State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh
Cited by 5 judgments in this corpus
- UNION OF INDIA v. V. SRIHARAN @ MURUGAN & ORS. · 2015 INSC 886
- State Of M.P. & Ors vs Khuman Singh & Anr · 2014 INSC 853
- STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. MOHAMMAD MUSLIM TAGALA · 2014 INSC 710
- SWAMY SHRADDANANDA @ MURALI MANOHAR MISHRA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA · 2008 INSC 853
- DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NOW N.C.T. OF DELHI) v. MANOHAR LAL · 2002 INSC 356
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
Special leave granted.
The respondent was eomfrted for an offence under Section 302/34 G
!PC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the judgment and
order dated May 28, 1987. After he had undergone a little more than 8
years of sentence he filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana al Chandigarh
seeking premature release. The High Court by the impugned order dated H
787
A January 18. 1986 considered the case on its merits and allowed the petition
directing the release of the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved of
the order dated January 18, 1986, hence this appeal.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion the
direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or permissible
B in law. The mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an
appropriate case to commute the sentence of a convict and to prematurely
order his release before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts.
Clause (b) of Section 433 Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of imprison
ment for life may be commuted for imprisonment for a term not exceeding
C 14 years or fine. Undisputedly, the respondent had not completed 14 years
sentence when he filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P .C. seeking
premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore to prema
turely release the respondent and set him at liberty forthwith could not
have been made. That apart, even if the High Court could give such a
direction, it could only direct consideration of the case of premature
D release by the Government and could not have ordered the premature
release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the power under
Section 433 Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and has to be exercised by
the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles.
The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and
E is hereby set aside.
This order shall, however, not come in the way of the respondent for
approaching the Government for commutation of his sentence and prema
ture release in terms of the order issued by the Governor of Punjab on
March 6, 1985. As and when such an application is made, the State
F Government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this
order or by the observations made by the High Court in the impugned
order.
T.N.A.