Kashi Nath Roy v. State of Bihar
Cited by 5 judgments in this corpus
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These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
This is an appeal by a .Judicial Officer in the Superior Juoicial Service
H serving in the State of Bihar, who is aggrieved against an order of a learned
558
K.N.ROYv. STATE 559
Single Judge of the High Court of Patna in refusing to expunge remarks A
passed against him in a judicial order.
The broad facts giving rise lo this appeal are that some accused in a
dacoity case, at one point of time, approached the Court of Session,
Munger for bail. The learned Sessions Judge rejected their bail application
on 15.4.1991. About three months later, the request was renewed. The
appellant by then, had assumed Chair in succession. Prayer for bail was
reiterated before him on the ground that the evidence of Test Identification
Parade of the culprits gathered by the investigation, an evidence important
in a dacoity case, was highly suspicious inasmuch as the witnesses who were
made to participate in the same, had already on their own disclosed the
names of the accused committing the crime to the Investigating officer,
which fact the appellant verified from the case-diary to be correct. Viewing
that ground for bail had been made out, he granted bail to the accused
persons vide order dated 17.8.1991. This provoked an application for
cancellation of bail at the instance of the complainant before the High D
Court. A learned Single Judge of that Court set aside that order and
cancelled bail passing remarks that the appellant seemed to have been
over-zealous, having gone out of his way in virtually approving the defence
case, involving the merit of the matter, as if sitting on trial, forgetting the
scope of discussion in disposing of a bail matter. Having observed this, he
passed the following order : E
"While parting \vith the order, I must opine. that by the aforesaid
act, it remains not at all doubtful that this officer has intentionally
exceeded and/or transgressed his limits by avoiding and in not
maintaining the established decorous norms of the Institution. I, F
therefore, say that in my considered view, this officer, K.N. Roy,
the then Jncharge sessions Judge, Munger, must be appropriately
condemned and, for this, I understand that the only proper forum
being the Standing Committee of the Court, this matter may laid
before it under administrative approval of the Hon'ble Chief Jus
tice, as scheduled by his Lordship. And ultimately I suggest that G
this officer should be divested from exercise of powers on the
criminal side!!.
The appellant's effort to have expunged remarks made qua him in
the orders of the High Court, in particular those as extracted above, failed H
giving rise to this appeal.
As embedded in the criminal jurisprudence obtaining in this country,
courts exercising bail jurisdiction normally do and should refrain from
indulging in elaborate reasoning in their orders in justification of grant or
non-grant of bail. For, in that manner, the principle of "presumption of
innocence of an accused" gets jeopardized; and the structural principle of
"not guilty '.ill proved guilty" gets destroyed, even though all sane elements
have always understood that such views are tentative and not final, so as
lo affect the merit of the matter. Here, the appellant has been caught and
exposed to a certain adverse comment and action solely because in reason-
C ing he had disclosed his mind while granting bail. This may have been
avoidable on his part, but in terms not such a glaring mistake or im
propriety so as to visit the remarks that the High Court has chosen to pass
o'n him as well as to initiate action against him, as proposed.
D It cannot be forgotten that in our system, like elsewhere, appellate
and revisional courts have been set up on the pre-supposition that lo\ver
courts would in some measure of cases go wrong in decision-making) both
on facts as also on law, and they have been knit-up lo correct those orders.
The human element injusticing being an import"hl element, computer-like
functioning cannot be expected of the courts; however hard they may try
E and keep themselves precedent-trodden in the scope of discretions and in
the manner of judging. Whenever any such intolerable error is detected by
or pointed out to a superior court, it is functionally required to correct that
error and n1ay, here and there, in an appropriate case, and in a manner
befitting, maintaining the dignity of the Court and independence of
r judiciary, convey its message in its judgment to the officer concerned
'
through a process of reasoning, essenlially persuasive, reasonable, mellow
but clear, and result-orienting, but rarely a.:; a rebuke. Sharp reaction of
the kind exhibited in the afore- extraction is not in keeping with institution
Jl functioning. The premise that a .Judge committed a mistake or an error
beyond the limits of tolerance, is no ground to inflict condemnation on the
Judge-Subordinate, unless there existed something else and for exceptional
grounds.
We should therefore think, without such ado, that the High Court
was unkind to the appellant and therefore the afore-paragraph deserves to
H be and is hereby pulled out from the orders of the High Court dated
-
KN. ROYi-. STATE 561
28.1.1993 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 12034 of 1991 titled Lala A
Pandey v. State of Bihar and 3 Others, decided by the High Court of Patna,
as well as all other references in the said order which tell upon the
fucctioning of the appellant.
We thus conclude resisting the temptation to say any more.
The appeal is allowed.
G.N. Appeal allowed.