Dakaya @ Dakaiah v. Anjani
Leave granted.
Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal is directed against
the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated February 13,1995
passed in Civil Revision Petition No.2824 of 1994. By the said impugned
judgment, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has dismissed the revision
G application made against the order dated July 4, 1994 of the Additional
Chief .Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad in R.A. No.203 of 1992
affirming the order dated April 29,1992 passed by the Prl. Rent Controller.
Secunderabad in R.C. No. 316 of 1988.
The respondent-landlady made an application under Section 10 of
H the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
DAKAYA v. ANJANI 293
(hereinafter referred to as the A.P. Rent Act) for eviction of the tenant A
appellant on the ground of wilful default of payment of rent for the period
September, 1988 to November, 1988 amounting to Rs.1125. There is no
dispute in this case that the tenant failed to make the payment within the
stipulated period for the said months. It however, appears to us that the
landlady gave a notice to the tenant on December 6,1988 claiming payment B of rent for the said months of September, 1988 to November, 1988. The
landlady however, demanded surrender of the tenancy of the tenant within
one week from the date of receipt of the notice dated December 6, 1988.
The tenant initially sent a money-order for a sum of Rs.375 being the
monthly rent on December 7,1.988 and such amount has been received by
the landlady and accepted by her. Within five days thereafter, on Decem
ber 12, 1988, the tenant sent a Bank Draft for Rs.1125 and it is an admitted
position that such draft was received by the landlady before filing the suit
for eviction. The said draft, however, has not been encashed by the
landlady and the same has been deposited before the Rent Controller in
the eviction proceedings. The Eviction Petition was filed before the Rent D
Controller on December 19, 1988.
It has been held by the Rent Controller that the tenant having
committed wilful default, the landlady is entitled to get the order of
eviction. Accordingly, order of eviction was made. The said view was
upheld in appeal and as aforesaid the revision application was dismissed E
by the High Court.
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has
drawn our attention to the decision of this Court in the case of S. Su11-
dmwn Pillai Etc. v. V.R. Pa11abira111a11, [ 1985] 2 SCR 643 ~ AIR1985 SC F
582. In the said decision, the provisions of Section JO of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was taken into considera
tion. It may be indicated here that Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is pmti mate1ia similar to Section 10
-of the A.P. Rent Act excepting that in Tamil Nadu Act an explanation has G
been added to the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 10 of the Tamil
Nadu Act. The said explanation provides that for the purpose of sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act, default to pay or tender rent
shall be construed as wilful, if the default by the tenant in the payment or
tender of rent continues after the issue of two monlhs notice by the
landlord claiming the rent. This Court in the aforesaid case of S. Sundaram H
294
A Pillai has indicated that default per se cannot be construed as wilful and
keeping in mind the beneficial purpose of the Rent Acl lo protect the
eviction of the tenant, if the payment has been made before the institution
of the suit, the cause of action for instituting of the suit, will vanish. In the
instant case, immediately on receipt of demand of payment of rent, the
tenant initially sent a sum of Rs.375 by money order and thereafter a Bank
Draft for Rs.1125 covering the entire period of default from September,
1988 to November, 1988 was sent to the landlady. It therefore, appears to
us that there was no occasion to proceed on the footing that there was a
wilful default for which an order for eviction of the tenant was to be passed.
As the tenant had already sent the Bank Draft covering the entire default,
there was also no occasion for the Rent Controller to direct deposit of
arrears within the stipulated period. In our view the Rent Controller, the
first appellate court and the High Court have failed to appreciate the
incidence of tendering the entire amount under default before the institu
tion of the suit. As a result, the courts below have erroneously proceeded
D on the footing that there had been a wilful default for which the landlady
was entitled to a decree for eviction.
We may indicate here that the learned counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the tenant will suffer serious prejudice if an order of eviction
is maintained because he is carrying on his business in the tenanted
E premises. The learned counsel has also submitted that if it commends to
this Court that interference under discretionary jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution is not warranted unless the tenant is prepared to
pay a reasonable and fair market rent, the tenant-appellant is willing to pay·:
such monthly rent as may appear just and proper to this Court, so that the .
F order Clf eviction is set a.side and the appellant is permitted to continue his
possession.
It appears to us that the tenant-appellant is carrying on business in
the disputed premises and the order of eviction cannot but affect his
interest seriously. It also appears to us that whether wilful or not, the fact
G remains that the tenant defaulted in payment of rent for several months for
which the landlady, stated to be poor and helpless widow, has suffered
considerable prejudice. It therefore, appears lo us that it will he consonant
to equity and justice if the interference with the impugned order of eviction
is made in this appeal with a direction to the tenant to pay fair and
H reasonable rent to which the tenant-appellant is ready and willing. Con·
DAKA YA v_ ANJANI 295
sidering the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of A
eviction by directing that the tenant-appellant would pay to the respondent
lan<llady the rent for the premises in question with affect from October 1,
1995@ Rs-550 (Rupees five hundred fifty only) per month. The appellant
tenant will also pay any other amount, if remains unpaid towards the
payment of rent at the old rate of Rs.375 per month till September 30, 1995
within a period of six weeks from today. In default, the appeal will stand
dismissed. We however, make it clear that this order will not preclude the
landlady to seek eviction of the tenant in future on such grounds as may
be available in law. The appeal is accordingly allowed without any order
as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed. c