S.K. Saha and Anr. Etc. v. Prem Prakash Agarwal and Ors. Etc.
N.P. SINGH, J. One appeal on behalf of S.K. Saha and the other on
behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh, have been filed against the judg- C
ment of the High Court, directing to treat the appellant junior to the
writ-petitioners/respondents in the cadre of Assistant Director of In
dustries.
The appellant was appointed as Foreman, Cycle Parts Factory, by
the erstwhile Madhya Bharat Government, on 31.10.1966. The appointment lb
was for one year on contract basis. The appellant joined on 4.1.1957, after
the formation of the new State of Madhya Pradesh, on 1.11.1956. Sub
sequently, the contract service of the appellant was extended from time to
time by the State Government. The post of Foreman was a Class-III post
(non- gazetted). The State Government by its order dated 18.12.1959 E
declared the post as Gazetted Class-II, w.e.f. 16.1.1959.
An advertisement was published in the year 1959 by the Madhya
Pradesh Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Com
mission"), inviting applications for the post of Foreman Class-II. Alongwith
others the appellant also applied for the said post and the name of the F
appellant was recommended by the Commission. The State Government
by its order dated 12.5.1960, appointed the appellant on temporary basis
till further orders, to the post of Foreman w.e.f. 4.1.1957 .
. The writ applica~ion in question was filed on behaif of the respon
dents, challenging the validity of a part of the order dated 12.5.1960, by G
which the appellant was appointed on 12.5.1960, w.e.f. 4.1.1957. It was
pointed out before the High Court, on behalf of the said respondents, that
the order dated 12.5.1960 appointing the appellant as Foreman was on
basis of an advertisement issued in the year 1959 and recommendation ~
made by the Commission thereafter. As such on basis of the said recom- H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A mendation, the appellant could not have been appointed w.e.f. 4.1.1957. It
was also pointed out that till 15.1.1959, the post of the Foreman was a
non-gazetted post and it is only on 16.1.1959, when by the Government
order dated 18.12.1959, the said post was made a gazetted one,. necessitat
ing appointment, on the basis of the recommendation of the Commission.
Respondent No. 1, who was one of the writ-petitioners, before the High
B Court, had been appointed as Assistant Director of Industries on 18.2.1959
on basis of a recommendation by the Commission, pursuant to an adver
tisement issued in the year 1958. So it was pointed out on his behalf that
the order dated 12.5.1960 of the State Government, appointing the appel
lant with effect from a retrospective date i.e. 4.1.1957, directly affected his
C seniority, which was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The
posts of Foreman and Assistant Director of Industries are equivalent and
it is not in dispute that if the order dated 12.5 .1960 appointing the appellant
w.e.f. 4.1.1957 is held to be valid, then the appellant although appointed on
12.5.1960 on basis of the recommendation of the Commission will rank
senior to the said respondent, who had been appointed on 18.2.195_?.
The High Court held that the State Government could not have
appointed the appellant on 12.5.1960 w.e.f. 4.1.1957 from a date not only
prior to the date of the recommendation made by the Commission but even
prior to the date of the advertisement in respect of the said post. It was
also said that once the appointment of the appellant had been made by the
process of direct recruitment, there was no occasion to reckon his seniority
taking into consideration the period during which he served the State· on
contract basis for one year, which was being extended from time to time.
So far the remaining seven writ petitioners/respondents are con
cerned, the High Court pointed out that in about January, 1964, the State
Government decided to transfer the Cycle Parts Factory to Madhya
Pradesh Udyog Nigam, a Government Corporation. The persons working
in the said factory including the appellant were given option either to opt
for the service under the said Corporation or for being absorbed in any
other department of the State. In the communication dated 24.1.1964,
addressed to the appellant, it was said that the State Government had
decided to transfer the management of the Cycle Parts Factory to the
Corporation aforesaid, as such the service of the appellant was proposed
to be transferred to the said Corporation on the condition that his scale of
pay and other conditions of service to which he was entitled, shall not be
S.K.SAHAv. P.P.AGARWAL (N.P. SINGH,J.] 837
affected by the transfer. The appellant was required to inform the State A
Government, whether he was agreeable to the said transfer of his service
to the Corporation. It was further said that in case he was not agreeable
to such transfer, then he "shall be retrenched or otherwise absorbed in the
service of the State Government on such conditions as may be permissible
under the law for the time being in force." Ultimately, it was said that if no B
reply was received from him by 29.2.1964, it would be presumed that he
had agreed to the transfer of his service to the said Corporation. There is
no dispute that the appellant joined the service of the Corporation and
there is nothing on record to show that he ever opted to be absorbed
against any post under the State Government. In the year 1972, the appel-
lant made a representation that he should be taken back in the service of C
the State Government and by an order dated 19.6.1972, the State Govern
ment appointed him as Assistant Director of Industries. The High Court
has pointed out that once the appellant did not opt to continue in the
service of the State Government against any other post and voluntarily
opted to join the service of the Corporation, it will be deemed that he D
ceased to be in the service of the State Government. In that connection,
the High Court took note of statutory rules respect of recruitment against
the post of Assistant Director of Industries, which admittedly were not
followed when the appellant was appointed as Assistant Director of In
dustries on 19.6.1972. Even if, the appointment of the appellant against the E
post of Assistant Director of Industries by an order dated 19.6.1972, is held
to be valid in eye of law, it will be deemed that he was appointed to the
cadre of Assistant Director of Industries w.e.f. 19.6.1972, after the appoint
ment of writ petitioners/respondents Nos. 2 to 8, as such he shall rank
junior to them as well. F
From time to time, this Court has considered, as to what is the
relevant date for fixing inter se seniority of entrants in the same cadre,
either by the same process or by different processes of recruitment. Ul
timately, the matter was examined by a Constitution Bench, in the case 'of
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of G
Maharashtra, [1990] 2 SCC 715 =AIR (1990) SC 1607. It was said that once
the appointment is made to a post according to rules, the seniority of the
person so appointed is to be counted from the date of his appointment and
not with regard to the date of his confirmation. It was also said that the
corollary of the above rule is, that where the initial appointment is only ad H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R ..
