Aa. Haja Muniuddin v. Indian Railways

The Judgment of the· Court was delivered by AHMADI, J. Special leave granted. The short question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether an indig~nt person who is not possessed of sufficient means to enable .him to pay the fee prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of ) the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter called 'the Act') can be permitted to prefer his claim as an indigent· person on the principle embodied in order XXXIII of· the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called 'the Code'). The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are as under. The appellant despatched marble slabs from Makrana Railway Sta­ tion for carriage by rail under railway risk to Ramanathapuram. The wagon carrying the marble slabs met with an accident. The marble slabs reached the station of destination in broken pieces. Treating the damage as a total loss, the appellant preferred a claim for Rs. 1,05,000 before the Railway Claims Tribunal established under Section 3 of the Act. The appellant was required to pay a fee of Rs. 2,055 on the said claim- application under Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act read with Rule 6 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,.1989 {hereinafter called 'the Rules'). However, since the appellant did not have the mearis to pay the requisite ..., fee, he lodged the claim-application on a fee of Rs.' 150 only and prayed 3 that he may be permitted to prosecute the claim 'as an indigent ·person. The Tribunal however, came to the conclusion that since Order XXXIII of the Code had no application to claims preferred under the provisions of the Act, the appellant cannot be permitted to prosecute the application as such. The Tribunal, therefore, spurned the appellant's request. It is against 1 the said order of the Tribunal that· the present appeal by special leave has A.A.HAJAMUNIUDDIN. v. INDIAN RAILWAYS [AHMADI,J.] 75 been brought to this Court. A In order to appreciate the contention urged before us it would be advantageous to bear in mind the scheme of the Act. The Act was enacted to inter alia provide for the establishment of a Railway Claims Tribunal for enquiring into and determining claims against the railway administration for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods B entrusted to it to be carried by railways and for matters connected there­ with or incidental thereto. Section 3 provides for the establishment of a Railway Claims Tribunal. Section 13 which confers jurisdiction reads as under: "13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal. - (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiCtion, powers and· authority as were execisable immediately before that day by any civil court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under th~ provisions of the Railways Act, - (a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administra­ tion as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for - (i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deteriora­ tion or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway; (ii) compensation payable under Section 82-A of the Rail­ ways Act or the rules made thereunder;. and (b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. (2) The provisions of the Railways Act and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, be applicable to the inquiring into or determining, any claims by the Claims Tribunal under this Act." Section 15 provides that on or from the appointed day, no court or other H 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1992] SUP}>. 3 S.C.R. A authority shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matter~ referred to in Sub-section {1} of Section 13. We now come to Section 16 which reads as under: "16. Application to Clai~s Tribunal. - (1) A person seek­ ing any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub­ section (1) of Sectio.n 13 may make an application to the. Claims Tribunal. ;· (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other e~dence and by such fee in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes as may be prescribed. · Provided that ~o such fee shall be payable in respect of an application under sub-clause (ii) of clause {a) or'sub- section (l) ofSection 13." · Section 18(1) provides that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of the Act and of any rules, the Claims Tribunal shall have powers to regulate .its own procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 then provides as under : "18(3). The Claims. Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its .functions under this Act, · the same · powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect ofthe following matters, namely:- ·' (a) summoning (ind enforcing the attendance of any per­ . son and examining him on oath; {b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evi<l~nce on affidavits; ( d) subject. to the provisions of Sections U3 and 124 of . the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (1 of 1872), requisi­ tioni~g any public record or document or copy of such · AA. HAJAMUNIUDDIN. v. INDIAN RAILWAYS [AHMADJ,J.] record or docurrient from atty office; . (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) reviewing its decisions: (g) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex pa rte;· (h) setting aside any order or dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (i) any other matter which may be prescribed." 77 :section 24 provides for the transfer of every suit, claim or other legal .proceeding (other than an appeal) pending before any Court, Claims D Co?lmissioner or other authority immediately before the appointed day, being a suit, claim or proceeding, the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the appointed day, within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that day to the Claims Tribunal. It is, therefore, obvious that every suit pending before any court before the appointed day would stand transferred E to the Claims Tribunal if the cause of action thereof is one that would have been, if it had arisen after the appointed day, within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. Section 28 lays down that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstand:,1g anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 30 empowers the Central F Government to make rules. In exercise of this power the Central Govern­ ment made the rules referred to above and brought them into force from the appointed day i.e. the date with effect from which the Claims Tribunal came to be established under Section 3 of the Act. Rule 6 which is relevant for our purpose provides that every application made under Sub-section (1) of Section 16 for seeking relief in respect of matters, other than claim G of compensation for death or injuries to passengers, shall be accompanied by a fee as specified in Schedule II. Rule 44 lays down that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Tribunal. H 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A It will be seen from the scheme of the Act that on its coming into force from the appointed day, all suits pending in the civil court would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal if the cause of action of the suit would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the appointed day. Therefore, even a suit filed under the· provisions of Order XXXIII B would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal would be required to dispose it of as such. That is because Section. 