statement of the appellant-Corporation
that they are unable to controvert the averments made in the writ
petition with respect to title and ownership of the Property. The writ
petition was disposed of restraining the appellant-Corporation from
interfering with the possession of Birinchi Shah and also injuncted
them from giving effect to the wrongful recording of its name in the
official records. The appellant-Corporation was also directed to remove
its men and material from the Property within two weeks from the
date of the said order. The specific finding of the High Court that
the appellant-Corporation could not establish its right and the title
in the Property is significant.
6. Dissatisfied, the appellant-Corporation filed a writ appeal bearing
A.P.O. No. 51 of 2015 against the order of the single Judge and
contended that their affidavit-in-opposition could not be filed before
the Single Judge as the records were misplaced. It is more or less
an admitted fact that a plea of acquisition was taken for the first time
before the Division Bench, and this seems to be the reason for the
Division Bench to remand the matter back to the single Judge after
imposing a cost of Rs. 50,000/- on the appellant-Corporation. After
remand, the appellant-Corporation filed an affidavit-in-opposition
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
before the single Judge claiming that the land was acquired. In view
of new developments, Birinchi Shah sought permission to withdraw
the pending writ petition with the liberty to file a fresh writ petition.
The High Court permitted this by an order dated 11.08.2016.
7. Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 930 of 2016 was filed by the respondent
no. 1, the executor to the estate of Birinchi Shah, inter alia, seeking
an order quashing the alleged acquisition as illegal and to restore
their name as owners in the official records.
8. The learned single Judge of the High Court, allowing the writ petition
by order dated 14.09.2017, formulated two questions. The first
question relates to the maintainability of the writ petition, which was
answered in the affirmative. As there is no contest to this issue, we will
not deal with it. The second issue relates to the legality and validity
of acquisition of the Property in exercise of power under Section
352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 19803. Answering the
second question, the learned single Judge held that the appellant-
Corporation purported to acquire the Property under Section 352(a)
of the Act when there is no power of compulsory acquisition therein.
The learned single Judge therefore quashed and set-aside the alleged
action of acquisition.
9. The appellant-Corporation as well as the respondent no. 1 assailed
the order of learned single Judge in writ appeals bearing APO No.
523 of 2017 and APO No. 210 of 2018, respectively.
10. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the judgment impugned
herein, affirmed the order of the Single Judge and accordingly,
disposed of the appeals with a direction that the appellant-Corporation
may initiate acquisition proceedings for the Property under Section
536 or 537 of the Act, within five months, or in the alternative, restore
the name of the last recorded owner as the owner of the Property.
11. It is against this judgment and order of the Division Bench of the
High Court, that the appellant-Corporation is in appeal before us.
12. Submission of Counsels: Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior
counsel, representing the appellant-Corporation, has submitted
that the appellant-Corporation has the requisite statutory power to
3 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Act”.
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acquire a property under Section 352 of the Act for the purposes of
constructing a park, as is the case here. He has referred to Section
363 of the Act provisioning compensation for acquisitions made
under Section 352 of the Act and submitted that acquisition under
this chapter is therefore complete and stands on its own footing. He
contended that the single and division benches of the High Court
erred in concluding that Section 537 of the Act is the only provision
for acquisition. Relying on State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter 4, he would
submit that for differential schemes and purposes of acquisition,
different compensation structures will not violate Article 14 of the
Constitution. On the same point, he also relied on the decisions
of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra 5, and
Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer6.
13. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsels,
appearing for the respondents, while supporting the judgment of the
High Court, impugned herein, submitted that the power of acquisition
is only in Section 537 of the Act and that invocation of Section 352
read with Section 363 is illegal and violative of Article 300A of the
Constitution. In support of their submissions, they relied on the
judgment of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao7.
14. Scheme of the Act: The Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980
extends to 636 Sections, followed by 9 Schedules. It has IX Parts,
of which we are concerned only with Part VI of which Chapter
XXI – relating to Streets and Public Places and Part VIII of which
Chapter XXXIII – relating to Acquisition and Disposal of Property.
