Karan Singh and Ors. Etc. Etc. v. Union of India
V.N. KHARE, J. This group of Civil Appeals by special leave and
Special leave Petitions is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench G
of Delhi High Court and the questions involved therein relate to quantum of
compensation with regard to acquisition of the appellants land situated in
village Gharoli, Delhi. Since common question of facts and law is involved,
we propose to dispose of these appeals and special leave petitions by a
common judgment, noticing the facts of the case as appearing in Civil Appeal
No. 2981/95. H
A Land measuring 2600.12 bighas situated in the revenue estate of village
Gharoli which included the appellants land was notified for acquisition vide
notification dated 17 .11.1980 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act (for short the "Act"). The purpose for acquisition shown was planned
development of Delhi. This was followed by declaration issued under Section
6 of the Act on 29.9.81. The collector by an award dated 2.7.83 assessed the
B market value of the entire land at Rs: 9,000 per bigha except some portions
of land the value of which was fixed at Rs. 7,000 and 4,000 per bigha,
respectively. The appellants not content with the said award of the Collector
sought references for determination. of compensation payable to them. The
Learned Additional District Judge, Delhi determined the market value of
C appellants acquired land at the rate of Rs. 23,000 per bigha. It may be noticed
here that for other portions of the fand the Additional District Judge awarded
lower rates of compensation. Thereafter, the appellants preferred Regular
First Appeals in the High Court of Delhi against the judgment dated 21.11.92
of the Learned Additional District Judge. However, the Union oflndia accepted
D the judgment.of the Learned Additional District Judge as it did not prefer any
appeal to the High Court. The High Court of Delhi by a common judgment
rendered in 46 appeals filed by the claimants in respect of the same village
granted compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 76,550 per bigha to all the
claimants. It is in this way the present appeals and the special leave petitions
have come up before us.
Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the leases, Ext. A-8, A-
9, A-10, A-12 and A-13 relied upon by the appellants for enhancement of
compensation for the acquired land were erroneously rejected by the High
Court on the ground that these 'evidences related to the post notification
F issued under Section 4 of the Act. According to learned counsel for the
appellants the lands comprised in Ext. A-8, A-9, A-JO, A-12 and A-13 are
situated ne_ar the acquired land and the leases thereof were executed shortly
after the notification under Section 4 of the Act, and as such, they ought to
have been relied upon by High Court in arriving at the correct market value
of the acquired land.
Ext. A-8, A-9 and A-JO relate to plots of land situated in Jhilmil Tahirpur
and Ext. A-12 and A-13 relate to leases in respect of land situated in Sector
12, NOIDA. These leases were executed much after the notification issued
under Section 4 of the Act in the present case.
H Before we advert to the argument raised on behalf of the appellants, it
KARAN SINGH v.U.0.1. [V.N. KHARE, J.] 241
has to be borne in mind while deciding these appeals, this Court is not A
required to re-appraise the evidences which were considered by the Courts
below. But what concerns us is whether correct or legal principles were
applied in arriving at the market value of the acquired land in awarding
compensation to the claimants. When a land is compulsorily acquired, what
is basically required to be done for awarding compensation is to arrive at the B
market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the
Act. The market value of a piece of land for determining compensation under
Section 23 of the Act would be the price at which the vendor and the vendee
(buyer and seller) are willing to sell or purchase the land. The consideration
in terms of price received for land under bona fide transaction on the date C
of notification issued unoer Section 4 of the Act or few days before or after
the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act generally shows the
market value of the acquired land and the market value of the acquired land
has to be assessed in terms of those transactions. The sale of land on or
about the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act is stated to be the
best piece of evidence for determining the market value of the acquired land. D
Often evidence on transaction of sale of land on or few days before the
notification under Section 4 's not available. In the absence of such evidence
contemporaneous transactions in respect of lands which had similar advantages
and disadvantages would be the good piece of evidence for determining the
market value of the acquired land. In case the same is not also available, the E
other trnnsaction of land having similar advantages nearer to the date of
notification under Section 4 of the Act would guide in determination of the
market value of acquired land. In the present case, in the absence of evidence
of any transaction or sale of land on the date of issue of notification under
Section 4 of the Act, the court would be justified in relying upon the transaction
of sale of land having similar advantages nearer to the notification issued F
under Section 4 of the Act which can be taken as a guide for determining the
market value of the acquired land and compensation to be awarded to the
claimants. Thus the transaction of sale of land after the issue of notification
under Section 4 of the Act can guide the court in fixing the market value of
the acquired lands under certain conditions. In the case of Administrator G
General of West Bengal v. Collector Varanasi, AIR (1988) SC 943, it was held
thus :
"Such subsequent transaction which are not proximate in point of
time to the acquisition can be taken into account for purposes of H
A detennining whether as on the date of acquisition there was an upward
trend in the prices of land in the area. Further under certain
circhmstances where it is shown that the market was stable and there
were no fluctuations in the prices between the date of the preliminary
notification and the date of such subsequent transaction, the
B transaction could also be relied upon to ascertain the market value."
