Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors.

K. RAMASWAMY, J. Application for impleadment allowed. Leave granted. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated September 29, 1992 passed by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in CIMA NO. 72 of 1988. The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is : whether G the respondents are entitled to solatium and interest under the Jammu & Kashmir Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act")? The facts in nutshell are that land admeasuring 399 Kanals and 4 marlas situated in Villages Rampur, Talwal and Goverdhan Pain was H acquired for public purposes, viz., defence, by publication of notification U.O.I. v. DHANWANTIDEVI[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 39 "'"" under Section 7 of the Act on October 16, 1986. The Deputy Commis- A sioner, Rajouri in his award dated November 3, 1986 awarded compensa- tion @ Rs. 21,000 in respect of lands situated in villages Rampur and .... Talwal and Rs. 10,000 per kanal in respect of land situated in village ;. Goverdhan Pain with 10% escalation on account of passage of time. The compensation was accordingly paid but feeling dissatisfied therewith, the B claimants~landowners sought reference under Section 8 of the Act to the arbitrator who by his award dated March 8, 1987 enhanced the compensa- tion to Rs. 60,000 per kanal in respect of lands in villages Rampur and Talwal and Rs. 40,000 per kanal in respect of land in village Goverdhan Pain; he also awarded 15% solatium and 4% interest per annum on the enhanced compensation. When the appellants questioned the same by c filing an appeal in the High Court, it by impugned judgment and order dated September 29, 1992 confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal .... holding that no discrimination could be made between the owners whose lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and owners _,... whose lands are acquired under the Act and hence the arbitrator was D justified in awarding solatium and interest to the land-owner-respondents. Hence this appeal by special leave. The admitted position is that prior to the acquisition properties were under requisition under Section 3 of the Act. Shri Nambiar, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the Act did not confer power E upon the arbitrator or the court to award solatium and interest. The controversy is no longer res integra as a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Dist1ict Judge, Udhampur & Ors., JT (1994) 3 SC . .. 629 had held that the claimants are not entitled to solatium and interest under the Act. The ratio in Union of India v. Hari Krishna Khosla, (1993) F Supp. (2) SCC 149 was applied wherein the Requisition and Acquisition ..... of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short, the "Central Act" similarly did not provide for payment of solatium and interest. Thus, it is contended , a three-judge Bench of this Court had held that the arbitrator and the court have no power to award solatium and interest on the enhanced compensa- tion under the Act. G On the other hand, argument of Shri Vaidyanathan, learned senior ...- counsel for the second respondent, adopted by Shri Thakur, learned senior counsel for the first respondent, is that the Act is a measure of appropria- tion of the private property of citizens though for public purpose. When H 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A the owner is deprived of his possession and enjoyment of his property payment of solatium and interest for compulsory acquisition is integral to the compulsory acquisition. In equity, the owner is entitled to restitution for dispossession and enjoyment with interest in lieu thereof. This Court had held in Satinder Singh & Ors. v. Amrao Singh & Ors., (1961] 3 SCC 676 that from the date of dispossession till the date of receipt of compensation it is an implied agreement to pay interest on the value of the property. The right to receive interest is in place of right to retain possession. Unless the statute specifically and expressly excludes payment of interest and solatium the land-holder is entitled to the interest on the amount quantified towards compensation and solatium; denial thereof would amount to unjust enrich­ ment by the State depriving the land-holder or his land as well as right to receive compensation for the intervening period. The denial also is ar­ bitrary and most unjust. In the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the right to property is still a fundamental right; hence, deprivation of the property without payment of solatium and interest violates an individual's fundamen- D tal right to property and therefore, it would be arbitrary offending Article 14 of the Constitution. When an acquisition under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is resorted to, the claimant-owner is entitled to solatium under Section 23 (2), interest under Sections 34 and 28 and additional amount under Section 23 (1-A). The denial of payment of solatium and interest, therefore, is discriminatory violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The very concept of market value is a price which is agreed upon by a willing purchaser as consideration for purchase of the property from a willing seller. Compul­ sory purchase is a hypothetical sale. Based on the above premises, it is contended, a purchaser on taking possession of the property has to pay the entire consideration forthwith but the quantification of compensation under the Act like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Acquisi­ tion Act") takes place at hierarchical stages. Until quantification is done, the claimant-owners is entitled to interest for the interregnum between the date of taking possession and the date of determination and deposit of the compensation so determined. Applying the above principles, this Court G repeatedly has helcl that payment of solatium and interest is an integral part of the compensation. In support thereof, Shri Vaidyanathan placed reliance on the