Chabi Karmakar & Ors. v. the State of West Bengal
Order
1. The appellants have been convicted under Sections 498A, 304B and
306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Court
had convicted sister-in-law (appellant no.1), husband (appellant no.2)
and mother-in-law of the deceased and sentenced them to suffer
life imprisonment, 3 years R.I and 10 years R.I for offences under
Sections 304B, 498A and 306 of IPC respectively, along with fine
and other default stipulations. Both the conviction and the sentence
of the present appellants have been upheld in appeal and the High
Court has dismissed the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal,
one of the appellants i.e. appellant no. 3 (Sova Rani Karmakar, the
mother-in-law of the deceased) had passed away and the case
against her stands abated.
2. The brief case of the prosecution is as follows:
The deceased, Sonali Karmakar, and the appellant No. 2, Samir
Karmarkar were married in March 2003, and out of the wedlock,
there is a son who was born on 4.9.2004 (Now 20 years of age).
On 2.5.2006 the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself in
her matrimonial house. The deceased was alone at the time of the
incident and the appellant No. 2, the husband was not even in the
house at the time of the incident. The appellant no. 2 was informed
and the deceased had been taken to the Krishnanagar hospital
Chabi Karmakar & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal
where she was declared dead. An inquest report was conducted at
the hospital and a post-mortem was conducted on 03.05.2006 by
Dr. Ajit Kumar Biswas (PW-15). Post-mortem report shows that there
were ligature marks around the neck of the deceased and the nature
of the ligature marks shows that it is a case of suicide. Apart from
the ligature marks, there were no other ante-mortem injuries on the
body of the deceased. The report also showed that the deceased
was 22 years of age at the time of her death.
An FIR was lodged by the brother of the deceased at Krishnaganj
Police Station, Nadia on 07.05.2006 i.e. after 5 days of the incident,
alleging that his sister i.e. the deceased was being harassed by
her in-laws on demand of dowry made prior to her death. A case
was registered under sections 498A/304B/34 and a chargesheet
was filed. Thereafter, Trial Court vide order and judgment dated
5.6.2009 convicted the present appellants and mother-in-law under
Sections 498A, 304B, 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code. The case of the prosecution is that there was a harassment
of deceased which was connected to the demand of dowry, which
led the deceased to commit suicide.
3. Prosecution witnesses PW-1, 3 and 16 have all deposed that there
was a demand of dowry about which they were informed when
the deceased had come to her maternal house soon before her
death. The learned counsel for the State would argue that there is
evidence in the form of PW-4 that appellant no. 2 was also having
an extramarital affair with another woman which led to frequent
discord between the deceased and appellant no. 2 and this was
another cause of her harassment.
The learned counsel for the appellants would, however, argue that
this cannot be construed as a demand for dowry and would not
come within the definition of dowry as defined under Section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which reads as under:
“Definition of ‘dowry’ – In this Act, “dowry” means any
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given
either directly or indirectly –
(a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
800 [2024] 8 S.C.R.
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(b) By the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any
other person,
At or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection
with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include]
dowry or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim
Personal Law (Shariat) applies.”
The point which is made by learned counsel for the appellants would
be that although a demand can be made either before or “any time
after the marriage”, it should be in connection with the marriage
of the said parties. The counsel for the appellants further argued
that the demand for dowry has not been fully established by the
prosecution hence the death as occurred on 02.05.2006 cannot be
termed as a dowry death.
4. We have heard arguments and counterarguments from both parties
and have gone through the material on record. From the evidence
which has been placed by the prosecution, there are certain facts
that have been proved beyond any doubt which are:
(i) That the deceased died within seven years of marriage;
(ii) The death was by suicide in her matrimonial house; and
(iii) There was harassment at the hands of her in-laws and
particularly by the husband;
(iv) And that there was marital discord between husband and wife.
5. As far as appellant no.1 (sister-in-law of deceased) is concerned,
we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to place any
credible evidence for the involvement of appellant no. 1 i.e. the
sister of appellant no. 2 and sister-in-law of the deceased. Moreover,
appellant no. 1 is a married woman and at the relevant point of
time, admittedly, she was residing with her family at her matrimonial
home. There is no specific evidence that has come in the form of
any of the prosecution witnesses that may connect appellant no. 1
to the commission of the crime and the Trial Court as well as the
appellate Court have not considered this aspect as it should have
been considered on the weight of the evidence which was placed
by the prosecution.
Chabi Karmakar & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal
Now, the only question left to be determined is regarding the guilt
of appellant no.2 (husband).
