Priya Vart and Anr. v. Union of India

The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') acquiring large extent of lands in three villages G including Khyala for planned development of Delhi, was published on 3rd September, 1957. The Land Acquisition Collector by his award dated 31st August 1961, determined the compensation @Rs. 600 Rs. 400 and Rs. 200 per bigha to various categories of lands. On reference, the District Court by its award and decree dated i9th March, 1975 enhanced the compensa­ tion at flat rate of Rs. 3,000 per bigha. On further appeal, the High Court H in the impugned judgment dated 16th September, 1994 further enhanced PRIYA V ART v. U.0.I. 565 the compensation to Rs 10,000 per bigha. Since the petitioners claimed A compensation @Rs. 14,000 per bigha, the special leave petition has been filed for the difference of the amount. Shri Mahabir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that as in an earlier case the claimants of other villages, viz., Tatarpur and Basaidarapur had restricted the claims to Rs 10,000 per bigha, the Court having noted that the lands possessed potentiality to increase compensation to Rs. 14,000 per bigha, confined the compensation to Rs. 10,000 per bigha. According to him, that would not form the basis for the limiting the compensation to the lands in village Khyala. He further contends that it was noted by the High Court that the lands were possessed of potential C value and the petitioners are, therefore, entitled to the higher compensa- tion @Rs. 14,000 per bigha. We find no force in these contentions. The High Court in the impugned judgment had noted that the entire village Tatarpur is located adjacent to Nazafgarh-Delhi Road but the lands in Khyala are far interior to the lands in Tatarpur village. The lands of the D village Khyala start from northern boundary of village Tatarpur and the acquired land is further away towards north from the road. In view of these facts it was found that determination of the compensation at Rs. 10,000 was just and fair. In view of the distinguishing features explained by the High Court, we think that there is no justification to further enhance the com- E pensation. It is next contended that this Court in Urned Industries & Land Development Co. & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1995) 1 Scale 309 and in SA. Jain College Trust v. State of Haryana and Anr., [1995] 3 SCC 74, held that the claimants will be entitled to the enhanced interest at 9 F percent under the proviso to Section 28 for one year from the date of taking possession and 15 percent thereafter till the date of deposit and also enhanced solatium under Section 23(2) and that, therefore, the petitioners also are entitled to that ratio in as much as the appeals were pending in the High Court by the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition G (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984. We find no force in this contention also. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754, a. Constitution Bench of this Court had held that the claimants would be entitled only to interest and solatium if their cases are pending from the date of notification till the date of decision by the Reference Court between April 30, 1982 and H 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 2S.C.R. A September 24, 1984 and the pendency of the appeals in the High Court or this Court would not be a ground for making further enhancement. In the first of the two decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court dealt with the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) only, which was denied. In the second decision, the Court had no occasion to consider B the question at hand. It cannot be conceded that a Bench of two Judges had overruled the decision of the Constitution Bench. Therefore, there is no need for us to make a further reference to the Constitution Bench decision since the controversy has already been covered by the ratio of Raghubir Singh case (supra). C It is next contended that unamended Section 28 prescribes interest only at 6 per cent and the Court is entitled to award compound interest in view of the long delay in disposal of the matter. We find no force in this contention as well. When the statute prescribed interest @6% per annum, r it necessarily means only simple interest and not compound interest and pendency of proceedings is no ground to award compound interest. When D the Act prescribes payment of interest at a· particular rate., it needs to be awarded at the rate prescribed and in no other way. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. G.N. Petition dismissed.