Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr.

PUNCHHI, J. Special leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Punjab and Haryana High Court passed on October 31, 1994 in Regular Second Appeal No. 3756 of 1987. It has arisen on these facts : The appellant, Pawan Kumar on 19.4.78 was appointed in a class IV D post as a Field Worker, on ad hoc basis, in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, General Hospital, Bhiwani, Haryana. In his terms of appointment it was .made clear that the ad hoc appointment offered was till such time his charaCtcr and antecedents \Vere verified as satisfactory, \Vhen he would be considered for Iegular appointment. He was required to give a decla- E ration in writing that he had not, on any previous occasion, been dismissed from service and had not been convicted by any court of law. This decla­ ration, the appellant presumably furnished. . While in service, the appellant on 4.6.1980 came to be convicted in a summary trial for offence under section 294 !PC by the Court of Shri F P.L. Kha,nduja, Chief .Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani on his entering upon a plea of guilt, for which he was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 20, which fine he paid there and then, whereaftcr it was deposited in the treasury by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day. The appellant's appointment how- ever, in the mea.ntime was kept renewed from time to time. G When steps were afoot to regularise his services, papers were moved to the office of the Superintendent of Police to verify about the character and antecedents of the appellant. The office of the Superintendent of Police reported back the factum of conviction of the appellant under section 294 !PC, but otherwise ve;ified that the appellant was of a good H 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A character. Thereafter the opinion of the District Attorney, Bhiwani was sought. He opined that the offence punishable under section 294 1 PC was not a serious offence \vhich could involve n1oral turpitude and the sentence of fine of Rs. 20 imposed on the appellant was not likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties and therefore there was no legal har for his B retention in service. A reference \Vas also n1adc to the Legal Remembran­ cer to the Government of Haryana, soliciting his opinion. This officer opined that it would not be desirable to appoint the appellant in go\'crn­ mcnt service since he had been convicted under section 294 IPC, involving an offence of moral turpitude, as other\vise the very purpose of verification of character/antecedents would be frustrated. On the collection of such C material, decision \Vas taken and the services of the appellant \Vere ter· minated vide order dated 30.9.J 984, as no longer required. Challenging this order the appellant went in suit for declaration before the Civil Court, describing the order terminating his services as D against law, equity, good conscience, and violative of print:iples of natural justice, claiming that he continued lo be in service entitled to all benefits of service including salary etc. The State and the Chief Medical Officer resisted the suit. The only contentious issue which sprung up from the pleadings of the parties was : E "Whether the order dated 30.9.1984 about the termination of ser\'ice of the plaintiff is wrong, illegal and liable to be set aside as alleged ?" The trial court decided the said issue against the appellant. The F lower appellate court on appeal affirmed the same. The High Court too in second appeal concurred with the decision of the courts below, basically on two grounds, namely, (i) that the conviction of the appellant under section 294 IPC revealed an act which per se constituted moral turpitude; and (ii) the order of termination of service, bare facedly, on its plain language was not stigmatic. All the same it was never disputed by the G defendants-respondents that since the character and antecedent verifica­ tion had revealed the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, that was the reason why the services of the appellant were dispensed with and not regularised. Hence this appeal. H Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows : ... " PAWANKUMAR v. STATE[PUNCHHI,J.] 397 "294. Obscene acts and songs - Whoever, to the annoyance of A others, (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to three months, or with fine, or with both.'· In order to secure a conviction the provision requires two particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e. (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not done in any public plac~, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no annoyance to others, the offence is not committed. The measure of sentence of three months imposable thereunder suggests that such offence is triable sum­ marily under Section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it being not an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. When the accused does not plead guilty, Section 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins upon the Magistrale that he shall (i) record the substance of the evidence; and (ii) a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding. Conversely put, when the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate may not be obliged lo write a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons, but the Magistrate is not absolved of the obligation to record the substance of the evidence. Otherwise, it would be difficult to conceive as to what could the accused have pleaded to. His plea of guilt is an admission to whatever factual data the prosecution lays before the court about the commission of the offence. Pleading guilty by the accused lo the violation of a provision of law is no plea at all, as he would have to be confronted with the substance of the G allegation, in order to enter upon a plea, one way or the other. When the substance of the allegations is not put to the accused, his