Punjab National Bank Limited v. K. L. Kharbanda

1962. February 2. The Judgment of the Court w&a delivered by WANCHOO, J.-Thi.s is an appeal by special lea.ve in an iBdustrial matter. The respondent Kharbanda is e. supervisor in the Punjab Nationel Bank Limited which is the appellant before us. The dispute relates to the fixation of his salary in accor. dance with the All India Industrial Tribune.I (Bank Disputes) A ward (hereinafter referred to as the Sastry award). The respondent made an applioe.• tion to the Central Labour Court, Delhi, under s. 33-0(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act), and his caae wns that he was entitled to certain benefits oape.ble of being computed in terms of money under the Sastry Award, but the appellant had made a wrong . ,, ... ... ' 2 s.c.n.. SUPREME OOUR'F REPORTS 979 calculation in fixing his basic salary. Therefore the respondent prayed that the benefit to which h~ was entitled by fixation of his basic salary correctly should be computed in terms of money and deter­ mined by the Labour Court. His case further was that when his basic salary was rightly fixed under Sastry A ward he would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 6,428.28 nP. as arrears upto the dat.e of his application. The application was opposed on behalf of the appellant and two contentions were raised to meet the case put forward by the respondent. In the first place it was urged that the application was not maintainable under s. 33-C(2) of the Act and the Labour Court haii no jurisdiction to decide it. Secondly, it .was urged that the manner in which the appellant had fixed the basic salary was correct and there was therefore no force in the contention of the reRpondent that he was entitled to certain benefits of which he had been deprived and which should be calculated by the labour court. Before we deal with the two points which arise in the present appeal we may refer to the provisions of the Sastry A ward out of which the present dispute arises. Originally another tribunal known as the Sen Tribunal was appointed in June 19'19 to go into the disputes between various banks all over the . country and their employees. The Sen Tribunal ma:le an award after an exhaus­ tive inquiry but on appeal to this Court the said award was set aside in 1951. Thereafter Act II 0f 1951 was passed as a. temporary measure for freezing cert.a.in provisions of the said a.ward in order to prevent the spread of the prevalent unrest am,Jngst the bank employees in quP.stion. The said dispute was then referred by the central G<i>vern­ ment to the Sastry tribunal in January 1952. · This tribunal held an elaborate inquiry and made its .. award which was published on April 20, 1953. 19'1 Punjab Notional. Bonk Limitd v. E L. Irharhno ... Wan;h .. J, JN! P1D1jd N•tinol BilM Liait1d •• lf.L. Khorbaa w-.1.oJ. 980 SUPR!ME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Appeals were preferred by the banks and their employNls against the said award before the La.hour Appellate Tribunal, and on April 28, 1954, the Appellate Tribunal substantially confirmed the recommendations and directions of the Sastry tribu­ nal with certain modifications. In the present appeal, we are not concerned with the further history of rhe disRute, for it is admitted that the provisions of the Sastry award with respect to the matter in controversy before us have remained unmodified when finally the dispute was set at rest by the Industrial Disputes (Hanking Companies) Decision Aot, (XLI of 1955). The Sastry tribunal deoided after oonsidering the matter from all aspects to provide only one scale for clerks in all banks, though banks them· selves were divided into four cl&l!Ses and the places where the baoks were situate were divided into three areas. In the present appeal we are oc>ncer­ ned with Cla1!8 A, area I, for which t.he grade provi­ ded was from Rs. 85 to Rs. 280 with varying incre­ ments (see para J 19 of the award) to which it is unnecessary to refer. Aft3r having provided one cadre of clerks, the Sastry tribunal then oonsidered the question of certain special posts where the incumbent required special skill for the c-fficient discharge of his duties and the problem before it was whether there should be a separate scale for such special posts or whether the incumbents of such posts should be in the same scale as clerks with certain advantages in the shape either of additional increments in the same soole or additional allowance over and above the scale or a combination of both. The Sastry Tribunal rejected the formulation of a separate IK'ale for these special posts and decided to grant a special allowance over and above the pay of the cleriMl scale. One suoh class of special posts with which the Sastry award was concerned was the class of supervi1ors to which the respondent belongs and it .