Narne Tulaman Manufactures Pvt. Ltd. Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad
SAJIYASACHI MUKliARJI, J. These are appeals under section
35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter called 'the
Act') arise from the decision of the Customs, Excise and Gold
(Control) Appellate Tribunal {CEGAT for short), New D~lhi. The
F question that fell for consideration by the Tribunal is whether the
appellant M/s. Name Tulaman Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. manufactured
weighbridge~ and as such was liable to duty under the Act.
It appears that weighbridges consisted of three different parts,
namely, (1) Platform, (2) Load Cells and (3) Indicating system. The
b contention of the appellant was that he got the platform manufactured
from other people. The load cells were imported and the appellant
only made the indicator system. In other words, it was the case of the
appellant that it manufactured only the indicator system. The ques
tion, that fell 'for the Tribunal's determination is whether the activity
indisputably c.arried out by the appellant amounted to manufacture
ff and what does it manufacture? It has been found that "the appellant
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N.T. MFRS. v . .COLLECTOROFCENTRALEXCISE [MUKHARJl,J.) 3
brought the three components together at site, fitted and assembled
them together so that they can work as one machine and as such the
appellant manufactured and created a new weigbbridge". The afore
said findings appear in paragraph 5 of the Tribunal's order. That
weighbridge had not been excised before is not disputed. The term of
the central excise speaks of "weighbridge"; wheneve1 weighbridges
are made, those weighbridges are subjected to duty as such. The
Tribunal held that by whatever process it became a complete weigh
bridge as long as a weighbridge has been made and completed, duty
has to be paid. According to the Tribunal, though the parts are
themselves liable to excise duty and so the complete machine is also
a new excisable good. In view of the well-settled principles, the
excisable goods are manfactured by the appellant. Section 2(f) of the
Act provides an inclusive definition and states that the word
"manufacture" includes any process incidental or ancillary to the com
pletion of a manufactured product. So any process by which an object
becomes new commercial goods, including any process incidental or
ancillary to the completion would be manufacture. Manufacture
means bringing into existence new goods. This Court observed in
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth Mills, [1963] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 586 that
manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture
and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and
manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be
transformation, a new and different article must emerge having a dis
tinctive name, character or use. The question, therefore, is whether the
activity carried out by the appellant of assembling the three compo
nents of the weighbridge brings into being complete weighbridge
which was a distinctive name, characte.r or use. See also the observa
tions of this Court in Allenburry Engineers (p) Ltd. v. Ramakrishna
Dalmia & Ors., [1973] 2 S.C.R. 257 and Jdandas v. Ananat
Ramchandra Phadke, [1981] 3 Scale 1790.
The appellant's contention before the Tribunal was that it was
only preparing a part and that part is dutiable as a separate part. The
appellant, however, did the work of assembling. As a result of the
work of the appellant a new product known in the market and known
under the excise item "weighbridge" comes into being. The appellant
will become a manufacturer of that product and as such liable to duty.
That is precisely what the Tribunal found on the facts of the case. The
appellant seems to have been obsessed by the idea that as a part of
machine is liable to duty t.hen the whole end product should not be
dutiable as separate excise goods. That is mistake, a part may be goods
as known in the excise laws and may be dutiable. The appellant in this
A case claims to have manufactured only the indicator system. If the
indicator system is a separate part and a duty had been paid on it and if
the rules so provide then the appellant may be entitled to abatement
under the rules. But if the end product is a separate product which
comes into being as a result of the endeavour and activity of the
B appellant then the appellant must be held to have manufactured the
said item. When parts and the end product are separate_ly dutiable
both are taxable.
In that view of the matter, the appellant's case that it is liable
only for the component part and not the end product cannot be
entertained. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in the view it took.
C These appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. This order
will not preiudice the rights of the appellant to claim, if any, abate
ment as indicated before according to the rules if the appellant is so
entitled.
R.S.S. Appeals dismissed.
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