Raj Deo Sharma v. the State of Bihar
THOMAS, J. On the facts and circumstances of the case, no notice
to any person is necessary in this application ..
C In the main appeal, a three Judge Bench of this Court to which two
of us were parties, has issued certain directions for effective enforcement
of the right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of
India (as recognised by a five Judge Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay
v. R.S. Nayak, [1992] 1 SCC 225. Relevant amoog such directions for the
D present purpose, are the following :
Direction No. (i) : In cases where the trial is for an offence
punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven
years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close
prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from
E the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed
whether prosecution has examined-all the witnesses or not, within
the said period aQ the court can proceed to the next step provided
by law for the trial of the case.
Direction No. (iii) : If the offence under trial is punishable with
imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused
is in jail or not, the court shall close prosecution evidence on
completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of
the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has
examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the
court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of
the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in
the interest of justice the court considers it necessary to grant further
time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time
limit.
The present petition is filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation
i I
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RAJ DEO SHARMA v. STATE [THOMAS, J.) 131
(CBI for short) for clarification (and also for some modification) of the
above directions, by stating (1) that the said directions are only prospective
and (2) that the time taken by the court on account of its inability to carry
on day-to-day trial due to pressure of work ')'ill be excluded. We wish to
reiterate that we have not fixed an outer time limit for conclusion of all
criminal proceedings in a case. Nor did we go counter to the decisions of
the Constitution Benches of this Court inA.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, f 1992]
1 SCC 225 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994] 3. SCC 569. In
paragraphs 12 to 14 of our judgment we have considered the ratio in the
afore-cited decisions and by keeping track with the observations therein we
made the endeavour to achieve to the possible extent the noble ideal of
"speedy trial" which has been held repeatedly by this Court to be an
incidence of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The whole idea was to speed up the trial in criminal cases to prevent
the prosecution from becoming a persecution of the person arrayed in a
criminal trial. No trial can be allowed to prolong indefinitely due to the
lethargy of the prosecuting agency or the State machinery and that is the D
raison d'etre in prescribing the time frame within which prosecution
evidence must be closed.
It may be remembered that even the different periods suggested by
this Court for closing prosecution evidence in different categories of cases . E
are not unexceptional as could be noted from the two exceptions provided
therein. They are :
"(iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution evidence
within the aforesaid petiod is attributable to the conduct of the
accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the F
prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the
cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii).
(v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by
operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall
be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution G
evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without
prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in "Common Cause"
A Registered Society v. Union of India, [1996] 4 SCC 33 as modified
by the same Bench through the order reported in 'Common Cause'
A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996] 6 SCC 775." H
A We are inclined to state by way of clarification that the discretion of
the courts in granting further time (exercisable "for very exceptional
reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice" as for Direction No.
(iii) above) can be imported in respect of Direction No. (i) as well.
According to the CBI a procrastinating accused might take ad
B vantage of the said excluding provision "by filing appeal or revision against
interim orders and it would indirectly delay the trial without obtaining any
stay orders from superior courts."
There is no scope for any such apprehension because the judgment
C has clearly provided that if the inability for completing prosecution
evidence was attributable to the conduct of the accused, the court is not
obliged to close the prosecution evidence at all. If the trial gets postponed
on account of pendency of any appeal or revision filed against any interim
order even though there was no order of stay it is open to the trial court
to reckon that period also within the ambit of clause (iv) extracted above.
We may observe that the power of the court as envisaged in Section
311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been curtailed by this
Court. Neither in the decision of the five Judge Bench in A.R. Antulay's
case nor in Kartar Singh's case such power has been restricted for achieving
E speedy trial. In other words, even if the prosecution evidence is closed in
compliance with the directions contained in the main judgment it is still
open to the prosecution to invoke the powers of the court under Section
311 of the Code. We make it clear that if evidence of any witness appears to
the court to be essential to the just decision of the case it is the duty of the
court to summon and examine or recall an"'d re-examine any such person.
Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General tried to
impress upon us that due to systemic causes the prosecutor would be
disabled from completing evidence in a trial and hence that time must also
be permitted to be discounted. Without concretising which kinds of sys-
G temic causes would disable the prosecution from promptly adducing
evidence, we are not inclined to permit the prosecutor to take advantage
on any such vague premises. However, we have noticed that absence of
presiding officer in a trial court (either on account of the physical disability
or due to the delay in taking over the charge of the court) is a valid cause
which disables the prosecution from adducing evidence. So we are of the
H view that such time can also be excluded by the court from the period
\
RAJ DEO SHARMA v. STATE [THOMAS, J.) 133
which we have prescribed in the judgment for completing prosecution A
evidence.
Another period which Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional
Solicitor General pointed out as causing delay is, when a public prosecutor
demits office due to any eventuality there would arise some interval for his
successor to take charge. He pleaded that the said interregnum should also
be excluded'"' from the aforesaid periods. It is the look out of the Stati: to
see that there is no unnecessary delay in appointing a public prosecutor to
the existing vacancy. The State cannot take advantage of its own inaction.
Nonetheless, to avoid any possible dislocation of the trial on account of any
such eventuality we make it clear that if the· tenure of office of a particular
person as public prosecutor expires he shall continue to hold office and
function as public prosecutor until his successor takes charge from him. If ·
the office of a public prosecutor falls vacant on account of any other
reason, a period of 3 months shall be excluded from the periods fixed under
direction No. (i) and (iii) for enabling the State Government to appoint a
public prosecutor to that office.
Section 309(1) of the Code enjoins on every trial court to continue
examination of witnesses from day-to-day until the witnesses in attendance
have been completed. The sub-section reads thus :
"In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as ex
peditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of
witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day
to day until all the. witnesses in attendance have been examined,
unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the
following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded."
We cannot permit the trial court to flout the said mandate of the
Parliament unless the court has very cogent and strong reasons. No court
has permission to adjourn examination of witnesses who are in attendance
beyond the next working day.
We request every High Court to remind the trial judges through a G
circular of the need to comply with Section 309 of the Code in letter and
spirit. We also request the High Court concerned to take note of the
conduct of any particular trial judge who violates the above legislative
mandate and to adopt such administrative action against the delinquent
judicial officer as the law permits. H
A Shri Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted
that unless directions No. (i) and (iii) are made prospective from the date
of judgment in Rajdeo Sharma prosecution in many pending cases would
be jeopardised. He pointed out that on the date of the said judgment the
period concerned stood expired in many cases. We have bestowed our
B consideration on the said submission and we find force in it. Possibility of
miscarriage of justice resugin_g therefrom must be averted. We are, there
fore, inclined to include a rider that an additional period of one year can
be claimed by the prosecution in respect of prosecutions which were
pending on the date of judgment in the main appeal, and the court
concerned would be free to grant such extension if the court considers it
C necessary in the interest of administration of criminal justice. As we
suspended the operation of the judgment from 14.5.1999 till today the said
time of suspension will stand excluded from the aforementioned additional
period of one year.
Criminal Miscellanceous Petition is disposed of in the above terms.
SRINIVASAN, J.: When I read the draft judgment prepared by my
learned brother Justice K.T. Thomas, I respectfully endorsed my agree
ment with the same as I found it to be in accordance with law and justice.
But now, I have received the draft judgment from my learned brother
E Justice M. B. Shah. After going through the same, I am of the opinion that
it is necessary for me to express my views by a separate order. I make it
clear at the outset that I am entirely in agreement with the view expre5sed
by Justice Thomas and I am unable to persuade myself to agree with Justice
Shah.
