Krishna Dass Agarwal v. Kanhaiyalal

B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted. Heard the counsel for the C parties. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the second appeal preferred by the appellant-plaintiff herein. D On December 5, 1960, the respondent Kanhaiyalal, purchased the suit-house from Ram Chander and others under a sale deed, which was registered on December 10, 1960, for a consideration of Rupees eight thousand. On December 5, 1961, the appellant- plaintiff instituted a suit seeking to enforce his right of pre- emption on two grounds, viz., (1) an agreement said to have been executed by Nath Mal, father of Ram Chander E agreeing to give the plaintiff the right of first purchase in the event of sale of the said house and (2) the Gwalior Pre-emption Act which created a right of pre-emption in favour of dominant-heritage holder vis-a- vis ser­ vient-heritage holder. The plaintiff also relied upon an alleged customary right of pre-emption. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's claim inter alia F on the ground that the Gwalior Pre-emption Act is unconstitutional and is unenforceable with effect from the date of the commencement of the Constitution of India. The Trial Judge decreed the suit on July 31, 1967. The respondent, Kanhaiyalal, preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned District Judge. The grounds on which the learned District Judge allowed the 'appeal are : (i) inasmuch as the Gwalior pre-emption. G Act has been repealed pending the said appeal (i.e., on June 28, 1968), the right of pre-emption claimed by the plaintiff can no longer be enforced. The plaintiff cannot also fall back upon customary right of pre-emption inasmuch as the said right came to an end with the enactment of the Gwalior Pre- emption Act in Samvat 1992. The said custom does not and H cannot revive on the repeal of the said enactment. (ii) The alleged agree- K.D. AGAl<WAL v. KANHAIYALAL[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.] 673 ment of pre-emption offended the rule of perpetuity and because the A respondent, Kanhaiyalal, was a bonafide purchaser of value without notice of the said agreement, the agreement cannot he enforced against him. The learned District Judge, however, declined to record any finding on the plaintiff's assertion that he is a dominant-heritage holder. The High Court dismissed that second appeal agreeing with the learned District .T udge on B the effect of repeal of the Gwalior Act pending the appeal. It relied mainly on the language employed in Section 23 of the Gwalior Pre-emption Act for arriving at the said conclusion. The High Court also took the view that Section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act docs not come to the rescue of the plaintiff. The correctness of the view taken by the High Court is challengeu in this appeal. C In Bishan Singh v. Kliazan Singh, A.LR. (1958) S.C. 838 = [1959] S.C.R. 878, Subba Rao, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench, obscrvcu that "the right (of pre-emption) being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendec allowing the claimant of a D superior or equal right being substituted in his place" (See Para 11)". Apart from being a weak right, it is a claim which is generally looked upon by co11rts with certain amount of distaste. That is because it interferes \Vith the freedom ot the owner to sell his property to the person of his choice. The Gwalior Pre-emption Act, which provided for pre-emption on E several grounds, also provided as follows in Section 23 : "23. Effect of loss of right oi pre-emptor prior to decree. - No decree for pre-emption shall be' passed in favour of any person unless he has a subsisting right of pre-emption at the time of the decree but where a decree for pre-emption has been passed in favour of a plaintiff whether by a court of first instance or of appeal, the right of such plaintiff shall not be affected by any such transfer or loss of his interest accruing after the date of such decree. 11 The Act was repealeu, as stated above, by the Madhya Pradesh Agra-Kraya-Vidhi Nirsan Adhiniyam, 1968, during the pcndency of the appeal before the learned District Judge. Section 23 says that the right of pre-emption must subsist "at the time of the decree". The High Court has H 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A construed the said words as meaning the final and operative decree. In other words, the High Court is of the opinion that inasmuch as an appeal was filed against the decree of the trial court in this case, the decree contemplated by Section 23 is the decree to be passed in the appeal, and if a second appeal is filed, the decree to be passed by the High Court, as B the case may be. On this reasoning, it held that the right of pre-emption must subsist on the date of the appellate decree/second appellate decree. Since the Act was repealed during the pendency of the appeal, it held, the right was not subsisting on the