ratio decidendi in R.B. Lala Narsingh Das v. Secy. of State for India, AIR 1925 PC 91 at 92, Raghubans Narain Singh v. The Uttar Pradesh Govemment through Collector of Bijnor, (1967) 1 SCR 489 at 497, H Plithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (1977) 2 SCR 633 at - U.O.I. v.DHANWANTIDEVI[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 41 635, Joginder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., (1985] 1 SCR 682 at A 684-85. Binninghan City C01poration v. West Midland Baptis (Tmst) As­ sociation (lncotporated), (1969) 3 All ER 172, Commissioner of Sales Tax, J & Kand Ors. v. Pine Chemicals Ltd. & Ors., (1995] 1 SCC 58, Prabhu Dayal & Ors. v. Union of India, (1995] Supp 4 SCC 221, Yanamadala Co-operative Labour Contract Society Ltd. v. Assistant Director of Mines & Geology, Guntur, AIR (1984) AP 271, Pe1iyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kera/a, [1991] 4 SCC 195, Nagpur Improvement Tmst & Anr. v. Vithal Rao & Ors. [1973] 1 SCC 500, P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Danwig [1982] 1SCC439, State of Kera/a & Ors. v. T. M. Peter & Ors., [1980] 3 SCC 554. He further contended that in Union of India v. Hari Kishan Khosla, [1993] Supp 2 SCC 149 a three-Judge Bench did not consider the ratio in Satinder Singh's case (supra) which is a decision of co-ordinate Bench of three Judges. There is no ratio in Hari Kishan Khosla's case; it is only a conclusion. A conclusion does not constitute precedent. If it is considered to be ratio, it is inconsistent with the ratio in Satinder Singh 's case. The ratio in Satinder Singh 's case does not have the effect of being over-ruled D in Hari Kishan Khosla's case. It is per se per incuriam. If a co-ordinate Belich disagrees with the view of an earlier co-ordinate Bench, the only course open to the former is to refer the matter to the larger Bench. Therefore, the decision in Hari Kishan Khosla's case requires reconsidera- tion by a Constitution Bench. E Having considered and given anxious consideration to therespective contentions, the question arises; whether the respondents are entitled to solatium and interest under the Act? It is not necessary to burden the judgment with copious references made by Shri Vaidyanathan. Suffice it to state that the State exercising the power of eminent domain.is empowered F to acquire, for public purposes, the property of a citizen. The compensation for the acquired property is determined according to the principles laid down in the Act under which the property came to be acquired. It is true that by process of compulsory acquisition, the owner is deprived of his possession and enjoyment and in lieu thereof compensation be awarded as G per the principles laid down in the Act. The determination of the compen­ sation is done at hierarchical stages as per law. 0 Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that llari Kishan Khosla's case is not H 42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A a binding precedent nor does it ope~ate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and per se per incwiam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of prece­ dents, every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems dis- closed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence is decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts provided, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the D expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for .what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of Stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstari- G ces of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. Therefore, in order to understand and apprtlciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be H decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause U.0.I. v.DHANWA!ITJDEVI[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 43 or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded a a full exposition of A law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether Hali Kisha11 Khos/a's case would form a binding precedent. Therein, admittedly the question that had arisen and was decided by the Bench of three Judges was whether solatium and interest B are payable to an owner whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Central Act? On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the pervious precedents bearing on the topic the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. The Central Act omitted to provide for paymellt ·of solatium and interest since preceding the acquisition the C property was under requisition during which period compensation was paid to the owner. The position obtained and enjoyed by the Government during the period of requisition continued after acquisition. The same principle was applied without further elaboration on entitlement to payment of interest of an owner. It is true that the decisions relied on by Shri D Vaidyanathan on the principle of payment of interest as part of compen­ sation in respect of land acquired were brought to the attention of this Court for discussion. What would be its purport would be considered a little later. Suffice it to say for the present that the finding that so la ti um and interest are not payable for the lands acquired under the Central Act E as part of compensation is a binding precedent. Obviously, therefore, this Court followed the ratio therein in Distlict Judge, Udhampur case (supra). The contention, therefore, that Hari Kishan Khosla's case cannot be treated as a binding precedent since therein there is no ratio but a conclusion without discussion, is not tenable and devoid of force. In that view, it is not ·necessary to discuss in extenso the effect of the decisions cited by Shri Vaidyanathan. Equally, the contention of Shri Vaidyanathan that the ratio in Hali Kishan Khos/a's case is in conflict with the ratio in Satinder Singh's case which was neither distinguished nor overruled and that the decision• of a co-ordinate Bench cannot have the effect of overruling decision of another co-ordinate Bench, canriot be given countenance. The effect of the G ratio in Satinder Singh 's case will be considered a little later; suffice it to state that there is no conflict in the ratio of these two cases if the facts in Satinder Singh 's case are closely analysed and the principle laid down therein is understood in its proper perspective. Therefore, Hali Kishan Khosla's case cannot be held to be per inculiam nor has it the effect of H 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A overrulin!~ the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh's case. Taking the question of entitlement to interest as a first question, as vehemently argued by Vaidyanathan, broadly speaking. the act of taking possession of immovable properties generally implies an agreement to pay interest on its consideration for deferred payment. In a court of equity, when the seller parts with possession of immovable property, the purchaser becomes its owner while the seller receives money as consideration in lieu of the property. The seller, therefore, is entitled to claim interest in place of his retaining possession of the property from the date the purchaser takes possession of the property till date of payment. On this premise, claim for interest is sought against the State when it exercises its power of eminent domain and acquires the property of a citizen for public purpose. This principle was extended! in equity to recompensate the owner for deprivation of his possession and enjoyment thereof in accordance with law. It was, therefore, held in equity that the owner is entitled to .interest D on the principal amount of award from the date of taking possession unless the statute under which the land was acquire express its contrary intention. It is on this premise that the right to receive interest takes the place of right to retain possession and its enjoyment. It is equally settled law that equity operates where statute: does not occupy the field. Conversely, when the statute occupies the field the equity yields place to the statute. The question, therefore, is whether the Act expresses any intention to exclude payment of interest and solatium in respect of the property acquired thereunder? It is not in dispute that the property was initially under requisition whereund.er possession thereof was taken from the F respondents. During the period of requisition the respondents received compensation. The quantum thereof was sought to be put in issue but since that question was neither relevant nor in issue in the courts, we desist from going into that aspect. Under section 7(1) of the Act, where property is subject to requisition, if the Government is of the opinion that it is necessary to acquire the property for a public purpose, it is empowered to G acquire such property by making publication to that effect in the State Gazette. Proceeding thereto, a prior notice of show cause should be given to the oWner-claimants as to why the property should not be acquired; their objections, if any, should be considered after giving an opportunity and before deciding the same. Such an order in substance is like a declaration H under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act after enquiry under Section 5-A. 1 U.O.L v. DHANWANTIDEVI[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 45 By operation of sub-section (2), the property vests in the Government from· A the date of publication in the Gazette, absolutely free from all encumbran- ces and the previous period of requisition of such property comes to a~ end. Sub-section (3) enumerates the circumstances in which the property cannot be acquired. Section 8 prescribes principles on which compensation shall be determined and given to the owner, in the manner and in accord­ ance with the principles set out therein. Clause (a) thereof gives right to fix compensation by an agreement between the Government and the owner indicating thus: "Where the compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be given in accordance with such agreement". Clause (b) gives alter­ native mode to the Government and provides that in the absence of such an agreement reached between the owner and the Government, "the Government shall appoint as arbitrator, a person, who is a District Judge or Additional District Judge". Clause (c) provided assistance to the ar­ bitrator in the form of a person to be nominated by the Government who has expert knowledge as to the nature of the property acquired, to assist the arbitrator as assessor in determining compensation. The principle of D determination of compensation found in Clause ( d) is "fair amount of compensation". Under Clause (e), the arbitrator shall, after hearing the disputes, obviously wherein Government is party, make an award determin- ing the amount of compensation which appears to him to be "just" and specify the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. In making the award, the arbitrator shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) so far as they are applicable. Sub-Section (2) deals with payment of compensation for the property requisitioned. Sub-section (3) contemplates compensation pay­ able for , the. property acquired under Section 7. It envisages that the compensation payable "shall, in the absence of an agreement, be the price which the requisitioned property would have fatched in open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of its requisition and been sold on the date of acquisition". It would thus be seen that in determining compensation in respect of the acquired property, which is the subject matter of prior requisition G and was in possession of the Government, the principle for determination of compensation is as per the bi-lateral agreement between the owner and the Government. Where it was not effectuated and no agreement was reached, the arbitrator is empowered to determine the compensation which the requisitioned property would have fetched in open market, if it had H 46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A remain_ed in the same condition as it was at the time of its requisition but the prevailing price should be as on the date of acquisition. Had it been sold in the open market to a willing purchaser by a willing vendor, the price offered by a willing purchaser in the open market would be the yardstick. The arbitrator, therefore, is kept in the arm-chair of a willing purchaser and should consider the circumstances attending the requisitioned proper­ ty. Had it remained with the owner in the same condition as it was at the time of its requisition and if it were to be sold on the date of acquisition in that condition, the price a willing purchaser would offer would be just and fair compensatio~ under the Act. The Acquisition Act provides for payment of interest under Sectiion 34 by the Land Acquisition Office and by the Court under Section 28. Similarly, Section 23(2) provides for pay­ ment of solatium, in addition to compensation, in consideration of compul- sory acquisition. The presµmptive evidence furnishes that the Jammu & Kashmir Legislature was aware of the above provisions and principles of determination of the compensation under the Acquisition Act. Yet, the D Legislature departed from thos1~ principles; instead, it set down under the Act its own principles to determine the compensation. The Act did not expressly provide for payment of interest and solatium as components of compensation under the Act. The question, therefore, emerges: whether it is necessary for the State Legislature to expressly specify that interest or solatium shall not be payable for the lands or property acquired under Section 7(1) of the Act. Sub silentio is eloquent. It would further be seen that Section 8 of the Central Act equally does not provide for payment of solatium and interest. The Act was passed in the year 1968 while the Central Act was passed in 1952. It would, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that the State Legis­ lature was cognizant to the express provisions for payment of interest and solatium available in the Acquisition Act. the Act omitted similar provisions for payment of interest and solatium as part or component of compensation, obviously to fall in line with the Central Act. In Satinder Singh's case (supra), East Punjab Acquisition and Req­ uisitien of Immovable Property (Temporary) Powers Act, 1948 did not provide for any principle on which the compensation in respect of the property acquired thereunder was to be determined, Section 5( e) of that Act makes Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 specifically H applicable for determination of compensation. Contentio.n raised therein U.O.I. v.DHANWANTIDEVI[K.RAMASWAMY,J.) 47 was that Sections 23 (2), 28 and 34 by necessary implication stood excluded. A Considering the said contention, the general principle of law as regards the right to interest on the compensation of immovable property was discussed and it was held that when possession of immovable property is taken from an owner, there is a general implied agreement to pay interest on the value of the property. On this premises, the claim for interest was made against the State. Accordingly, it was held that Sections 28 and 34 providing for payment of interest and Section 23(2) for payment of solatium, were not excluded. The ratio, therefore, must be understood in the light of the facts found therein. Thus considered, we find that the ratio in Harikishan Klwsla's case and in Satinder Singh's case are not in mutual conflict nor the former has the effect of overruling the latter. The difficulty arises in C understanding the ratio in proper perspective. In National Insurance Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Life Insurance C01poration of India, (1963] Supp. (2) SCR 971 the business of insurance carried on by the appellant was nationalised under Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 D and stood vested in the Life Insurance Corporation of India on and from Septe~ber 1, 1956, the appointed day. The dispute between the parties related to the compensation payable to the appellant-Corporation on such vesting and one of the issues was whether interest was payable one such compensation. There was no express provision for payment of interest as E the life insurance business vested in the Life Insurance Corporation. The Tribunal had held that it had no jurisdiction to award interest since there was no express provision in the Act. It was conceded during the hearing in this Court that the Corporation agreed to pay interest awardable but the dispute was about the rate of interest, the amount on which it is payable and the date from which it should be given. Considering the contentions in that background, this Court had held that the property remained just where it was. The purchaser has the money in his pocket and the seller has the estate vested in him but the character changes in a court of equity; the seller becomes the owner of the money and the purchaser becomes the owner of the estate. On entering possession, the purchaser becomes en­ titled to the rent but if he has not paid the price, interest in equity is G payable by him on the purchase price which belongs to the seller. On this principle, this Court referred with approval the ratio in Satinder Singh 's case. In this background, it would be that there is no dispute as regards the principle of law on the right to receive interest on the value of the property from the date of taking possession by the purchaser from the H 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A seller when the purchase price was not paid. The question whether the land holder would be entitled to interest when the Act omitted payment thereof did not arise therein since the Life Insuran_ce Corporation had agreed to pay~ interest on the value of the life insurance business of the appellant therein which vested in the Life Insurance Corporation. Therefore, the B ratio in this case is also of little assistance to the facts in this case. The facts in Prabhu Dayal & Ors. v. Union of India, [1995] Supp. 4 221 were