As the appellant-Corporation invoked Section 352 of the Act to
acquire the Property for the purpose of opening a park and ward
office, we need to examine the provision. Section 352 of the Act
provides as under:
“Section 352:- Power to acquire lands and buildings
for public streets and for public parking places:–
The Municipal Commissioner may, subject to the other
provisions of this Act –
4 [1980] 3 SCR 290 : (1980) 3 SCC 554
5 [2011] 3 SCR 1 : (2011) 3 SCC 1
6 [2014] 7 SCR 879 : (2014) 15 SCC 116
7 [1973] 3 SCR 39 : (1973) 1 SCC 500
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
(a) acquire any land required for the purpose of opening,
widening, extending or otherwise improving any public
street, square, park or garden or of making a new one,
together with any building standing upon such land;
(b) acquire, in relation to any land or building as aforesaid,
such land with building thereon outside the regular
line or the projected regular line of such public street;
(c) acquire any land for the purpose of laying out or
making a public parking place.”
15. The appellant-Corporation has also relied on Section 363 of the Act
relating to payment of compensation. The said provision is as under:
“Section 363-Compensation to be paid:– (1)
Compensation shall be paid by the Corporation to the
owner of any building or land acquired for a public street,
square, park or garden under the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that any increase or decrease in the value of
the remainder of the property, of which building or the
land so acquired formed part, likely to accrue from the
setting back to the regular line of a public street, shall
be taken into consideration in determining the amount of
such compensation.
(2) If any additional land, which will be included in the
premises of any person permitted or required by an order
under sub-section (2) of section 360 to set forward a
building to the regular line of a public street, belongs to the
Corporation, such order shall be a sufficient conveyance
to the owner of such land; and the price to be paid to the
Corporation by the owner for such additional land and the
other terms and conditions of the conveyance shall be set
forth in such order.
(3) The Corporation shall pay compensation in respect
of land or building acquired under this Chapter at the
following scale:
(i)….
(ii)….”
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16. A close examination of the text of Section 352 of the Act coupled with
the context with respect to the placement of the section in the Act,
clarifies the purpose and object of the provision. The text of Section
352 of the Act provides that the Municipal Commissioner may acquire
any land required for the purpose of opening, widening, extending,
etc. of a street, square, park, etc. The purpose of this provision is
to declare that if the Municipal Commissioner is of the view that any
land is required for the purpose of opening a street, park, etc., such
a land may be acquired. Once the Municipal Commissioner takes the
decision to acquire a piece of land, what would then be the process
of acquisition is not provided in Section 352. It is provided in Section
535 occurring in Chapter XXXIII of Part VIII of the Act which relates
to ‘Acquisition of Property’.
17. Before we deal with the Section 535, it is sufficient to conclude
that Section 352 merely contemplates the power and duty of the
Municipal Commissioner to identify the land intended for opening
of a street, park etc., and once that decision is taken, the Municipal
Commissioner would take steps to acquire such a property, for a
public purpose.
18. The context in which Section 352 is located in Chapter XXI of Part
VI of the Act relating to ‘streets for public place’, also makes the
position clear that this provision relates to vesting of public street,
squares, parks and gardens in the appellant-Corporation but does
not provide for the power of acquisition. In the following paragraph,
we have explained how the text and the context of the expression,
‘The Municipal Commissioner may acquire ’ in Section 352 is not at
all the power of acquisition.
19. Upon arriving at a decision to acquire any land for the purpose of
opening a street, square, park, etc., under Section 352, the Municipal
Commissioner will then apply to the Government under Section
537 of the Act to initiate the process of acquisition. Section 537 is
located in Chapter XXXIII Part VIII of the Act relating to ‘Acquisition
of Property’. This Chapter commences with Section 535 which
specifically provides that the appellant-Corporation shall have the
power to acquire and hold immovable property. It is followed by the
power to acquire properties through an agreement under Section
536 of the Act or in the alternative, through compulsory acquisition
of immovable property as provided in Section 537 of the Act.
