Raghbir Singh v. Surjit Singh and Ors. Etc. Etc.

VERMA, J. Pursuant to the notification to elect a Member for the H 768 .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency, the appellant Reghbir Singh filed his 11omination on 1.2.1992 which was found valid in the scrutiny on 22.1992, and he contested the election held on 19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on 20.2.1992. There­ after, the ,respondent Surjit Singh, a voter from that constituency filed an B Election Petition for a declaration that the appellant's election was void on the ground that he was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of · election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted. The appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 149, l.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous C imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 in addition to his conviction and sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the Trial Court on 15.11.1984. The appellant's appeal against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special leave petition against the same was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987. D The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to 21.10.89 and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accord­ ance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Repre­ sentation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "RPA Act") the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The high Court has upheld E this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the elec­ tion petition declaring the appellant's said election to be void. Hence this appeal under Section l16A of the R.P. Act. There being no controversy that according to the plain language of F sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act, the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992, the appellant has also filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 243 of 1994 along with this appeal challenging the constitutional, it is obvious that the appeal also must fail. Thus, the only question for consideration by us is the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act. The submission of Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (1) of Section 8 being only six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of disqualification prescribed in sub-section (3) thereof extending to six years H since his release is discriminat~ry. The submission is that the period of RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.] 769 disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the A date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub-sections of Section 8. We are unable B to accept this argument. Seciion 8 prescribes disqualification on conviction for certain offec- nes. Sub-section (1) provides the disqualifaction for a period of six years from the date of conviction for the offences specified in clauses (a) to (i) thereof. In sub-section (1), the only reference is to conviction for the C specified offences irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. Sub- section (2) then prescribes that on conviction for the offences specified therein and sentence to imprisonment for not less than six months, that person shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since D his release. Thus, in case of conviction for the offences specified in sub­ section (2), the disqualification is attracted only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that event the dis­ qualification is for a period of not merely six years from the date of such conviction but commencing from the date of such conviction it shall E continue for a further period of six years since his release. Sub-section (3) then prescribes a similar longer period of disqualification from the date of such conviction to continue for a further period of six ye¥s since his release where a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced \o imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). The classification is clear. This classification is made with reference to the offences and the sentences awarded on conviction. In sub-section (1) are specified the offences which are considered to be of one catagory and the period of six years dis­ qualification from the date of conviction is provided for them irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction. In sub- section (2) are G" specified some other offences, the conviction for which is considered significant for disqualification only if the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six months and in that case a longer period of disqualification has been considered appropriate. Then comes sub-section (3) which is the 770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A residuary pro,ision of this kind \\'herein the disqualification is prescribed only with reference to the period of sentence of imprisonment of not less than two years for which the longer period of disqualification is considered appropriate. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis of their nature and in the residuar:11 pro\ision contained in sub-section (3), B the classific~tion is made only \>ith reference to the priod of sentence being not less than tv.·o years. In sub-section (3) of Section 8, all persons con\icted of any offence and sentences to imprisonment for not less than two years [other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2)) are classified together and the period of disqualification prescribed for all of them is the same. All persons comicted of offences other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and sentenced to imprisonment of not less than two years constitute one class and are governed by sub-section (3) prescribing the same period of disqualification for all of them. The category of persons covered by sub-secti.ons (1), (2) and (3) being different and distinct; the question of comparison i11ter se between any two of these three distinct classes does not arise, without such a comparison between persons governed by these different sub- sections being permissible, the very basis of attack on the ground of discrimination is not available. Prescription of period of disqualification for different classes of persons ·convicted of different offences is within the domain of legislative discretion and wiodon;i, which is not open to judicial scrutiny. Classification of offence for certain purposes on the basis of the period of sentence is a well known method of classification. The First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to Classification of Offences for purposes of cognizance, bail and trial, and therein the clas' sification of offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code is made on the basis of the sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore, clear that the mode of classification adopted in the different sub-sections G of Section 8' of R.P. Act is a well recognised mode of classification of offences. The legislature having wide discretion in the matter of classifica­ tion and there being no arbitrariness reflected in the classification, the matter must end there . . ' H There is thus no merit in the challange to the constitutional validity RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.] 771 of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act. Consequently, the writ A petition is dismisaed which results in dismissal of the civil appeal also. The appellant/petitioner will pay the costs to the respondents. Costs quantified at Rs. 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) only. R.P. Appeal and petition dismissed.