• ,. ' " ' 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REFORTS 981 provided -i special allowance of Rs. 50/- in the case of A class bank~ in area I for supervisors by para. 164 thereof. Then arose the question of fixing the pay of the employees of the banks into the new scale provi­ ded in the award and that matter was dealt with in para. 292. '.The Sastry award divided the emplo­ yees into categories, namely, (i) those who entered the service of the banks before January 31, 1950, and (ii) those who entered the service of the banks after January 31, 1950. In the preeent case we are con­ cerned with those who joined the service of the bank after January 31, 1950. The relevant provision with respect to such employees is cl. (7) of para 292 which reads as follows :- " (7). The workmar. shall be fitted into the new scale of pay on a point-to-point basis as though it had been in force since he joined the service of the bank, provided that his adjusted basic pay is not less tha~what it would be under a point-to-point adjustment on the corresponding 'pre-Sen' scale." · It may be mentioned that the respondent was appointed as a supervisor by the appellant on April 22, 1951 on the basic salary of Rs. 120/- per mensem. . At that time the basic '!Jcale for super­ visors was Rs. 120-8-200-EB-J0-300 while there was a basic scale for graduateclerksetc. ofRs. 75-5-120- 8-200. The respondent was appointed on the initial basic salary of Rs. 120/- per mensem. The dispute between the parties is that the respondent claims that his basic salary should be fixed under para 292(7) according to the supervisor's scale for the purposes of the proviso while the appellant claims that it can only be fixed at the highest on the scale for gradu­ ate clerks, and the appellant fixed the respondent's pay on that basis, and that led to the respondent's makin. g thtlresent application unde. r s. 33-0(2) of the Act. ne tribqna.l has foqnd in favour of the J96S Punjti> National Bcnk Limited· .. K.L. Kharbanda Wanchoo J, ;HI ,..,,job N111i4n.l B..tLO.Ud •• X.L. Xh .. 1 on'- Want 1n J. respondent. The appellant therefore applied for special leave which was granted ; and that is how the matter has come up before us. The first question therefore that falls for decision is whether such an application e&n be ma.de under s.33- C(2) of the Act, Section 33-C (2) reads as follows :- "(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any bent•fit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the a.mount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may, ma.de under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court a.a may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Uovern­ ment, and the amount so determined may he recovered as provided for in s11b-sec­ tion (I)." It is contended on behalf of the appellant that s.33-C(2) deals only with such oases where the work­ man is entitled to receive from the employer 11.ny benefit which is non-monetary but. which could be computed In terms of money. It is said that it is only in such a case where the workman claims a non monetary benefit from his employer that he can apply to the• labour court for converting the value of this non-monetary benefit into money and computing the amount due in teI'IDll of money. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent that the benefit to which e. workman may be entitled need not necessarily be non-monetary and that any benefit to which be is entitled under an award if it requires computation can be the subject-matter of an appli­ cation under s. 33-0 (2). Reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent in this connection on e. couree of decisions by the indlll!trial tribune.ls and the High Courts where the meaning of the word "benefit" in sub-s.(2) has not been oonfined to non· monetary benefits only. ' r " ' 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 983 The crucial words which we have to interpret are "any benefit which is capable of being compu­ ted in terms of money". The word "benefit" is of wide .import, and the dictionary meaning thereof is "advantage, profit". This would naturally include monetary advantage or monetary profit. There is no reason therefore for excluding 'monetary benefits, from the word "benefit" used in this sub-section, unless it is clear frotn the words used that mone­ tary benefits were not intended to be included in the wide word "benefit" used therein. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that we should exclude monetary benefits from the meaning of this word in the context of this sub-section because the word is qualified by the words "which is capable of being computed in terms of money". This, it is urged, suggests that the meaning of the word '·benefit" here excludes ntonetary benefits, for, according to the appellant, there would be no sense in compu­ ting monetary benefits in terms on money. But this contention overlooks the fact that the word used in the qualifying clause is "computed" and not "converted". If the word bad been "converted" and the clause bad read "which is capable of being convert.id in terms of money" there would have been a clear indication that the benefit which was to be converted in terms of money was other than monetary benefit. The dictionary meaning of the word "corivert" is "to change by substituting an equivalent"; and if the word "convert" bad been used in the qualifying words, the argument that the word "benefit'' only means non-monetary benefit might be incontrovertible. But the word in the qualifying clause is "computed" and the dictionary meaning of the word "compute" is merely "to calculate". Therefore, where the benefit to which a workman may be entitled has not already been calculated, for example, in an award which confers on him the. benefit, it stands to reason that sub-s.