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
20. The position is thus, clear. Upon application of the Municipal
Commissioner under Section 537 for the acquisition of land for
opening of a street, square, park etc., the Government may order
proceedings to be taken for acquiring land on behalf of the appellant-
Corporation as if the land is needed for a public purpose within the
meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
21. Sections 535, 536 and 537 of the Act are extracted hereinbelow for
ready reference:
“Section 535. Acquisition of property. – The Corporation
shall, for the purposes of this Act, have power to acquire
and hold movable and immovable property or any interest
therein, whether within or outside the limits of Kolkata.
Section 536. Acquisition of immovable property by
agreement.—
(1) Whenever it is provided in this Act that the Municipal
Commissioner may acquire, or whenever it is necessary
or expedient for any purpose of this Act that the Municipal
Commissioner shall acquire, any immovable property, such
property may be acquired by the Municipal Commissioner
on behalf of the Corporation by agreement on such
terms and at such rates or prices or at rates or prices
not exceeding such maxima as may be approved by the
Mayor-in-Council either generally for any class of cases
or specially in any particular case.
(2) Whenever, under any provision of this Act, the Municipal
Commissioner is authorised to agree to pay the whole or
any portion of the expenses of acquiring any immovable
property, he shall do so on such terms at such rates or
prices or at rates or prices not exceeding such maxima as
may be approved by the Mayor-in-Council either generally
or in particular as aforesaid.
(3) The Municipal Commissioner may on behalf of the
Corporation acquire by agreement any easement affecting
any immovable property vested in the Corporation and
the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply to
such acquisition.
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Section 537. Procedure when immovable property
cannot be acquired by agreement. – (1) Whenever the
Municipal Commissioner is unable under section 536 to
acquire by agreement any immovable property or any
easement affecting any immovable property vested in
the Corporation or whenever any immovable property or
any easement affecting any immovable property vested
in the Corporation is required for the purpose of this
Act, the State Government may, in its discretion, upon
application of the Municipal Commissioner, made with
the approval of the Mayor-in-Council and subject to other
provisions of this Act, order proceedings to be taken for
acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation, as if
such property or easement were land needed for public
purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (I of 1894)
(2)…..
(3) For the purpose of acquisition of immovable property
under this section, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall
be subject to the amendment that the market value of any
land or building to be acquired shall be deemed, for the
purpose of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act, to be
the market-value determined according to the disposition
of such immovable property at the date of declaration
under sub-section (1) of section 4 thereof in respect of
such immovable property.
(4) The amount of compensation awarded and all other
charges incurred in the acquisition of any such property
shall, subject to all other provisions of this Act, be forthwith
paid by the Municipal Commissioner and thereupon such
property shall vest in the Corporation.”
22. The scheme of the Act makes it clear that Section 352 empowers the
Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose
of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section
537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government
to compulsorily acquire the land. Upon such an application, the
Government may, in its own discretion, order proceedings to be
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
taken for acquiring the land. Section 352 is therefore, not the power
of acquisition. We, therefore, reject the submission on behalf of
the appellant-Corporation that Section 352 enables the Municipal
Commissioner to acquire land.
23. We will now deal with the other submission of Mr. Jaideep Gupta
that there is also a provision for compensation under Section 363
where land is acquired under Section 352. In so far as Section 363
relating to payment of compensation is concerned, the High Court
has clarified that this provision relates to payment of compensation
upon an agreement and not for compulsory acquisition. We are in
agreement with this finding of the High Court.
24. The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights: There is
yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme,
compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person
of his immovable property is well entrenched. We are examining
this issue in the context of Section 352 of the Act which is bereft
of any procedure whatsoever before compulsorily acquiring private
property. Again, assuming that Section 363 of the Act provides for
compensation, compulsory acquisition will still be unconstitutional if
proper procedure is not established or followed before depriving a
person of their right to property. We find it compelling to clarify that
a rather undue emphasis is laid on provisions of compensation to
justify the power of compulsory acquisition, as if compensation by
itself is the complete procedure for a valid acquisition.
25. While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment8, the right
to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, there
continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions,
hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite
its spatial placement, Article 300A 9 which declares that “no person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” has been
characterised both as a constitutional and also a human right 10.
To assume that constitutional protection gets constricted to the
8 Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
9 300A of the Constitution: “Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. – No person
shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”
10 Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram (2007) 10 SCC 448; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2
SCC 569
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mandate of a fair compensation would be a disingenuous reading
of the text and, shall we say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of
the Constitution.
