Smt. Gulab Devi v. the Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors.
We have remained unassisted because no one has appeared for the
H respondents.
528
..
GULAB DEVI v. DY. DIRECTOR OF CON SO LIDA TION 529
From the judgment under appeal we gather that the High Court has A
proceeded on the basis of the genealogy drawn that Jageshwar Singh had
I /4th share in a joint holding. On the death of Jageshwar Singh, his widow
Bhagwanti succeeded to his estate under Section 35 of the U.P. Tenancy
Act, 1939 [the Act] which provides for a special rule of succession to a
male tenant in contrast to personal law, and under head (b) thereof, the
widow comes in the second position after the male lineal descendants in B
the male line of descent coming in the first. After her death, resort again
had to be made to the same provision to discover who next would succeed
to the estate and it turned out to be that under head (i) , the unmarried
daughter had a right to succeed. On that basis, both the daughters of
Jageshwar Singh, namely, Guiab Devi, the appellant herein and Ram
Kumari (whose estate is in dispute) succeeded to the property of their C
father in equal shares. After such succession, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 [the Abolition Act] came into force. While
so, on 30.10.1954 Ram Kumari died. Shortly thereafter, consolidation
operations commenced in the village. Since Guiab Devi concededly stood
married on the date of the death of Ram Kumari, dispute arose between
her and the collaterals of Jageshwar Singh relating to succession to the D
estate of Ram Kumari. The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer
held in favour of the appellant but the Deputy Director, in revision, and
the High Court, in affirmance, have held that the marriage of the appellant
stood in the way of her succeeding to the estate of her sister, Ram Kumari.
We are, thus, required to discover from the inter-play of the legal provisions E
whether the view taken by the Deputy Director [Consolidation] and the
High Court is correct.
As said before, bot~ the sisters ware tenure-holders in their own
right to their respective shares on the date when the Abolition Act came
into force. It is not disputed that they had received their respective tenancy F
holdings having succeeded to the estate of their father in accordance with
Section 35 of the Tenancy Act. It would be worthy of emphasis that they
had not succeeded to the estate under the provisions of the Abolition Act.
Section 171 of the Abolition Act governs succession to male G
Bhumidhars or Assamis. It is maintained by learned senior counsel for the
appellant that the word "Bhumidhar" would include a tenure-holder and
thatthe provision is applicable to the case of the estate involved. We proceed
on that footing since this assertion has not been refuted. Now, no succession
to a male has opened after the coming into force of the Abolition Act. So,
section 171 is out of the way. Section 172 provides succession in the case H
A of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter
etc. This provision applies to the case of a tenure-holder who dies after the
date of vesting having obtained the estate before the date of vesting while
the. Abolition Act being in force. The death, abandonment or surrender of
or made by a female would have the effect of putting back the property
fictionally in the hands of the last male holder whose heirs would have to
B be searched in the list provided under Section 171 of the abolition Act.
Since, instantly the estate had vested in the two sisters prior to coming
into force of the Abolition Act and sequally before the date of vesting,
Section 172, therefore, was out of applicability. ·~esort then has to be
made to Section 174 of the Act which provides succession to a woman
holding an interest otherwise than the one covered under Section 171 or
C 172. The provision provides that when such a woman dies, her interest in
the holding shall devolve in the order of succession given therein, and in
clause (h), 'sister' is an heir without the qualification of being a married or
an unmarried sister. Now, on the fact-situation, it is plain that the succession
to the estate of Ram Kumari could only be governed by the provisions of
Section 174 of the Abolition Act. Since neither Section 172 nor Section
D 171 could derivatively apply to her case, for the estate was obtained by
her on the death of her father which occurred prior to the coming into
force of the Abolition Act and under the provisions of Section 35 of the
Abolition Act, the High Court as well as the Deputy Director of
consolidation seemed to have committed an error which deserves
rectification to that effect at our end. We, therefore, upset those orders by
E allowing this appeal as also the writ petition preferred by the appellant
before the High Court, declaring her to be the heir to the estate of her
sister, Ram Kumari, without any obstacle preventing. Ordered accordingly.
No costs.
R.P. Appeal allowed.