Din Dayal Sharma v. the State of Uttar Pradesh

IMAM, J.-The appellant was convicted under s. 5(2) Imam J. of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment on each count. The sentences were made to run concurrently. On the facts found by the courts below the appel­ lant accepted Rs. 20/- as illegal gratification from one Malekchand who had applied for allotment of a house. The appellant was employed at that time as a clerk in the office of the District Relief and Rehabilitation Office, Meerut. The aforesaid sum of money was accepted by the appellant as bribe with a view to get­ ting a house allotted to Malekchand. There can be 98 . ' '959 no question that., on the facts found, the appellant Din Dayal Sharma was guilty both uuder s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Cor- . v. ruption Act and under s. 161 of the Indian Penal The State of Code. Uttar Prndesh The first point taken was that the investigation had Imam·]. taken place by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Consequently, the investigation had taken place in contravention of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The conviction of the appellant was therefore vitiated. This point was taken before the Additional Sessions Judge who had heard the appeal of the appellant against his conviction. The Additional Sessions Judge referred to a decision of the Calcutta High Court which supported the submission made on behalf of the appellant. He also referred to a decision of the Allaha­ bad High Court to the contrary effect. He followed, as he was bound to follow, the decision of the Allaha­ bad High Court. The decision of this Court in the case of H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. 'Phe State of Delhi(') does not support the submission made by Mr. Umrigar on behalf of the appellant. He, how­ ever, referred to a passage in the aforesaid cited deci­ sion at page 1164 to the effect that where a breach of a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining cognizance, would have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified by ordering such investigation as the circumstances of the case may i;all for. It ha.s not been shown to our satisfaction that the attention of the trial court was drawn at an early stage to any breach of the provisions of.the Prevention of Corrup­ tion Act. There had been an enquiry before commit­ ment to the Sessions. It is clear that during these proceedings before commitment no objection was rais­ ed that the investigation had taken place by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in contravention of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The decision of this Court was given on December 14, 1954, and the High Court j).1dgment in the present case was delivered on {I) [1955] I S.C.R. u50, u64. ',,. ' (2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 779 \ ........ . "December 16, 1955. No point was taken before the 1 959 High Court to the effect that the investigation had n· D - 15 , .b db ffi 1 h kfD u1aya11a7ffl.4 een ma e y an o cer be ow t e ran o eputy v. Superintendent of Police in contravention of the pro- The stat• of visions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Such an Uttar Pradesh objection should have been taken if the appellant was prepared to establish before the High Court that ·the. 1"'"m J. objection had been taken at a sufficiently early stage and that in view of the decision of this Court in the case cited the trial court ought not have proceeded with the trial unless the defect had been removed. The decision of this Court in the case cited is clear, however, that generally a conviction is not vitiated because there had not been strict compliance ·with the provisions of the Prevention ofCurruption Act in the matter of investigation by a police officer. As· to whether the objection was taken at a siifficiently early stage is a question of fact and ought to have been raised in the High Court as the decision of this Court in the case cited had been delivered something like a year before. As this point in this form was not raised before the High Court we cannot allow it to be raised at this stage. It was next contended that the Assistant Sessions Judge who tried the case had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was triable by a Special Judge only. It is clear, however, that the case had been committed to the Court of Session before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,' 1952, came. into force. Under s. IO of this Act all cases pending before the Court of a Magistrate were transferred to the Court of a Special Judge .. Section 10 did not purport to transfer c11oses, pending in the Court of Session at the commencement of the Act, to the Court of the Special Judge. In the case of Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla v. The State('}, this Court observed " The cases which were pending before the courts of sessions did not require to · be so transferred because they would be tried by the procedure obtaining in the courts of sessions ancl nothing further required to be done." It seems clear to us, therefore, that the Assistant Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try the case as the same had been {I) [1957] S.C.R. 678, 686. ·,..._. 780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. . r959 pending in the court of Session when the Act came . · ·. - into force. · Din Dayal Sha,ma . . • v. The third content10n raised was that the courts The state of below had not correctly appreciated the nature, extent u11a .. P;adesh and the quantum of proof required for raising the presumption under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corrup- Im,am J. tion Act. The High Court's judgment does not show that that Court in any way raised any presumption under s. 4 against the appellant. The following pas­ sage from the High Court's judgment would make this clear: "It was next contended that the evidence on the ~ecord does not satisfactorily prove that the sum of Rs. 20 was received by the applicant as illegal gratifi­ cation. The finding on this point is a finding of fact. · I have gone through the judgment of. both the courts below and . I see no satisfactory reason to disagree with the concurrent finding of both the courts on this -~ point. There is ample evidence on behalf of the pro­ secution to the conclusion that the sum of Rs. 20 was ~ paid by Malekchand to the applicant on his demand in order to secure the allotment of a house. There does not appear any satisfactory reason why Malek­ chand should have paid Rs. 20 to the applicant to procure wheat.for him." · There is, therefore, no question of. any presumption being raised against the appellant. On the contrary, his defence that he had taken the sµm of Rs. 20 from l\Ialekchand to purchase wheat for him was disbeliev­ ed and l\falekchand's evidence that he had taken this money in order to secure an allotment of a house for l\Ialekchand was accepted. There appears to be no substance in the point raised. It was next urged that the matter of sentence may be considered. The incident took place in 1951 and the appellant has been· on bail and it would not bo desirable to send him back to jail. The sentence of one year's imprisonment for corruption by a public servant cannot, however, be considered as unduly severe. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed •