Janta Dal Etc. Etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. Etc. Etc.
S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. We gave our conclusions in our earlier
Order dated 27th August 1991 reserving the reasons to be given later. H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A Accordingly, we render our reasons in the present judgment.
We feel that a prefatory note, though not the detailed facts of the
case, is necessary for disposal of these appeals and writ petition. The facts
culled out from various documents placed before this court are as follows:
B The Ministry of Defence, Government of India approved in August
1980 a proposal forwarded by Army Headquarters (HQ) recommending,
inter-alia, the introduction of 155 mm calibre medium gun both towed and
self-propelled to meet its defence operational requirements. The choice for
obtaining the. said gun system/guns was short listed in December, 1982 to
C (1) Mis Sofma of France (2) Mis A.B. Bofors of Sweden (briefly called
'Bofors') (3) Mis International Military Services of U.K. and (4) Mis Yoest
Alpine of Austria. In November 1985, there was a further shortlisting of
Sofma and Bofors. Fmally, the order was placed by the Government of
India with Bofors on 24th March 1986 for the supply of 410 numbers (400
plus 10 free) of 155 mm Field Howitzer 77-B gun system/spare guns vide
D contract No. 6(9)/84/D (GS-IV) for a total amount of SEK 8410.66 million
(Swedish Kroners) (equivalent to about Rs. 1437.72 crores or Rs. 14377.2
million). The related contract for supplying the gun package (towed) and
other related agreements/contracts were concluded and signed on 24th
March 1986 with Mis A.B. Bofors.
On 17 April, 1987, .some leading newspapers of our country gave
prominent coverage to a Swedish Radio Broadcast made in the previous
day, broadcasting that bribes had been paid to senior Indian politicians and
key Defence figures to win the contract awarded by the Government of
India to M/s. Bofors of Sweden on 24 March, 1986.
The Swedish Radio repeated the allegation on 17 April, 1987 claim
ing that it had documentary proof of the payoffs in four installments to
Indian accounts in Swiss Banks and it had checked with Skandinaviska
Enskilds Banken, the bankers for Bofors. On the other hand, Bofors denied
G paying any kickbacks to Indian politicians or officials for the deal involving
the supply of 155 mm Towed howitzers and also issued a statement on 17th
April 1987, itself which statement reads thus:
"AB Bofors has not paid, or conspired to pay, any bribes
in connection with the order. All allegations to the con-
H trary are hereby categorically denied."
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 239
The Government of India on 17th April 1987 issued a statement A
denying the allegations contained in the news items based on the broadcast
report, made by the Swedish Radio and Television in connection with the
arms order placed on Swedish firm, Bofors and categorized the news item
as false, baseless and mischievous. The part of the said statement reads
thus:
"Government's policy is not to permit any clandestine or
irregular payments in contracts. Any breach of this policy
by any one will be most severely dealth with."
On 20th April, 1987, the Minister of Defence (Shri K.C. Pant) made C
a suo-motu statement on the subject in Lok Sabha stating inter-alia that on
tbe eve of finalising \he contract, in response to a reiteration of
Government's policy and a demand for confirmation, M/s Bofors had
replied, vide their letter of the 10th March, 1986 that they did not employ
any Representative/Agent in India for the project: However, for ad
ministrative services, e.g. hotel bookings, transportation, forwarding of D
letters, telexes etc., they use the services of a local firm.
The Defence Minister further stated that "if any evidence is produced
involving violations of the law, the matter will be thoroughly investigated
and the guilty, whoever they may be punished."
A similar statement was made by the Minister of State for Defence
in Raj ya Sabha on 21st April, 1987:
This issue created a storm of controversies both in the Lok Sabha ·
and Rajya Sabha. Several issues were raised by the members in the respec
tive Sabhas relating not only to the alleged kickbacks paid by M/s Bofors
for winning the contract but also about the quality and suitability of the
gun selected for procurement.
On 20th April 1987, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister
intervening in the debates in the Lok Sabha stated:
" .......... And like Panditji has said now, you show us any
evidence, we do not want proof. We will bring the proof.
You show us any evidence that there has been involvement
of middlemen, of payoffs or of bribes or commissions, we
will take action and we will see that nobody however
high-up is allowed to go free."
The then Defence Minister following the assurance made by the then
Prime Minister stated:
"The Prime Minister has already intervened on a number
of occasions and has said that there are no charges at the
moment and if evidence is asked fonhen we shall look
into it. We shall inquire into it and if somebody is found
guilty ·we will punish him. This is the essence of what
Members have been asking."
During the course of the discussion in Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha,
several members demanded a probe with full details by a Parliamentary
Committee. When the matter stood thus on 4th June 1987, the Swedish
Embassy in India, forwarded a copy of the Report dated !st June 1987 of
the Swedish National Audit Bureau (SNAB for short) with a note to the
D Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, stating that what was
made available to the Government of India was only one part of the Report
of SNAB but not report in its entirety and the rest was withheld by the
Govermnent of Sweden on the bank secrecy requirements. The summary
of the observations of the SNAB as extracted in the report of the JPC are
as follows:
" ..... that an agreement exists between AB Bofors and
.............. "' concerning the settlement of commission sub
sequently to the FH 77 deal; and
- that considerable amounts have been paid subsequently
to, among others, AB Bofors' previous agent in India.
11
(*Names not disclosed)
However, the rep0rt did not disclose the names of the recipients of
G kickbacks as indicated above.
This report of the SNAB (Swedish National Audit Bureau) was
discussed by the then Prime Minister with the leaders of the opposition
parties on 11 June, 1987. The Government decided to request the Speaker,
Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to set ap a Joint
H Parliamentary Committee (hereinafter referred to as 'JPC') to enquire into
,
.I<
'
' I
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 241
and establish the identities of the persons who received the payments. But A
the Speaker and the Chairman of the respective Sabhas declined to set up
on their own the JPC to probe into the Bofors deal. Thereupon, the then
Prime Minister during his meeting with the leader of the opposition in
Parliament on 17 June, 1987 indicated that the Government would move a
motion in the Monsoon Session of Lok Sabha for the appointment of a B
Parliamentary Committee to probe into the Bofors deal. Accordingly, the
Minister of Defence (Shri K.C. Pant) moved a motion on 29th July 1987 in
the Lok Sabha for appointment of the JPC. While moving the motion, the
Minister on 3rd August 1987 after recalling the whole sequence of events
stated inter-alia as follows:
"Two facts emerged from a careful study of the Report of
the Swedish National Audit Bureau. These are, firstly, that
sizable payments were made in 1986. It would also be seen
that the most crucial portion of the Report, which contains
particulars of the recipients of the amounts paid by
Bofors, have not been disclosed to us.
11
Further in justification of the constitution-of JPC, the Defence Min
ister added that "That Government has nothing to hide. The Government
wants to get at the truth and that is why this Committee has been set up."
Therefore, certain substitute motions were moved by the Parliament
Members and ultimately after a discussion in both the houses, the JPC was
constituted with the appointment of its chairmain on 28.8.88 totally consist
ing of 30 elected members - 20 from Lok Sabha and 10 from Rajya Sabha
for making the inquiry into the following matters:
(i) Whether the procedures laid down for the acquisition
of weapons and systems, were adhered to in the purchase
of the Bofors' gun;
(ii) to ascertain the identity of the persons who received, G
and the purpose for which they received, payments of the
following amounts:
(a) SEK 170-250 million
(b) SEK 29 .5 million H
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
( c) SEK 2.5 million
from M/s Bofors (as referred to in. the Report of the
Swedish National Audit Bureau, received by the Govern
ment of India on June 4, 1987);
(iii) arising out of the enquiry, if there is prima facie
evidence that M/s Bofors have in addition to payments
mentioned in (ii) above, made any other payments for
securing the Indian contracts, the identity of the persons
who received such payments shall be ascertained;
(iv) to determine if any Indian laws/rules/regulations have
been violaied either by M/s Bofors or. by persons as
indicated in (ii) and (iii) above.
Of the elected members, two members by name Shri Mahabir prasad
D and Smt. Sumati Oraon resigned w.e.f. 16.3.1988. One other member, Dr.
KG. Adiyodi died and three other members of the Committee ceased to
be members of the Committee consequent on their retirement from Rajya
Sabha w.e.f. 2.4.1988. In place of the members, who resigned and a member
who died, these other members from the Lok Sabha were elected.
E The JPC submitted its report on 22nd April 1988 with its conclusion,
the resultant portion of which reads as follows:
(i) to (xii) ............................... .
(xiii) That there is no evidence to establish that the Bofors'
F payment totaling SEK; 319.4 million involved a violation
of any Indian law. ·
(xiv) There is no evidence of any other payment having
been made by Bofors for winning the Indian contract."
G One of the Members gave his note of dissent disagreeing with th•
conclusions of the Committee.
Para 7.176 of the Report of JPC reads as follows:
"7.176. The Committee note that during discussions, in
H September, 1987 with the Government of India team, the
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.J
Bofors officials gave the following information regarding
the names of Companies and details of payments made to
them by way of winding- up charges:-
SVENSKA INC. PANAMA - SEK 188.4 million
MORESCO/MOINEAO - SEK 81 million in
243
three
S.A. (PITCO) Geneva instalments of SEK 37 million,
SEK 12 million and SEK 32
- million.
A.E. SERVICES Ltd., U.K. SEK 50 million"
It is further seen from the Report of the JPC that Mr. Lars Gotblin, C
Chief Jurist and Senior Vice-President of the Noble Industries was ex
amined by the JPC and during the examination his attention was drawn to
a statement of Mr. Thunbolm, Chairman of the Noble Industries, which is
the holding company of M/s AB. Bofors that so fll! as be was aware,
payments had been made to Indians or to an Indian company in connection D
with the contract. Of course, the Chief Jurist finding himself in a piquant
situation, said that the words of Dr. Thunbolm were twisted. (Vide paras
7.41 and 756 of the Report of JPC).
In spite of the conclusion in the Report of the JPC, allegations of
malpractices in the deal with Bofors, payments of kickbacks and receipt of E
illegal gratification were persistently reiterated and the matter was relently
agitated. Meanwhile, there was a change of Government. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the Superintendent of Police, CBl/DSPE/ACU-IV, New
Delhi registered a First Information Report on 22nd January 1990 in Crime
No. RC 1 (A)/90/ACU-IV under Section 120-B read with Sections 161, 162, F
163, 164 and 165-A of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 5(2),
5(1)(d) and 5(2)/5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 read
with Sections 409, 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code against 14
accused of whom three are named, they being (1) Shri Martin Ardbo,
former President of Mis A.B. Bofors, Sweden, (2) Shri.Chadha alias Win G
Cbadha, S/o Shri Assa Nand, President of Mis Anatronic General Cor
poration/Anatronic General Companies Ltd., ·c/4, Main Market, Vasant
Vihar, New Delhi and Shri G.P. Hinduja, New Zealand House, Hay
Market, LOndon SW-1. The rest of the 11 accused are stated in general as
directors/employees/holders/beneficiaries of account code and public ser
vants of the Government of India. The preface of the First Information H
A Report shows that the case was registered "on the basis of reliable infor
mation received from certain sources, ·certain facts and circumstances that
have become available, through media reports dated 1st June 1987 of the
Swedish National Audit Bureau, certain facts contained in the report dated
22nd April 1988 of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) and the
B report dated 28th April 1988 of the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India (CAG)". The FIR gives a detailed sequ~nce of the events relating to
the purchase of guns from M/s A.B. Bofors, Sweden and the related
agreements entered thereupon in violation of the Government's policy i.e.
not to involve any agent and the existing law of this land. Various allega
tions are made mention of in the FIR regarding the payments of
C bribes/kickbacks and receipt of illegal gratification, the debates made in
the Parliament, the correspondences among
0
the parties and the various
findings of the JPC. It is further averred in the First Information Report
that even in the letter dated 3.10.86, sent to the Swedish National Bank,
Bofors had referred to some of the payments to Svenska Inc. and the code
D name 'Mont Blanc' as "commission payments" and that the payment to M/s
Moresco/Moineao/SA/Pitco, Geneva was deposited by Bofors in three
code name accounts, namely, "Lotus" in Suissee Bank Corporation, 2 Rue
de la Confederation 1204, Geneva; ''Tulip" in Manufacturers Hannover
Trust Company, 84 Rue du Rhone, 1204, Geneva and "Mont Blane" in
Credit Suissee, 2 Place Belle Air, 1204, Geneva and that these payments
E to code name accounts are without mentioning or disclosing the payers'
names. Ultimately, reference was also made in paragraph 112 of the FIR
to the statement of Mr. Thulholm, Chairman of Noble Industries reading:
"As the report of JPC discloses, Shri Thulholm, Chairman
of Noble Industries had stated that so far as he was aware,
payments had been made to Indians or to an Indian
company in connection with the contract. Shri Thulholm
had also stated that he could not guarantee that bribes
had not been paid. Bofors being a subsidiary of Noble
Industries, these statements of Shri Thulholm are impor
tant."