entering any kind of plea is no plea legally, due to the non observance of such procedural requirement of utmost importance. There is a sequator lo it. Section 375 of the Code of Criminal H 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. Procedure provides that when the accused pleads guilty and has been convicted on such pica, there shall be no appeal, except to the extent or legality of the sentence. Section 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further goes to provide that where a case has been tried summarily by a Magistrate empowered to act under section 260 Cr. P.C. and passes a sentence of line only not exceeding Lwo hundred rupees, no appeal shall lie. The totality of the situation thus is that since the appellant was tried summarily under Section 260 and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 20 on his entering the plea of guilt, he could nol have filed an appeal against the same. Procedural barbs thus coil the appellant, causing reper­ cussions not only to his service career but in being branded for ever as "unfit' 1 for govern1ncnt service. This is the rancour and the sting \Vhich hurts the appellant most, not the payment of fine of the paltry sum of rupees twenty, but the consequences which have visited him, due to the acl/s covered under section 294 !PC leading lo the conviction per se being treated as involving moral turpitude. 11 Moral turpitude'' is an expression \Vhich is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection shO\ving depravity. The government of E Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on February 2, 1973 (Annexure E in the Paper Book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for infor- F mation and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the government of Haryana on 17/26th March, 1975 explained the policy decision of February 2, 1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral tur- G pitude as follows : " ........ The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not : (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. PAWANKUMAR v.STATE[PUNCHHI,J.] 399 (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one. A (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Decision in each case will, however, depend on the circumstan- B ces of the case and the competent authority has to exercise its discretion while taking a decision in accordance with the above mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral tur­ pitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be C offence which are not included in it but which in certain situations and circun1stances n1ay involve moral turpitu<lc. 11 Section 294 !PC still remains out of the list. Thus the conviction of the appellant under section 294 !PC on its own would not involve moral turpit11de depriving him the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts D and circumstances, \vhich led to the conviction, met the requirements of the policy decision above-quoted. We had required of the respondents to produce before us the copy of the judgment whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence. As was expected only a copy of the institution/summary register maintained by the court of the Chief Judicial tvJ"agistrate, Bhiwani was placed before us showing that the appellant on 4.6.1980 was imposed a fine of Rs. 20. A copy of the treasury challan supporting that the fine paid was deposited by the Chief Judicial Magistrate the same day has also been produced. The copy of the summary register neither discloses the substance of the allega­ tions put to the appellant, nor the words in which the plea of guilt was entered. It is of no significance that the appellant Lreats hin1self a convict as he had pleaded guilty. Ex facie it only shows that the entry concerns F.l.R No. 231/3.6.1980 under Section 294 !PC. Therefrom it is difficult to discern the steps taken in the summary trial proceedings and what had the appellant pleaded to as guilly, whether to the allegations in the FIR or to G the provision of the !PC or any other particular ? Mere payment of fine of Rs. 20 does not go to show that the conviction was validly and legally recorded. Asst~ming that the conviction is not open to challenge at the present juncture, \Ve cannot but deprecate the action of the respondents in having proceeded to adversely certify the character and antecedents of the H A Appellant on the basis of the conviction per se, opinion to have involved moral turpitude, without satisfying the tests laid dow!l in the policy decision of the government. We are rather unhappy to note that all the three courts below, even when invited to ,iudge the matter in the said perspective, went on to hold that the act/s involved in conviction under section 294 !PC per se established moral turpitude. They should have been sensitive to the changing perspecti.ves and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards, and its changing views of obscenity. The matter unfortunately was dealt with casually at all levels. Before concluding this judgment we hereby draw attention of the Parliament to step in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy arc tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, n1ore often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost among them being traffic, municipal and other petty offences under the Indian Penal Code, moslly commiltcd by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payn1ent of a paltry ~um on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measures are therefore necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard lo petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of line upto a certain limit, say upto Rs. 2000 or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. This can brook lJO delay, whatsoever. As. a result of the above discussion, \Ve allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court as also that of the two courts below and decree the suit of the appellant as prayed for, \vilh costs. G v.s.s. Appeal allowed.