6. After going through the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-4 and P-16
(who are the brother, father, mother and cousin of the deceased
respectively), it becomes clear that the deceased faced cruelty and
harassment at the hands of her husband (appellant no.2) which
compelled her to commit suicide. However, these witnesses did
not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with
the demand for dowry. With respect to the demand for dowry, they
have just made some general statements which are not sufficient
to convict the appellants under section 304B of IPC.
7. Trial Court raised a presumption under section 113B of Evidence
Act to convict the appellants under section 304B of IPC. The High
Court did not go into the question of whether the trial court was right
in relying upon section 113B of the Evidence Act.
In Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand 2023
SCC OnLine SC 454, where there were allegations against the
husband that he was subjecting the deceased therein on the demand
of a motorcycle and some land, this Court in relation to Section 113B
of Evidence Act and section 304B of IPC, had noted that:
“21…………………It is only certain oral averments
regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also
much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by
the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke
presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of
the Indian Evidence Act……
22. XXXXXXX
23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by
the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the
prerequisites to raise presumption under Section 304B
and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not
being fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be
justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in
the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will
not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section
304B and 498A of IPC.”
802 [2024] 8 S.C.R.
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Similarly, in the case at hand, it has not been proved by the prosecution
that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death
in connection with the demand of dowry and hence we are of the
opinion that this is not a case of dowry death under Section 304B
of the Indian Penal Code. PW-1 and PW-3 had only stated that
deceased used to tell them about her torture. PW-4 (mother of the
deceased) did not speak about any demand of dowry after marriage.
Moreover, this witness had said that appellant no.2 used to assault
her deceased daughter as the deceased had objections to the illicit
relation of appellant no.2 with another woman. PW-16, who is the
cousin of the deceased, had deposed in court almost a year after the
testimony of PW-1, 3 & 4 and his deposition regarding the physical
assault of the deceased in connection with the demand of dowry
is also not believable. Considering the aforesaid, in our view, the
trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not
established.
8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State of West Bengal
would rely on two judgments of this Court, seeking appellants’
conviction under Section 304B of IPC, both of which were decided
by Three Judges’ Bench of this Court: Rajinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Jogendra
& Anr. (2022) 5 SCC 401.
The facts in Rajinder Singh (Supra) were entirely different. In that
case, the deceased had died due to consumption of poison and there
were specific allegations against in-laws in the form of evidence from
the deceased’s father, who had given credible evidence that the
in-laws were demanding money for the construction of the house.
There was also evidence of giving a she-buffalo to pacify the in-laws.
Father of the deceased therein further deposed how the Sarpanch
and Ex-Sarpanch of their village went to the matrimonial home of
the deceased for reconciliation where the father of deceased had
promised to give money after harvest of crops.
Jogendra (Supra) was decided by taking into account the peculiar
facts of that case where the evidence of PW-1 therein contained
specific allegations of constant demand for dowry. It was stated that
deceased was asked to raise Rs.50,000 for the construction of house.
Chabi Karmakar & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal
He further stated that there was even an attempt by the ‘people of
society’ to settle the matrimonial discord between the parties.
In paragraph 9 of Rajinder Singh (Supra), this Court had discussed
the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC as follows:
“9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B
IPC have been stated and restated in many judgments.
There are four such ingredients and they are said to be:
(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any
burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of
her marriage;
(c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband; and
(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with
the demand for dowry.”
The evidence placed before us, in the case at hand, is not sufficient
to prove the fourth ingredient i.e. cruelty or harassment in connection
with the demand for dowry, as laid down by the abovementioned case.
9. All the same, having considered all the relevant aspects of the matter,
and the evidence of the prosecution, we are also of the opinion that
a case of abetment of suicide under Section 306 of IPC and cruelty
under Section 498A of IPC is made out against the appellant No.
2, although the offence under Section 304B is not made out and
consequently, we set aside the conviction of appellant no.2 under
Section 304B of IPC. With respect to the offences under Section
306 and 498A, we convict the appellant No. 2 and sentence him
to undergo three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.
25000/- on each count. Both the sentences shall run concurrently
and in default of fine, he shall undergo further imprisonment of 3
months. Further, we direct that the fine payable shall be paid to the
nearest relative of the deceased within a period of 3 months from
today. The appellant no.2 shall surrender before the concerned Court
within four weeks from today and undergo the remaining sentence.
804 [2024] 8 S.C.R.
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Also, we allow the appeal with respect to appellant no. 1 by acquitting
her for all offences in present case. As she is presently on bail, so
she need not surrender.
The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand(s) disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
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