The core of the allegations in the FIR is that the accused, named and
unnamed, entered into a criminal conspiracy, obtained illegal gratification
in the form of money from BOFORS, a Swedish company through the
H agent/firms/companies/persons as motive or reward for such public ser-
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 245
vants who by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise dishonestly using A
their official position as public servants caused pecuniary advantage to
themselves, BOFORS, the agents and others in awarding contracts to
BOFORS for the supply of guns to the Go.vernment of In\fia and in the
transaction committed the offences of criminal breach of trust, cheating,
forgery and using of forged documents. It appears that the CBI has B
commenced its investigation during the course of which it has recorded
statements of witnesses and took into its custody various documents and
files relating to this Bofors deal.
While it was so, the CBI moved an application before the Special
Judge, namely, Shri R.C. J.ain requesting to issue a letter rogatory/request C
to Switzerland urgently for getting the necessary assistance so that the
investigation can be conducted in Switzerland lest very important and
relevant evidence would remain uncollected and the cause of justice would
be frustrated.
Be it noted, the compelling reasons which necessitated the CBI to
file that application h~ve already been given in brief in our earlier order
dated 27th August 1991 reported in [1991) 3 SCC 756. Therefore, we are
not repeating those facts. in this final judgment. The Special Judge after
hearing the then Additional Solicitor General of India, Deputy Legal
Advisor of CBI and S~nior Public Prosecutor allowed that application by E
his order dated 5th February 1990. The relevant portion of which reads
thus:
"In the result, the application of the CBI is allowed to the
extent that a request to conduct the necessary investiga
tion and to collect necessary evidence which can be col
lected in Switzerland and to the extent directed in this
order shall be made to.the Competent Judicial Authorities
of the Confederation of Switzerland through the Ministry
of External Affairs, Government of India subject to the
filing of the requisite/paper undertaking required by the
Swill Law and assurance for reciprocity."
The Special Judge also directed certain documents to be sent along
with this letter of rogatory. Further, the learned Judge has put up a note
reading thus:
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
"Needless to mention that no (sic - any) observation made
in this order shall tantamount to expression of opinion at
any subsequent stage of enquiry or trial."
It appears that tl:e Jetter rogatory was sent back by the order of the
Cantonal Court of Geneva for compliance of certain procedural formalities
B in that said order. It was at this relevant time that Shri Harinder Singh
Chowdhary, an Advocate -claiming to be the General Secretary of an
Organisation named as Rashtriya Jan Parishad which according to him, is
devoted to uphold the "Rule of Law, fight against injustice in any field and
abide by the Constitution and respect ideals and institutions" filed Criminal
C Miscellaneous Case No. 12 of 1990 before the Special Court under Article
51 (A) of the Constitution of India seeking the following prayers:
"In the premises your petitioners humbly request that in
order to maintain the dignity, prestige and the fair name
of the country and the ideals enshrined in the Constitution
no rogatory Jetter be issued on the formal request of the
CBI unless the allegations against named persons are
established to the satisfaction of this Hon'ble court:
It is further requested that 110 request for rogatory or
freezing bank account be made to Swiss Government
unless the concerned persons are noticed and heard on
the subject:
It is further requested that the petitioner may be permitted
to join during inquiry before this Hon'ble Court in the
capacity of Public interest litigant:
It is further requested that inquiry under Section 340 Cr.
P.C. be held to determine the alleged offence committed
by various persons and till then proceedings of rogatory
be stopped."
The Special Judge, Shri V.S. Aggarwal dismissed that petition by his
order dated 18th August 1990 observing thus:
"It goes without saying that Letter Rogatory had been
issued by Shri R.C. Jain, then Special Judge, Delhi on
recording his satisfaction that it should be issued. The
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
petitioner has appended along with the application the
copy of the order passed by the Cantonal Court, Geneva.
It is accompanied by its English translation. It clearly
recites that application for judicial assistance should be
sent back after completing the procedural formalities
mentioned in the order. It cannot, therefore, be said that
the letter of request had been rejected. It further does not
call for any fresh reconsideration in this regard pertaining
to the order passed by my learned predecessor.
247
Coming to the question of locus standi of Shri Harinder Singh
Chowdhary ·to file this petition requesting the prayers mentioned ibid, the C
learned Judge held thus:
"Examining the present case on the touch-stone of the
above mentioned cases, it is clear that though petitioner
is a member of the noble profession, but while the matter
is still at investigating stage, he cannot be permitted to D
intervene and the doors of the Court will not be ajar for
him. He has no direct interest in such investigation nor
suffers any special Joss. Therefore, at the threshold, one
can safely conclude that he has no /ocus-standi to claim
reliefs mentioned above." E
Consequent upon the above findings, the Special Judge dismis,ed the
petition stating, "This request of the learned counsel cannot be accepted.'
Thereafter, the Special Judge issued (1) Note of Compliance and (2)
Amended letter rogatory on August 22, 1990.
On being aggrieved by the order of the Special Judge dated August
18, 1990, Shri Harinder Singh Chowdhary filed a criminal revision before
the High Court of Delhi under Sections 3"17/482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure raising multiple questions of law challenging the legality and
validity of not only the impugned order but also the very registration of the G
FIR and the investigation carried thereon by the CBI. The reliefs sought
for in the criminal revision are as follows:
"(a) to quash the entire FIR No. RC l(A)/90/ACU-IV.
dated January 22, 1990 and criminal proceedings covered
by the same. H
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
(b) or remand the case to the Special .Judge permitting
the petitioner to argue his case before the lower court and
also direct the court below to decide the petition on
merits.
( c) direct the court that no request for rogatory letters be
made to Swiss Government, till the petitioner is heard on
his application.
( d) the petitioner may be permitted to join during the
inquiry to determine .the question of dual criminality
before the learned Special Judge in the capacity of public
interest litigant, and also direct tl\e learned Special Judge
to decide the question of dual crimin3lity before issuing
the letter rogatory.
(e) direct the learned Special Judge not to issue any
rogatory letter on the formal request of the CBI unless
the allegations against named persons is established to the
satisfaction of the Special Judge by cogent evidence.'
This revision petition has been registered as Criminal Miscellaneous
E (Main) No. 1821 of 1990 on the file of the High Court of Delhi. During
the hearing of this case, several applications seeking impleadment/interven
tion were filed by various political parties and others of whom one was by
Mr. Shanti Bhushan, an Advocale of this Bar and another by Mr. N. Ram
and so on.
F The above criminal case (Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) Case No.
1821 of 1990 was listed before Justice M.K. Chawla, the then Judge of the
High Court of Delhi, Several applications were taken before him by the
impending interveners seeking several prayers such as permitting them to
implead themselves in the revision proceedings and affording them ade-
G quate opportunities to make their submissions before the Court opposing
the revision petition. As the prayers of the interveners were ncit acceded
to, the Janata Dal etc. filed a special leave petition (criminal) No. 2320 of
1990 before this Court which passed an order on 10th December 1990, the
relevant portion of which is as follows:
H " .......... We are of the view that the learned Judge should
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.]
dispose of these applications by a judicial order before
the matter is reserved for judgment and in case the ap
plications are not accepted, judgment should not be
delivered for at least 2 days after such an order on these
writ petitions (sic on the revision petition) is made to
enable them to move this court."
249
In compliance of the above direction of this Court, Mr.Justice Chawla
heard Mr. Ram J ethmalani, Sr, counsel who appeared on behalf ofJanata Dal
and Mr, Prashant Bhushan. It appears Mr. Jethmalani was constrained to
make a request to Mr, Justice Chawla to recuse himself from the case, which
request, of course, was rejected by the learned Judge, Thereafter, a petition C
for recusation was filed which was also dismissed. Mr. Justice Chawla after
hearing the learned counsel for Mr. H.S. Chowdhary as well as the inter
veners, passed his final impugned order on 19th December 1990, dismissing
the revision petition, the relevant portion of the said order read thus:
"In my opinion, the case of the petitioner does not fall D
within the ambit and scope of the law laid by the Supreme
Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, [1986]
Supp SCC 553. So, I hold that the petitioner has no locus
standi to file the present revision petition and is thus not
maintainable on his behalf. The same is hereby dismissed. E
As a consequence of the dismissal of the present petition,
holding that the petitioner has no locus stand~ the ap
plicants have no right to be impleaded and their implead
ment/intervention applications are also rejected.
This is not the end of the matter. There is yet another
process by which the court can take judicial notice of any
illegality being committed by any court, with a view to
prevent the injury being caused to the known or unknown
aggrieved party." G
xx xx xx
The learned Judge of the High Court, Mr. Justice M,K. Chawla after
referring to Sections 119, 397, 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure concluded thus: H
"In the light of the settled legal proposition, I have care
fully examined the record placed before me. Prima fade,
I am of the opinion that the following illegalities have been
committed by the Trial Court:
(1) That the FIR filed by the CBI in this case on the face
of it does not disclose any offence. It is in violation of the
provisions of Section 154, inasmuch as no investigation can
be carried out for an offence alleged to have been com
mitted outside India, and the court of the Special Judge
should not have taken cognizance of the same.
(2) That the C.B.I. should have exhausted their remedies
before the J.P.C. before launching proceedings in the
court of the Special Judge inasmuch as the same inves
tigating agency cannot be allowed to override the findings
of the JPC, and this aspect has not been taken into
consideration by the trial court.
(3) The court of the Special Judge who issued letter
rogatory had no jurisdiction to entertain such a request
or to pass any order on it.
E ( 4) The so-called memo of understanding relied upon by
the trial court was contrary to the Municipal law of the
land and is violative of Article 21 and 300-A of the
Constitution of India.
( 5) That the CBI is not a legally constituted force which
can be entrusted with the investigation; and
( 6) That the investigation on the face of it is biased and
influenced by outside agencies.
So, I sue motu take cognizance while exercising my powers
under Sections 397 and 401 read with Section 482 of the
Code, and direct the office to register the case under the ·
title, court on its OWi\ motion. vs. State and CBI.
Consequently, I call upon the CBI and the State to show
H cause as to why the proceedings initiated on the filing of
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.]
FIR No. RCI (A)/90/ACU-IV dated 22.1.90, pending in
the court of Shri V.S. Aggarwal, Special Judge, Delhi, be
not quashed."
251
Feeling aggrieved by the above order of Justice Chawla of Delhi High
Court, all these criminal appeals and the Writ petition have been filed
before this court. This Court on 20th December 1990 in Criminal Appeal B
No. 304 of 1991 (arising out of SLP Criminal No. 2476 of 1990 filed by the
Janata Dal) passed the following order granting interim stay:
"In the meantime, the reasons leading to registration of
the suo motu proceedings would not be operative. There C
shall be interim stay of proceedings including hearing
before the High Court.'
We have given a gist of all those appeals as well as the Writ Petition
in our Order dated 27th August 1991. Therefore, we feel it not necessary
to reiterate the same. D
After carefully considering all aspects of the case and examining the
rival contentions of the parties we have recorded our conclusions in the
earlier order as follows:
"1. Mr. H.S. Chowdhary has no locus standi (a) to file the
petition under Article 51-A as a public interest litigant
praying that no letter rogatory/request be issued at the
request of the CBI and he be permitted to join the inquiry
before the Special Court which on February 5, 1990
directed issuance 0f letter rogatory/request to the Com
petent Judicial Authorities of the Confederation of
Switzerland; (b) to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the
High Court under Sections 397 read with 401 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure challenging the correctness,
legality or propriety of the order dated August 18, 1990
of the Special Judge and (c) to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the first infor
mation report dated January 22, 1990 and all other
proceedings arising therefrom on the pleas of preventing
the abuse of the process of the court.
2. In our considered opinion, the initiation of the present
proceedings by Mr. H.S. Chowdhary under Article 51-A
of the Constitution of India cannot come within the true
meaning and scope of public interest litigation.
3. Consequent upon the above conclusions (1) and (2),
the appellants namely, Janata Da~ Communist Party of
India ( Marxist) and Indian Congress (Socialist) who are
before this Court equally have no right of seeking their
impleadment/intervention. For the same reasons, Dr. P.
Nalla Thampy Thera also has no right to file the Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 114 of 1991 as public interest
litigant.
4. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case,.the suo motu action of Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla in
taking cognizance in exercise of the powers under Sections
397 and 401 read with Section 482 of the Code based on
the convoluted and strained reasoning and directing the
office of the High Court of Delhi to register a case under
the title Court on its motion v. State and CBI cannot be
sustained.
Consequent upon the above conclusions No. ( 4), we hold
that the directions of Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla calling
upon the CBI and the State to show cause as to why the
proceedings initiated on the strength of the first informa
tion report dated January 22, 1990 be not quashed, cannot
be sustained.
In the result, we agree with the first part of the order
dated December 19, 1990 of Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla
holding that parties have no locus standi. We, however,
set aside the second part of the impugned order whereby
he has taken suo motu cognizance and issued show-cause
notice to the State and CBI and accordingly the show
cause notice issued by him is quashed.
In view of the above conclusions, all the proceeding~
initiated in pursuance of the first information report dated
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
January 22, 1990 relating to Crime No. RC/(A)/90/ ACU·
IV on the file of the Special Judge, Delhi including the
issuance of the letter rogatory/request as they stand now,
remain unaffected and they can be proceeded with in
accordance with law.
In Summation
Criminal Appeal Nos. 304, 305, 306, 307, 308 and 309 of
1991 are dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 310 of 1991 filed
by the Union of India against the order dated September
5, 1990 of the High Court is dismissed in view of the fact
that the said order does not survive for consideration on
the passing of the fmal order dated December 19, 1990.
The Writ Petition No. 114 of 1991 is also dismissed.
Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1991 filed by Union of India
and CBI is allowed for the reasons stated above."
253
The sum and substance of the order of Mr. Justice Chawla in this
regard, is that Harinder Singh Chowdhary has no locus standi to file the
revision petition and resultantly his revision petition was not maintainable
and consequently all the applicants (interveners) have no right to be
impleaded and that the applications for impleadment/intervention were E
liable to be rejected.
Mr. Anand Dev Giri, the learned Solicitor General (as he then was)
and thereafter Mr. Altaf Ahmad, the present Additional Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the Union of India as well on behalf of CBI and F
Mr. Ram Jethmalani and Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel
assisted by Mr. Pr ash ant Bhushan appearing in Criminal Appeal Nos. 304,
305 and 307 of 1991 and Mr. K.G. Bhagat, the learned senior counsel
appearing in Criminal Ap,Peal Nos. 306 and 311 of 1991 on behalf of Mr.
H.S. Chowdhary besides a battery of lawyers representing their respective G
parties advanced respective arguments for a considerable length of time
raising multiple questions of law with reference to the various legal aspects.
Though, more often than not, there were some heated arguments - oc·
casionally tinged with acrimony and tumult - all the learned counsel made
their erudite submissions and scholarly debate in forensic eloquence ex~
hibiting their profound knowledge of law - particularly in thr criminal field. H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992J SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
The resultant propositions deducible from the rhetorical submissions
and the counter-submissions expostulated with reference to various
provisions of the Constitution, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Code') and other cognate statutes can be summarised
as follows:
1. The unrestricted and inherent powers of Subordinate
Courts - both Civil and Criminal - apart from their
ancillary and incidental powers, in the absence of any
provision to the contrary could and should be exercised
ex-debitio justiciae for ends of justice, that is for taking
steps as may be necessary to enable the Courts in dis
charge of the judicial functions to issue directions or pass
appropriate orders without causing prejudice to either of
the parties for administering substantial justice whenever
legitimate occasion for doing so arises.
2. The discretionary power of the Special Judge in issuing
Letter Rogatory on 5.2.1990 even before the introdnction
of Section 166-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as "the Code") in exercise of his
uninhibited inherent powers is supported by the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) creating a con
tractual arrangement between the two countries, namely,
India and Switzerland which arrangement amounts to
bilateral international treaty having a binding force be
tween the two contracting parties and also in substantial
.compliance of Section 285 of the Code.
3. Criminal Courts are not forbidden in participating in
the course of investigation in the matter of collection of
evidence; and in fact the Courts are invested with statutory
power to take active role and aid the investigation in
gathering evidence as contemplated under Sections 91, 93,
94, 105 (as amended by the Amending Act XXXII of
1988), 284, 285 etc. of the Code as well as under Sections
156 (3), 157, 159, 167 (2), 190, 202, 164, 306 etc. of the
Code.
4. Neither an accused nor a pnblic interest litigant has
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
right to question the mode of collection of evidence of the
investigating agency and interfere in the progress of the
investigation.
5. The re-submission (after complying certain procedural
formalities) of the Letter Rogatory on 22nd Febrsary
1990, subsequent to the introduction of Section 166-A of
the Code by an Ordinance promulgated on 19th February
1990 and replaced by an Act coming into force with
retrospective effect from 19 .2.1990 is supported by sanc
tion of law.
6. Whether the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
is constitutionally invalid, being contrary to Articles 73 and
77 and in conflict with and opposed to Articles 21 and 300
A of the Constitution?
7. Whether Courts can take judicial noiice of the MOU
without its being gazetted and ratified in compliance with
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969?
8. Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is
a legally constituted body and empowered with powers of
registering and investigating a cognizable offence?
9. Whether the contents of the First Information in the
present case constitute a cognizable offence warranting
the registration of a case under Section 154 of the Code?
255
10. What are the circumstances under which the Criminal F
Court can suo moto exercise its revisional jurisdiction?
11. Is there any bar for the Courts to examine the report
of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) constituted
by the Parliament under the Rnles of Procedure made
under Article 118 of the Constitution or for a successor
Government to question its findings in the absence of any
negation or modification or change of the findings of the
Report?
The learned counsel for the parties while advancing their argu;nents H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A on the above propositions posed several ancillary questions of law. Mr.
Bhagat made a special reference to The Geneva Convention Act of 1960,
The Extra Convention. Act of 1962, The International Monetary Fund and
Banking Act of 1945, The Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 etc. in support
of his contention that the present MOU cannot partake of the force of law
and that it cannot be invoked. A host of decisions were cited at the Bar in
support of the above propositions.
It is not only appropriate but also has become necessary in this
connection to point out that the grounds taken in the petition filed by Mr.
H.S. Chowdhary before the Special Judge were only with reference to issue
C of Letter Rogatory and the authority of the CBI to register a case in the
absence of any named public servant being. brought as accused in the FIR
and the power of CBI to investigate the case since the JPC had already
rendered its findings on the subject-matter in issue. One other contention
was that the registration of the case was on account of political rivalry
I) entertained by the Janata Dal Government as against the outgoing Con
gress Government.
The Special Judge disposed of the petition holding, "Shri H.S.
Chowdhary has no locus standi to claim the reliefs sought for in the
petition." In the revision petition, Mr. H.S. Chowdhary took certain addi-
E tional grounds stating that. the First Information Report has not disclosed
the commission of any cognizable offence and the CBI has gone wrong in
registering the FIR in the absence of any additional evidence which were
not available before the JPC ·and that the Letter Rogatory ought not have
been issued without recording evidence. The High Court dismissed the
F revision petition as being not maintainable on the sole ground of locus
standi and did not go to other questions of law raised by Mr. Chowdhary.
Only for the first time before this Court, the parties are litigating on the
above stated propositions of law which except for one or two have neither
been raised before the Courts below nor agitated. Strictly speaking, as the
present appeals are preferred challenging only the judgment of the High
G Court dated 19.12.90, this Court is called upon to examine the tenability of
the reasons given by the High Court as regards the locus standi of Mr. H.S.
Chowdhary and in addition, the invocation of the suo motu action of the
High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This court while
disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 306/91 filed by Mr. H.S. Chowdhary
H challenging the first part of the order of the High Court dismissing his
JANTADAL V. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 257
revision petition on the ground that he has no locus standi, has confined A
its consideration only on that point. However, with regard to the various
questions of law, we expressed our view in our earlier Order as follows:
"Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply
gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature
registered against specified accused persons, it is for them
and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge
the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate
time before the proper forum and not for third parties
under the garb of public interest litigants."
We have also given the reasons for not dealing with specific proposi
tions raised by the respective counsel in our earlier Order observing thus:
"Therefore, under these circumstances one should not lose
sight of the significant fact that in case this Court pronoun- D
ces its final opinion or conclusions on the issues other than
the general issues raised by the appellants as public inter-
est litigants, without hearing the really affected per-
son/persons, such opinion or conclusions may, in future,
in case the investigation culminates in filing a final report
become detrimental and prejudicial t<> the indicated ac- E
cused persons who would be totally deprived of challeng-
ing such opinion or conclusions of this apex Court, even
if they happen to come in possession of some valuable
material to canvass the correctness of such opinion or
conclusions and consequently their vested legal right to F
defend their case in their own way would be completely
nullified by the verdict now sought to be obtained by these
public interest litigants."
However, as we. have expressed our view "that the question as to
whether laws are so petrified as to be unable to respond to the challenges G
made will be dealt with in detail in our main judgment, we have to examine
the law as regards the scope and ambit of public interest litigation and the
power of the High Court in taking suo motu cognizance in exercise of its
powers under Section 3'YI and 401 read with Section 482 of the Code which
are the general issues as indicated by us in our earlier Order. H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A We hasten to add that we will not be justified to make disembodied .
pronouncements or any observation on seriously disputed questions of law
and facts taking its cue from mere affidavits, that too not from the person
aggrieved or affected and without the b.attle lines being properly drawn by
the affected parties.
B We shall now briefly deal with the scope and object of 'public interest
litigation' (PIL), the horizon of which is widely extended and which at
present constitutes a new chapter in justice delivery system acquiring a
significant degree of importance in the modern legal jurisprudence prac
ticed by Courts in many parts of the world, based on the principle, "Liberty
C and Justice for All".
Public Interest Litigation - its origin and meaning
The question, "what 'PIL' means and is?" has been deeply surveyed,
explored and explained not only by various judicial pronouncements in
D many countries, but also by eminent Judges, jurists, activist lawyers, out
standing scholars, journalists and social scientists etc. with a vast erudition.
Basically the meaning of the words 'Public Interest' is defined in the Oxford
English Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Vol. XII as "the common well being
............... also public welfare".
In Shrouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (IV Edition), 'public interest'
is defined thus:
"PUBLIC INTEREST (1) A matter of public or general
interest "does not mean that which is interesting as gratify
ing curiosity or a love of information or amusement' but
that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary
interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or
liabilities are affected." (per Cambell CJ., R. v. Bed·
fordshire, 24 L.J .Q.B. 84).
