Sri Chand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh and Anr.

The appellant landlord had filed an application under Sec. 14(i)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the 'Act') for ejectment of G the respondents. All the three courts concurrently found that Guizar Singh was the sole tenant. The Rent Controller and the Tribunal found that he sublet the demised premises to Avtar Singh, his brother and therefore ordered ejectment. The High Court found that the tenant was in exclusive ppssession of the premises bearing No. W: Z. 258/4, Subash Bazar, N angal H A Raya, New Jail Road, New Delh~ and that he did not sublet the premises ,. to Avtar Singh. On that premise the petition for ejectment was dismissed. Thus this appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Shri Nagaraja, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the High Court has committed a gross error in interfering with the concur- B rent finding of fact recorded by the Addi. Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenant, Guizar Singh has sublet the premises in question to his brother, Avtar Singh and that it is not open fo the High Court to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact. He placed reliance ~ on Sec. 18 of the Evidence Act and said that in an· affidavit filed by A vtar Singh before Income-Tax Authorities he claime.d exclusive possession as a C tenant and that, therefore, the admission made by him would be binding on Guizar Singh. The Addi. Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal relying upon this admission of Avtar Singh and other oral evidence con­ cluded that Avtar Singh alone was in exclusive possession and thatJ there­ fore, subletting was proved as a fact. We find no substance in the contention. Section 18 of the Evidence Act reads as under:- "18. Admission by party to proceeding or his agent; by suitor in representative character; by party interested in subject-matter; by person from whom interest derived. - Statements made by a party to the proceedings, or by an agent to any such party, whom the CO!lrt regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to made them, are admissions; Statements made by parties to suits, suing or sued in a repre­ sentative character, are not admissions, unless they were made while the party making them held that character. Statements made by - (1) persons whom have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceeding and who make the state­ ment in their character of persons so interested, or (2) persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject matter of the suit, are admissions, if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statement." Section 18 postulates that statements made by a party to the S. C. GUPTAv. GULZARSINGH 541 proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, A under the circumstances of the.case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admissions. Equally statement made by a person who has an proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceedings ,or persons having derivative interest make statements during the continuance of the interest also are admissions. In this case, admitted- ly, Guizar Singh was not a party to the .affidavit signed by Avtar Singh. B Therefore, the admission made by Avtar Singh that he is the tenant in exclusive possession of the demised premises does not bind Guizar Singh. In view of the plea and stand of the appellant, A vtar Singh cannot claim to have any pecuniary interest or any joint interest alongwith Guizar Singh in the demised premises. Once it is found that Guizar Singh alone is the tenant, as admittedly pleaded by the appellant, A vtar Singh cannot claim C to have any pecuniary or derivative interest in the demised premises. He is not an agent of Guizar Singh. Under those circumstances, as rightly found by the High Court, that the admission made by Avtar Singh in the affidavit is inadmissible and does not bind Guizar Singh. Once that admission is excluded from consideration, there is no other evidence worth accepting to conclude that Avtar Singh was in exclusive possession as a tenant. The D High Court rightly held that the finding of subletting or parting with pos­ session of the premises in dispute was vitiated in law as it was primarily based on inadmissible evidence. Having found the finding vitiated, it was open to the High Court to re-examine and reappreciate the evidence on record. On reappraisal it disbelieved the oral evidence. We do not find any error in such reappraisal. It is then sought to be contended that Guizar E ·Singh had other business and it implies that he is not in exclusive posses­ sion of the demised premises. We find no force in the contention. It may be that Guizar Singh had other business but that does not lead to the con­ clusion that Guizar singh is not in exclusive possession of the demised premises as tenant or that he sublet the premises to Avtar Singh. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.