Prem Narayan Barchhiha v. Hakimuddin Saifi
S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. These appeals, by special leave, are
from the judgments and decrees of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at F
Jabalpur in Second Appeal Nos. 408/89 and 409/89 passed on 9. 7.1997. The
appellant is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant of two shops in
house Nos. 23/507 and 508 situated at Azad Chowk Handipara, Raipur
(hereinafter referred to as 'suit premises').
On 2.5.85, the appellant filed two suits in the Court of Ilnd Civil Judge G
Class 11, Raipur, agai11st the respondent for his eviction from the suit premises
on the ground of bonajide requirement of his unemployed son for establishing
a Provision Store under Section 12(1 )(f) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). He stated that he had
no alternative reasonable suitable non- residential accommodation in the city
of Raipur for the said purpose. The respondent's plea was one of denial of H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. I S.C.R .
. . · A bonajide requirement of the landlord. After framing necessary issues and
considering the evidence on record, the learned Trial Judge came to the
conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his bonafide requirement and
observed that he had only a desire to -establish the business for his son. -
However, he recorded the finding that the appellant had no reasonable suitable
B accommodation in the Raipur city. Consequently both the suits were dismissed
by the learned Trial Judge by a Common judgmeat on January 27, 1987.
Dissatisfied with that judgment and decree of the Trial Court the appellant
tiled two appeals in the Court of 1st Additional Distt. Judge, Raipur. The
learned District Judge, on appreciating the evidence, held that the appellant
had proved bonajide requirement for establishing a business for his son. In
C that view of the matter he allowed the appeals and decreed the suits against
the respondent on September 6, 1989. The tenant questioned the correctness
of the said judgment and decree of the learned District Judge before the High
Court in Second Appeal Nos.408- 409 of 1989.
The High Court, at the time of admission of the Second Appeals, framed
D the following question of law for determination :-
"Whether the Court below was justified in granting a decree under
Section 12(1 )(t) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, under
the facts and circumstances of the case?"
E At the stage of final hearing of the Second Appeals, the following
additional substantial question of law was formulated :-
"Whether respondent has proved all the ingredients of Section 12(1)(f)
of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in order to get a decree
of eviction against the appellant?"
The answer to these questions recorded by the High Court is that the
appellant failed to prove all the ingredients of Section 12(1 )(t) of the Act and
his claim that he bonafide required the suit premises, cannot be sustained as
he suppressed the fact that he was in possession of an alternative vacant
G accommodation in the same building. The High Court thus allowed the appeals
of the respondent and dismissed both the suits of the appellant for the same
reasons but by separate judgments dated 9. 7. 97. It is against those judgments
and decrees of the High Court, the present appeals are filed.
Mr. S.S. Khanduja, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that ...
H the High Court fell into an error in re-appreciating the evidence and answering
-·
1.
P.N. BARCHHIHA v. H. SAIFI [QUADRI, J.) 5
the questions in the negative - against the appellant. The High Col.irt should A
have, submitted the learned counsel, recorded answer to the questions on the
basis of the facts found by the 1st Appellate Court.
Mr. B.S. Banthia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, argued
that the appellant/landlord, before filing the eviction petition, had in his
possession two residential portions of the hou~e which he let out to others B
but he did not plead that he was in possession of other accommodation and
that it was not suitable for non-residential purposes so the High Court was
right in coming to the conclusion that as the appellant suppressed the facts
his plea for bonafide personal requirement could not be accepted.
On the contention urged before us, the question that needs to be C
adverted to is :-
"Whether it is incumbent upon a landlord, seeking eviction of the
accommodation let out for non-residential purposes under Section
12(l)(f) of the Act to disclose if he is in possession of residential D
accommodation and further prove that it is not suitable for non
residential purposes."
The definition of 'accommodation' in Section 2(a) of the Act, reads as
under:-
"2(a). "accommodation" means any building or part of a building, E
whether residential or non-residential and includes -
(i) any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes;
(ii) garden, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to
such building or part of the building; F
(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the
more beneficial enjoyment thereof;
(iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building
or part of a building."
The word 'accommodation' takes in both residential as well as non
residential building or part ofa building. In Section 12(l)(e)&(t), the expressions
'accommodation let for residential purposes' and 'accommodation let for non
residential purposes' are used distinctly in clear and unmistakable terms.
Now, it will be apt to refer to Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1) of the H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.