G In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), 'public interest' is defined.
as follow:
"Public Interest - Something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some
interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are af-
H fected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities,
which may be affected by .the matters in question. Interest
shared by citiiens generally in affairs of local, staie or
national government ............. ; .... .
259
The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceed' B
ings therein, initiated in a Court of Law with the purpose of enforcing a
right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means
a legal action initiated in a Court of Law for the enforcement of public
interest br general interest in which the public or a class of the community
have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or
liabilities are affected. There is a host of decisions explaining the expres- C
sion 'PIL' in its wider connotation in the present-day context in modern
society, a few of which we will refer to in the appropriate part of this
judgment.
It would be quite appropriate in the case on hand to analyze both D
the basic features and the evolution and profound transformation of the
developing and growing PIL in modem society. Suffice it to say that the
challenges facing this meliorable litigation are examined in the light of their
social, economic, political and ideological causes; and that the solutions to
be adopted by the legal system to meet those challenges are explored, since
there is still an ocean of umnet needs. The•e challenges are : (1) The E
expanded role of Courts in the modern 'social' state and the new demands
for judicial responsibility; (2) the rise and growth of varied systems of
judicial review and the legitimacy of such development; (3) the emergence
of the notion of 'access to justice' as a judicial answer to egalitarian ideals
and demands for effectiveness, and the development of PIL, and ( 4) the F
role of courts in promoting the legal system in the arena of PIL. The
relentless efforts taken by courts in meetiilg all those challenges, in fact,
strive for a optimality in which the interest of the least advantaged is given
an overriding priority. During the last three. decades, judicial activism has
opened up new dimension for the judicial process and has given a new
hope to the justice-starved millions. Ort the question of legitimacy of the G
PIL and the significant importance ofits various aspects· in the context of
the present-day felt needs, stimulated by the emergence of a variety of new
social movements and societal exigencies, this Court has laid down a Icing
line of decisions, outlining the evolution of PIL, its vital issues and
problems relating to the focus, choice of relief methods, the means and the H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A administrative strategy for litigation and the demand for distributive justice
for resolving the complicity of social problems and creating genuine initia
tives so that this new activism may be more meaningful social justice. Thus
the concept of PIL which has been and is being fostered by judicial activism
has become an increasingly important one setting up valuable and respect-
able records, especially in the arena of constitutional and legal treatment
for 'the unrepresented and under-represented'..
The period of 1960s in United States of America was the important .
period of social embroilment during which not only manifold changes to
many institutions took place; but also significant reforms of which public
C interest litigation was one were proposed and tried The concept of PIL
though had its origin in U.S.A., over the march of years it has passed
through various changes and modifications in their common law based
systems. It is not necessary to examine all those modifications and changes
in the structure of the public law of that. country and the manner in which
D the legal services have been redistributed in American society except saying
that the strict requirement of legal interest has been diluted and attenuated
in the country of its origin. Similarly, the common law based systems in
other parts of the common wealth countries have also undergone various
changes. Legal aid programmes in Australia and Canada have been
restructured to serve divergent aspects of the public interest. Some '!f the
E countries have gone to the extent of broadening its scope even beyond
litigation and including many varieties of negotiations and even non-litigat
ing approaches. Thus the definition of PIL emerged from historical context
in which the commonality of the various forms of legal representation
involving the basic and fundamental rights of a significant segment of the
F public demanding vindication of its rights has been recognised in various
parts of the world.
The emergence of the concept of PIL, in the Indian legal system has
been succinctly explained by P .N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in one of
his articles contributed under the caption 'Social Action Litigation: The
G Indian Experience' thus:
"The judiciary has to play a vital and important role not
only in preventing and remedying abuse the misuse of
power but also in eliminating exploitation and injustice.
H For this purpose it is ncessary to make procedural innova-
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
ti.ons in order to meet the challenges posed by this new
role of an active and committed judiciary. The summit
ju<J\ciary in India, keenly alive to its social responsibility
and accountablity to the people of the country, has
liberated itself from the shackles of Wester thougbt, made
innovative use of the power of judicial review, forged new
tools, devised new methods and fashioned new strategies
for the purpose of bringing justice for socially and
economically ~isadvantaged groups .....
During the last four or five years however, judicial activism
has opened up a new dimension for the judicial process
and has given new hope to the justice-starved millions of
india."
261
(Vide 'Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies' published D
in 1987.)
Indian law has historically been strongly identified - both in theory
and practice - with a tradition which has been concerned with the rigbts
and duties of individuals. Yet in recent years it has been recognized that
this tradition is ~adequate to cope with a wide range of problems arising E
out of inequality of means, opportunities and entitlements in society. This
conflict has generated increasing discussion of PIL, and also the develop
ment of a whole new corpus of law for eft:ective and purposeful implemen
tation of PIL and institutions explicitly concerned with the manner and
techniques by which the public interest is, .•nd can be, safeguarded by the F
legal system.
The seed of the concept of PIL wene initially sown in India by
Krishna Iyer, J. in 1976 (without assigning tihe terminology) in Mumbai
Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai, [1976) 3 SCC :~32, he while disposing an G
industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bnous, has observed:
"Our adjectival branch of juri~prudence, by and large,
deals not with sophisticated litigants but the rural poor,
the urban lay and the weaker societal i;egments for whom
law will be an added terror if technical mis-descriptions H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11992] SUPP. l S.C.R.
and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the
cause-title create a secret weapon to non-suit a part.
Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted,
latitude is a grace of processual justice. Test litigations,
representative actions, pro bono publico and like bro
adened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the
current accent on justice to the common man and a
necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass the real
issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral
procedural short comings. Even Article 226, viewed on
wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of col
lective or common grievances, as distinguished from asser
tion of individual rights, although the traditional view,
backed by precedents has .opted for the narrower alterna
tive. Public interest is iiromoted by a spacious construction
of locus standi in ol!l' socio-econ<Jmic circumstances and
conceptual latit11dinarianism permits taking liberties with
individualis<1.UQI\ of the right to invoke the higher courts
where the remedy is shared by a considerable number,
particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consis
tent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law."
E After the germination of the se.eds of the concept of PIL in the soil
of our judicial system, this rule of PIL was nourished, nurtured and
developed by the Apex Court of this land by a series of outstanding
decisions.
In Feltilizer CopoMtion Kamgar Union v. Union of India, [1981] 2
F SCR 52 = AIR 1981 SC 344 the terminology 'public interest litigation" was
used. In that decision, Krishna Iyer, J. delivering his opinion for Bhagwati,
J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) and himself used the expression
'epistolary' jurisdiction. However, this rule on gaining momentum day by
day, burgeoned more and more expanding its branches in the cosmos of
G PIL and took its root firmly in the Indian Judiciary and fully blossomed
with fragrant smell in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149.
Locus Standi
Though it is imperative' to lay down clear guidelines and propositions;
H and outline the correct parameiers for entertaining a Public Interest Litiga-
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 263
tion - particularly on the issue of locus standi yet no hard and fast rules A
have yet been formulated and no comprehensive guidelines have been
evolved. There is also oue view that such adumberation is not possible and
it would not be expedient to lay down any general rule which would govern
all cases under all circumstances.
Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasise that the requirement of B
locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal
capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action
in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained
at the threshold.
The traditional syntax of law in regard to locus stamli for a specific
judicial redress, sought by an individual person or determinate class or
identifiable group of persons, is available only to that person or. class or
group of persons who has or have suffered a legal injury by reasons of
violation of his or their legal right or a right legally protected, the invasion D
of which gives rise to actionability within the categories of law. In a private
action, the litigation is bipolar; two opposed parties are locked in a
confrontational controversy which pertains to the determination of the
legal consequences of past events unlike in public action. The character of
such litigation is essentially that of vindicating private rights, proceedings
being brought by the persons in whom the right personally inhere on their E
legally constituted representatives who are thus obviously most competent
to commence the litigation.
In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litiga
tion is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus F
standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient
.interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public
injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interpoler; since
the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the provisions of the
Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause
of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest G
by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or
any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient
interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put
the judicial machinery in motion like actio popularis of Roman Law
whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict. H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
It will be befitting to recall the observation of this Court in People's
Union for Democratic Rights and others v. Union of India and Others, [1982]
3 sec 235 which reads thus:
"But the traditional rule of standing which confines access
to the judicial process only to those to whom legal injury
is caused or legal wrong is done has now been jetttisoned
by this Court and the narrow confines within which the
rule of standing was imprisoned for long years as a result
of inheritance of the Anglo-Saxon System of jurisprudence
have been broken and a new dimension has been given to
the doctrine of locus standi which has revolutionised the
whole concept of access to justi.ce in a way not known
before to the western system of jurisprudence ................... .
it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by relax
ing this traditional rule of standing in order that justice
may become easily available to the lowly and the lost."
R.S. Pathak, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) while agreeing
with the directions proposed by Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) inBandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors., [1984) 2 SCR
65 at 159 expressed his view stating," in public interest litigation. the role
E held by Court is more assertive than in traditional actio9~,"
M.N. Venkatachaliah, J, sreaking for the Bench ij! Sheela !Jqrs~ 1!·
Union of India and Others, [1988 4 §~e R/l '1115 brought out the distinction
between private litigation and public interest litigation in the following
words:
"In a public interest litigation, unlike traditional dispute
resolution mechanism, there is no determination or ad
judication of individual rights. While in the ordinary con
ventional adjudications the party structure is merely
bi-polar and the controversy pertains to the determination
of the legal consequences of past events and the remedy
is essentially linked to and limited by the logic of the array
of the parties, in a public interest action the proceedings
cut across and transcend these traditional forms and in
hibitions. The compulsion for the judicial innovation of
the technique of public interest action is the constitutional
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
promise of a social and economic transformation to usher
in an egalitarian social order and a welfare State.
................................................ The dispute is not com-
parable to one between private parties with the result
there is no rec0gnition of the status of a dominus litis for
' any individual or group of individuals to determine the
course or destination of the proceedings, except to the
extent recognised and permitted by the Court. The "rights"
of those who bring the action on behalf of the others must
necessaily be subordinate to the "interests" of those for
whose benefit the action is brought. The grievance in a
public interest action, generally speaking, is about the
content and conduct of government action in relation to
the consitutional or statutory rights of segments of society
and in certain circumstances the conduct of government
policies. Necessarily, both the party structure and the
matters in controversy are sprawling and amorphous, to
be defined and adjusted or readjusted as the case may be,
ad hoc, according as the exigencies of the emerging situa
tions. The proceedings do not partake of predetermined
private law litigation models but are exogenously deter
mined by variations of the theme."
265
Though we have, in our country, recognised a departure from the
strict rUie of locus standi as 'applicable to a person in private action and
broadened and liberalised the rule of standing and thereby permitted a
member of the public, having no personal gain or oblique motive to
approach the court for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of F
socially or economically disadvantaged persons who on account of their
poverty or total ignorance of their foundamental rights are unable to enter
the portals of the courts for judicial redress, yet· no precise and inflexible
working definition has been evolved in respect of locus standi of an
individual seeking judicial remedy and various activities in the field of PIL. G
Probably, some reservation and diversity of approach to the philosophy of
PIL among some of the Judges of this Court as reflected from the various
decisions of ·this Court, is one of the reasons for this Court finding it
difficult to evolv' a consistent jurisprudence in the field of PIL. True, in
defining the rule of locus standi no 'rigid litmus test' can be applied si:..ce
the broad contours of PIL are still developing apace seemingly with diver- H
A gent views on several aspects of the concept of this newly developed law
and discovered jurisdiction leading to a rapid transformation of judicial
activism with a far reaching change both in the nature and form of the
judicial process.