13 specifically provides that the Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on or from the appointed day all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exer­ cisable immediately befote that day by any civil court providep the same c relates to the recovery of compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods entrusted to the railways for carriage by railway. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and try such suits on and from the appointed day. In other words after the appointed day the Claims Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to enter- D tain and try claims referred to in clauses (a) & (b) of Sub-section (i) 'of Section 13 of the Act. Section 18 then sets out the procedure to be followed by the Clainis Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound ?Y the procedure laid down by the Code but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. and shall have powers to regulate its own procedure. It is true that Sub-section (1) of Section 18 E in term states that the Claims Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code but that does not mean that it is precluded from invoking t_he procedure laid down by the code even if the ends of justice so require. The Sub-section further states that· the Tribunal shall have powers to regulate its own procedure and Sub-section (3) of Section 18 enumerates the matters in respect whereof the Claims Tribunal is per­ mitted to exercise the same powers vested in a civil court under the Code while trying a suit. Rule 44 in terms states that nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Nowhere G in the Act is there any provision which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the pro0sions of Order XXXIII of the Code. Although the Act and the Rules do not specifically provide for the application. of Order XXXIII of the Code, there is ·nothing in the Act or the Rules which predudes the Tribunal from following that procedure if the ends ofjustice so require. If H the view taken by the Tribunal is acc~pted as laying .down the correct iaw, - A.A HAJAMUNIUDDIN. v. INDIANRAILWAYS[AHMADI,J.] 79 the result would be that a claimant who has a.genuine claim for compen- A sation under the provisions of the Act would be denied access to the Claims Tribunal if he is an indigent person and does not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim-application. Before the establishment of the Claims Tribunal he would have been able to file the suit invoking Order XXXIII of the Code as an indigent person. Now that a special Claims B Tribunal has been established under the Act, can it be said that indigent persons who do not have the means to pay the fee required on the claim-application are altogether debarred from seeking compensation from the railway administration for the wrong done to them? Access to justice cannot be denied to an individual merely because he does not have the C means to pay the prescribed fee. Such a. view would leave indigent persons without a remedy. It is, therefore, essential that the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be broadly interpreted to ensure access to justice. If a claimant is left without redress even if he .has a valid claim against the railway administration merely because he is an indigent person, it would D be a sad day and the poor will lose confidence in the system. No one can be heard to say, much less the railway administration, that even though the claimant has a genuine claim for compensation against the railway ad­ ministration, he must forgo the same if he does not have the means to pay the requisite fee. Such an interpretation which denies justice must be avoided. Section 18(1) only says that the Claims Tribunal 'shall not be E bound' by the procedure laid down by the Code but does not go so far as to say that it 'shall be precluded' from invoking the provisions laid down by the Code even if the same is not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules. Since the Claims Tribunal is empowered to regulate its own procedure, there is nothing in the Act and the Rules which precludes the invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. A view which advances the cause of justice must be preferred to the one which defeats it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal adopted a narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act in coming to the conclusion that the Act as well as the Rules did not perm.it invocation of Order XXXIII of the Code. The G view taken by the Tribunal results in a person not having the means to pay the fee prescribed for preferring a claim being left without a remedy. Such a view would result in gross injustice. The Tribunal has the power to lay down its own procedure and as stated earlier Section 18(1) does not preclude it from invoking the provisions of Order XXXIII of the Code if H 80 SUPREME CO:JRTREPORTS (1992] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A the_ ends of justice so require. When an .indigent person approaches the Tribunal for compensation for the wrong done to him, the Tribunal cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely because he does not have th~ m~ans to pay the fee. In such a s;tuation we think the ends of justice :require that the Tribunal should follow the procedure 4iid down :in Order XXXIH of B the Code to do justice for which it came to be establi~hed. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Claims Tribunal and remit the matter to the Claims Tribunal to deal with the appellant's claim-application in the light of the principle enunciated hereinabove. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no C order as to costs. V.P.R. Appeal allowed.