26. The constitutional discourse on compulsory acquisitions, has
hitherto, rooted itself within the ‘power of eminent domain’. Even
within that articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition being
for a public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of
compensation in lieu of acquisition were mandated 11. Although not
explicitly contained in Article 300A, these twin requirements have
been read in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory
deprivation to afford protection to the individuals who are being
divested of property 12. A post-colonial reading of the Constitution
cannot limit itself to these components alone. The binary reading
of the constitutional right to property must give way to more
meaningful renditions, where the larger right to property is seen as
comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character
but interconnected to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave
themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action
or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property
must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and
not just one or many of its strands.
27. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi
constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such
sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are: i) duty
of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property
– the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to
the acquisition – the right to be heard , iii) the duty of the State to
inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned
decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition
is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose ,
v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of
restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct
the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines
of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process,
11 State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga (1952) 1 SCC 528
12 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T. Plantation Pvt Ltd
v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the
right of conclusion.
28. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is
tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of
them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment
of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)13 declares that the law
envisaged under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching
principles of rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is,
of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights
as ‘procedural’, a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the
inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be
procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to
property under Article 300A, non-compliance of these will amount to
violation of the right, being without the authority of law.
29. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated
in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised
by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions
for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will
demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an
integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition
and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our
courts have evolved from time to time.
30. Following are the seven principles:
30.1. The Right to notice: (i) A prior notice informing the bearer
of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right
to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right
to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does
not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire
must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes
reflect this right.
(ii) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1)
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
13 K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1
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Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3A of the National
Highways Act, 1956 are examples of such statutory
incorporation of the right to notice before initiation of the land
acquisition proceedings.
(iii) In a large number of decisions, our constitutional courts
have independently recognised the right to notice before any
process of acquisition is commenced 14.
30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful
and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the
property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns
to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard
against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not
a sham.
(ii) Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1)
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3C of the National
Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory embodiments of this
right.
(iii) Judicial opinions recognizing the importance of this right are
far too many to reproduce. Suffice to say that that the enquiry
in which a land holder would raise his objection is not a mere
formality15.
14 In Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125, it was held that a notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even in urgent cases falling under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 is the sine qua non of the process of acquisition. In State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib (1973)
3 SCC 196, it was held that a notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is necessary for
completing the land acquisition process. In Narinderjit Singh and Ranjit Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1
SCC 157, this Court held that the notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory
and if no notice is published, the entire process of land acquisition is vitiated. In Competent Authority v.
Barangore Jute Factory (2005) 13 SCC 477, this Court held that if the initial notification under Section
3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 is bad, the entire process which is followed in pursuance of it is
vitiated.
15 In Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217, this Court has held the right under Section
5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to be a substantial one and it cannot be taken away. In Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627, this Court has held that the right
of submitting objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is a valuable right and the
hearing given in pursuance of exercise of this right must not be rendered to a mere formality. In Union of
India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564, this Court held that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained
in the scheme of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute
Factory (2005) 13 SCC 477, this Court observed that in the process from the initial notification to the final
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision : i) That the authorities
have heard and considered the objections is evidenced only
through a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority
to take an informed decision and communicate the same to
the objector.
(ii) Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(2) of the
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
and Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956, are the
statutory incorporations of this principle.
(iii) Highlighting the importance of the declaration of the
decision to acquire, the Courts have held that the declaration
is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings will
cease to have effect 16.
30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the
acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an
important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire.
This requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition
must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a
welfare state and distributive justice.
(ii) Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections
3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Sections 2(1), 11(1),15(1)(b) and 19(1) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and
Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 depict the
statutory incorporation of the public purpose requirement of
compulsory acquisition.
declaration, objections play a vital road. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2012) 2 SCC 25, this
Court quashed the land acquisition proceedings when a proper hearing under Section 5A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was not accorded. In Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2013) 16 SCC 660, this
Court held quashed the land acquisition proceedings when it was observed that a mere formality was
rendered in the name of a hearing under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
16 In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132, this Court held that
publication of a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory. In Project
Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy (2021) 3 SCC 572, this Court held that
if a declaration is not published under Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 then the initial
notification and resultantly, the acquisition proceedings cease to have effect.