F 2. The present pet1t10n is filed only for directions/modifications/ .
clarification of the directions of this Court dated 8.10.98 in Criminal
Appeal No.1045 of 1998 (vide para 1 of the petition). This is not a petition
for review of the judgment in the main appeal. It is also needless to say
that this Bench is not sitting in appeal over the judgment in the main
appeal. The petitioner herein was not a party as such in the appeal. The
G Superintendent of Police, CBI, Patna was impleaded as second respondent
in the petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal Appeal No.1177 of
1996) by Court order dated 9 .9 .96 and on grant of leave, the appeal was
numbered as Criminal Appeal No.1045of1998. In the course of arguments,
learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the petitioner expressly
H stated that he was only seeking a clarification of the judgment in the main
. -
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RAJ DEO SHARMAv. STATE [SRINIVASAN, J.] 135
appeal, as according to him, the subordinate courts are under a wrong A
impression that the directions contained in the said judgment give no
option to them but to close the evidence r f the prosecution whenever the
periods mentioned in the guidelines are completed. Thus, there is no
occasion for this Bench to consider whether the directions contained in the
judgment in the main appeal are against law in the sense that they run
counter to the earlier judgments of this Court rendered by Constitution
Benches. In my humble opinion, it is not open to this Bench to canvass the
legality or correctness of the directions contained in the main judgment.
The only prayer by the petitioner is to clarify the main judgment, in order
that the Subordinate Courts understand the directions contained therein in
the proper perspective and carry out the same in letter and spirit. c
3. It is needless to point out that for more than two decades, this
Court has been 'repeatedly emphasising the right of an accused to speedy
trial and giving appropriate directions to the State and the subordinate
judiciary with a view to reduce the delay in the disposal of criminal matters.
The Constitution Bench in Antulay's case [1992] 1 SCC 225 thought fit to D
lay down certain guidelines. The Court said :
"In view of the above discussion, the following propositions
emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that the
propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situa- E
tions. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules."
While stating that it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any
time limit for trial of offences, the Court took care to say in proposition
No. 9 as follows : ·
"Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that
right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges
or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this
is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other
circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, G
it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order
including an order to conclude the trial within a fv:ed time where the
trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has
concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstan-
ces of the case." (emphasis supplied) H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 4. Thus, the Constitution Bench had in Antulay's case itself _ -;
contemplated an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time in
appropriate cases. In fact, in the _judgment in the main appeal in the
present case, the Court has not fixed any time limit for the conclusion of
trial. As such, the Court has only laid down guidelines for closing the
B prosecution in certain circumstances. There is a difference between fixing
a time limit for the disposal of a trial and fixing time limit for the
prosecution to complete its evidence. A perusal of the guidelines contained
in the main judgment would themselves show that there is no hard and fast
rule applicable to every case, irrespective of facts and circumstances
C thereof. If the delay is not due to any fault of the prosecution, it is open
to the prosecution to place the relevant facts before the court and seek -<
further time for producing its evidence. It is clear from the last part of
clause 3 in paragraph 16 of the judgment. Even though, there is no express
exception similar to that in clause 1 in paragraph 16, the same position will
obtain. The judgment in the appeal cannot be understood as punishing the
D prosecution and preventing the same from adducing evidence even when
it is not responsible for the delay.
5. It is necessary to place on record certain facts brought to the
notice of the Court when the main appeal was heard. In the State of Bihar
E alone, several· cases were pending for more than 25 years. A report sub
mitted by the Special Judge, CBI Court in December 1996 pointed out that
in one case which was pending from 1982, the prosecution had cited as
many as 40 witnesses, but had examined only 3 witnesses up to 1996; the
last of them was examined on 3.9.93. The report also pointed out that
F thereafter, the prosecution had taken 36 adjournments to examine the
remaining wit_nesses, but had not produced even one of them. There were
hundreds of such cases and if this Court is going to look on helplessly by
merely reiterating that right to speedy trial is a fundamental right enshrined
in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but no time limit could be fixed
for conclusion of trials, the problem will remain unsolved for ever. It is
G stated by my learned brother Justice Shah that the accused would get
undeserving benefit by the time limit prescribed in the judgment in the
main appeal a_nd it may result in doing injustice to the society. It is also
observed by him that "all the beneficiaries of the large scale frauds, all the
employees who have misappropriated large sum of money from the public
H exchequer or private employer or accused who are tried for corruption
. -
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RAJ DEO SHARMAv. STATE [SRINIVASAN, J.] 137
cases would get undeserving benefit at the system of implementation of A
law." With respect, I am unable to agree. In fact, Justice Shah has himself
quoted, a passage m the judgment m Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S.
