Jhummamal Alias Devandas v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

0 JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J, We grant special leave and pro- F ceed to dispose of the appeal. The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated April 25, 1986 quashing the final order made under sec. 145 of Cr. P.C..in respect of a shop premises. The shop was in possession of one Asgarali son of Akbar Ali as mortgagee since G October 17, 1969. On August 7, 1982, Asgarali was said to have leased out the shop to the petitioner and also .delivered possession thereof. The entering.of possession by the petitioner became a subject matter of dispute. Apprehending breach of peace, the police initiated pro­ ceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P.C. before the Additional Oistrict Magis­ trate, Ujjain. In that proceedings, the petitioner was party no. 2 and H' r.espondent no. 2 was party no. I. On August 13, 1982 the Magistrate made a preliminary order. The proceedings continued for about three years. On May 17, 1985, the Magistrate made the final order in the following terms: "Hence I believe that the party no. 2, Jhummamal alias Devandass S/o Jethanand had the occupation within two months from 13.8.1982 on which summons were issued by the court under sec. 145 sub-sec. ( 1). Hence I or.der that party no. 2 Jhummamal is entitled for the occupation of the shop unless he is evicted by proce­ dure established by law. And I issue injunction that there should not be any obstacle in handing over the possession to Jhummamal. And if there are locks placed by Motilal or his accomplices, the same should be broken open. And the goods, if any, found in the shop should be handed over to a responsible person after making a panchnama." It will be seen from the above order that the petitioner is entitled to restoration of possession since he was dispossessed forcibly and wrong­ fully within the terms of proviso to sec. 145(4) of Cr.1'.C. But unfor­ tunately, the petitioner could not be put into possession. E On July 15, 1985, the respondent filed a suit for injunction. On August 14, 1985, he obtained temporary injunction against the appel­ lant. But upon appeal that temporary injunction was vacated. The learned first Additional District Judge, who delivered the judgment in that appeal, has recorded the following findings: F "Consequently it is clear from the above analysis that Asgar Ali was in possession of the disputed shop till 7 .8.82. It seems to be his prima facie right to rent out the shop. That it seems that he received the rent in advance, executed the rent deed and transferred the possession to appellant/Jhummamal. As it is mentioned above the First G Information Report lodged by Kanhayalal on behalf of Jhummamal in which it is .stated that Jhummamal obtained possession on 9.8.82, does riot seem right, when only re­ spondent has demanded possession in his petition dated 13.8.82. Hence I believe that Jhummamal obtained the possession of the disputed shop ·in his capacity as tenant. Respondent and his brothers put their locks later on. And JHUMMAMAL v. STATE OF M.P. [SHETIY, J.] 587 as in my opinion on the date of occurrence of incident, A Jhummamal was in possession of the shop, respondent/ plaintiff . does not have a prima facie case in his favour ...... •.• ................. · ............... •'• ........ . Hence, I believe that the temporary injunction order pas- B sed by the lower court is not just and as per law. Conse­ quently while disagreeing with the order passed by the lower court, I accept the appeal and quash the order passed by thelower court." In. between the parties, there were also certain criminal proceed­ ings regarding the theft from and house trespass on the same premises. C A couple of days before the preliminary order was made under sec. 145 Cr.P.C., a relation of the appellant filed report before the Police complaining against the respondent. On that report the respondent was prosecuted under secs. 380 and 454 of the IPC. On February 22, 1984, he was convicted of the said offences. But upon appeal, he was D acquitted by the Additional District Judge. The revision against the order of acquittal was also dismissed by the High Court. It may also be relevant to state that the respondent challenged the final order under sec. 145(6) of the Cr.P.C. in a revision before the Sessions Judge. On September 27, 1985, that revision was dismis- E sect, After becoming unsuccessful in the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. and also before civil court in the suit for injunction, the respondent moved the High Court under sec. 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. The High Court accepted the petition and quashed the proceedings by following the judgment of this Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., [1985] 1 SCC F 42 7. The operative portion of the High Court order is as follows: ··Jn view of the fact that civil proceedings in respect ot the disputed premises is pending before the competent civil court, where interim reliefs have been prayed for and obtained, the reappears to be no justification for continuing G with the proceedings u/s 145 Cr.P .C. pending before the S.D.M. Shri Tiwari learned counsel submitted that in case the plaintiff's suit is either withdrawn or dismissed, he would be , left with no remedy. This submission cannot be accepted H ·jn view of the Supreme Court judgment as reported -in Ram Sumer f'uri v. State of U: P., AIR 1985 SC 472. Section 145 is intended to provide a special remedy for the prevention of breach of peace arising out of a dis­ pute relating to immovable .property. Its primary object is to maintain the public peace and not to decide disputes between the contending parties or adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to possession. Now, that the civil court is seized of the matter, it is desirable that such parallel propeedings in respect of the same subject matter and dis­ pute should not be allowed to continue in the criminal comt as it amounts to an abuse of the process of the court which is one of the grounds for invoking section 482 Cr. P.C: For the foregoing reasons, this petition deserves to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The proceedings u/s 145 Cr.P.C. pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Ujjain, along with the orders passed therein is; thorefore, quashed." The validity of the aforesaid order has been called into question in this appeal. E It will be obvious from the order of the High Court that the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer's case has been totally misunder­ stood. In that case, a title suit for possession and injunction in respect of certain property was instituted before the civil court. The suit was dismissed on February 28, 1981. The matter was taken up in appeal. When the appeal was pending for disposal, proceedings under sec. 145 F Cr.P.C. were initiated with regard to the same property. In that proceedings, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under sec. 145(1) of the Cr.P.C. and also attached the property. The aggrieved party challenged that order in.a revision petition before the Allahabad High Court. The Hig~ Court refused to interfere with that order. But this Court quashed the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. observfog: G "There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the pro­ position that parallel-proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court, ~I JHUMMAMAL v. STATE OF M.P. [SHETTY. J.) 589 the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its juris- ·A diction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appoint­ ment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed.'' We fail to understand how the High Court rn this case took advantage of the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer's case. The ratio of the said decision is that a party should not be permitted to litigate before the criminal court when the civil suit is pending in respect of the same subject matter. That does not mean that a concluded order under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. made by the Magistrate of compeient jurisdiction should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has approached the civil court. An orde! made under sec. 145 Cr.P.C. deals only with the factum of possession of the party as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed pro­ perty. The order is subject to decision of the civil court. The unsuc­ cessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil court. He may move the civil court with properly constituted suit. He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which the Magis­ trate has reached. Counsel for the respondent, however, suggested that having re­ gard to the nature of dispute and the rights of parties relating to the property in question, we should not exercise our extrnordinary jurisdic­ tion under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We do not think that the_ contention could be accepted in view of the patently erroneous order of the High Court. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Magistrate. The parties may work out their rights as per law. P.S.S. Appeal allowed.