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(iii) The decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject
to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine
whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court
arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose
involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside.
This Court has time and again reiterated the importance of the
underlying objective of acquisition of land by the State to be
for a public purpose 17.
30.5. The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A
person’s right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part
to the constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or
extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution,
be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or
other similar means. Compensation has always been considered
to be an integral part of the process of acquisition.
(ii) Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 8 and
9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Section 23 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3G and 3H of the National
Highways Act, 1956 are the statutory incorporations of the right
to restitute a person whose land has been compulsorily acquired.
(iii) Our courts have not only considered that compensation
is necessary, but have also held that a fair and reasonable
compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process18.
17 In Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 23, this Court held that the Constitution permits
acquisition of private land by the State only for a public purpose. The rationale of taking away private
land by the State for a public purpose is that private interest must give way to public interest as observed
by the Court in Daulat Singh Surana v. First Land Acquisition Collector (2007) 1 SCC 641. In Union of
India v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar (1996) 3 SCC 491 and D. Hanumanth SA v. State of Karnataka (2010)
10 SCC 656, this Court held acquisition proceedings to be valid even if there was a change in the
public purpose, so long as there is a public purpose for which the land is acquired. The importance of
the communication of public purpose as an ingredient of the notification for acquisition was reiterated
by this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337 when acquisition proceedings were
set aside since the public purpose was mentioned as “planned development of the area” which was
observed to be wholly insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the specific purpose. Similarly, in Madhya
Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi (1992) 2 SCC 168, wherein this Court quashed the acquisition
proceedings on the ground that the public purpose was mentioned as “residential” which was too vague.
18 In State of U.P. v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126, this Court held that payment of compensation is an
integral part of the process of land acquisition. In M. Naga Venkata Lakshmi v. Visakhapatnam Municipal
Corpn. (2007) 8 SCC 748, this Court held that wherever promised, compensation is ought to be paid. In
NHAI v. P. Nagaraju (2022) 15 SCC 1, this Court held that compensation must be adequate and must be
arrived at keeping in mind the market value of the acquired land. In Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. (2020) 2
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The
acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason.
The administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting
the enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final
declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the
award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession
are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration
to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable
time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A.
(ii) Sections 5A(1), 6, 11A, and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 6(1A) and 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition
of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5),
14, 15(1), 16(1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Sections 3C(1),
3D(3) and 3E(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, prescribe
for statutory frameworks for the completion of individual steps
in the process of acquisition of land within stipulated timelines.
(iii) On multiple occasions, upon failure to adhere to the timelines
specified in law, the courts have set aside the acquisition
proceedings19.
30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of
acquisition and payment of compensation, the State takes
SCC 569, this Court held that even though compensation is not expressly provided for under Article 300A
of the Constitution, it can be inferred therein. In the American jurisprudence, payment of compensation
has been made part of due process (See Sweet v. Rechel [159 US 380 (1895) : 40 L.Ed. 188], Delaware
L. & W.R. Co. v. Morristown [276 US 182 (1928) : 72 L.Ed. 523] and United States v. Caltex (Philippines)
[344 US 149 (1952) : 97 L.Ed. 157).
19 In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand (2009) 12 SCC 194; Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC
682 and Union of India v. Mahendra Girji (2010) 15 SCC 682, this Court has underscored the importance
of following the timelines fixed by the statute. In Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak (1984) 1 SCC 125, this Court
has held that the powers relevant to the land acquisition process must be exercised within a reasonable
time. In Kerala State Housing Board v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 672, this Court has
held that if the concerned legislation does not stipulate the time-frames within which the process or its
components are to be completed, it amounts to a violation of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution.
In Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44, this Court has acknowledged the realisation of the
Parliament that the authorities are not completing the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time
and thus, the Parliament has introduced time-limits. In Ambalal Purshottam v. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corpn. (1968) 3 SCR 207, this Court held that a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any unreasonable
delay. In Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. (1976) 1 SCC 843, this Court held that excessive intervening
delay between notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, keeping the
landowner in suspense throughout, is illegal.