Bangarappa & Ors., (1995] 4 SCC 41. In that passage it is pointed out that
when the case reaches the stage of trial after all the interruptions by the
higher courts, the time would have taken its own toll, the witnesses are won
over, evidence disappears and the prosecution loses interest. It is unneces B
sary to point out that when. the prosecution delays the production of its
witnesses, the failing human memory of such witnesses could be certainly
advantageous to the accused and .even in such cases, there will be a failure
of the system. The problem is one of basic human rights of persons
languishing in prison for years together which in several cases exceed the
maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offences alleged to have
been committed by them even before the trial is concluded. Even if the
accused are not in prisori, they would be suffering from immense mental
agony as if a dagger is hanging over their heads. Can they be compensated
. if they are found to be innocent at the end of the trial?
. 6. As pointed out in A11/:U/ay's case, the court has to balance and
weigh the several relevant factors and determine in each case whether the
right to speedy trial has been denied in the given case. It is only to enable
the Subordinate Courts to apply the right balancing test or balancing
process, the guidelines have been given in the judgment in the main appeal. · E
7. The judgment has also taken care to mention that the directions
given therein are only to supplement the propositions laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Antulay's case and also in addition to and without
prejudice to th~ directions. issued by this. Court in "Common Cause" case F
[1996] 4 sec 33 and [1996) 6 sec 775.
8. I am unable to appreciate how the operation of a judgment
rendered by the court can be held in abeyance indefinitely when there is
no appeal or review against the same. Prayer 'a' in the petition is unsus
tainable and it cannot be countenanced by this Bench .. As regards prayer G
'e', directions were being given by this Court again and again ever since
Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] 1
SCC 81 to the State Governments and it is mandatory duty of all the State
Governments to take appropriate steps to comply with such directions. If
the State Governments a~e interested in the proper administration of H'
A justice, they should fulfill their constitutional obligations, a's repeatedly
pointed out by this Court in its earlier judgments.
9. In the result, the only clarifications which are required to be made
are found in the order of Justice Thomas and I express my concurrence
with the same, Neither prayer 'a' nor prayer 'e' can be granted as stated
B by my brother Justice Shah,
SHAH, J. I am having the advantage of going through the judgment
rendered by my learned Brother K.T Thomas, J. With all respect and
humility, I consider that the directions given in Raj Dea Shanna v. State of
C Bihar, [1998] 7 SCC 507 require to be kept in abeyance and appropriate
directions as prayed for in prayer ( e) of the Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition require to be granted.
The Central Bureau of Investigation has filed this Petition for direc
tions/modification/clarification of the directions issued by the three Judges
D Bench of this Court on 8.10.1998 in Raj Dea Shanna v. State of Bihar, [1998]
7 sec 507. In the said application, following prayers are made requesting
the Court to :
(a) "Order holding in abeyance the operation of the Judg
ment/Order dated 8.10.1998 of this Hon'ble Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1045 of 1998;
(b) Clarify that the Judgment/Order dated 8.10.1998 in Criminal
Appeal No. 1045/98, would only have prospective effect;
(c)
(d)
(e)
Clarify that the time taken by the courts on account of their
inability to carry on day-to-day trial on account of pressure
of work will be excluded;
Clarify that the exceptions made in Para 4 of the 1st Common
Cause Judgment reported in [1996] 4 SCC 33 and Para III of
2nd Common Cause Judgment reported in (1996] 6 sec 775,
would still continue;
Issue directions to the State Governments and Registrars of
the High Court to come up with specific plans for the setting
up of additional Courts/Special Courts (permanent/ad-hoc)
to cope up with the pending work load."
RAJ DEO SHARMA v. STATE [SHAH, J.] 139
In Raj Dea Sharma's case after considering the various decisions, the A
Court inter alia directed in paragraph 17 as under :
"(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the
accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution
evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of
recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether
the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the
said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided
by law for the trial of the case.
(ii) ........
(iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for
a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not,
the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of
three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on D
the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the
witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed
to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless
for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of
justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the E
prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit.