In this context, it would be quite relevant to recite the observations
B made by Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in S.P. Gupta
v. Union of India, [1981] Supp. SCC 87 at page 210 reading thus:
'Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial
process; the theatre of law is fast changing and the
. problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The
Court has to innovate new methods and devise new
strategies for the purpose of providing access to justice to
large masses of people who are denied their basic human
rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning.
The only way in which this can be done is by entertaining
writ petitions and even letters from public-spirited in
dividuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons
who have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose
constitutional or legal rights has been violated but who by
reason of their poverty or socially or economically disad
vantaged position are unable to approach the court for
relief."
(emphasis supplied)
As briefly pointed out in S.P. Gupta's case (cited supra), there are
F certain exceptions carved out of the strict rule of standing, to be made
applicable to PIL cases. By way of illustration, it may be .stated that under
Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, any person acting as the
next friend of a minor may bring an action in his name for judicial redress.
So. also any other person other than the person under detention may file
an application for issue of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality
G of the detention of the detenu. Similarly, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council approved the exception to the strict rule of standing in
Durayappah v. Fernando, [1967] 2 All ER 152 {PC) = [1967) 2 AC 337. In
United States of America also, though the exception has been recognised
and the strict rule of standing has been liberalised in the interest of justice,
H it bas been attenuated later on in some of the cases vide {1) Data Processing
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 267
Service v. Camp, 367 US 150 = 25 L Ed. 2d 184; (2) Flast v. Cohen, 392 A
US 83: 20 L Ed. 2d 947 (1968); (3) Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC US App DC 328; ( 4) U.S. v. Richardson, 418 US
166; and (5) Warth v. Seldin 422 US 490.
In the United Kingdom, there have been remarkable developments
on account of the dynamic activism of Lord Denning. B
In Attorney General (on the relation of Mc WhiJter v. Independent
Broadcasting Authority, 1973 (1) All ER 689 Lord Denning, MR while
dealing with the case of a relator action observed as follows:
"In the light of all this I am of the opinion that, in the last
resort, if the Attorney General refuses leave in a proper
case, or improperly or unreasonably delays in giving leave
or his machinery works too slowly, then a member of the
public, who has a sufficient interest, can him.ielf apply to
the court itself. He can apply for a declaration and, in a
proper case, for an injunction, joining the Attorney
General .if need be, as defendant. In these days when
government departments and public authorities have such
great powers and influence, this is a most important
safeguard for the ordinary citizens of this country; so that
they can see that those great powers and influence are
exercised in accordance with law. I would not restrict the
circumstances in which an individual may be held to have
a sufficient interest... ......................................... I have said so
much because I regard it as a matter of high constitutional
principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a
government department or a public11uthority is transgress
ing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which
offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects,
then in the last resort any one of those offended or injured
can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek
to have the Jaw enforced. But this, I would emphasise, is
only in the last resort when there is no other remedy
reasonably available to secure that the Jaw is obeyed."
ln R v. Greater London Council, (1976] 3 All ER !84 one Albert
Raymond Blackburn and Tessa Marion Blackburn applied for an order of H
A prohibition to issue against the Greater London Council (the 'GLC') to
prevent them from exercising their censorship powers over the public exhibi
tion of cinematograph films in accordance with a test of obscenity which was
bad in law. The Divisional Court of Queen's Bench Division refused the order
and dismissed the application. Challenging that order Raymond Blackburn
came before the Court of Appeal. The appeal was opposed on the ground of
locus standi contending that Blackburn had no sufficient interest to bring
those proceedings against the GLC.Lord Denning, MR rejected that conten- .
tion relating to locus standi concluding thus:
"In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Blackburn has made out
his case. He has shown that the GLC have been exercising
their censorship powers in a manner which is unlawful;
because they have been applying a test which is bad in
law. If they continue with their present wrong test and in
<:onsequence given their consent to films which are grossly
indecent, they may be said to be aiding and abetting a
criminal offence. In these circumstances, this Court can
and should issue an order of prohibition to stop them.
Subsequently in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers and Others,
{1977) 3 AllER 70, the House of Lord while dealing with the case of a relator
E action in which the appellant, John Prendergast Gouriet after having failed to
obtain the consent of the Attorney General to bring an action at the relation of
the plaintiff against the Union of Post Office Workers ('the UPW') for an
injunction restraining the UPW from solidting or endeavouring to procure
any person wilfully to detain or delay any postal packet in the course of trans
mission between England and Wales and the Republic of South Africa, issued
F a writ in his own name against the UPW seeking the same relief, held that it
was a fundamental principle of English law that public rights could only be
asserted in a civil action by the Attorney General as an Officer of the Crown
representing the public and that a private person was not entitled to bring an
action in his own name for the purpose of preventing public wrongs and,
G therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief, whether interlocutory
or final or whether byway of an injunction or declaration, in such an action.
This decision evoked serious debate and was subjected to severe
criticism by the jurists in England and elsewhere.
H So far as the newly invented concept of PIL in Indian legal system is
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PAND!AN,J.] 269
concerned, we can be proud of saying that there is a tremendous develop- A
ment and dynamic progress in the cosmos of PIL in spite of multiple
criticism levelled against the various aspects of PIL. The melioration of the
philosophy of PIL is demonstrably radiated by the long line of decisions, a
few of which we will presently refer to.
This Court in Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, [1980) 3 SCC B
488 has accepted a letter written to the Supreme Court by one Sunil Batra,
a prisoner from Tihar Jail, Delhi complaining that the Jail Warder had
subjected another prisoner serving life term in the same jail to inhuman
torture. This Court treated that latter as a writ petition and by an elaborate
judgment allowed the petition and issued certain directions inclusive of one C
for taking suitable action against the erring official to the Ministry of Home
Affairs and all State Governments on the ground that Prison Justice has
pervasive relevance, thereby enlarging the scope of habeas corpus by
making it available to a prisoner not only for seeking his liberty but also
for the enforcement of a constitutional right to which he was entitled to
even while in confinement. D
This Court in Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., {1983) 2 SCC 308
entertained a letter sent by the two Professors of Delhi University seeking
enforcement of the constitutional right of the inmates in a Protective Home
at Agra who were living in inhuman and degrading conditions in blatant E
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The said letter was treated as a
writ petition and the two Professors were permitted to maintain an action
for an appropriate writ.
Again in Miss Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar and Others, [1982) 2 SCC
583 this Court treated a letter addressed to a Judge of this Court by the F
Free Legal Aid Committee at Hazaribagh, Bihar as a writ petition.
In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (supra),
letter addressed by the petitioner-Orgallisation 'seeking a direction against
the respondents for ensuring observance of the provision of various labour G
laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work of projects
connected with the Asian Games, was entertained by relaxing the tradition-
al rule of standing.
Treating a letter sent by an organisation demanding the release of
bonded labourers as a Writ Petition this Court in Bandhua Mdkti Morr:ha H
A v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 2 SCR 67 issued several directions to the
Cental Government and State of Haryana not only for the release of the
bonded labourers but also for their future improvement and betterment.
Though R.S. Pathak (the Chief Justice as he then was) and A.N. Sen, J.
have delivered separate Judgments, in general they agreed with the direc-
B tions issued by Bhagwati, J. in his separate leading judgment.
A number of Writ Petitions were filed by two journalists along with the
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties Committee for the Protection of
Democratic Rights and two other pavement dwellers under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India challenging the correctness and legality of the decision
C of the Bombay Municipal Corporation to demolish the dwellings of the slum
hutments on several grounds, one of which being violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution. These Writ Petitions were heard by a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Olga Tellis v.Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 51
= [1985] 3 SCC 545. The respondent challenged the very maintainability of
D the Writ Petitions. Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for the Constitution Bench
rejecting the challenge of the respondent therein entertained those petitions
and held that the right to life conferred by Article 21 is of wide sweep and far
reaching and one of the facets of such right is the right to livelihood.
In Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, [1989] Supp. l SCC
E 251 a writ petition was registered under Article 32 of the Constitution on
the basis of a petition addressed by the writ petitioners to one of the
learned Judges of this Court as a Public Interest Litigation but Mukharji,
J. (the learned CJ. as he then was) speaking for the Bench dismissed the
Writ Petition holding:
" ........... the allegations are too vague, too indirect and too
tenuous to threaten the quality of life of people at large
or any section of the people. The acts complained of
resulting in the threats alleged are too remote and, in our
opinion, to be amenable under Article 32 of the Constitu
tion. The petitioners further assert that there has been
violation of Article 51-A(I) of the Constitution as a duty
has been cast on every citizen to value and preserve the
rich heritage of our composite culture. Indeed, it is our
duty but the enforcement of that duty by means of a writ
under Article 32 of the Constitution ..... "
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 271
Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Bench .in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit A
Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by its Assistant General Secretary
on behalf of the Association etc. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 S.C. 298
over-ruling the plea that a Writ Petiton filed by an unrecognised association
cannot be sustained observed that "we have no "hesitation in holding that
the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and in- B
dividual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions."
In Fertilizer Corporation Union v. Union of India (supra), Chand
rachud, CJ. speaking for himself and on behalf of Fazal Ali and Kaushal,
JJ. observed that the violation of a fundamental right is the sine qua non
of the exercise of the right conferred by Article 32 and disinissed the writ C
petition as not maintainable having regard to the facts of the case. Krishna
Iyer, J. s;ieaking for himself and Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in a separate
judgment though concurred with the conclusion of the majority held that
if a person belonging to an organisation which has special interest in the
subject-matter has so.ne concern deeper than that of a busy body, he D
cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him
is justiciable may still remain to be considered and pointed out:
"Public interest litigation is part of the process of par
ticipate justice and 'standing' in civil litigation of that
pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial E
doorsteps. n
He further added:
"We have no doubt that in a competition between courts
and streets as dispenser of justice, the rule of law must
win the aggrieved person for the law court and wean him
from the lawless street. In simple terms, locus standi must
be liberalised to meet the challenges of the times. Ubi just
ibi remedium must be enlarged to embrace all interets of
public-minded citizens or organisations with serious con
cern for conservation of public resources and the direction
and correction of public power so as to promote justice
in its triune facets .... /
1
In National Textile Workers' Union etc. v. P.R. Ramakri;hnan &
Others, (1983] 1 SCR 922 Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) speaking for t\le H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A majority expressed his view that the workers of a company are entitled to
appear at the hearing of the winding up petition whether to support or to
oppose it· and they have a locus standi to appear and he heard both before
the petition is admitted and an order for advertisement is made as also
after the admission and advertisement of the petition until an order is made
B for winding up the company. A.N. Sen, J dissented from the above view.
In passing, it may be stated that in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas
Nayak, [1984] 2 SCC 500 this court observed the "Locus standi of the
complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except
that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the
C complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded
by such statutory provision."
Reference also may be made to:
(1) D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 S.C. 130 (decision of a
Constitution Bench): (2) P. Na/la Thampy Thera v. Union of India, AIR
1984 S.C .. 74; (3) Rural Litigation and entitlement Kendra, Dehradun &
Others v. State of U.P. & Others, [1985] 2 SCC 431 and (4) Kurukshetra
University and another v. State of Haryana, [1977] 4 SCC 451.
From the above pronou11cements, it emerges that this summit Court
has widely enlarged the scope of PIL by relaxing and liberalising the rule
of standing by treating letters or petitions sent by any person or association
complaining violation of any fundamental rights and also entertaining Writ
Petitions filed under Articl~ 32 of the Constitution by public spirited and
F policy oriented activist persons or journalists or of any organisation reject
ing serious challenges made with regard to the maintainability of such
petitions rendered many virtuosic pronouncements and issued manifold
directions to the Central and the State Governments, all local and other
authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Govern
ment of India for the betterment of the public at large in many fields in
G conformity with constitutional prescriptions of what constitutes· the good
life in a socially just democracy. The newly invented proposition of law laid
down by many learned Judges of this Court in the arena of PIL irrefutably
and manifestly establish that our dynamic activism in the field of PIL is by
no means less than those of other activist judicial systems in other part of
H the world.