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possession of the property in normal circumstances. The
culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment
of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical
possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition
is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after
the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is
divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-
with possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the
State’s, or its beneficiary’s right, title and interest in the property
is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to
conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part
of Article 300A.
ii) Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 4 and
5 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Sections 37 and 38 of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3D and 3E of the
National Highways Act, 1956, statutorily recognise this right
of the acquirer.
iii) This step of taking over of possession has been a matter
of great judicial scrutiny and this Court has endeavoured to
construe the relevant provisions in a way which ensures non-
arbitrariness in this action of the acquirer20. For that matter, after
taking over possession, the process of land acquisition concludes
with the vesting of the land with the concerned authority. The
culmination of an acquisition process by vesting has been a
matter of great importance. On this aspect, the courts have
given a large number of decisions as to the time, method and
manner by which vesting takes place 21.
20 In State of W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd. (2002) 4 SCC 134, this Court held that possession
can be resumed by the acquirer only in a manner known to or recognised by law and it cannot resume
possession otherwise than in due course of law. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995
Supp (1) SCC 596, this Court held that though eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the Government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity,
even then the right to take possession of a private property must be exercised in the manner directed by
the Constitution and the laws of the State, since deprivation of property must take place after following
the procedure of law and upon ensuring due process.
21 In Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, this Court held that under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, upon the payment of compensation and taking of possession of a land so acquired,
the land is vested in the State free of encumbrances and the completion of such vesting of the land in
the State amounts to the transfer of title from the owner to the State by a legal fiction. In P. Chinnanna v.
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
31. The seven principles which we have discussed are integral to
the authority of law enabling compulsory acquisition of private
property. Union and State statutes have adopted these principles
and incorporated them in different forms in the statutes provisioning
compulsory acquisition of immovable property. The importance of
these principles, independent of the statutory prescription have been
recognised by our constitutional courts and they have become part
of our administrative law jurisprudence.
32. Conclusions: Returning to the legal submissions of the counsel for
the appellant-Corporation, as we have noticed that Section 352 does
not provide for any procedure whatsoever, we reject the contention that
it contemplates the power of acquisition. We have already held that
Section 352 is only intended to enable the Municipal Commissioner
to decide whether a land is to be acquired for public purpose. The
power of acquisition is in fact vested with the State under Section 537
and it will exercise it, in its own discretion, whenever the Municipal
Commissioner makes an application to that effect. We have also
agreed with the decision of the High Court that Section 363 is not
a provision for compensation for compulsory acquisition. In this
context, we have also held that a valid power of acquisition coupled
with the provision for fair compensation by itself would not complete
and exhaust the power and process of acquisition. Prescription of
the necessary procedures, before depriving a person of his property
is an integral part of the ‘authority of law’ , under Article 300A and,
Section 352 of the Act contemplates no procedure whatsoever.
33. We are not referring to the detailed facts of the case involving multiple
rounds of litigation where the respondents have taken inconsistent
stands about the ownership and acquisition of the Property. There
is no doubt in our mind that the exercise of the power is illegal,
illegitimate and has caused great difficult to the respondent-land-
State of A.P. (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri (2016) 12 SCC 649, this
Court held that mere passing of award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will not suffice to vest the
land in the State since taking possession is of utmost importance. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union
v. Delhi Improvement Trust, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 37, this Court held that once the land is vested in
the State, it is vested neither for a limited purpose nor for a limited duration. Further, in Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304, this Court observed that the National Highways Act, 1956 has an object
of reducing delay in the process of land acquisition in order to speedily implement projects pertaining
to highways. It is in this context that this Court held that under Section 3D of the National Highways
Act, 1956, the land to be acquired vests in the Union upon the publication of a notification declaring the
acquisition, which is done after the disposal of objections of the land-owner, if any.