(iv) and (v) .... ".
It is true that ideal situation may be where criminal cases are tried
within six months from the date of. institution, and appeals are disposed of F
within a period of one year from the date of filing. For achieving this ideal
situation, if there is lack of infrastructure and procedural delays for various
reasons, then what is required to be done? In such a situation, would it be
justifiable to acquit the accused after lapse of a particular time if prosecu-
tion has failed to examine all witnesses? And, whether the appeal could be G
dismissed if the appellate authority fails to decide the same within a
particular time? To do so, in my view, would not be just and fair for the
society and the victims affected by the crimes.
The aforestated directions issued in the case virtually prescribes time
limit to close the prosecution evidence in cases where the offence is H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R ..
A punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven. years or
for a period exceeding seven years. In view of these directions the accused
may get acquittal on the ground of delay without considering the fact that
in number of cases delay might be because of large number of cases
pending before the court and insufficient strength of judges to cope up with
B the workload. Delay only due to congestion of court calendar, unavailability
of Judges and on occasions non-availability of counsel for either party or
any other circumstances beyond the control of prosecution cannot be a
ground for closure of prosecution evidence.
It is true that speedy trial in civil or criminal case is a must. It is of
C much more importance in criminal cases as it has its own effect for the law
and order situation in the society. To achieve that objective, there are
various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code including Section 309.
It is also true that this Court has emphasized in a series of decisions that
Articles 14, 19 and 21 sustain and nourish each other and any law depriving
D a person of personal liberty must prescribe a procedure which is just, fair
and reasonable, that is, a procedure which promotes speedy trial. However,
this laudable objective of speedy trial is frustrated for various reasons.
Since number of courts constituted to try various offences under the Indian
Penal Code and other Acts are not sufficient and appointment of Judges
to man these courts are delayed; cases have piled up. Therefore, to protect
E the rights of under trial prisoners a scheme was evolved by this Court in
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Under Trial Pn'soners v.
Union of India, (1994] 6 SCC 731 for releasing them on bail after lapse of
a particular time.
F Because of the direction in the said judgment after a lapse of a
particular time, under trial prisoners are not kept in jail, still the question
remains of their trial. If their trial is delayed for various reasons, would it ·
be just, fair and reasonable to direct the trial courts to stop further
proceedings in the case and dispose of the same without recording further
evidence? In some of the cases, allegations against the accused would be
G of serious nature, such as, corruption which has affected the entire moral
fiber of the society, large scale frauds and misappropriations by persons in
power or authorit) and offences against human body including rape. In all
such cases, accused including dreaded accused would get undeserving
benefit by prescribing the time limit as directed in paragraph 17 in Raj Dea
H Sharma's case. In my humble view, this may result in doing injustice to the
RAJDEOSHARMAv.STATE [SHAH,J.] 141
society, to the victims or the heirs of the victim who is murdered - for such · A
delay in trial they are not responsible. All the beneficiaries of the large
scale frauds, all the employees who have misappropriated large sum of
money from the public exchequer or private employer or accused who are
tried for corruption cases would get undeserving benefit at the system of
implementation of law.
It is to be stated that the contention of fixing time limit. for disposal
of criminal cases was considered in Abdul Rehman Antu.lay v. R.S. Nayak,
[1992] 1 SCC 225 wherein the Constitution Bench of this Court held that
it is sufficient to say that constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating
from Article 21 is properly reflected in the provisions of the Code but the
relative question for consideration is - "how long a delay is too long?" The
Court held that it was not possible to lay down any time schedules for
conclusion of criminal proceedings. After considering the various causes
for delay, the Court held "it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or
prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings."
The Court further observed that :
"Some off~nces by their very nature e.g., conspiracy cases, cases
of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, sedition, ac
quisition of disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of
. corruption against high public servants and high public officials
take longer time for investigation and trial. Then again, the
workload in each court, district, region and State varies. This fact
is too well known to merit illustration at our hands. In many places,
requisite number of courts is not available. In some places, frequent
strikes by members of the bar interfere with the. work schedules. In
short, it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day
circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceed-
. ing will not be allowed to go. Even in the USA, the Supreme Court
has refused to draw such a line .... It is neither advisable nor feasible
to draw or p_ rescribe an outer time limit for conclusion of all
criminal proceedings. It is not. necessary to do so for effectuating G
the right fo speecly trial.We are also not satisfied that without such
an outer limit, the right becomes illusory."
Finally, after considering various contentions, the Court in paragraph
86 inter a/ia held thus : H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
"(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have
regard to all the attendant circumstances, including, nature of
offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the Court
concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on - what is called, the
systematic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to
ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a
realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters
instead of a pedantic one.
(8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several
relevant factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and
determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been
denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the con
clusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed
the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed.
But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and
other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case,
it is open to the court to :nake such other appropriate order -
including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where
the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial
has concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the
circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit
for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one.
Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of
proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In
every case of complaint of denial of right of speedy trial, it is
primarily for the prosecµtion to justify ani:! explain the delay. At
the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the cir
cumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the com
plaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refus_ed to
fix any such outer time limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor
do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the
guarantee of right to speedy trial."
0
RAJ DEO SHARMAv. STATE [SHAH,J.] 143
Even in the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569,
the Constitution Bench has not laid down any precise time limit during
which, if the case is not disposed of, accused is to be discharged by holding
that it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
the Court has to adopt balancing approach by taking note of possible
prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by accused by unavoidable
delay and to determine whether the accused in criminal proceedings has
been deprived of speedy trial with unreasonable delay.
At this stage, it would be worthwhile to refer to the reasons for delay
in disposal of criminal cases as succinctly summarised by Krishna Iyer, J. in
the case of Re Special Courts Bill, 1976 (1979) 1 SCC 380 while dealing
with the contention that the Special Courts Bill, 1976 was violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge observed thus
at page 442:
"It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal D
courts excel in slow-motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets
are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and, still more
exasperating, there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and
supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination
of prosecutions, not to speak of the contribution to delay by the
"Administration itself by neglect of the basic necessaries of the E
judicial process. Parliamentary and pre-legislative exercises Sj?read
over several years hardly did anything for radical simplification and
streamlining of criminal procedure and virtually re-enacted, with
minor mutations, the vintage Code making forensic flow too slow
and liable to hold-ups built into the law. Courts are less to blame F
than the Code made by Parliament for dawdling and Governments
are guilty of denying or delaying basic amenities for the judiciary
to function smoothly. Justice is a Cinderalla in our sche~e. Even
so, leaving V.V.l.P. accused to be dealt with by the routinely
procrastinating legal process is to surrender to interminable delays
as an inevitable evil. Therefore, we should not be finical about G
absolute processual equality and must be creative in innovating
procedures compelled by special situations."
The aforesaid observations were again referred to by Mukherjee, J.
in Ganesh Narain Hegde v. S. Bangarappa & Ors., [1995] 4 SCC 41. In that H
A case a contention was raised that a complaint filed under Section 500 of
the Indian Penal Code should not be allowed to be proceeded with after
a lapse of a period of· 12 years. While rejecting the said contention, the
Court held that the complainant was certainly not responsible for the delay.
The learned Judge thereafter referred to the aforesaid paragraph and
observed :
"The slow motion becomes much slower motion when politically
powerful or rich and influential persons figure as accused. FIRs
are quashed. Charges are quashed. Interlocutory orders are inter
fered with. At every step, there will be revisions and applications
for quashing and writ petitions. In short, no progress is ever
allowed to be made. And if ever the case reaches the stage of trial
after all these interruptiOns, the time would have taken its own toll;
the witnesses are won over; evidence disappears, the prosecution
loses interest - the result is an all too familiar one. We are sad
to say that repeated admonitions to this Court have not deterred
superior courts from interfering at initial or interlocutory stages of
criminal cases. Such interference should be only in exceptional
cases where the interests of justice demand it; it cannot be a matter
of course."
E Without multiplying various observations in other cases, the reasons
for delay could be summarized as under :
(i) The procedure is dilatory;
(ii)
(iii)
No effective steps are taken for radical simplification and
streamlining criminal procedure except re'-enacting with
minor mutations.