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDJAN,J.] 273
,, '
It may not be out of place of mention here that there may be A
numerous circumstances justifying· the entertaining of Public Interest
Litigation but we cannot obviously enumerate an exhaustive list of all such
situations. n 1
Bhagwati, J in S.P. Gupta's case (popularly known as Judges' Ap
pointment and Transfer case) which was heard by a Bench of seven learned
Judges, has clearly defined 'what PIL means and is' and expressed his views
in meticulous detail in the following terms:
"It may therefore now be taken as well established that
where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person
or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation
of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is im
posed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provi
sion or without authority of law or any such legal wrong
or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such
person or determinate class of persons is by reason of
poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economi
cally disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court
for relief, any member of the public can maintain an
application for an apporpriate directions, order or writ in
the High Court under Article 226 and in caoe of breach
of any fundamental right of such person or determinate
class of persons, in this Court under Article 32 seeking
judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to
such person or determinate class of persons .................... ..
This Court will readily respond even to a letter addressed
by such individual acting pro bono pub/ico. It is true that
there are rules made by this Court prescribing the proce
dure for moving this Court for relief under Article 32 and
they require various formalities to be gone through by a
person seeking to approach this Court. But it must not be
forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice
and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be
thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The court
would therefore unhesitatingly and without the slightest
qualms of conscience cast aside the technical rules of
procedure in the exercise of its dispens~g power and treat
the letter of public-minded individual as a writ petition
and act upon it ............................... But we must hasten to
make it clear that the individual who moves the court for
judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona
fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if
he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of
political motivation or other oblique consideration, the
court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance
of such person and must reject his application at the
threshold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed
to the court or even in the form of a regular writ petition
filed in court. We may also point out that as a matter of
prudence and not as a rule of law, the court may confine
this strategic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal
wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or
group of persons or the contitutional or legal right of such
determinate class or group of persons is violated and as
far as possible, not entertain cases of individual wrong or
injury at the instance of a third party, where there is an
effective legal-aid organisation which can take care of such
cases."
After having elaborately explained the concept of PIL, the learned
Judges held that:
" ....... any member of the public having sufficient interest
can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury
arising from breach of public duty or from violation of
some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek
enforcement of such public duty and observance of such
constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essen
tial for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause
of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the
constitutional objectives."
However,thelearnedJudgehassoundedanoteofcautiontotheCourts
to be observed while entertaining a Public Interest Litigation as follows:
"But we must be careful to see that the member of the
H public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
acting bona fide and not for perosnal gain or private profit
or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The
court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians
and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to
gain a political objective."
275
The other learned Judges - namely, Gupta, Tulzapurkar, Fazal Ali, B
Desai and Pathak, JJ - who were parties to the above judgment have all
agreed in general with the view expressed by Bhagwat~ J. on the question
of locus standi. However, Desai, J. added a note saying "that the contention
about locus standi is now of academic interest and I do not propose to deal
with it. However, I am in full agreement with learned Bhagwat~ J." C
However, Venkataramiah, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
in his separate judgment with regard to the question of locus standi of
lawyers in filing petitions in respect of matters concerning judges, courts
and administration of justice has registered his opinion thus:
"It has, however, to be made clear that it cannot be said
that lawyers only because they have a right to practise in
a court have 'locus standi' to file petitions in respect of
every matter concerning judges, courts and administration
of justice. There are many such matters in which have no
'locus standi' to ask for r~.licf. By way of illustration,
lawyers cannot question the establishment of a new court
on the ground that their professional prospects would be
affected thereby. Even in these cases on the question of
non-appointment of Mr. S.N. Kumar and on the question
of transfer of Mr. K.B.N. Singh, the lawyer-petitioners may
have no voice. But for the active participation of these tow
persons, the petitions regarding reliefs concerning them
individually would have probably become liable to be
dismissed on the ground that the lawyers have no 'locus
standi' to make these prayers.
But, since as already stated, Mr. SN. Kumar and Mr.
K.B.N. Singh have requested the Court to consider and if
thought fit to grant relief in their favour and the learned
Attorney- General has fairly stated that he would not raise
the objection that the petitioners have no locus standi in
,
view of the importance of the questions debated in these
cases, we hold that the petitions cannot be rejected merely
on the ground that the petitioners who are lawyers have
no locus standi to file these petitions. Before leaving this
topic, it has to be observed that other question of locus
standi in the field of administrative law is still in a fluid
state ·and it is not possible to lay down in any one case the
principles which can govern all situations."
On an assiduous analysis and scrupulous study of the major landmark
decision of Gupta's case which .serves as a charter of PIL, we unreservedly
C hold that the said decision describes the broad definition of the expression
'PIL', explores the conceptual problems, outlines the evolution of legal
strategies, discusses the institutionalisation of ihe PIL movement and con
cludes with innovative methods and devices for increasing citizens' par
ticipation to promote reforms of the legal system in order to ensure real
access to the justice delivery system, and to encourage the continuation and
D expansion of public interest representation. Above all, it has opened wide
the doors of the Court to millions of the poor, ignorant and socially or
economically disadvantaged to articulate their grievances and seek justice
which otherwise would have been denied to them.
E In short, the decision in Gupta's case is a golden master key which
has provided access to the Courts for the poor and down-trodden.
Vexatious and frivolous litigations
While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all
F emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this
newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert
and a note of severe warning that courts should not allow its process to be
abused by a mere busybody or a meddlesome interpoler or wayfarer or
officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal
G gain or private profit or other oblique consideration.
In Gupta's case (supra) Bhagwat~ J emphatically pointed out that the
relaxation of the rule of locus standi in the field of PIL does not give any
right to a busybody or meddlesome interpoler to apporach the court under
the guise of a public interest litigant. He has also left the following note of
H caution:
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.]
"But we must be careful to see that the member of the
public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is
acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit
or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The
court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians
and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to
gain a political objective ..... "
277
In State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student, (1985] 3 SCC 169 it has been
said that public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with
great care and circumspection.
Khalid, J. in his separate supplementing judgment in Sachidanand
Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987] SCC 295 and 331 said:
"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases
in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire
confidence in courts and among the public. They must be
above suspicion........................................ Public interest
'litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think
that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases
are now filed without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore,
necessary to lay down clear guidelines a,nd to outline the
correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If
courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the
name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation
will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing
justice, will have to taken upon themselves administrative
and executive functions............................ I will be second
to none in extending held when such help is required. But
this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always
open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some
self-imposed restriant on public interest litigants."
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench in
Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (supra) was in full agreement
with the view expressed by Khalid, J. in Sachidanand Pandey's case and
added that 'public interest litigation' is an instrument of the administration
of justice to be used properly in proper cases.
A See also separate judgment by Pathak, J. (as he then was) inBandhua
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (supra).
Sarkaria, J. in Jasbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, [1976] 30 SCR 58
expressed bis view that the application of the busybody should be rejected
at the threshold in the followed terms:
"It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply
for a writ of certiorar~ an applicant may ordinarily fall in
any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii)
'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Per
sons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
those coming under the first .two categories. Such persons
interfere in things whcih do not conern them. They
masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act
in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no
interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They
indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial
process either by force of habit or from improper motiv~s.
Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or
cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some ap
plicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the
wheels of adminstration. The High Court should do well
to reject the applications of such busybodies at the
threshold."
Krishna Iyer, J in Feltilizer Corporation v. Union of India, (supra) in
stronger term stated:
'If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or .officious
intervener without any interest or concern beyond what
belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this
country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him."
In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P.,
[1990] 4 SCC 449 Sabyasachi Mukharji, C.J. observed:
'While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental
rights, it is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this
weapon under Article 32 should not . be misused or per-
JANTADAL V. H.S.CHOWDHARY(PANDIAN,J.)
milted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the Superior
Court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental
rights being considered by the Court."
279
In a recent decision of this Court in Union CariJide Corporation and
Others v. Union of India and Others, [1991) 4 SCC 584 at 610 Ranganath
Mishra, CJ. in his separate judgment while concurring with the conclusions B
of the majority judgment has said thus:
"I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public ac
tivists should also be permitted to espouse the cause of
the poor citizens but there must be a limit set to such
activity and nothing perhaps should be done which would
affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the serv
iceability of the institution to the people at large. Those
who are acquainted with jurisprudence and enjory social
privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation to the
community of educating it properly and allowing the judi
cial process to continue unsoiled."
K.N. Singh, J. speaking for the Bench in Subhash Kumar v. State of
Bihar & Ors., [1991) 1 SCR 5 has ex-pressed his opinion in the following
words:
"Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person
or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge
and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, are enter
tained it would amount to abuse of process of the Court,
preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners
from this Court. Personal interest cannot be enforced
through the process of this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation.
Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceedings
for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a
group of persons or community which are not able to
enforce their fundamental rights on account of their in
capacity, poverty or ignorance of Jaw. A person invoking
the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 must approach
this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of
affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of
·B
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP.1 S.C.R .. (2X
his personal grudge or enmity. It is duty of this Court to
discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of
justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous
litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court for personal matters under the garb of the public
interest litigation.
11
It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having
sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi
and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy,
suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for
C personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique considera
tion. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before
the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the
threshold.
D It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings
initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted which time other
wise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants.
Though we are second to none in fostering and developing the newly
invented concept of PIL and extending our long arm sympathy to the poor,
the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are
E infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented
and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while
genuine litigants with legitimate grievnaces relating to civil matters involv
ing properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in
which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and
F persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long
years, persons suffering from the undue delay in service matters, Govern
ment or private persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge
amounts of public revenue or unauthorised collection of tax amounts are
locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc.
etc. - are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond
G hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the
busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners
haivng absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private•
profit either for themselves or as proxy of others or for any other ex -
traneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling their
H faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.] 281
C<;mrts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitons and thus criminally waste A
the valuable time of Courts and as result of which the queue standing
ou.tside the doors of the Court never moves which piquent situation creates
a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose
faith in the administration of our judicial system.
In the words of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) "the Courts must be B
careful in entertaining public interest litigations" or in the words of
Sarkaria, J. ''the application of busy bodies should be rejected at the
threshold itself' and as Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out, "the doors of the
Courts should not be ajar for such vexatious litigants'.
Further, we would like to make it clear that it should not be c
misunderstood that by the expression of our above view, there is any
question of retreating or recoiling from the earlier views expressed by this
court about the philosophy of public interest litigation in many outstanding
judgments which we have already referred to; on the other hand we look
back to the vantage point from which we started our journey and proceed D
on our onward journey in the field of PIL.
Keeping in mind the recent development of the doctrine of PIL and
the judicial exposition of the rule governing locus standi, we shall now
revert to the facts of the instant case and carefully examine the questions;
(1) Whether H.S. Chowdhary has locus standi to file this litigation and (2) E
Whether this litigation will fall within the ambit and scope of PIL seeking
declaratory as well as injunctive reliefs. Before the Special Judge, he filed
the petition under Article 51-A of the Constitution proclaiming that he
being the General Secretary of an Organisation, calling itself as Rashtriya
Jan Parishad which is devoted to uphold the Rule of Law and fight against F
injustice, has got a fundamental duty to inform the court "regarding the
activation of the complainant (CBI) in the aforesaid case which has tar
nished the image, credibility of the nation and has also lowered the national
prestige". According to him, the prosecution has been malevolently
launched with rancour, stimulated by political vendetta after Shri V .P. G
Singh became the Prime Minister, who with his colleagues have attributed
mendacious charges publicly, that there was payment of kickbacks and
receipt of oribe from Bofors.
