Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Shripati Pandurang Khade & Ors. Etc.

DUTT, J, Special leave is granted. Heard learned Counsel for C the parties. These appeals preferred by the appellant, the Maharashtra State Cooperntivc Cotton Growers Marketing f'ederotion Ltd., nre directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court whereby the High Court allowed the writ petitions of the respondents and quashed the D order of the Industrial Court Maharashtra (Kolhapur Bench), Kolhapur, dl~misslng tho complaints filed by tho respondents. The Government of Maharashtra appointed the Muharnshtra State Cooporotlve Marketing Federation, horeinaft~r referred to llS "the Marketing Federation", the Chief Agent in the Cotton Monopoly E Scheme under the provision of section 42 of the Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement Process of Marketing) Act, 1971. The activities of the Marketing Federntion extended to various ngrlculturnl produce including foodgrains. In Februory, 1984, the Government carved out the operation of the, levy of cotton from the other activities of the Marketing Federation and assigned them to another society, namely, p the Maharashtrn State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd., the appellant in all these appeals. By its order dated August 10, 1984, the Government directed the Marketing Federation to take the following actions: 0 "(i) In respect of the Staff working under the Co.tton Monopoly Scheme at present, the Services of•thc seasonal staff working, If any, should be terminated with immediate effect and in any case not later than lSth August, J984. I (Ji) So far as the regular staff Is concerned, it Is proposed that tho services of the staff working in tho Cotton Depart· ment of tho Federation at Bombay and in the Mofussil « """'" """''""" . ., - ',... - ' - - ~~ STATE COOPERATIVE COTTON v, S.P. KHADE !DUTT, J,J 475 ' areas would be placed at the disposal of the new Organisa· A tion on "as is where is basis" as on 1st July, 1984." In a subsequent letter dated September 8, 1984 the Marketing Federation was directed to effect the transfer of the chief agency from the Marketing Federation to the appellant, Inter alla, by transferring all the assets and liabilities under the scheme account and the cash and B Bank balance at Bombay and Mofussil under the scheme account as well as under the non-scheme account to the appellant etc. The respondents claimed that they were permanent employees of the Marketing Federation and in view of the directions contained ln the said letter dated August 10, 1984 of the Government, the appellant C should have appointed them on a permanent basis and not as seasonal employees. The case of the respondents was that they had been in the employment of the Marketing Federation since 1972 on monthly salaries with annual Increments. Even though there wa1 on Award In their favour by the fodustrial Tribunal declaring them os permanent employees, yet the Marketing J' ~deratlon and the appellant failed D and neglected to 11ive them the permanent status. Accordingly, they mnde · complaints before the Industrial Court complaining of unfair lnbour prnctlccs on tho part of the Marketln11 Fedcrallon as also on the part of the appellant as contained In Items Nos. 6 and 9 of Schedule IV to fhe Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. Items 6 and 9 are as follows: B "Jtcms 6. To employ employee os "bad/ls'', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with.the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees. Item 9. Failure to Implement award, scttlomont or agree· mcnt." p In this connection, we may refer to section 5(d) of the said Act which provides that it shall be the duty of tho Industrial Court to decide complaints relating to unfair Jabour practices except unfair o , labour practices falling In Item 1 of Schedule JV. The Industrial Court took the view that' the complaints made by the respondents did not come under Item Nos. 6 and 9, but they came under Item No. 1 and, as such, It could not decide the complaints In view of section 5( d). Further, It was held by the Industrial Court that H ---- "~ 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 3 S.C.R. A there was no unfair labour practice on the part of the Marketing Fedra­ tion or the appellant and that, in any event, the complaints were barred by limitation as the same were filed beyond 90 days tro'm the date of the knowledge of the respondents that they were appointed by the appellant as seasonal employees. Upon the said findings, the Industrial· Court dismissed the complaints of the respondents. Being B aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Court, the respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court and, as stated already, the High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the order of the In­ dustrial Court. Hence these appeals. It has been already noticed that under the Award~f the Indust­ rial Tribunal, the respondents were declared the permanent employees of the Marketing Federation. The appellant has prepared a seniority list for the year 1985-86 which shows that most of the respon­ dents have been in the employment of the Marketing Federation since 1972. The said seniority list is Annexure 'D' to the writ petitions filed by the respondents in the High Court. The annual increment list, also D prepared by the appellant, shows that the respondents have been in the service of the appellant on monthly salaries and they were given annual increments on November 1, 1985. In spite of the above facts, the respondents have been shown in the seniority list and also in the annual increment list as temporary employees. In our opinion, there cannot he any doubt that there has been unfair labour practice on the p_art of the_!vlarke_ting Federation as also on the appellant bv continuing them as temporary employees. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the Award is not binding on the appellant. In view of the Award, it must be held that the respondents were the permanent employees of the Marketing Federation, and that after the constitution of the appellant and the transfer of the employees of the Marketing Federation to the appellant, the appellant was bound to accept the respondents as permanent employees and not to treat them as seasonal employees or temporary employees. This act on the part of the appel­ lant amounts to unfair labour practice. We do not find any justification for the finding of the Industrial G Court that the complaints made by the respondents do not come within the purview of Items Nos. 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trad~ Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. No reason has been given by the Industrial Court why the complaints come within Item No. l of Schedule IV and, as such, can be decided only by the L31bour Court and not by the Indust- H rial TribunaL The complaints made by the respondents are clear and .i STAIB COOPERATIVE COTTON v. S.P. KHADE [DUTT, J.J 477 specific and ·there was no scope for categorising them as complaints under Item No. 1 of Schedule IV. With regard to the.question of limitation, the Industrial Tribunal seems to think that as the appointment letters bear some dates in October, 1984, the period of limitation will be computed from the respective dates of the appointment letters. It has been assumed by the Industrial Tribunal that the respondents come to know that they we.re being appointed as seasonal employees on the respective dates of their appointment letters. There is, however, no material on record to show on what dates the appointment letters were served on the respondents. In other. _:-vords, there is nothing to -show when the respondents received the appointment letters. In the circumstances, the Industrial Court was not at all justified in holding that the complaints filed by the respondents were barred by limitation. Even assuming that the complaincs were barred by limitation, as held by the Industrial Court, the Industrial Court should have given an opportunity to the respon­ dents for explaining the-delay. No such opportunity has been given to the respondents. Accordingly, we are unable to subscribe. to the view of the Industrial Court that the complaints filed by the respondents were barred by limitation. Before parting with these appeals, we may dispose of a short contention of the appellant. The learned Counsel for the appellant has placed much reliance upon a letter of the Government dated November 9, 1984 giving some directions to the appellant, as con­ tained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the said letter. Paragraphs 1 and 2 are as follows: "1. All staff recruited after 1st July, 1972 specifically for the cotton scheme with prior approval of Government F wherever necessary or where the Government representa- tive was associated with the selection/appointment of the candidates, should be immediately placed on deputation without payment of Deputation Allowance to the Cotton Growers' Marketing federation. Their salaries and al­ lowances will be payable from the scheme as part of the G commission payable to the Cotton Growers' Federation till 1st January, i985. 2. The Cotton Growers' Federation Ltd. will finally absorb the above categories of staff after scrutiny as on 1st January, i985. Those out of the above staff who are not H 478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R. acceptable to the new Federation for some reason or the other, and_so have to be retrenched, will be retrenched by the Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. and the cost thereof would be debited to cotton . scheme account" On the basis of the directions in paragraph 2 extracted above, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the appellant is at liberty · not to absorb or accept the respondents in the appellant's concern. This contention, in our opinion, is without any substance whatsoever. There is a specific direction that the appellant shall finally absorb the staff of the Mar!ceting Fedration after scrutiny as on January 1, 1985. c The appellant cannot refuse to absorb or accept a permanent employee of the Marketing Federation without any reason what· soever. So far as the respondents are concerned, we do not find any reason why the appellant should not accept them as its permanent employees. The High Court has rightly directed the appellant and the Marketing Federation to process the cases of the respondents on the D basis that they have put in more than 240 days of service and grant them all the benefits under the circular letter dated January 18, 1985; For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and.the appeals are dismissed with one set ofcosts quantified at Rs.s,ooo · l.\L:S.K. Appeals dismissed. ·