Various appeals, revision applications, repeated· anticipatory
bail as well as regular bail applications and petitions under
Articles 226 and 227 are entertained which is also a cause for
delay in disposal of cases finally; FIRs and charges are
quashed; lot of time is wasted in deciding interlocutory ap
plications; slow motion becomes much slower when politically
powerful and rich people figure as accused because of various
contentions raised by filing interlocutory applications for get
ting benefit of technicalities despite various provisions in the
_,·
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
RAJ DEO SHARMA v. STATE [SHAH, J.] 145
Code;
Dockets are heavy; arrears are mounting; even the service of
process is delayed.
Neglect of the basic necessaries of judicial process by the
administration (as observed "Justice is Cinderalla in our
scheme"). Governments are guilty of denying amenities for
the judiciary to function smoothly ..
If ever the case reaches the stages of trial, the time taken for
reaching that stage has its own toll resulting in acquittal of
more than 90% of those who are tried.
For remedying the aforesaid causes. for delaying m disposal of
criminal cases, it is time for
(a) the Judiciary;
(b) the Legislature; and
( c) the State. Governments
.to take effective steps.
Before appropriate steps are taken for remedying the known causes
of delay - without considering the pendency of the matters in all courts
and without finding whether prosecution agency was at fault for delay or
delay was caused for any other reasons, it would not be just or fair,
equitable or reasonable to prescribe time limit and give benefit to the
accused persons, against whom serious charges are levelled, solely on the
ground of delay in trial. If this is continued and permitted, it would affect F
the smooth functioning of· the Society in accordance with law and finally
the Constitution. If the victims are left without any remedy, they would
resort to taking revenge by unlawful II).eans ·resulting in further increase in
the crimes andcriminals. Pebpie at large in the Society would also feel
unsafe and insecure and their confidence in judicial system would be
shaken. Law would loose its deterrent effect on the criminals. G
Figures of pending criminal cas~s are easily available. Disposal
criterion is known. Applying the said disposal criterion, it would be
apparent that workload of various courts is so heavy in number of courts
that with the present strength of judges who are requited to deal with H
A criminal cases, it would be almost impossible for them to dispose of the
cases within the prescribed time. It is true that in such a situation without
any further delay or without having exercise of appointing committee or
committees for finding out how many judges are required, on ad hoc basis,
the strength of judges who can deal with the criminal cases is required to
B be increased. Further, until there is radical simplification and streamlining
of Criminal Procedure Code as well the method of investigation of crimes,
it would not be just and reasonable to close the prosecution evidence solely
on the ground of delay in trial.
C This is what was contemplated by this Court before two decades in
Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bi!zar, [ 1980] 1
SCC 81, wherein a three Judges Bench of this Court considered that there
is notorious delay in disposal of cases; it is sad reflection on the legal and
judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for
long number of years; even the delay of one year _in the trial in the
D commencement of the trial is bad enough; how much worse this could be
when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years; speedy trial is of
the essence of criminal justice. Thereafter the Court posed the question:
whether because of such delay accused should be unconditiona1lly freed
from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after
E an unduly long· period of time and convicting him after such trial would
constitute violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21? That ques
tion was not decided, but the Court observed as under :
"But one thing is certain and we cannot impress it too strongly
on the State Government that it is high time that the State Govern
ment realised its responsibility to the people in the matter of
administration of justice and set up more courts for the trial of
cases. We may point out that it would not be enough merely to
establish more courts but the State Government would also have
to man them by competent judges and whatever is necessary for
the purpose of recruiting competent judges, such as improving
their conditions of service, would have to be done by the State
Government, if they want to improve the system of administration
of justice and make it an effective instrument for reaching justice
to the large masses of people for whom justice is today a mean- .
ingless and empty word."
...