(2) would apply for oomput'\tion of such benefit if funfab _N ,_ tion1l Btt11k Limitad v. K.L. Kh.,b1nd& Wach•• J, 1•61 /',,.j <b NcJi°"ti B im.t Lintittd v. Ir.C.. Eli4r6-la w..nc.1 .. J. there is di8J>Ut.e about it. Further, if we compare sub-s.(I) with sub-s.(2) of this section, it will appear that suo-s,(Il applies to cases where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settle· ment or an award or under the provisions of Chap. VA and that contemplates that the amount is al­ ready computed or calculated or at any rate there can be no dispute about the oomputation or oalculr.­ tion; while sub-s.(2) applies to cases where though the monetary benefit has been conferred on a work­ man under an award, it has not been caloulated or computed in the award itself, and, there is dispute as to its calculation or computation. It cannot therofore be said looking to the words used in sub-s.(2) that it only applies to cases of non-mone­ tary benefit which has to be oonverted in terms of money. It appears to us that it can also apply to monetary benefits to which a workman may be entitled which have not been calculated or compu­ ted, say, for example, in an award and about their r.alculation or computation there is dispute bet'lteen the workman and the employer. It may be added that s.33-C was put in the Act for the purpQflell of execution in J 956 after the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, (48 of 1950) was repealed in that year. The Appellate Tribunal Act con· t&ined s. 20 which provided for execution of awa.rds and was in terms almost similar to s.33-C. When the Appellat.e Tribunal Act was repealed in 1956 a provision Himilar to that contained in s. !:O waa brought into the Act at the 88UlO time. It is clear therefore that s.33-C is a provision in the nature of executing and where the amount to be executed is worked out (for example in an award) or where it may be worked out without any dispute, 1.33.q I) will apply. But where the amount due to work­ man is not stated in the award itself and there is a dispute as to its calculation, sub-s.(2) will apply and the •orkman would be entitled to apply there­ under to have the a.mount computed provided he~ r' ! . I( 2 S.C.R. SUPREJ.\IE COURT REPORTS 985 entitled to a benefit, whether monetary or non­ monetary, which is capable of being computed in terms of money. This matter had come up before Appellate Tribuniil in l\J55 in Glaxo Laboratories ( lndia) Limited. Bombay v. Shri A. Y. Manjrekar. (1). 'l'he appellate tribunal took the view that s. 20 of the Appellate Tribunal Act was concerned purely with execution and there was no reason to hold that sub-s. (2) only applied to non-monetary bene­ fits. '1 he same view was taken by the Madras High Court in South Electricity Distribution Company Limited v. Elumalril (2 ) by a learned Single Judge and again by the same High court in M.S.Y.S. Transports' Tiruchirapalli v. Rajaram (K)(3 ) by a Division Bench. Looking therefore to the words of the sub-section and the previous decisions with respect tn them we are of opinion that the word "benefit" used in sub-R. (l) is not confined merely to non-monetarv benefit which could be converted in terms of 11101;ey but is concerned with all kinds of benefits, whether monetary or non-monetary, to which a workman may be entitled, say, for example, under an award and that the sub-section oomes into play when the benefits have to be comput,!ld or caloulated and there is a dispute as to the calculation or computation. After the benefits have been so computed, the workman can apply under.sub-s. (l) for recovcr.v of the amount in the same manner as arrears of land-revenue. As in this case, the Sastry award had conferred a benefit on the respondent and thosH like him by providing for fixation of pay in the new scale, even though that benefit may be monetary and there- was a disput11 between the parties as to the amount of tl:rat bene­ fit, it was ope1;1 to the respondent-to apply to \,he labour court for computation of that benefit in terms of money, and the labour court would have (I) (1955) L.A.C.505. • (2) (1959) J.L.L.,J. 624, (3) (1960) J.t.L.J. 336. 1962 P .. jtiJ National Bank Limiwl •• IC.L. Khmbanda WiuwlwoJ. Ifft Punio • ft' •lion, l &nit limikd •• K'.L. Jrh.,b,..U jurisdiction to entertain the application and compute the amount due on the basis of the bt nefit conferred by the award. This brings us to the next question, namely, •as to how the basic salary should be fixed. The main emphasis on behalf of the appellant in this connection is on tho word "corres.ponding" appear· ing in cl. (7) of para. 292. It is urged that the Saatry tribunal fixed one scale for all clerks and as supervisors are clerks the respondent could only be considered as belonging to the corresponding scale for clerks in the appellant-bank for the application of the proviso and thereafter he would be entitled to the special allowance of Re. 60( • per meneem. On the other hand, the respondent con­ tends that Eupervisors are