Smt. Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan v. Union of India & Ors.

K. JAGANNATIIA SHETTY, J. These two petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitutfon are for issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus for the B release of Ram Ratan and Hawa Singh, who have been detained under sec. 3(2) of the National Security Act of 1980. Ram Ratan was a Head Constable and Hawa Singh was a Const· able in the Security Unit of Delhi Police. While on duty, they were together said to have committed a cognizable offence under Sec. 392/ C 34 of IPC alongwith a member of the public. Immediately thereafter they were arreste·a and placed on suspension. The Court, however, released them on bail". While the case was under investigation, the Commissioner of Police. Delhi (Mr. Vi jay Karan) thought fit to detain them under the National Security Act. Accordingly, he made the orders which are impugned herein. Subsequently, they have been sum- D marily dismissed from service under Article 3 ll(ii)(b) of the Constitution. The principal contention urged for the petitioners relates to the oft-repeated question-that the ground of detention has no nexus to the "public order", but purely a matter for "law and order". · E In order to appreciate the contention urged in this regard, it will be necessary to have regard to the orders of detention. The orders passed against the two detenu are on different dates, but are similar in terms and it may be sufficient if we reter to one of the orders. The ground of detention in each case relates to one incident which has been F stated as follows: "That on 22. 7 .88, one Shri Ja:;bir Singh S/o Shri ' lnder Singh R/o 5869/3 Ambala City (Haryana) reported that on 21.7.88 he purchased some T.V. parts from Lajpat Rai Market. After purchase, he loaded the TV parts on a G rickshaw and asked the rickshaw puller Shanker S/o Shri Vasudev R/o Old Lajpat Ra; Market, Near Hanuman Mandir, who was known to him to take the TV parts to Patiala Transport near Libra Service Station G.T.K. Road. He h:mself went alone to Patiala Transport and waited for the rickshaw puller. ·At about 11.00 pm, the rickshaw H 1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R. puller informed him that two police personnel namely H.C. ~· A Ram Ratan and Constable Hawa Singh who were pre- viously posted in P .S. Kotwali along with a member of the !· public '!rabhu Dayal wno he knew has stopped his rickshaw near l:l l:llock, Industrial Area, G.T.K. Roact. Head Const- able Ram Ratan caught him and started beating him and B asked for a receipt for the goods. Constable Hawa Singh ancic';abhu Dayal removed the parts and loaded in a TSR and went away." It was also stated that those T. V. parts were recovered from the detenu and the case was registered under sec. 392/34 IPC in which the c investigation was progressing. There then, it was said: "From the above criminal activity of Shri Ram Ratan it is clear that he, being a Police Officer and bound to D provide security and safety to the public, has himself com- milted a heinous offence which has created a sense of inse- curity in the minds of public at large and is pre-judicial to • tne mamtcnance of public order. ' 1'..eeping in view the above criminal activity of the i:" E said Head Constable Ram Ratan, it has been felt necessary to detain him U/S 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 so that his such activity which is prejudicial to the main- tenance ol public order could be stopped xxx xxx xxx xxx Sd1- (Vi jay Karan) COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: Delhi" j! , As is obvious from the order, the Commissioner was satisfied .... with the need to detain the person, firstly because, the person being a ,. G police officer was boutid to provide security and safety to the public and secondly, the offence committed was "heinous" which has createct a >ense of msecunty in the minds of the public at large. , i he same was highlighted before us by Shri Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondents justifying the detention orders. The H counsel argued that though the incident in question was a simple case { • . '! I "' t-• •: ~- c:tj_~,'!'!-!! - _, /.'":;::: SMT. ANGOORI DEVI v. U.0.1. ISHETTY, J.J 1027 of robbery, since it was committed by persons belonging to the disci- A plined police force, it would certainly disturb the public safety in the life ·of the community with a sense of msecurity in their minds. It is true that the detenu belonged to the police force in the national capital. Public look for the police for safety. Society regards them as their guardian for its protection. Society needs a properly B trained and well disciplined police force whom it can trust in all respects. They are the real frontline of our defence against violence. They have to maintain law and order. They have to safeguard our freedoms and liberty. They have to prevent crime and when crime is committed, they have to detect it and bring the accused to justice. They must be available at all hours. They are always expected to act and indeed must act properly. it is reprehensible if they themselves C indulge in criminal activities. We are not, as we cannot, be unmindful of the danger to liberties of people when guardians of law and order themselves indulge in un­ desirable acts. But the law of preventive detention is not different to D police personnel. It is the same law that we apply to police as well as to public. We cannot, therefore, apply a different standard in respect of acts individually conunitted by any police officer. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority with respect to the persons sought to be detained should be based only on the nature of the activities disclosed by the grounds of detention. The grounds of deten- E tion must have nexus with the purpose for which the detention is made. · The question in this case is whether the crime in question has any impact on ·'public order" as such. Courts have strived to give to this concept a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest. F In the Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [ 1960] .:. SCR 32 i Subba Rao, J., as he then was, observed (at 833): "But in India under Art. 19(2) this wide concept of "public order'' is split up under different heads. It enables G the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression i.n the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or· in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. All the grounds mentioned therein can .he H -·<:: 1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11988] Supp. 3 S.C.R. brought under the general head "pubik ~rder" in its most comprehensive sense. But the juxtaposition of the different grounds indicates that, though sometimes they tend to overlap, they must be ordinarily intended to exclude each other. "Public order•· is therefore something which is demarcated from the others. In that limited sense, particu­ larly in view of the history of the amendment, it can be postulated that "public order'' is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility." 