A Jf oc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the
officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the
seniority. The same view has been reiterated in the case of State of West
Bengal v. Aghore Nath Dey, (1993) 3 SCC 3?1.
B there cannot be any dispute that the appointment of the appellant,
according to rules, was made on basis of the recommendation of the
Commission, on 12.5.1960. In this background, there was no occasion to
take into consideration the period when the appellant was continuing on
ad hoc basis, especially, during the period when the post itself was a non
gazetted post. The appellant was given seniority w.e.f. 4.1.1957, but the post
C of the Foreman which the appellant was holding itself became a :gazetted
post since 16.1.1959. Any officiation on the post when it was a non-gazetted
post cannot be held to be a continuous officiation on the post so as to
entitle the ~ppellant to count that period towards his continuous officiation.
The High Court has rightly held that while appointing him on the basis of
D the recommendation of the Commission, the date of appointment could
not have been ante dated and made to be effective w.e.f. 4.1.1957. This
Court has repeatedly struck down and decried any attempt on the part of
the appointing authority to give a notional seniority from a retrospective
date especially, w4en this process affects the seniority of those who have
E already entered into the service. In the present case the respondent No. 1
had been appointed as Assistant Director of Industries on 18.2.1959 on.
basis of an advertisement made in the year 1958 and on the recommenda
tion of the Commission. His seniority in the service could not have been
affected by the State Government, by giving notional date of appointment
F of the appellant w.e.f. 4.1.1957.
The other issue, as to whether the appellant having not opted to be
absorbed in some other Department of the State Government, after the
Cycle Parts Factory, was transferred to the Corporation and the appellant
having joined the said Corporation in terms of the offer given to him by
G the State Government ceased to be an employee of the State Government,
till he was again appointed as Assistant Director of Industries on 19.6.1972,
needs a closer scrutiny. In view of Article 311(1) no person who is a
member of civil service of the Union or of a State or who holds a civil post
under the Union or the State can be removed from service except after an
H enquiry as contemplated by the said Article. A Constitution Bench of this
S.K. SAHAv. P.P. AGARWAL [N.P. SINGH, J.] 839
Court, in the case of State of Mysore v. H.Panappa Gowda, AIR (1971) SC A
191, has held that in view of the provisions of Article 311, it is not open
to the State Government to declare even by a statutory rule that after
transfer of the department alongwith posts to a University, the holders of
such posts under the Government in such department shall cease to be in
the service of the State Government, because that will be violative of B
Article 311 of the Constitution.
Where all the functions of a Department of the State or Union
Government along with posts are transferred to some University or
Government Corporation, which of late has become a common feature, in
view of the fact that it has been accepted at all levels that public interest C
is better served if the activities which were part of the department are
entrusted to some autonomous Corporation or University, a question arises
. as to how to transfer the services of the holders of such posts having
protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. A situation is created whete
the holders of the posts are in service of the State Government, but the D
activities of the whole department are transferred to some Government
Corporation or Undertaking. How the State can retain the members of
such service against those posts when the department itself becomes
defunct. A holder of any post in such a department has no right to question
the wisdom of the State to entrust the activities of the department to an
autonomous body. It is true in view of Article 311, merely on this ground, E
the holders of civil posts ~annot be dismissl!d or removed from service.
However the State can give an option to the holders of such posts either
to be absorbed in some other depat"tment or to leave the service of the
State and to opt for the service of the Government Corporation or Under
taking in question. Once any such employee of the State opts for the service F
of the Corporation, he shall cease to be in the service of the State. In such
a situation, it cannot be held that the holder of the post, has been deputed
to the Corporation holding his lien with the State Government. Admitlk:dly,
in the present case an option was given to the appellant to opt either to be
absorbed in ano.ther department or to go to the Corporation. A time limit
was fixed after which it was to be deemed that he had agreed to the transfer G
of his service to the Corporation. There is nothing on the record to show
that the appellant ever exercised his option to remain with the State
Government. On the other hand, he joined the service of the Corporation
and only in the year 1972, on his representation, he was appointed as
Assistant Director of Industries. In this background, the period when the H
840 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1993)SUPP.3S.C.R ..
A appellant joined the Corporation and was again appointed in the service
of the State Government on 19.6.1972, shall not be counted towards his
seniority and it shall be deemed that appellant was appointed afresh on
19.6.1972. There is no dispute that the respondent Nos. 2 to 8 had entered
in the cadre before 19.6.1972 and in that event they will also rank senior
B to the appellant as has been held by the High Court.
Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. In the facts and cir
cumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeals dismissed.