workmen, as has been held in a diapute between this very bank and its supervisors, referred to an industrial tribunal which gave an award on April 4, 1967, (see the observa­ tions ofthia Court in the Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen) (l), and therefore all tha.t was necessary to find out th" corresponding scale was to 1ee in what scale of workmen the respondent was at the relevant time. In this connection, we ·ma.y incidentally add that it is not disputed by the appellant tha.t its supervisors, accountants and accounts in-charge are generally workmen under the Act, though some may not be so. The diffi· culty, so far u the appellant is concerned, arose on account of the fact that the appellant had nine scales which applied to workmen of all kinds begin­ ning with peons and chaukidars and ending with aocountants and accounts in-charge. Three of these scales were for what may be called subordi· nate eta.If under the Sastry award while six were for what is clerical staff under the Sastry award. These six included the grade of super­ visors. The appellant however contends that only (I) C.A. 450of1959, Dockltd Oii December 9, 1960. ( ' ' ! "'i ( 2 S.0.R. SbPREME COURT REPORTs 987 four gra:des, namely (i) Assistant Cashiers. (ii) Head Cashiers, (iii) Undergraduate clerks, typists and Godown keepers, and (iv) Graduate clerks, all stenographers in sanctioned stenographer's posts, should be treated as clerks for purposes of correspon­ dence with the scale for clerks fixed by the ::-astry award and the remaining two grades, namely, (i) Supervisors, and (ii) Accountants and Accounts in-charge, should not be treated as clerks for the purpose of correspondence. In view, however, of the decision o{ the industrial tribunal in the dis­ pute between the appellant and s0me of its super­ visors and accountants already referred to, it is obvious that these two grades -for supervisors and accountants and accounts in-charge were also grades for workmen prevalent in the appellant­ bank. What the Sastry award did was to make one grade for all clerical workmen and when cl. (7) spe iks of correspondence it relates in our opinion to the corresponding grades of workmen by whatever name they may have been known in particular banks. The fact that certain clerical workmen in this bank were called clerks while certain others were called supervisors, accountants and accounts in-charge would not in our opini(,n make any difference to the- question of correspon­ d~ncfl, para 292 deals with workmen generally and not separately with clerical staff and subordinate staff. Further cl. (7) itself lays down that the workmen shall be fitted into the new scale of pay on a point-to-point basis and therefore when we have to find the corresponding scale for the pur­ pose of the proviso in cl. (7) we have to look at the corresponding scale which relates to a workman at a time before the Sen award. Now if the supervisor's scale was the scale of a workman previous to the Sen award then it must be held to be a corresponding scale for the purpose of fixation so far as the respondent is concerned, irrespective of the name by which this class of workmen was designated in this particular bank. The proviso 1962 Punja6 JV stional Bank Limited v. K. L. Kharh•ni.a 1962 hnj•b Nationol Bank CimiW v. Kl Klt.rillNfa Won&hoo J. 988 SUPREME <X>URT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. t says th11t after adjustment the basic pay she.II not be· leBB than what it would be under a. point­ to-point adjustment on the corresponding pre-8en scale. If therefore the supervisor's scale is a. workman's scale it must be the corresponding prc­ Sen scale so far a.s the respondent is concerned; consequently his be.sic pa.y oa.nnot be fixed in the new era.le prescribed by the Sa.stry a.ward below what it would be on the corresponding pre-Sen scale. We ha. ve already pointed out that it has been already held between this very bank a.nd its. workmen that supervisor's are workmen a.nd therefore the supervisor's scale in this bank was a workmen's scale; therefore when the fixation of pay has to be ma.de under cl. (7) we have to find out the corresponding workmen's scale in the case of the respondent at a. ·time before the Sen a.we.rd \l'nB ma.de and th1't in our opinion can only be the supervisor's scale, for supervisors hf!ove been held to be workmen between the parties to the pre­ sent dispute. The fact that the Sastry a.we.rd pro­ vided for a specie.I pay for certain employees includ­ ing super\•isors has no rE>levance on the question of correspondence which has to be worked out under· cl. (7) in order to find out the be.sic pay for pur­ poses of fixation. In view of what we have said, the superviloor's sea.le being a scale for workmen in this bank, the respondent is right in his claim that his be.sic pa.y cannot be reduced below what it would be under a point-to.point adjustment on the corredponding scale which he was drawing before the Sen award. in this bank as a. workman. In this view of the matter the view taken by the labour court is correct. Once the principle is fixed, there is no dispute as the amount due to the respondent. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismiBBed wit b costs. ..