date of the appellate decree. The High Court relied upon the principle, applicable to civil courts, that appeal is C continuation of the original suit, that once an appeal is filed, the decree appealed against loses its finality and that the only effective decree in such a case is the decree of the appellate court, whether it is one of affirmation, modification or setting aside. Accordingly, it held that when Section 23 speaks of decree, it is the final decree - be it the decree of the trial court, first appellate or the second appellate court, as the case may be. For this D proposition, the 1-ligh Court also placed strong reliance upon the Division Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ninnala Devi v. Km. Rcnuka, [1972[ 21 J.L..l. 453. That was, of course, a case where the repeal of the said Act took place during the pendcncy of the suit itself and it is on this ground that Sri Satish Chandra, learned counsel for the appellant, E seeks to distinguish the said decision. The said distinction is no doubt valid but the question still remains whether the interpretation placed by the High Court on Section 23 is unsustainable in law. Section 23 is in t\vo-parts. 'fhe first part says that 1 'no decree for pre-en1ption shall be passed in favour of any person unless he has a subsisting right of pre-emption at the time of the decrec 11 , \vhile the second part, \vhich is in the nature of a proviso, says: 1 '(B)ut \vhcre a decree for pre-emption has been passed in favour of a plaintiff, \Vhether by a court of first instance or of appeal the right of such plaintiff shall not be affected G by any such transfer or loss.of his interest accruing after the date of such decree". Sri Satish Chandra strongly relies upon the second part while Sri Parasaran, learned counsel for the respondent, emphasises the first part. In our opinion, the second part visualises the situation \Vhere, after the passing of the trial court's decrl:e or the first appellate court's decree, the H plaintiff transfers his right and says that such transfer shall not affect the K.D.AGAflWALv. KANHAfYALAl[B.P.JEEVANREDlJY,J.] 675 interest which has accrued to the plaintiff under the decree in his favour. A This provision is prc1niscd upon the assumption that the Act continues to be in force. It does not cover a situation \Vhcrc the Act itself ceases to be in force. Nov.1, coining to the first part, it is possible to take two vie\VS. It is possible to construe the \Vords "at tin1e of the decrcc' 1 a~ referring to the decree in favour of the plaintiff against \Vhich the appeal is pending; it is equally possible of being construed as referring to the final decree, i.e., the appellate (first appellate or the second appellate or for that matter any other appellate) decree. Hal"ing regard to the fact that the right of pre­ emption is a weak right and is generally looked upon with distaste and because the High Court has taken a particular l"icw of the matter on the interpretation of a lncal cnactinent (\vhich is no longer in force) \VC are not inclined to take a different vic\v. ()ur disinclination also arises fron1 the fact that the said Pre-emption Act was repealed as far back as 1968. Sri Salish Chandra Placed strong reliance upon Section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957 which is in pmi malC1ia with D Section 6 of the Central General Clauses Act. The applicability of this section was considered by the Di>ision Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in J'/in11ala Devi. It heh.I, after referring to a nutnber of decisions on the subj cct, that : "A right of pre-emption is in the nature of an inchoate right which can be perfected only in accordance with the procedure laid down in the statute, i.e., the pre-emption Act in this case. It could not be treated as a right vested in the plaintiff \Vithin the meaning of section 10 of the :rvt.P. General Clauses Act so as to rcn1ain unaffected by the repeal of the Act... ..... As pointed out above, the right of pre-emption is a remcUial right or in other \Vords a right to take advantage or an cnactn1cnt for acquiring a right to land, or other properly. The right cannot be said to have been acquired or accrued until a decree is passed, and therefore, is not saved by the provisions of section 10 of the M.P. General Clauses Act. The G Plaintiff-appellants arc, therefore, not entitled to enforce a right of pre-emption after the repeal of the Pre-emption Act." The High Court also relied upon the language in Section 23 to support the above conclusion. V./e are not inclined to take a different vie\v H A even if one is possible having regard the fact that High Court has taken one possible view on a local law which has been repealed as far back as 1968. Indeed, it was not even a law made by Madhya Pradesh Legislature but a hang-over from the erstwhile princely state of Gwalior. The appeal accordingly fails anti is dismissed. No order as to costs. T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.