Mithilesh Garg Etc. Etc. v. Union of India And. Ors. Etc. Etc.

KULDIP SINGH, J. The liberalization for private sector operations in the Road Transport field - under Section 80 and other provisions of The D Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - has been challenged iti these bunch-petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, filed by the existing-operators, pri­ marily on the ground that they have been adversely affected in the exer- cise of their rights under Articles 14 andJ9 of the Constitution of India. It is necessary to notice the statutory provisions operating in the E field of motor transport business prior to and after the coming into force of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The Motor ·vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called 'the old Act') was enacted and enforced with the object of having closer control to establish a coordi- nated system of transport. The subject of 'Mechanically Propelled Vehi­ cles' being in List-III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution, vario\ls F amendments were made from time to time by several State Legislatures either adding to or modifying the provisions of the old Act. Chapter IV of the old Act consisted of sections 42 to 68 providing "control of transport vehicles". Sections 47 and 57, to the relevant-extent, are re-produced as under:- "47.Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit- (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage car­ riage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely:- (a) the interest of the public generally; (b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. "'". ,.. A including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being bro- ken; J (c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operat- ing or likely to operate in the near future, whether by B road or other means, between the· places to be served: (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him c for permits are pending; (t) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area, and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already .providing passenger transport facilities by D any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of' road transport facilities recognized in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within Whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies; ................. E (3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-section (I), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any speci- tied area or on any specified route within the region. F 57. Procedure in applying for and granting permits.- (I) An application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier's permit may be made at any time. (2) An application for a stage carriage permit or a public carri- er's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the G date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the re- .. ' ceipt of such applications, on such dates. '..Ill (3) On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Transport Authority H shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the sub- MITHILESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 433 \ stance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice A of the date before which representation in connection there- with may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered: Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the B application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or any route within the region, under the class of pennits. to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-section (3) of Section 47 or sub-sec- c tion (2) of Section 55, as the case may be, the Regional Trans- port All,tht#.itY :TI:tay,. smnmarily refuse the application without following 'tbe'pr~c~diire laid down in this sub-section. The old Act was repealed by the Act which came into force on July 1, 1989. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended D to the Act is re-produced as under:- -I "The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), consolidates and amends law relating to motor vehicle's. This has been amended several times to keep it up to.date. The need was, however, felt that this Act should now inter a/ia, take into account also changes in the road transport technology, pattern of passenger E and freight movements, development of the road network in the country and particularly the improved techniques in the motor vehicles management. 2. Various Committees like National Transport Policy Com- ;. mittee, National Police Commission, Road Safety Committee, F Low Powered Two-wheelers Committee,. as also the Law Com- mission have gone into different aspects of . .road transport. They have recommended updating, simplification and ration- ; alisation of this law. Several Members of Parliame,n.t have also -L urged for comprehensive review of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to make it relevant to the modem-day requirements. G ' 3. A Working Group was, therefore, constituted in January, 1984 to revTew all the provisions of the Mofor Vehicles Act, 1939 and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legis- lation tO"'replace the existing Act. This Worki~g Group took into account the suggestion and recommendations earlier made H by various bodies and !nstitutions like· CenU'al Institute of Road 434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. I Transport Automotive Research Association oflndia, and other transport organisations including the manufacturers · and the general public. Besides, obtaining comments of State Govern­ ments on the. recommendations of the Working Group, these were discussed in a specially convened meeti11g of Transport Ministers .of all States and Union Territories. Some of the more important modifications so suggested related for taking care of- (a) ............. . (b) (c) the greater flow of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; (d) (e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalization for private sector operations in the road transport field; and (f) .......................... .. . The proposed legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background. Some of the more important provisions of the Bill provide for the folloWing matters, namely:- (a) to (f) ................ ; .................. . (g) liberalized schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non-nationalized routes, all-India tourist peml.its and also national permits for goods carriages ... (h) to 1) ....................... .. Chapter V of the Act-substitute for Chapter IV of the old Act - consisting of Sections 66 to 96, provides for 'control of transport vehi­ cles'. SecHons 71, 72 and 80, to the relevant extent, are reproduced as under: · "71. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit. - (I) A Regional Trans­ port Authority shall, while conside11,ng an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of this Act: Provided that such permit for a route of fifty kilometers or less shall be granted -only to an individual or a State trans­ port undertaking. r MITHILESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 435 (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time-table fur­ nished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: Provided that before such refusal an opportunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the time-table so as to con­ form to the said provisions. · (3)(a) The State Government shall, if so directed by the Central Government having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct a State Transport Authority and a Re­ gional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage car­ riages generally or of ariy specified type, as may be fixed and specified in the notification, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less than five lakhs .................... . (4) A Regional Transport Authority shall not grant more than five stage carriage permits to any individual or more than ten stage carriage permits to any company (not being a State trans­ port undertaking). (5) In computing the number of permits to be granted under sub-section (4), the permits held by an applicant in the name of any other persons and the permits held by any company of which such applicant is a director shall also be taken into account. 72. Grant of stage can"iage permits - (I) Subject to the provi­ sions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 70, grant a stage car­ riage permit in accordance with the application or with such F modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit: Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application. 80. Procedure in applying for and granting permits, - {I) An application for a permit of any kind ·may be made at any time. G (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kin~ made at any time under this Act: · Provided that the Regional Transport Authority may sum­ marily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in H 436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. accordance with the application would have the effect of in­ creasing the nwnber of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of . ._ sub-section (3) of section 71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 74: Provided further that where a Regional Transport . Au­ thority refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter." A comparative-reading of the provisions of the Act and the old Act make it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a . permit for asking irrespective of the nwnber of operators already in the field. Under Sections 57 read with Section 47(1) of the old Act an applica- tion for a stage carriage permit was to be published and kept for inspec­ tion in the office .. of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file representations/objections against the said application. The application, along with objections, was required to be decided in a quasi-judicial manner. Section 47(3) of the old Act further permitted the imposition of limit on the grant of permits in any region, area or on a E : particular route. It is thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV "control of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under: I. The applications for grant of permits were published and were made available in the office of the Regional TransPQrt Authority so that the existing operators could file representa­ tions; 2. . The applications for grant of permits along with the repre­ sentations were to be decided in quasi judicial .manner; and 3. The Regional Transport Authority was to decide the appli­ cations for grant of permits keeping in view the criteria laid down in section 47(1) and also keeping in view the limit fixed under Section 47(3) of the Act. An application for grant of permit beyond the limited nwnber fixed under Section 47(3) was to be rejected swnmarily. The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Section 47 and 57 of the old Act H has been completely done away with by the Act. ·The right of existing- J ; ' MITIIlLESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 437 operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the numyer A of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to /I liberalize the grant of permits. Section 71(1) of the Act provides that .., while considering an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional . . I Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section B 80(2), which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Section 71(3) (a) of the Act under which a limit can be c fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more than five Iakhs. The petitioners are existing stage-carriage operators on different routes. They h~ld permits granted by the Regional Transport Authorities con- cemed. Mithlesh Garg, petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No.1345/89 .has D stated that he holds a stage carriage permit and plies his vehicles on the Meerut-Parikshitgarh-Hasifabad-Laliana and allied routes under the juris- diction of the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut. According to him prior to the enforcement of the Act, 23 permit-holders were operating on the said route but thereafter under Section .80 of the Act the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut has issued 272 more permits in respect of the E same route. Similar facts have been stated in the other writ petitions. As mentioned above the petitioners are permit holders and are existing opera- tors. They are plying their vehicles on the routes assigned to them under the permits. They are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the F enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators. There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statutory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors. We see no justification in the petitioners' stand. More opera- tors mean healthy-competition and efficient transport system. Over-crowded G buses, passengers standing in the aisle, persons clinging to the bus-doors - and even sitting on the roof-top are some of the common sights in this ,.,.. country. More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstry, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter-public H to board the vehicle of their choice and patronize the operator who is 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A providing the best service. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concen­ tration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. The apprehen­ sions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to B affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession, is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed-out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are C economically viable. In any case tht=: transport system in a state is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal. The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy competition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade. This Court in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar & D. Ors., [1976] 3 S.C.R. 58 posed the following questions for its determina­ 'tion:- "Whether the proprietor of a cinema theater holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex de bi to justitiae to get a 'No-Objection Certificate', granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for· short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect· of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave." Sarkar:ia, J. speaking for the Court answered the question in the following words:- "In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on ...... While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the· court should not interfere at MITHILESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, I.] 439 the instance ur 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circum- A stances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an ad­ verse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger', and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in . the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary pow- B ers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential.to raise commercial morality; it will tend to prepetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents l & 2, which they have under Article C 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by law. The in- stant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of the this Court's decision in Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda, wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to chal­ lenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill· by D another-even if such setting up be in contravention of S. 8(3) (c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958-be­ cause no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. for all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction tinder article 226. of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question E posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the nega­ tive." We, therefore, see on justification for the petitioners to complain against the liberalised policy for grant of permits under the Act. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citi­ zens the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution oflndia. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of UP. and Others, [1955] · 1 S.C.R. 707 held that the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) entitles any member of the public to carry on the.business of transporting passen­ gers with the aid of the vehicles. Mukerjea, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: "Within the limits imposed by State regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that H extent he can also carry on the busin~ss of transporting passen- 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) SUPP. 2 S.C;R. A gers with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in article 19(1) (g) is at­ tracted ~md a citizen can legitimately complain if any legisla­ tion talces away or curtails that right any more than is permis­ sible under clause (6) of that article." B It is thus a guaranteed right of every Citizen whether rich or poor to take up and carry on, if he so wishes, the motor transport business. It is only the State which can impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the right under Article 19(l)(g) so far as the motor transport C business was concerned. The said restrictions have been taken away and the provisions of Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the Statute Book. The Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business. The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Article 19( 1 )(g) of the Con­ stitution of India. The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the D Parliament has undone. When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 19( 1 )(g) there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners. On an earlier occasion this Court dealt with somewhat similar situa- E tion. The Uttar Pradesh Government amended the old Act by the Motor Vehicle (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1972 and inserted Section 43A. The new Section 43-A apart from making certain changes in Section 47 of the old Act also omitted sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the old Act. Section 43- A provided that in the case of non nationalised routes, if the State Govern­ ment was of the opinion that it was for the public interest to grant permits F to all eligible applicants it might, by notifi'cMioii in the official gazette issue a direction accordingly. The necessary notification was issued with the result that the transport authorities were to proceed to grant permits as if sub-section (3) of section 47 was omitted and there was no limit for the grant of permits on any specified route within the region. Section 43-A and the consequent notification was challenged by the existing operators G before -the Allahabad High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. On appeal this Court in Hans Raj Kehar & Ors. v. The State of U.P. and Ors., [1975] 2 S.C.R 916 dismissed the appeal. Khanna, J.speaking for the Court held as under;- "It hardly need much argument to show that the larger number of buses operating on different routes would be for the conven- MITHILESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 441 ience and benefit of the travelling public and as imch would be A in the public interest. Any measure which results in larger number of buses operating on various routes would necessarily eliminate or in any case minimise long hours of waiting at the bus stands. It would also relieve congestion and provide for quick and prompt transport service. Good transport service is one of the basic requirements of a progressive society. Prompt B and quick transport service being a great boon for those who travel, any measure which provides for such an amenity is in' the very nature of things in the public interest ................. The contention that the impugned notification is violative of the. rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(t) or (g) of the Constitution is equally devoid of force. There is nothing in the C notification which prevents the appellants from acquiring, holding and disposing of their property or prevents them from practis- · ing any profession or from carrying on any occupation, trade or business. The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a viola- tion of the appellants' rights under the above two clauses of. D article 19 of the Constitution. The above provisions are not intended to grant a kind of monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right is guaranteed to any private party by article 19 of the Constitution of carry- ' ing on trade and business without competition from other eli~ gible persons. Clause (g) of article 19(1) gives a right to all E · citizens subject to article 19(6) to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is an enabling pr6vision and does not confer a right on those already practis-· ing a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or busi- ness to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practis- ing that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade F or business. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons. We, therefore, find no valid basis for holding that the impugned provisions are violative of article 19". The identical situation bas been created by Sections 71, 72 and 80 of G the Act -by omitting the provisions of Section 47(3) of the old Act. It has been made easier for any person to obtain a stage carriage permit under the Act. The attack of the petitioner on Section 80 on the ground of Article .19 has squarely been answered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case (supra). It has been contended in the writ petitions that different yard-sticks have been provided for interregion, intra-region and inter-State permits 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll991] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. under the Act. According to the petitioners the imposition of limit for grant of iriter-State permits is pe~issible under Section 88(5) of the Act whereas no such 'limit can be imposed in respect of intra-region permits. The contention is that the provisions are discriminatory and are violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are not impressed by the argument. The three categories of permit-seekers cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class. Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories. It is nobody's case that Section 80 brings about discrimination in the matter of grant of permits between applicants belonging to the same class. The argument on the ground of Article 14 is thus wholly untenable and is rejected. This question also came for consideration in Hans Raj Kehar's case (supra) and this Court rejected the contention in the following words:- / "Argument has also been advanced that the deletion of Section 47(3) would have the effect of removing the limit on the number of permits for intra-region routes but that fact would not pre­ vent the imposition of a limit for the number of permits for inter-region routes. This argument has been advanced in the context of the case of the appellants that the impugned provi­ sions discriminate in the matter of issue of permits for intra­ region routes and those for inter-region routes and as such are violative of article 14 of the Constitution. We are not im­ pressed by this argument for we. find no valid basis for the inference that if there is no limit on the number of permits for intra-region routes, limit on the number of permits for inter­ region routes would have to be imposed. The object of the impugned notification is to liberalise the issue of permits and we fail to see as to how such a liberal measure can have the effect of introducing strictness or stringency in the matter of grant of permits for inter-region routes. Assuming that a differ­ ent rule is applicable in the matter of inter-region routes, the differentiation is based upon reasonable classification. It is nobody's case ·that the impugned provision brings about dis­ crimination in the matter of grant of permits between appli­ cants belonging to the same class. The argument,about the impugned provision being violative of article 14 is wholly untenable." The learned counsel for the writ petitioners, have relied upon a later decision of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad & Ors., v. State .of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1983) 2 S.C.C. 195 and have contended that the deci­ sion of this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case (supra) no longer holds the MITHILESH GARG v. U.0.1. [KULDIP SINGH, J.) 443 field. There is no force in the contention. This Court on two occasions A interpreted the old Act as amended by the State of Uttar Pradesh at the relevant times. The provisions of law which were interpreted in Hans Raj Kehar's case were entirely different than those which were before this Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case. The legal position with which we are faced in these writ petitions is almost similar to that which was considered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case. What happened in the State of B Uttar Pradesh was that after the U.P. Amendment of 1972 to the old Act, which was subject matter of interpretation before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case, it was found that certain anomalies had arisen in the work- ing of the liberal policy of granting permits. With a view to remedy the situation the U.P. Legislature amended the old Act again by the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 permitting imposition of limit on the number of permits to be C issued. In spite of the restrictions on grant of permits as provided in the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 the State Government issued notifications permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit. This Court held in Rameshwar Prasad's case that the said notifications were inconsistent with the limitation as to the number of permits introduced by the U.P. Amending Act 1976 and as such were bad in law. Venkataramiah, D J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case observed as under: "We may here state that any observations made in Hans Raj Kehar case would be inapplicable so far as these cases pres­ ently before us are concerned. In that~ase the court was con- E cemed with sub-section (2) of Section 43-A of the Act as it stood then which was a provision enacted by the legislature. That sub-section provided that without prejudice to the gener­ ality of the power contained in Section 43-A(l) of the Act where the State Govenunent was of opinion that it was in public interest to grant stage carriage permits (except in re- p spect of routes or areas for which schemes have been pub­ lished under Section 68-C) or contract carriage permits or pub- lic carrier permits to all eligible applicants it may issue appro­ priate directions as stated therein. That sub-section contained a clear legislative policy which considered that there could be no public prejudice if all eligible applicants were granted per- G mits. Without saying anything more on the point, it may be stated that whatever this court may have observed while con­ sidering that provision would not apply now as there is a clear departure made by the legislature from that policy when it enacted the new sub-section (2) of Section 43-A." It is thus obvious that the reliance by the petitioners on the ratio and H observations of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case is wholly mis- 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A placed. The Parliament has, under the Act, made a clear departure from the policy and has reverted to the position which was before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case. Relying on Rameshwar Prasad's case the petitioners contend that it is in 'public interest' to limit the grant of permits on intra-region routes B and while fixing the limit various factors indicated by this Court in the said case are to be taken into consideration. We do not agree. The concept of public interest, in relation to motor transport business, as propounded by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case was only in the context of the old Act as amended by the U.P. Act. We are of the view that the Act having brought-in complete change in the policy of granting permits, the C observations of this Court in Ramesh war Prasad 's case are not relevant in the present context. The provisions of law for consideration before this Court In Hans Raj Kehar 's case were almost similar to Section 80 of the Act. We are, therefore, bound by the law laid down by the four-Judges Bench of this Court in Hans Raj Kehar's case. D The petitioners have further contended that the conditions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being elimi­ nated by big operators, conditions of hiily routes, fuel availability and pollution control are some of the important factors which the Regional Transport Authority is bound to take into consideration while taking a decision on an application for grant of permit. These are the matters E. which are supposed to ,Pe within the comprehension of the transport au­ f!iorities. The legislative policy under the Act cannot .be challenged on these grounds. It is not disputed that the Regional Transport Authority has ' the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons. It is for the authority .to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the tim~;.of quasi-judicial consideration of the applica­ F tions for grant of permitS~ The statutory authori.ties under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting pennits under the liberalised policy. We, ,therefore, see no force in any of the contentions raised by the petitionerS and as such we dismiss tbe writ petitions. The parties. are left to bear their own costs. G.N .. Petitions dismi~sed.