_ A Act which run as under :
"12(1). Restriction on eviction of tenants - (l). Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no
suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction
from any accommodation except on one or more of the following
grounds only namely :-
(a) to (d). **** **** ****
(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required
bonajide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or
for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof or for any
person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the
landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town
concerned;
(t) that the accommodation let for non- residential purposes is required
bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his
business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he
is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no
E other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own
in his occupation in the city or town concerned."
A plain reading of the provisions, extracted above, makes it clear that
the Act maintains a clear distinction between the accommodation let for
residential purposes and the accommodation let for non-residential purposes.
Clause (e) deals with ground of eviction of a tenant from accommodation let
for residential purposes. Under this clause eviction of a tenant can be sought
ifthe landlord bonafide requires the accommodation let for residential purposes
for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family,
provided he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
G accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation
in the city or town concerned. Clause (t) which deals with ground of eviction
of a tenant from accommodation let for non-residential purposes and provides
that the tenant can be evicted if the landlord requires accommodation let for
non-residential purposes bonafide for the purpose of continuing or starting
H his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he
... _
·-
P.N. BARCHHIHA v. H. SAIFI [QUADRI, J.] 7
is the owner thereof or for any person for who:;e benefit the accommodation A
is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable
non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned. They [clauses (e) and (f)] are thus distinct and independent
grounds having different ingredients and are thus mutually exclusive. That,
this is the purport of the said provisions, has been endorsed by this Court B
in Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sakhi Gopal, [1977] 3 SCC 284 and in Hasmat
Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR ( 1981) SC 1711.
are:
Now the ingredients of clause (t), with which we are concerned here,
(1) the accommodation from which the tenant is sought to be evicted C
has been Jet ouf for non-residential purposes;
(2) the landlord is the owner thereof and requires that accommodation
bonajide for the purpose of continuing or starting (i) his business
or (ii) business of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters;
or
(3) the landlord requires the accommodation for any person for
whose benefit the accommodation is held by him; and
(4) the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable
non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in E
the city/town concerned.
Admittedly, here requirements (I) and (2) are satisfied (2 and 3 are
alternative). In regard to ( 4) what is necessary for the appellant is to satisfy
the Court/Rent Controller that he or such person for whom eviction is sought,
has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own F
in his occupation in the city or town concerned. On this aspect the learned
Distt. Judge correctly recorded the finding in favour of the appellant. It
follows that the landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from non-residential
accommodation on the ground that he required the same for the purpose of
continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried G
daughters, has to prove that he has no other reasonably suitable non
residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town.
It is no part of the obligation of the landlord seeking eviction of a tenant
under Clause (t) of Section 12(1) of the Act to aver in his plaint/petition the
facts that he is in occupation of residential accommodation and that it is not
suitable for non-residential purposes. These facts are not the requirement of H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. I S.C.R.
A clause (f) and are irrelevant to make out a case under that clause. To read such
a requirement in the said clause (f) would amount to doing violence to the
language of the clause nay rewriting the clause which is far beyond the
principle of iron out the creases and is clearly impermissible.
It is futile to contend that accommodation is a neutral word taking in
B its fold both residential as well as non-residential purposes, the landlord
ought to disclose the residential accommodation in his possession and show
that it is not reasonably suitable for non- residential purposes when he is
seeking eviction of the tenant from accommodation let for non-residential
purposes. The Court cannot burden the landlord with additional conditions
C of disclosing particulars of residential accommodation in his possession and
proving that it is not reasonably suitable for non-residential purposes. Non
suiting him on such grounds will mean non-suiting him on extraneous grounds.
It follows that the appellant has fulfilled the fourth requirement of clause (f)
also.
D It is, however, contended that there is no provision in the Act which
prohibits use of the residential accommodation let for non- residential purposes,
therefore, it is the duty of the landlord to show if he has in possession
residential accommodation, even when he is seeking eviction of tenant for
non-residential accommodation. Neither on principle nor on authority can
such a contention be countenanced. We have no hesitation in rejecting the
same.
From the above discussion, it follows that the appellant has satisfied
all the requirements of clause (t) of Section 12(1) of the Act. The impugned
judgments and decrees of the High Court on this aspect are, therefore,
F erroneous and are liable to be set aside.
We accordingly set aside the impugned judgments and decrees of the
High Court and restore the orders of the 1st Appellate Court dated 6.9.89. The
appeals are allowed and the suits of the appellant for eviction of the respondent
from suit premises are decreed. There shall be no order as to costs.
A.Q. Appeals allowed.
I,