The sum and substance of the inculpation as gathered from the
averments made in the petition and the submissions made by Mr. Bhagat H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A on behalf of H.S. Chowdhary, in short, are that those who were at the helm
of affairs in the then Government during January 1990 in their attempt to
lock horns with those who were in power of the then outgoing Government
with ma/a fide intention of vindicating their electoral rivalry have been
instrumental in registration of the FIR containing the unveracious and vile
B charges by using every possible trick and ruse at their command and
disposal and making vociferous verbal attack with their long power to settle
their personal scores with their political opponents. The further attack
against the author of the FIR and the investigating agency is that the CBI
under 'pressure of its political masters in conspiracy with them have been
giving reeklessly the names of various leaders of this country to tarnish their
C image without any basis'; and the on-set of the investigation is biased,
unfair and unc:thical and the procedure adopted is in utter violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and the procedural law.
Mr. Jetmnalani expostulating the objectives of PIL urged with
D vehemence and persistence that H.S. Chowdhary does not have any locus
standi to initiate this litigation and as such his petition is liable to be
rejected even at the threshold. According to him, the true Public Interest
Litigation is one in which a selfless citizen having no personal motive of
any kind except either compassion for the weak and disabled or deep
concern for stopping serious public injury approaches the Court either for
E (1) Enforcement of fundamental rights of those who genuinely do not have
adequate means of access to the judicial system or denied benefit of the
statutory provisions incorporating the directive principles of State Policy
for amelioration of their condition and (2) preventing or annulling execu'
live acts and omissions violative of Constitution or law resulting in substan-
F tial injury to public interest.
According to him, the present litigation brought by Mr. Chowdhary
does not satisfy the definition of PIL even remotely. With strong intensity
of conviction, he states that the appellant does not stand in a better footing
than that of a busybody or a rank meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or
G officious intervener having no concern except for some private motivation
and obligue consideration. He continues to acrimoniously urge that Mr.
Chowdhary is acting as a proxy under the mask of public interest litigant
for the benefit of all the real accused, in the discovery of whose identity of
whole nation is interested and that Mr. Chowdhary on being inspired by
H some other extraneous consideration is attempting to keep all the named
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.] 283
and unnamed accused behind a smoke screen so that the identity of those A
recipients of the kickbacks and bribes should not be discovered and go
unpunished and the bribe money deposited in Swiss Banks should not be
frozen. He also says the very purpose of filing this petition by Mr.
Chowdhary for quashing the proceedings is only to stultify and frustrate
the proceedings against the accused. He further states that when the B
scandal of Bofors' affairs involving clandestine payoffs at the highest level
which has come to light and surfaced by the Swedish Radio Broadcast, has
assumed mammoth proportion, Mr. Chowdhary pretentiously claiming to
be a crusader for justice in the name of probono publico has filed this
benami litigation at the instance of the holders of foreign bank accounts
and is attempting to thwart and stall the proceedings by masquerading the C
accused persons as paragons of virtue.
Mr. Anand Dev Girl, the learned Solicitor General stating that Public
Interest Litigation is not in the nature of adversorial litigation and it is
intended to promote and vindicate public interest wliich demands that D
violation of constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who
are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position,
should not go unnoticed and unredressed. According to him, the very
litigation itself is not within the definition of Public Interest Litigation and
more so H.S. Chowdhary absolutely has no locus standi to approach the
Court by filing the petition under Sections 397 and 482 of the Code of E
Criminal Procedure by way of a revision of the order of the Special Judge
and also quashing the criminal case filed against some known and unknown
· persons, involved in a series of criminal offences of conspiracy, criminal
breach of trust, cheating and bribery. It is the submission of the learned
Solicitor General that Mr. Chowdhary, wearing the insignia of a public F
interest litigant has preferred the quashing petition before the High Court
for the glare of publicity. According to him, the petition by Mr. Chowdhary
has been drafted in an ingenious way without mentioning as to who all are
respondents besides the Union of India and it is an ignoble and un
scrupulous action and, therefore, both the Special Judge and the learned
Judge of the High Court were justified in rejecting this petition holding G
that Mr. Chowdhary does not even have the semblance of public interest
litigant and as such be has no locus standl
Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.
Cbowdhary after stating that the probono parties must have real, tangible H
A and perceptible interest, urged that in the present case, Mr. Chowdhary
has espoused only real public interest and, therefore, his right of locus
standi cannot be questioned. He asserts that the very registration of the
case smacks of political vendetta.
After deeply and carefully considering the submissions of all the
B parties, we see much force in the submissions made by the learned Solicitor
General, Mr. A.O. Giri and Mr. Jethamalani, senior counsel. A perusal of
the petitions filed by H.S. Chowdhary before the Special Judge and the
High Court clearly unfolds that Mr. Chowdhary appears to be very much
concerned with the personal and private interest of the accused in the
C criminal case and there is absolutely no involvement of public interest. Can
it be said that this litigation is in the nature of PIL to vindicate and
effectuate the public interest? The emphatic answer would be 'Not even a
single ray of the characteristic of public interest litigation is visibly see'.
Indeed, we are surprised to note that in the petition filed before the
D High Cour, Mr. Chowdhary has stated that it is his duty to see that
'individuals' get justice from the Indian Courts. From whichever angle we
survey and audit the contentions in both the petitions before the Courts
below and the petition filed before this Court, there can be no escape
except to come to the conclusion that Mr. Chowdhary has no locus standi
E at all to file these petitions, as found by the Courts below.
In this connection, we would like to add a few words about the
dismissal of the applications of the interveners.
The High Court rejected the applications of the interveners as having
F no right to be impleaded as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition
of H.S. Chowdhary on the ground that he has no locus standi. We too in
our earlier Order having held that H.S. Chowdhary has no locus standi to
file the petition or to invoke the revisional or extraordinary inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 and 482 of the Code of
G Criminal Procedure respectively and that the petition under Article 51-A
of the Constitution cannot come within the true meaning and scope of
public interest litigation, dismissed the applications of the interveners
holding thus:
"Consequent upon the above conclusions (1) and (2), the
H appellants namely, Janata Dal, Communist Party of India
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY[PANDIAN,J.]
(Marxist) and Indian Congress (Socialist) who are before
this Court equally have no right of seeking their implead
ment/intervention. For the same reasons, Dr. P. Nalla
Thampy Thera also has no right to file the Writ Petition
(Crl.) No. H4 of 1991 as a public interest litigant."
285
The above paragraph is self-explanatory and the intervention peti- B
tions were rejected only consequent upon our conclusions (1) and (2)
recorded in our earlier order.
It is significant to note that Mr. Prashant Bhushan in his written
submissions has stated, "the Janata Dal never claimed any locus to inter- C
vene in the matter; and that in fact its stand is that Mr. Chowdhary has no
locus to interfere in the investigation and that the J anta Dal intervened in
the matter only after the High Court began to seriously entertain the
petition of Mr. Chowdhary without even deciding the question of his locus
and that the J anata Dal's intervention w~s only to prevent sabotage of the
investigation. n
Revisional and Inherent Pqwers of the High Coutt
The next question of law that comes for our consideration is the suo
moto power of the High Court in exercise of its powers under Sections 190
(dealing with powers of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence), E
397 (empowering the High Court or any Session Judge to exercise powers
of revision), 401 (dealing with the High Court's powers of revision) and
482 (dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Justice M.K. Chawla, learned Judge of the High Court
relying (Jn the decisions, namely (1) Rattan Singh v. State of Maharashtra, F
1977 Crl. LJ. 673, (2) Mohammad v. State of Kera/a, 1982 Crl. L.J. 1120
and Range Forest officer Sirsa and Others v. Anand Venkataraman Hegde,
1978 Crl. LJ. 1374 has held in his order, impugned herein thus: "A b•Ie
perusal of these provisions leave no doubt in my mind that this court by
itself can call for the record of the lower court if it comes to or is brought
to its knowledge that any illegality is being committed at the instance of G
the State or by the Investigating Agency in the garb of discharging their
duties under any provision of law." Justice M.K. Chawla on his own stating
that there are 'six prima facie illegalities' which, according to him, war
ranted suo moto cognizance in exercise of the powers under Section 397,
401 and 482 of the Code directed the office to register the C'Se under the H
A title, "Court on its own motion v. State and CBI''.
We are pained to note that Justice M.K. Chawla has taken an
extreme view that 'the Court can take judicial notice of any illegality being
committed by any court with a view to prevent the injury being caused to
the known or unknown aggrieved party', even when the investigation is at
B its threshold. The very sentence which we have quoted above is indicative
of the fact that the learned Judge in order to protect any possible injury
that might be caused either during the investigation or on the culmination
of the criminal proceedings to the known or unknown aggrieved palty has
determined to take suo moto cognizance and proceed with the matter, by
C virtually stepping into the shoes of the accused parties both present and
prospective.
Now let us briefly cogitate over the legal issue relating to the revisional
and inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to call for the records and examine
D the records of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court within its
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and to quash
criminal proceeding, deliberate on the legality and correctness of the later
part of his order of Justice M.K. Chawla in and by which he has assumed the
jurisdiction to initiate suo moto proceedings, particularly for quashing the
E First Information Report and all other connected and allied proceedings aris
ing during the course of the investigation.
Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the new Code are analogous to Section
435, 439 and 561(A) of the old code of 1898 oxcept for certain substitutions,
p omissions and modifications. Under Section 397, the High Court possesses
the general power of superintendence over the actions of Courts subor
dinate to it which the discretionary power when administered on ad
ministration side, is known as the power of superintendence and on the
judicial side as the power of revision. In exercise of the discretionary
powers conferred on the High Court under the provisions of this Section,
G the High Court can, at any stage, on its own motion, if it so desires and
certainly when illegalities and irregularities resulting in injustice are
brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. The words in
Section 435 are, however, very general and they empower the High Court
to call for the record of a case not only when it intends to satisfy itself
H about the correctness of any finding, sentence or order but also as to the
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [P AND IAN, J.]
regularity of any proceedh.g of any subordinate Court. A
By virtue of th~ power under Section -401, the High Court can
examine the proceedings of inferior Courts if the necessity for doing so is
brought to its notice in any manner, namely, (1) when the records have
been called for by itself, or (2) when the proceedings otherwise comes to
its knowledge. B
The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 i< to
confer power upon superior criminal Courts - a kind of paternal or
supervisory jurisdiction - in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising
from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper C
precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the
one hand, or on the other hand in some underserved hardship to in
dividuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it
must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and
circumstances of each particular case; anxious attention being given to the
said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to case. D
Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561 A of the old Code and
to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle
and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The rule of inherent
powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedi~ E
concedere videtur id sine quo_ ipso, ess uon potest" which means that when
the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which
the thing itself could riot exist.
The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such
orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though F
unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exer
cised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justiliae to do
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts
exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code-are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great
caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in G
exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
The Judicial Committee in (1) Emperor v. Nanr Ahmad, AIR 1945
P.C. 18, 22 and (2) Lala Jai Ram Das v. Emperor, (1945) 47 Bom. L.R. 634
(PC) has taken the view that Section 561-A of the old Code gave no new H
A powers but only provided that those which the Court already inherently
possessed should be preserved. This view holds the field till date.
This Court in Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. The State of Bihar, [1964) 2 SCR
336 had· an occasion to examine the extent of inherent power of the High
Court and"its jurisdiction when to be exercised. Mudholkar, J speaking for
himself and Raghubar Dayal, J after referring a series of decisions of the
Privy Council and of the various High Courts held thus:
''. ....... every High Court as the highest court exercising
criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make
any order for the purpose of securing the ends of jus-
tice .................... Being an extraordinary power it will, how-
ever, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant
abuse by a subordinate Court to is powers ..... "
See Ta/ab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and
D Another, [1958) SCR 1226 and Pampapathy v. State of Mysore, [1966)
(Supp.) SCR 477.