that the property of the appellants was acquired under the Central Act but the appellants received that compensation under protest. The arbitrator was not appointed for a long period by the Government as enjoined under Section 8 of that Act to determine the market value. In Harbans Singh C Shanni Devi v. Union of India, Civil Appeal Nos. 470-71 of 1985 decided on February 11, 1985 which was followed in Harkishan Khosla's case, solatium and interest were awarded to the claimants. The question which arose for decision in thes1~ cases was as to the !aches on the part of the Union of India in appointing an arbitrator to determine compensation and D whether the owner was disentitled to interest and solatium. This Court applied the principle of equity and directed payment of solatium and interest to recompensate loss of enjoyment of the money payable towards compensation. The ratio, therefore, is of no avail to the appellants. All the decisions cited by Mr. Vaidyanathan in support of his con- E tention on solatium were considered in H01ikishan Khosla's case. His repeated attempts failed to persuade us to have that decision referred to a larger Bench of five Judges. We are unable to persuade ourselves to doubt the correctness of the judgment in Harikishan Khosla's case. All the decisions cited by the counsel were considered in extenso by the Bench in F Hari /(Jishna Khosla's case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not necessary to re-examine all the decisions once over. We are in respectful agreement with the ratio in H01ikishan Klwsla's case. It would be seen that sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Acquisition Act expressly states that solatium is "in addition" to the compensation as consideration for compul­ sory nature of acquisition. This distinction was pointed out in catena of G decisions including the one referred by a Bench of three Judges in Prem Nath Kapur & Anr. v. Nati'onal Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. [1996] 2 sec 71. For parity of reasons, without further discussion it was held that interest also was not payable. We, therefore, respectfully agree with the ratio in Harikishan Klwsla's case that the Act omitted to pay H solatium and interest, in addition to compensation. The omission by the U.0.I. v. DHANWANTI DEVI [K RAMASWAMY,J.] 49 legislature, as stated earlier, is deliberate. In Dist1ict Judges, Udhampur's A case a Bench of two Judges of this Court had held that the claimant is not entitled to solatium and interest. Accordingly; we hold that the respondents are not entitled to, so la ti um and interest. It is then contended by Mr. Vaidyanathan that citizens in Jammu & Kashmir have fundamental right to property under the J & K Constitution. The State Act was not incorporated in Schedule IX of the Constitution. The omission to pay solatium and interest is unconstitutional, arbitrary offending article 14 of the Constitution. The similar contention raised in Halikishan Khosla 's case was considered and rejected. It was held that it · is not violative of Article 14. We are in respectful agreement with the same. The Act is not violative of even Article 31 of the Constitution as applicable to Jammu & Kashmir. The contention that the denial of solatium and interest in respect of the property acquired under the Act would be an unjust enrichment of the D State, is devoid of substance. The public money is credited to the Con­ solidated Fund which is expended in accordance with the Appropriation Bill passed by the Parliament or the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The amount collected would be ex­ pended for the purposes of appropriation and for implementation of the Directive Principles of the State policy and the law made by the ap- E propriate legislature or the executive policy in furtherance thereof. There­ fore, the non-payment of solatium and interest does not independently get into the coffers of the public ..:xchequer nor does the State enrich itself. The public money is expended only for public purpose. The concept of unjust enrichment by the State is alien to and in derogation of the constitu­ tional scheme and public policy. The general principle is that one should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of other. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. Three elements must be established in order to sustain a claim based on unjust enrichment, the benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; appreciation of knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circum~tances as to make it · inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value. These principle specifically absent in the case of omission by a statute, are made by the competent Legislature to award interest or H 50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. A solatium, in addition to compensation. So, it cannot be to characterised as unjust enrichment where such action does not involve violation of law or is not opposed to public policy either directly or indirectly when the statute prescribes the principle for payment of compensation .and omits as its policy to provide for the payment of interest and solatium as component of compensation. It is the legislative public policy to provide for acquisition of the private property for a public purpose. The State pays compensation for the acquired land in accordance with the principle laid down in the statute. It would, therefore, be illogical to contended that by legislative omission to pay solatium and interest the State enriches itself unjustly at the expense of the private person. The contention, therefore, is unsus­ tainable in law. Accordingly, we hold that the High Court and the arbitrator com­ mitted manifest grave error of law in awarding solatium and interest on the compensation determined under Section 8 of the Act. D The appeal is accordingly aHowed. The award of solatium and inter- est on the compensation awarded stands set aside. The compensation stands upheld, but in the circumstances, without costs. v.s.s. Appeal allowed.