Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited v. Grse Limited Workmens Union & Ors.
Judgment
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
September 04, 2024 1 passed by an Hon’ble Division Bench 2 of
1 impugned order
2 Division Bench
1816 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. 3 In course of deciding an
intra-court appeal 4 filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent by
the respondents in this appeal,5 their writ petition6 was allowed, the
order impugned in the writ petition set aside and directions were
issued to the appellant-Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers
Limited7 to appoint 48 (forty-eight) of the 51 (fifty-one) writ petitioners
on compassionate ground.
3. Having regard to the order we propose to pass, it is not considered
necessary to delve deep into the facts giving rise to the writ petition.
4. Suffice it to note, the subject matter of the writ petition concerned
refusal to offer compassionate appointment by GRSE Ltd. to the writ
petitioners. A learned Single Judge 8 of the High Court by an order
dated February 21, 2022 (under challenge in the intra-court appeal)
had de-listed the writ petition awaiting a decision of this Court on
the reference made to a larger bench in State Bank of India v.
Sheo Shankar Tewari,9 with liberty to mention after the reference
is answered. The Single Judge had referred to the decision of a
bench of three-Judges in N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka. 10
We are inclined to observe that the said decision, at the relevant
time, had settled the issue as regards the policy that would apply
in considering applications for compassionate appointment, yet,
the Single Judge refrained from proceeding with hearing of the writ
petition on the specious ground of the pending reference. Although
the Single Judge may not have been entirely right in de-listing the
writ petition on the stated ground and ought to have proceeded with
consideration of the writ petition finally, giving due regard to the
law then prevailing, rights of the parties were not determined and
no judgment was rendered if seen within the prism of clause 15 of
the Letters Patent; thus, it is debatable as to whether an intra-court
3 High Court
4 MAT 850 of 2022
5 writ petitioners
6 WPA No.13605 of 2016
7 GRSE Ltd.
8 Single Judge
9 (2019) 5 SCC 600
10 Civil Appeal Nos. 9280-81 of 2014, since reported in (2020) 7 SCC 617
Garden Reach Shipbuilders And Engineers Limited v.
GRSE Limited Workmens Union & Ors.
appeal could have at all been maintained before the appellate court
against the order of de-listing in view of the decision of this Court in
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania.11 At any rate, even if an
intra-court appeal was maintainable against the order of de-listing,
the writ petition not having been heard finally and on it being de-
listed by the Single Judge with liberty to mention after the reference
is answered by this Court, at the highest, intervention to the limited
extent of requesting the Single Judge to decide the writ petition in
accordance with law was open and permissible. However, it has
intrigued us to no end as to how the writ petition could be heard by
the Division Bench.
5. At this stage, our attention has been invited by Mr. Soumya Majumdar,
learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners to an order
dated March 11, 2024 passed by another Division Bench12 which was
then seized of the intra-court appeal. It was pointed out that before
such bench, learned senior counsel appearing for GRSE Ltd. had
agreed to the suggestion of counsel for the writ petitioners to disposal
of the writ petition by the appellate court and it is pursuant thereto
that the records of the writ petition were placed before the Division
Bench which ultimately, upon a contested hearing, proceeded to pass
the impugned order finally disposing of the intra-court appeal as well
as the writ petition in favour of the writ petitioners. It is, therefore,
submitted that GRSE Ltd. having also agreed to consideration and
disposal of the writ petition by the appellate court, this Court may
not take too technical a view of the matter and decide the appeal
on its merits.
6. This appeal involves a serious question as to whether judicial
discipline and propriety, in the light of Rule 26 of the Rules framed
by the High Court at Calcutta under Article 225 of the Constitution
of India in relation to applications under Article 226 thereof and the
powers of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court 13 as the
master of the roster, were maintained. Rule 26, to the extent relevant,
reads as follows:
11 (1981) 4 SCC 8
12 predecessor Division Bench
13 Chief Justice
1818 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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“26. ***
A Judge, for the reasons recorded, at the hearing or at
any subsequent stage of the proceeding may make it
returnable before a Division Bench or may while hearing
the Rule, refer the same to the Division Bench for hearing.
