Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy and Anr. v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa (dead) by Lrs. and Anr.
The appellants are sons of the brother of Bhoomireddy Pedda Chen
naiah. The respondents are the sons of the sister of Laxmamma, widow of
Pedda Chennaiah. Pedda Chennaiah during his life time had bequeathed
all his properties to his wife Laxmamma by his registered Will dated May D
12, 1947 with right to enjoy the property with vested reminder in the
respondents with absolute right and he died on May 25, 1947. Laxmamma
held the property <juring her life time and she died on October 21, 1965.
When the appellants started interfering with the possession and enjoyment
of the plaint sc~edule properties, the respondents filed O.S. No. 187/69 in E
the Court of District Munsif at Anantapur for a perpetual injunction. The
trial Court decreed it. On appeal, the Additional District Judge confirmed
the same. In the Second Appeal No. 437/77, by judgment and decree dated
February 21, 1979 the learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh dismissed
the same. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Mr. K. Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants, is right in his contention that Laxamamma having inherited the
properties under the Will executed by her husband Pedda Chennaiah, as
a limited owner, after Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, became
an absolute owner as her limited right of enjoying the property during her
life time for her maintenance ripened into' an absolute estate under Section G
14(1) of that Act and that she died as full owner of the said properties.
The legal position in this behalf is settled by this Court in C. Masilamani
· Mudaliar& Ors. v. Idol of Shri Swaminathanswami Thirukoil &Anr., [1996]
8 sec 525, wherein it has been held that the properties given to the wife
by the husband under his Will for maintenance must be constr1;1ed to have H
A bee!) acquired by the wife, in view of her pre-existing right to maintenance.
When properties are thus bequeathed for their enjoyment in life, it cannot
be said to be a right acquired for the first time under the Will but it has
to be considered a--' a reflection of the pre-existing right. After 1956, her
limited right got enlarged into absolute right by operation of Section 14(1)
of the said Act. She will have to be treated as having become an absolute
owner. However, the real question which arises for consideration is :
whether an injunction could have been granted in favour of the respondents
in view of the facts of this case? It is seen that even during the life time of
Laxmamma, after the demise of Pedda Chennaiah, the respondents came
in possession of the property and were enjoying the same right from 1947.
C The properties were mutated in their name. It is also an admitted fact that
in 1951, the appellants themselves had purchased some of the propertie..>,
the subject matter of the Will, from the respondents. In view of these facts,
the question arises whether an injunction can be granted against the
appellants? The trial Court as well as the appellate Court have concurrent-
D ly found as a fact thus :
"The lands were transferred in the name of the respondents and
pattas also were granted to them and they were in possession and
enjoyment of the property since the death of their testator.
Voluminous evidence clearly demonstrated the fact. In view of the
admission made by the appellants that the re;poudents were in
possession of the part of the properties purchased from the respon
dents, it would clearly indicate that the respondents remain in
possession of the property right from the date of the death of the
testator. Under these circumstances, the injunction was rightly
granted against the appellants."
Shri K. Madhava Reddy has contended that no injunction can be
granted against a true owner. As a proposition of law, it is indisputable.
But the question is: whether the appellants have become owners of the
property? Several imponderable things would arise until that declaration is
G given to them. It is seen that when the respondents have been in possession
and got their names mutated in assertion of their right, right from 1947,
may be it was open to them to contend that they remained in possession
in assertion of their own right even to the knowledge of the appellants and
the appellants had acquiesced to it. The admitted purchase of the proper-
H ties from them by the appellants themselves may lend assurance to that
,
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BHOOMIREDDY CHENNAREDDY.: BHOOSPAUPE'DDA VERRAPPA 335
assertion. Therefore, it would be open to them to raise that plea, had the A
appellants asserted their right. But it is a fact that no such issues were
raised as no such plea was taken. Under these circumstances, we think that
the injunction, due to the above documentary evidence and admitted facts,
was rightly granted against the appellants.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs. B
T .N .A. Appeal dismissed.