Thus, the inherent power under this Section can be exercised by the
High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or (2)
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. In relation to exercise of inherent powers of the High
Court, it has been obse-rved in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1978 SC 47 = [1978) l SCR 749 that the power in not to be resorted to if
there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of grievance of the
aggrieved party and that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of process of any Coiirt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
and that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Vide (1) Ta/ab Hazi Hussain
v. Madhukar Purshottam, AIR 1958 SC 376 = [1958] SCR 1226; (2) Khushi
Ram v. Hashim and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 542; and (3) State of Orissa v. Ram
G Chander Agarwa/a, AIR 1979 SC 87 = [1979) l SCR 1114.
This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should
not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being
the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prema
ture decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete
H and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced
JANTADAL v. H.S.CHOWDHARY(PANDIAN,J.] 289
before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of A
great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in
regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction to quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State
of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., [1990] 3 Supp. SCR 256 B
to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and
enunciated the law listing out the cirumstances under which the High Court
can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore,
think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import
and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code.
The question that arises for our consideration is whether Mr. Justice
M.K. Chawla in exercise of this inherent power is justified in directing the
office of the High Court to register a case so that he could exercise his
discretionary revisional and inherent powers. The text and tenor of the
impugned Order spells out that the initiation of the suo moto proceedings
is to quash the FIR and the proceedings connected therewith as clearly D
borne out from the learned Judge's statement reading "that the FIR filed
by the CBI in this case on the face of it does not disclose any offence."
The three decisions cited and relied upon by Mr. Justice M.K.
Chawla in his Order cannot be of any assistance for initiating a suo moto E
proceeding when the matter is under serious investigation.
In Rattan Singh's case (supra), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
finding certain illegalities in the prosecution relating to setting aside the
conviction of two accused persons in an appeal preferred by them, ex
tended the benefit to a non-appealing accused by exercising its suo moto F
revisional jurisdiction.
In Mohammad's case (supra), the observation of the Kerala High
Court that "if a clear illegality or injustice comes to the notice of the High
Court by whatsoever means it might be, the suo moto jurisdiction of the G
High Court is available to correct such mistake." This observation was
made having regard to the facts of that case wherein the appellant instead
of filing an appeal, filed a revision which was dismissed. Thereupon,
realising the mistake the appellant filed an appeal before the appellate
Court with an application for condonation of delay which was dismissed as
barred by limitation. Then the appellant filed a revision before the High H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP.1 S.C.R.
A Court which allowed the petition holding that it would advance the ends
of justice. It was only in those circumstances the observation about the suo
moto exercise of the power was made.
In the third case relied on by Justice M.K. Chawla, namely, Range
Forest Officer's case, a vehicle belonging to the respondent was confiscated.
B The respondent unsuccessfully preferred an appeal against the order of
confiscation before the Sessions Judge. Thereafter, the respondent filed a
revision before the High Court under Section 397 of the new Code which
was allowed and the confiscation was set aside. The appellant in this case
filed an application under Article 134 {IC) of the Constitution for a
C certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. Presumably, the
jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code was not invoked. Therefore, the
High Court observed that even if the respondent had no right to file the
revision nevertheless, the High Court could exercise its power of revision
suo moto.
D On carefully going through all the three decisions, we unhesitatingly
hold that none of the decisions would be of any help to the facts of the
present case.
The inherent power of a High Court to stay proceedings has been
E repeatedly debated in many English Court and a majority of the judgments
has stressed that the power of staying proceedings should be reserved only
for exceptional cases. We are not inclined to refer all those English
decisions except a few.
In Connelly v. D.P.P., 1964 A.C. 1254, .Lord Ried at page 1296
F expressed his view "there must always be a residual discretion to prevent
anything which savours of abuse of process" . with which view all the
members of the House of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this
entitled a Court to stay a lawful prosecution.
G The inherent power of a Court to stay proceedings was again the
subject of debate in D.P.P. v. Humphrys, 1977 A.C.l.
Most of the decisions of the English cases laid down the dictum that
only in cases where there is substantial amount of delay or potential abuse
of process or vexatious prosecution or the proceedings tainted with malice
H etc. alone the Court can step in by exercise of the inherent power.
JANTADAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN,J.] 291
The Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC A
18 examined the question of the inherent power of the High Court in
interfering with the statutory investigation of the police and laid down the
following dictum:
"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime
should have free access to a Court of justice so that he
may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence
with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance
that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in
matters which are within their province and into which the
law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as
has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of
the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged
congnizable crime without requiring any authority from
the judicial authorities, and it would, as their_ Lordships
think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible
to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of
the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the
judiciary and the police are complementary not overlap
ping and the combination of indiVidual liberty with a due
observance of law and order is only to be obtained by
leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course,
subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an ap
propriate case when moved under S.491, Criminal P.C.,
to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such
a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin
when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It
has sometimes been thongh that S. 561-A has given in
creased powers to the Court whlch it did not possess
before that Section was enacted. But this is not so. The
section gives no new powers, it only provides that those
which the Court already inherently possess shall be
preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it
should be considered that the only powers possessed by
the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal
Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived
the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence
is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake
an investigation."
Lord Denning in R. v. Metroplitan Police Commissioner, (1968) 1 All
E.R. 763 at 769 has observed thus:
B "Although the Chief Officers of police are answerable to
the law, there are many fields in which they have a dis
cretion with which the law will not interfere. For instanee,
it is for the Commissioner of Police. or the Chief Constable
as the case may be, to decide in any particular case
C whether enquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest
should be made or a prosecution brought. It must be for
him to decide on the disposition of his force and the
concentration of his resources on any particular crime or
area. No court can or should give him direction on such
a matter.
11
This Court in Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration, (1974] 3 SCR 794
held that when the First Information Report discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence, the statutory power of the Police to investigate the
cognizable offence cannot be interfered with in exercise of the inherent
E power of the Court.
Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Kurukshetra University and
Another v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 = (1977] 4 SCC 451 pointed
out thus:
"Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction
on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice.
That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Thus, the
High Court in exercise of inherent powers under Section
482, Criminal P.C. cannot quash a first information report
more so when a police had not even commenced the
investigation and no proceeding at all is pending in any
Court in pursuance of the said F.l.R."
Desai, J. articulating for the Bench in State of Bihar and Another v.
H J.A.C. Saldanha and Others, [1980] 1 SCC 554 has clearly well demarcated
I
I'
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.] 293
the sphere of activity in the field of crime detection in the following words: A
"Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved
for the executive through the police department the su
perintendence over which vests in the State Government. '
1
In Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Kumar Sharda and another v.
Shri Rajiv Poddar and Other, AIR 1985 SC 1668 this Court has observed
thus:
"We consider it absolutely unnecessary to make reference
to the decision of this Court and they are legion which
have laid down that save in exceptional case where non
interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation."
In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, [1990) 3 Supp. SCR 259, we D
had an occasion to examine the scope of the inherent power of the High
Court in interfering with the investigation of an offence by the police and
laid down the following rule:
"The sum and substance of the above deliberation results
to a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the
field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose
powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power
to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately
exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling
under Chapter XII of the Code and the Court are not
justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the
investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds
as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the
scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is a Magistrate
is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation
but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual inves
tigaion or to direct the police how that investigation is to
be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the
circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises
his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory
provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty
and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being
approached by the person agrieved for the redress of any
grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the
breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for
without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons
since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution."
See also Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, [1976] 3 SCR 58;
Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, [1977] 4 SCC 137 and State of Bihar v. V.P .
.Sharma, [1991] 1 Scale 539.
C Sawant, J. in his submission note in Kekoo J. Maneckji v. Union of
India, 1980 (86) Cr. LJ. 258 has has expressed his opinion thus:
"This is admittedly a stage where the prosecuting agency
is still investigation the offences and collecting evidence
against the accused. The petitioner, who is the accused,
D has therefore, no locus !tandi at this stage to question the
manner in which the evidence should be collected. The
law of this country does not give any right to the accused
to control, or interfere with the collection of evidence."
The Seven-Judges Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court went into
E the matter very exhaustively in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U.P., 1989 (95)
Cr!. LJ. 1013 and held that "the power of the police to investigate into a
report which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence is unfettered
and cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C." This decision has over-ruled two earlier
F decisions of that Court in Prashant Gaur v. State of U.P., 1988 All WC 828
and Puttan Singh v. State of U.P. 1987 All LJ 599.
After the proposition of Jaw enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
G of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code
in Bhajan La/'s case, we have given certain category of cases by way of
illustrations wherein the power of quashing could be exercised either for
preventing abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice stating that it may not be possible to Jay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficient channellised infrangible guidelines and rigid formula
H to give an exhaustive list of various kinds of cases wherein such power
JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY [PANDIAN, J.] 295
should be exercised. We do not like to prolong the discussion on this point A
any more. However, it has become necessary atleast to deal with the first
alleged illegality. We are constrained to do so because of the assertion of
the High Court; that being that the First Information Report on the face
of it does not disclose any offence."
According to Mr. Ram Jethmalani, the conclusion, arrived at by Mr. B
Justice M.K. Chawla is absolutely unjustified and perverse since the First
Information Report in paragraph Nos. 8, 16, 67, 68, 73 clearly alleges that
the payments made by Bofors are illegal gratification paid to Indian public
servants either to influence them or as a reward for the contract given to
Bofors. We have carefully and scrupulosly gone through the First Informa- C
tion Report and we are unable to share this view of Mr. Justice Chawla,
quite apart from the other grounds on which the accused may like to attack
the First Information Report. None of the named accused came before Mr.
Justice Chawla raising this question of Jack of allegations and particulars
in the FIR so as to constitute any offence, muchless a cognizable offence
The then Minister of Defence, Shri K.C. Pant had stated that "if any
evidence is produced involving violations of the law, the matter will be
thoroughly investigated and the guilty, whoever they may be punished", and
thereafter the then Prime Minster on 20th April 1987 declared that "if any
evidence proving the involvement of middlemen or payoffs or of bribes or E
commissions are brought, the Government will not hesitate to take action
and will not allow anybody, however, high-up to go free" which statement
was subsequently re-asserted by the Minister -of Defence. The excerpts of
both the statements in the Parliament, have been cited in the earlier part
of this judgment.
While so, it shocks our judicial conscience that Mr. Justice M.K.
' Chawla before whom no aggrieved or affected party had come challenging
the FIR, has taken suo moto action and recorded such a categorical
assertion that 'no offence' thereby meaning muchless a congnizable offence
is made out in the FIR.
As pointed out in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal, [1973]
3 sec 753 that once an investigation by the police is ordered by a
Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate cannot place
any limitations or direct the officer conducting it as to how to conduct the
investigation. When that is the position of law, Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla, H
. 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP.1 S.C.R .
A in our considered view, has overstepped his jurisdiction and made the
statement which is unwarranted and uncalled for. As we feel that any
further deliberation on this matter may affect the merits of the case at any
later point of time, we refrain from making any more observation on this
aspect as the matter is at the threshold of tlie investigation.
B Therefore, we are constrained to set aside that statement, holding
that the opinion of Justice Chawla in this regard has no legal effect or
consequence. So far as the rest of the alleged illegalities are concerned, we
straightaway say that those grounds are not available for suo moto exercise
of power in the light of the well settled legal principles enunciated by this
C Court for the exercise of such powers.
In the result, we reiterate our earlier conclusion that we agree with
the first part of the order dated 19.12.1990 of Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla but
quash the later part of the impugned order taking suo moto congnizance
under Sections 397, 401 read with 482 of the Code issuing show-cause
D notice to the CBI and the State. We make it clear that we do not express
ap.y opinion on the merits of the case including the legal tenability of the
illegalities opined by Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla in his impugned order.
V.P.R. Appeals disposed of.