'The impact on "public order'' and "law and order" depends updn the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquility, it may fall within the orbit of the public order. This is precisely the distinguishing feature between the two concepts. Sometimes, as observed by Ven­ katachaliah, J. in Ayya Alias Ayub v. The State of U.P. & Anr., Judl(­ mcnt Today 1988 Vol. 4 p. 489 (at 496): "what might be an otherwise simple "law and order'' situation might assume the gravity and mis­ chief of a "public-order" problem by reason alone of the manner or circumstances in which or the place at which it is carried-out." Neces­ sarily, much depends upon the nature of the act the place where it is committed and the sinister significance attached to it. As for example dare devil repeated criminal acts, open shoot out, throwing bomb at public places, committing serious offences in public transport, armed persons going on plundering public properties F or terrorising people may create a sense of insecurity in the public mind and may have an impact on "public order". Even certain murder committed by persons in lonely places with the definite object of promoting the cause of the party to which they belong may also affect the maintenance of 'public order'. G In Abdul Aziz v. The Distt. Magistrate Burdwan & Ors., [1973] 2 SCR 646 this Court has stated so. There two grounds were furnished to the detenu in justification of the order of detention. It was stated: "firstly, that the petitioner and his associates were mem­ bers of an extremist party (CPI-ML), that on 16th August 197 J, they armed themselves with lethal weapons like ; : SMT. ANGOORI DEVI v. U.0.1. [SHETfY, J:I 1029 firearms, choppers and daggers with a view to promoting the cause of their party, that they raided the house of one Durgapada Rudra and murdered him and that the afore­ said incidents created a general sense of insecurity, as a result of which the residents of the locality could not follow their normal avocations for a consider~!Jle period. The second ground of detention is that on 22nd .May, 1971 the petitioner and his associates raided the house of Smt. Kshetromoni Choudhury and· murdered one Umapada Mallick who was staring in that house. This incident is also stated to have created a general sense of insecurity amongst the residents of the locality." Repelling the connection in that case that the two incidents refer­ red to above are but simple cases .:if murder germane to law and order but could have no impact on public order Chandrachud, J. as he then vas, said (at p. 648): "A short answer to this contention is that the murders are stated to have been committed. by the petitioner and his . associates with the definite object of promoting the cause of the party to which they belonged. These, therefore, are not stray or simple- cases of murder as contended by the learned counsel. Such incidents have serious repercussions not merely on law and order but on public order." . In Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan v. State of West Bengal, [ 1975] Suppl. SCR U4 this Court had an occasion to consider the detention of a person under the maintenance of Internal Security Act, 197 1 regarding a single instance of theft in a running train at night. The acts attributed to the detenu in that case were that on 3.8.1973 between 2110 and 2120 F hrs., the detenu and his associate being armed with daggers boarded a 3rd class compartment of SL 257 UP train of E. Railway Sealdah Division at Gocharan Railway Station. They put the passengers of the compartment to fear of death and snatched away a wrist watch and a gold necklace from one Nirmal Chatterjee and his wife in between Gocharan and Surajpur Railway Stations. Then they decamped with · G booty from the running train at Suryapur Railway Station. It was con­ tended in that case that the said single incident referred to have not even casual connection with the disturbance of public order. Fazal Ali, J. while rejecting that contention said (at 126): · "From a perusal of this we are unable to accept the H F' content10n of the petitioner that this ground has no nexus with the disturbance of public order. It is true that the ground contains a single incident of theft of valuable pro­ perty from some passengers travelling in a running train and may amount to robbery. But that does not by itself take the case out of the purview of the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. There are two per­ tinent facts which emerge from the grounds which must be noted. In the first place the allegation is that the petitioner had snatched away a wrist watch and a gold necklace after putting the passengers of the compartment to fear of death. Secondly, the theft had taken place at night in a running train in a third class compartment and the effect of it would be to deter peaceful citizens from travelling in trains at night and this would undoubtedly disturb the even tempo of the life of the community." We have carefully examined the act complained of in the present case in the light of the principles stated above. It is an isolated criminal case with no sinister significance attached to it. The offence was com­ mitted by two misguided police men under the cover of darkness with the assistance of a member of the public. It was certainly suicidal to those two police personnel. But it seems to have no connection what­ soever to disturb the 'public order' having regard to the circumstances o: the case. The last contention urged for the petitione" that the detention would be illegal in view of dismissal of detenu from service is really without merit. The subsequent order of dismissal is not germane to examine the validity of the detention. In the result the rule is made absolute. The orders of detention impugned in these cases are q°uashed. The detenu Ram Ratan and Hawa Singh be set at liberty forthwith. M.L.A. Petitions allowed. I ) )