It is , therefore, no longer in doubt that in the absence of any evidence
of sale of land on the date of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act,
under certain• conditions the post n_otification transactions of sales of land
can be relied upon in detennining the market value of the acquired land. One
C of the conditions being that it must be shown before the Court by reliable
evidence that there was no appreciation of the ':alue of land during the period
of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act and the date of transaction
of sale which is sought to be relied upon for the purposes of fixing the market
value of the acquired land. It has also to be borne in mind that if the claimant
relies on any post notification transaction, the burden is upon him to show
D that the price of the land remained static and there was no upward rise in the
price of the land during the period of issue of notification under Section 4
of the Act and the date of transaction of sale. In the present case what we
find is that excepting filing of Ext. A-8, A-9, A-10, A-12 and A-13, no effort
was made by the claimants to establish before the Court that there was no
E upward rise in the price or increase in the price of land in vi!iage Gharoli and
NOIDA during the period between the issue of notification under Section 4
and date of execution of the Exhibits sought to be relied upon.
Before we part with the first argument of learned counsel for the
appellants, we would like to notice the two decisions in the cases of State
F of U.P. v. Major Jitendra Kumar and Others, AIR (1982) SC 876 and in Mehta
Ravindrarai Ajitrai (deceased by LRs) & Others v. State of Gujarat, AIR
(1989) SC 2051, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. In these
cases there is no controversy as to whether the burden to establish that there
was no rise in price of land after the issue of notification under Section 4 of
G the Act, was on the claimant or on the State, and as such, these decisions
are of no assistance for deciding the controversy at hand. For these reasons
we are of the opinion that the High Court did not commit any error in rejecting
Ext. A-8, Ext. A-9, Ext. A-10, Ext. A-12 and Ext. A-13 while arriving at the
market value of the acquired land.
H Learned counsel for the appellants then urged that the High Court
KARAN SINGH v.U.0.1. (V.N. KHARE, J.] 243
erroneously discarded Ext. A-11 which was an award in respect of a land at A ·
village Jhilmil Tahirpur on the ground that it was not a previous judgment of
the Cout '· The land comprised in the award was acquired under notification
issued 11nder Section 4 of the Act on 27.7.81. By the said award, the Court
awarded compensation @ Rs. 625 per sq. yds. It has earlier been seen that
in the present case the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was B
earlier in point of time than the notification issued for acquisition of land
comprised in Fxt. A-11. There is no quarrel with the proposition that judgments
of Courts in land acquisition cases or awards given by the Land Acquisition
Officers can be relied upon as a good piece of evidence for determining the
market value of the land acquired under certain circumstances. One of the
circumstances being that such an award or judgement of the Court of law C
must be a previous judgment. In the case of Pal Singh and others v. Union
Territory of Chandigarh, JT (1992) 5 SC 371, it was observed thus:
"But what cannot be overlooked is, that for a judgment relating
to value of land to be admitted in evidence either as an instance or
as one from which the market value of the acquired land could be D
inferred or deduced, must have been a previous judgment of Court
and as an instance, it must have been proved by the person relying
upon such judgment by adducing evidence aliunde that due regard
being given to all attendant facts and circumstances, it could furnish
the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land."
Following this decision, we hold that it is only the previous judgment of a
court or an Award which can be made basis for assessment of the market
value of the acquired land subject to party relying such judgment to adduce
evidence for showing that due regard being given to all attendant facts it
could form the basis for fixing the market value of acquired land. F
In view of the fact that Ext. A-II was not the previous judgment, it was
rightly rejected and not taken as a guide for arriving at the market value of
the acquired land.
Learned counsel for the appellants lastly relied upon three decisions of G
this Court in support of his arguments. Baldev Singh and others v. State of
.. Punjab, [1996] 10 SCC 87; State of Madras v. A.M Nanjan and another, [1976]
. 1SCC973 and Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trust Boardv. H.
Naravanaiah Etc. Etc., [ 1977] 1 SCR 178 we have perused the judgments and
in none of the decisions the controversy related to previous judgment or
subsequent judgment and as such, these decisions are not helpful to the H
A arguments of learned counsel for the appellants.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in these appeals and the
special le.ave petitions, which are accordingly dismissed. There shall not be
any order as to costs.
B B.K.S. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.