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bearer. It is necessary to refer to the findings of the learned single
Judge that the appellant-Corporation acted in blatant violation of
statutory provisions, these findings are as follows:
“The facts disclosed by the Corporation in the Affidavit-in-
Opposition evidently shows that the acquisition was made
by invoking Section 352(a) of the said Act by exercising
the power of eminent domain. There was a doubt in
the mind of some of the Municipal Authorities whether
such sovereign power can be exercised by the Statutory
Authority like the Corporation and a legal opinion was
sought by the Chief Municipal Law Officer from one of the
Senior Advocates. The Senior Advocate, however, doubted
over the said exercise of power and also highlighted the
anomalies in such action. On the basis of such opinion
the Chief Municipal Officer made the following remark: -
“Doubt has arisen in the past on the question whether the
Municipal Commissioner could under Section 352(a) of
the CMC Act, 1980 straightway compulsorily acquire any
land by giving notice to owner/occupiers also in contract
Newspapers and pay compensation under Section 363(3)
of the Act. The former Ch. Mpl. Law Officer had referred
the question to Mr. P.K. Ghoah Senior Advocate for his
opinion. A copy of his opinion is placed below for persual. I
have nothing more to add. If in spite of the anomalies in the
statute pointed out by Mr. P.K.Ghosh the Mpl. Commissioner
proceeds to take possession of the land in question, I have
no comment to make. If the aggrieved party moves the
Court, then the Court will resolve the anomalies.”
It is curious to note that despite the same, the then
Mayor put a note that the Corporation may proceed to
acquire the property by invoking powers under Section
352(a) and the note of the Chief Municipal Law Officer
was simply kept in the file. It would further appear from
the subsequent noting of the Chief Municipal Law Officer
put on 08.01.1991 wherein it is noted that the act is silent
as to when the possession is to be taken either before
or after the payment of compensation under Section
363 and according to him, the possession can only be
Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.
taken after the payment of compensation under Section
363(3) of the said Act. Despite the aforesaid noting, the
Municipal Commissioner passed an order of acquisition
on 18.01.1991 directing to acquire the subject land under
Section 352(a) of the Act with immediate effect and the
possession should also be taken immediately. There is a
serious dispute whether the possession was in fact taken
in terms of the said order of the Municipal Commissioner or
not. However, it is seen from the notes put on 16.03.1991
that the possession was taken. The fact remains that no
compensation has been paid as yet. The Corporation has
further disclosed a letter allegedly written by the recorded
owner on 14.11.1991 wherein it is categorically stated that
the possession has not been taken. Though it appears
from the noting that the possession was taken way back
in 1991 but the record maintained by the Corporation was
not altered and/or corrected and in fact the Corporation
continued to accept the property tax paid by the recorded
owner in respect of the said property. Even in the year
2000, the Corporation mutated the name of the Birinchi
Behari Shaw and also issued the No Due Certificate to
him. It is only in the year 2010 the Corporation deleted
the name of the said owner and incorporated its name
as owner thereof. Yet, showing the huge outstanding on
account of property tax with interest and penalty in the
letter of intimation issued on 17.07.2010. The explanation
is sought to be offered that there is no synchronization
between the two departments of the Corporation and a
mistake has been committed, which cannot confer any
equity or right in favour of the Petitioner.
I am unable to persuade myself to agree with such
explanation. For the sake of argument, if it is accepted
that possession was taken way back in 1991, there was
no occasion to accept the property tax for more than a
decade without altering the entries made in the assessment
register.
This Court, therefore, finds that the Corporation acted
blatantly in violation of the statutory provision in acquiring
the property as such acquisition should have been
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facilitated by approaching the State under Section 537(1)
of the said Act. The entire action concerning the acquisition
of property by invoking Section 352(a) of the Act is per se
illegal, invalid and in clear contravention to the provisions
of the Act and are hereby quashed and set aside.”
34. In the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the High
Court was fully justified in allowing the writ petition and rejecting the
case of the appellant-Corporation acquiring land under Section 352
of the Act. The impugned judgment does not brook interference on
any count.
35. Having considered the matter in detail, we dismiss the appeal arising
out of SLP (C) No. 4504 of 2021 filed by the appellant-Corporation
against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in APO No. 523
of 2017 dated 17.12.2019 with costs quantified at Rs. 5,00,000/-, to
be paid to respondent no. 1 within a period of sixty days from today.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall be disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
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