. ,_
-
RAT DEO SHARMA v. STATE (SHAH, J.] 147
That question was further considered by this court in Hussainara A
Khatoon 's (IV) case at page 98. The Court observed that it is the
constitutional obligation of the State to device such procedure as would
ensure speedy trial to the accused and the State cannot be permitted to
deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground
that the State has no adequate financial resources _to incur the necessary B
expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial
apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial. Thereafter the Court
observed :
"It is also the constitutional obligation of this Court, as the guar
dian of the fundamental rights of the people, as a sentinel on the
qui vive, ~o enforce the fundamental right of the accused to speedy
trial by issuing the necessary directions to the State· which may
include taking of positive action, such as augmenting and
strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts,
building new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to D
the courts, appointment of additional judges and other measures
calculated to ensure speedy trial."
Further, the aforesaid question was considered by a three Judge
Bench in State of Maharashtra v. Champa Lal Punjaji Shah, reported in E
AIR (1981) SC 1675 wherein the Court has held that fair trial implies
speedy trial; while a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of fair trial; the
converse is nut necessarily true; a delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair
trial, if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the
court to raise a pres:.imption that the accused has been prejudiced in F the conduct of his defence. The Court also negatived the contention that
because of long lapse of time, Court should not interfere with the
acquittal order or at any rate accused should not be sent back to the prison
by observing thus : ·
. "The offence is one which jeopardises the economy of the country G
and it is impossible to take a casual or a light view of the offence.
It is true that where the offence is of a trivial nature such as a
simple assault o·r the theft of a trifling amount. We may hesitate
to send an accused person back to jail as it would not be in the
.public interest or in the interest of anyone to do so." H
A F~om the discussion of the aforesaid decisions, it can be stated that
delayed trial may not always be unfair to the accused. On occasions,
accused take advantage of such delays and it would depend upon the facts
and circumstances in each case. The larger bench of this Court has
specifically held in Antulay's case "it is neither advisable nor feasible to
B draw or to prescribe any outer limit for conclusion of all criminal
proceedings." In cases where delay for trial rests not on the pros1~cuiion
agency then it would not be fair to close the prosecution evidence after
prescribed period. In any case, before directing to close the pros1~cution
evidence, the nature of offence is required to be taken into consideration.
c Further, if the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code,
particularly, Section 309 as discussed by my learned Brother are strictly
adhered to, deiay in trial could be reduced to some extent. That may be
done by the concerned Judge with active cooperation of the prosecuting
agency. At present, the said provision is observed in breach. Once the
D criminal trial begins, trial court should see that witnesses are examined
continuously in the said case and it should continue from day-to-day until
the witnesses in attendance are examined. In any case, for adjourning the ·
matter, reasons should be recorded. If practice of allotting certain sessions
cases to a particular Judge for trial and disposal is adopted, it would fasten
E responsibility with the said Judge to dispose it of within the stipulate.d time.
It is also true that under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the
Court has ample power to examine witnesses who appear to the Court to
be essential for. the just decision of the case, but this may further delay
proceedings as accused is bound to oppose such exercise of power.
In this view of the matter, in my view, prescribing time limit would
be against the deCisions rendered by the Constitution Bench of.this Court
in A.R .. Antulay and KartarSingh cases (supra) as well as other decisions
stated above. It would be prescribing time limit which is not provided by
Criminal Procedure Code or by any other statutory provision. And finally,
it would have an adverse effect in implementation of criminal law.
In the result, in· my view, prayer (a) of holding in abeyance the
operation/order dated 8th October, .1998 in Criminal Appeal No. 1045 of
1998 requires to be granted. Secondly, prayer ( e) also requires to be
H granted. The Registrars of the High Courts should come up with specific
,_
RAJ DEO SHARMA v. STATE (SHAH, J.] 149
plans for setting up of additional courts/special courts (permanent/ad hoc)
to cope up with the pending workload on the basis of available figures of
pending cases as well as by taking into consideration criteria for d.isposal
of criminal cases prescribed by various High Courts.
It is ordered accordingly.
Judgment is pronounced in terms of the majority opinion. Copy of
this judgment shall be forwarded to Registrar of every High Court with the
direction that every Sessions Judge shall be informed of it for implemen
tation of the directions therein forthwith.
S.V.K. Petition disposed of.