***”
7. The Single Judge not having referred the writ petition to a bench
of two Judges for hearing, the predecessor Division Bench was not
quite correct in accepting the suggestion of the parties and agreeing
to hear the writ petition without having any authorization from the
Chief Justice in this behalf, 14 and more particularly bearing in mind
the well-settled principle that ‘consent does not confer jurisdiction’.
A judicial order based on consent of the parties, which is in the
teeth of the Writ Rules and seeks to unsettle and even override the
determination made by the Chief Justice, could not have vested
jurisdiction in the appellate court to hear the pending writ petition.
As a sequitur, the Division Bench which passed the impugned order
could not have assumed unto itself the jurisdiction to decide the
writ petition based on the earlier order dated March 11, 2024. The
Division Bench, without feeling bound by the said order, could and
did have the jurisdiction to decline to hear the writ petition in the
absence of any determination. We presently consider it expedient
to advert to this aspect of the matter.
8. The cause-list of the predecessor Division Bench dated March 11,
2024 would reveal that it had, inter alia , the determination to hear
“AppeAl F rom order relAting to S ervice ( group vi) including
ApplicAtionS connected thereto [excluding ...]”. We have further
noticed from the cause-lists of August 16, 2024 (the date on which
the writ petition, after hearing, was reserved for judgment) and
September 4, 2024 (the date when the writ petition was allowed by the
impugned order) that the Division Bench had the same determination,
i.e., to hear, inter alia, “AppeAl F rom order relAting to S ervice
(Group VI) IncludInG ApplIcAtIons connected thereto [excludInG ...]”.
Moreover, as per the roster set by the Chief Justice, determination
was not given either to the predecessor Division Bench or to the
14 determination, as is commonly referred to in the High Court
Garden Reach Shipbuilders And Engineers Limited v.
GRSE Limited Workmens Union & Ors.
Division Bench to hear writ petitions under ‘Service (Group VI)’
of the Classification List appended to the Writ Rules. We have also
noticed that determination to hear writ petitions relating to Group VI,
as made by the Chief Justice, was given to single benches on
the relevant dates. On the face of such determination, neither the
predecessor Division Bench nor the Division Bench of the High Court
could have assumed jurisdiction to hear the writ petition premised
on the legal position that they had jurisdiction to hear appeals from
orders passed on writ petitions relating to Group VI.
9. In the light of the law laid down by the High Court itself 15 in Sohan
Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal,16 as approved by a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand 17
which has subsequently been approved by a Constitution Bench in
Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of
India,18 as well as Rule 26 (supra), we hold that any order which a
bench - comprising of two judges or a single judge - may choose to
make in a case that is not placed before them/him by the Chief Justice
of the High Court or in accordance with His Lordship’s directions,
such an order is without jurisdiction. In other words, an adjudication,
beyond allocation, is void and such adjudication has to be considered
a nullity. It needs no emphasis that the Chief Justice of the High Court,
being the primus inter pares, has been vested with the power and
authority to set the roster, as articulated in Sohan Lal Baid (supra),
and such roster is final and binding on all the ‘Companion Justices’
of the said court. Plainly, therefore, the order dated March 11, 2024
and the impugned order are without jurisdiction.
10. On this limited ground, but without examining the merits of the rival
claims, the impugned order is liable to be and is, accordingly, set aside.
We order a remand, with the result that the writ petition shall stand
revived on the file of the High Court. We request the Chief Justice of
the High Court to assign the writ petition to an appropriate bench for
its consideration and disposal, as early as possible, but preferably
within six months from today, considering that the respondents have
15 authoritatively speaking through Hon’ble P.D. Desai, CJ. (as the Chief Justice then was)
16 AIR 1990 Calcutta 168
17 (1998) 1 SCC 1
18 (2018) 1 SCC 196
1820 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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been waiting for their turn for compassionate appointment and the
appellants have their own reasons for not proceeding with making
such appointment resulting in a delayed determination.
11. We, however, record the statement of Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned
senior counsel appearing for GRSE Ltd. that till such time the writ
petition is disposed of by the appropriate Bench of the High Court
to which it is assigned by the Chief Justice, no appointment shall
be made so as to render the writ petition infructuous. That would
take care of the anxiety of the writ petitioners of being non-suited,
if appointments were made to defeat their rights. Hence, we refrain
from making any interim order to be operative during the pendency
of the writ petition or to extend the ad-interim order dated August 1,
2016, passed on such writ petition.
12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†